Hi!!!!; 
lllllli 


THE  LIBRARY  OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF 

NORTH  CAROLINA 


THE  COLLECTION  OE 

NORTH  CAROLINIANA 

ENDOWED  BY 

JOHN  SPRUNT  HILL 

CLASS  OF  1889 


CB 

Dl86d 


0 


o 


e^,<^*»x**^' 


fU^H^ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILI 


00032193484 

This  book  must  not 
be  taken  from  the 
Library  building. 


OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 


W^WCi^XfiJl^ 


From  painting  in  Navy  Department  by  B.  S.  Meryman 


OUR  NAVY 
AT  WAR 


BY 


JOSEPHUS  DANIELS 

SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY 
1913  to  1921 


Illustrated  with  Reproductions  of  Original 
and  Official  Photographs 


Pictorial   Bureau 

Washington,  D.  C. 


1922 


COPYRIGHT   BY 

Pictorial   Bureau 

1922 


To  the  Six  Hundred  Thousand  Men 

Who  Served  in  the  United  States  Navy 

and  Marine  Corps  in  the 

World  War 

Manning  more  than  two  thousand  vessels — 

Operating  with  Allied  Navies  from  the 

Arctic  to  the  Adriatic — 

Transporting  troops  and  supplies  across  the  Atlantic — 

Protecting  ships  from  attack  and  destruction — 

Driving  off  and  defeating  the  murderous  submarines, 

You  made  safe  the  seas,  and 

Kept  open  the  Road  to  France,  so  that, 

Of  all  the  vast  Army  sent  overseas, 

Not  one  soldier  on  an  American  troop-ship 

Lost  his  life  on  the  way  to  France. 

Fighting  with  the  Army,  your  comrades, 

The  Soldiers  of  the  Sea,  won  fame  in 

Hard-fought  battles  that  saved  Paris, 

Drove  back  the  German  hordes,  and 

Won  for  Humanity  Complete  and  Glorious  Victory. 


In  recognition  of  your  splendid  service,  your  dauntless  deeds,  this 
work  is  dedicated  by  one  who  was  sometime  your  commander  and 
always  your  shipmate. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    When  the  War  Call  Came 1 

II.    "To  Be  Strong  Upon  the  Seas" 9 

III.  The  Break  with  Germany 19 

IV.  The  Day  of  Decision 30 

V.     Sending  Sims  to  Europe 36 

VI.     Naval  Allies  in  Historic  Conference 45 

VII.     "We  Are  Ready  Now,  Sir" 53 

VIII.     Race  Between  Wilson  and  Hindenburg 70 

IX.     The  Fleet  the  Kaiser  Built  for  Us 89 

X.     Guarding  the  Coast  of  France 99 

XI.     Gibraltar  and  the  Convoy 116 

XII.     Shutting  up  the  Hornets  in  Their  Nests 125 

XIII.     President  Wilson  as  a  Strategist 143 

XIV.     Comrades  of  the  Mist 151 

XV.     Cinderellas  of  the  Fleet 161 

XVI.    "Do  Not  Surrender"— "Never" 173 

XVII.    When  the  U-Boats  Came  to  America 187 

XVIII.    Marines  Stopped  Drive  on  Paris 206 

XIX.     The  Answer  to  the  75-Mile  Gun 218 

XX.     The  Navy  That  Flies 228 

XXI.     The  Ferry  to  France 241 

XXII.    Radio  Girdled  the  Globe 250 

XXIII.  A  Surprise  for  Count  von  Luxburg 259 

XXIV.  American  Admiral  Saved  Kolchak 268 

XXV.     The  Half -Way  House 275 

XXVI.     To  Victory  on  a  Sea  of  Oil 280 

XXVII.     Edison— and  100,000  More 285 

XXVIII.     Building  a  Thousand  Ships 297 

XXIX.     Making  Sailors  out  of  Landsmen 309 

XXX.     Three  Hundred  Thousand  Strong 318 

XXXI.    Women  in  the  Navy 328 

XXXII.     Coast  Guard  Wins  Distinction 332 

XXXIII.    Winning  the  First  Battle  of  the  War 341 

XXXIV.     Fighting  the  Profiteers  347 

XXXV.     "Sirs,  All  Is  Well  with  the  Fleet" 354 

XXXVI,     After  the  Armistice  366 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


Josephus  Daniels Frontispiece 

FACING   PAGE 

War  Chiefs  of  the  Navy,  the  Secretary  and  his  Advisory  Council. .     16 

A  Friendly  Bout 17 

School  Hour  Aboard  a  Battleship    17 

President  Wilson  and  the  War  Cabinet 32 

American  Dreadnoughts,  the  Embodiment  of  Sea  Power 33 

American  Destroyers  in  Queenstown  Harbor 52 

The  Return  of  the  Mayflower 53 

The  Surrender  of  the  U-58 58 

Crew  of  the  Fanning,  which  sank  the  U-58 59 

They,  Too,  Were  Ready 67 

The  Seattle  and  Rear  Admiral  Albert  Cleaves 68 

A  Dash  through  the  Danger  Zone 68 

The  Sinking  of  the  President  Lincoln 80 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  with  Captain  Dismukes  and  the  men  who 

saved  the  Mount  Vernon 81 

The  Mount  Vernon  safely  in  port  after  being  torpedoed 81 

Brest,  Center  of  the  Great  System  of  Naval  Operations  in  France.  . .  112 

A  German  "Sub"  and  Some  of  its  Enemies 113 

At  Gibraltar,  Key  to  the  Mediterranean 124 

The  Great  Mine  Barrage  against  the  Submarines 125 

Planting  Mines  in  the  North  Sea 128 

How  the  Big  Mines  in  the  North  Sea  Barrage  Worked 129 

One  of  the  Perils  of  Mine-Sweeping 136 

The  Mine-Sweepers  Proved  Wonderful  Sea  Boats 136 

United  States  Naval  Officers  in  Important  Commands 137 

American  and  British  Naval  Officials 137 

The  Transport  which  carried  President  Wilson  to  the  Peace  Con- 
ference     144 

Allied  Naval  Council  in  Session  at  Paris 145 

Fifth  Battle  Squadron  Joining  the  British  Grand  Fleet 160 

Surrender  of  the  German  High  Seas  Fleet 161 

American  Sub-chasers  at  Corfu,  Greece 168 

A  Flock  of  Sub-chasers  with  their  Mother-ship 169 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING  PAGE 

Gun-crew  of  the  Luckenbacli  has  a  Four-Hour  Fight  with  a  Submarine  192 
Chief  Gunner's  Mate  Delaney,  of  the  Campana,  Defying  his  Captors  192 

The  Merchant  Submarine  Deutschland 193 

Leaders  of  the  Marines 208 

The  Marines  in  Belleau  Wood 209 

Naval  Railway  Battery  Firing  from  Thierville  upon  Longuyon ....  224 

On  the  Turret  Platform  of  a  Battleship 225 

Assembling  Naval  Airplanes  at  Brest 228 

A  Navy  Blimp  Leaving  Hangar  at  Guipavas,  Fiance 229 

Naval  Aviation  Hangars  at  Guipavas 229 

Pauillac,  Naval  Aviation  Station 240 

Fliers  whose  Exploits  Brought  Prestige  to  Naval  Aviation 241 

The  Station  Whose  Messages  are  Heard  around  the  World 256 

The  Tablet  on  the  Main  Building  of  the  Lafayette  Radio  Station . .   257 

Eagle  Boats  at  Anchor  in  the  Ice  of  the  White  Sea 274 

The  Half -Way  House 275 

The  Naval  Consulting  Board  and  the  Navy  Department  Chiefs 288 

Secretary  Daniels  and  Thomas  A.  Edison 289 

Fitting  Out  for  Distant  Service 304 

Hanging  up  a  Record 305 

The  Living  Flag 320 

United  States  Naval  Academy  at  Annapolis 321 

Yeomen  (F)  in  Liberty  Loan  Parade,  New  York  City 328 

Cyclops,  the  Collier  which  Disappeared  without  Leaving  a  Trace .  .   329 

Lost  with  Every  Man  on  Board  (Coast  Guard  Cutter  Tampa) 336 

They  Saved  Survivors  of  Torpedoed  Vessels 337 

Gallant  Officers  of  the  Coast  Guard 337 

A  General  View  of  Bantry  Bay 352 

A  Close-up  View  of  American  "Subs"  at  Berehaven 352 

Rodman  and  Beatty 353 

From  Manila  to  the  Adriatic 368 

Scorpion,  only  American  Naval  Vessel  Interned  during  the  War. . .   369 


Our  Navy  at  War 

CHAPTER  I 
WHEN  THE  WAR  CALL  CAME 

NEWS  FLASHED  TO  SHIPS  AND  STATIONS  FIVE   MINUTES  AFTER  PRESI- 
DENT  SIGNED   DECLARATION ENTIRE    NAVY   MOBILIZED   AT   ONCE 

FLEET,  ON  WAR  BASIS  SINCE  BREAK  WITH  GERMANY,  WAS  AT  YORK- 


TOWN "IN    BEST    STATE    OF   PREPAREDNESS   IT    HAD   EVER   BEEN, 

ADMIRAL  MAYO  SAID OFFICERS  AND  MEN  EAGER  FOR  ACTION. 


F 


IVE  minutes  after  President  Wilson  signed  the  war 
resolution  passed  by  Congress  April  6,  1917,  the  Navy's 
radio  operators  were  flashing  this  message  to  every  ship 
and  station: 


Sixteen  Alnav.  The  President  has  signed  act  of  Congress  which 
declares  a  state  of  war  exists  between  the  United  States  and  Germany. 
Acknowledge.     131106.  Secnav. 

That  dispatch  had  been  prepared  hours  before.  Radio  and 
telegraph  operators  were  at  their  keys  waiting  for  the  word 
to  '  *  let  it  go. ' '  Lieutenant  Commander  Byron  McCandless,  my 
naval  aide,  was  waiting  in  the  executive  office  at  the  White 
House.  Lieutenant  Commander  Royal  Ingersoll  was  stationed 
at  the  Navy  Department,  across  the  street,  watching  for  the 
signal.  The  moment  the  President  appended  his  signature, 
McCandless  rushed  out  and  wigwagged  that  the  resolution  had 
been  signed.  Ingersoll  dashed  down  the  corridor  to  the  Com- 
munication office,  and  ordered  the  operators  to  start  the 
"alnav"  (all  navy)  dispatch. 

Flashed  from  the  towers  at  Arlington,  in  a  few  minutes  it 
was  received  by  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  fleets,  by  vessels  and 
stations  all  along  the  coast.    By  radio,  telegraph  and  cable,  the 

1 


2  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

message  was  carried  to  Panama,  across  the  Pacific  to  Honolulu, 
the  Philippines,  to  the  vessels  on  the  Asiatic  station.  By  the 
time  the  newspaper  " extras"  were  on  the  street,  the  naval 
forces  had  received  notice  that  we  were  at  war. 

The  fleet  was  mobilized  that  afternoon  by  the  following  tele- 
gram to  the  five  flagships : 

TJ.  8.  8.  Pennsylvania 
TJ.  8.  S.  Minnesota 
V.  8.  8.  Seattle 
TJ.  8.  8.  Columbia 
TJ.  8.  8.  Vestal 

Flag  Sigcode.  Mobilize  for  war  in  accordance  Department's  con- 
fidential mobilization  plan  of  March  21.  Particular  attention  invited 
paragraphs  six  and  eight.     Acknowledge. 

Josephus  Daniels. 

[Paragraph  6  assigned  the  rendezvous  of  the  various  forces,  and 
paragraph  8  contained  instructions  with  regard  to  vessels  fitting  out  at 
navy  yards.] 

When  this  message  was  received  by  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  at 
1:33  p.  m.,  Admiral  Henry  T.  Mayo,  Commander-in-Chief, 
hoisted  on  his  flagship,  the  Pennsylvania,  the  signal,  "War  has 
commenced."  At  5:50  o'clock  he  received  the  mobilization 
order,  for  which  officers  and  vessels  were  so  well  prepared  that 
Admiral  Mayo  said  he  did  not  have  to  "give  a  single  order  of 
any  kind  or  description  to  pass  the  Fleet  from  a  peace  to  a 
war  basis."  The  entire  Navy — Department,  Fleet,  yards  and 
stations — was  on  a  war  footing  within  a  few  hours  after  war 
was  declared.  Complete  instructions  and  plans,  brought  up  to 
date,  had  been  issued  two  weeks  previous,  and  mobilization  was 
completed  without  an  hour 's  delay. 

The  Fleet  was  at  its  secret  rendezvous  "Base  2,"  to  which  it 
had  sailed  from  Hampton  Roads  on  April  3,  the  day  after 
President  Wilson  delivered  his  war  message  to  Congress. 
"Base  2"  was  Yorktown,  Va.,  one  of  the  most  historic  spots  in 
America,  and  our  battleships  were  in  sight  of  the  place  where 
Cornwallis  surrendered  to  George  Washington.  They  rode  at 
anchor  in  the  waters  where  the  timely  arrival  of  De  Grasse's 
ships  assured  the  success  of  the  war  for  American  independence. 


WHEN  THE  WAR  CALL  CAME  3 

In  those  waters,  first  made  historic  in  naval  annals  by  the 
presence  of  the  French  ships  sent  to  aid  the  struggling  colonists 
in  the  crucial  days  of  1781,  the  American  Navy  was  making 
ready  to  repay  that  invaluable  assistance — to  send  its  vessels 
to  the  beleaguered  French  coast,  both  to  safeguard  the  vast 
army  America  would  send  to  France  and  to  drive  back  the 
onrushing  enemies  that  threatened  its  life.  In  1917  the  York 
and  the  Chesapeake  were  again  the  rendezvous  of  fighting  men 
of  the  same  mettle  as  those  of  1781,  who  were  to  strengthen  by 
united  service  and  common  sacrifice  in  the  World  War  the  bonds 
of  friendship  between  France  and  America  that  had  been  forged 
more  than  a  century  before. 

And  those  who  fought  each  other  then  were  comrades  new. 
"Old  wars  forgot,"  Great  Britain  and  France  for  years  had 
held  the  lines,  and  America  was  taking  its  place  beside  them, 
throwing  all  its  power  and  strength  with  them  against  the 
common  foe.  From  Yorktown  went  the  first  United  States 
forces,  ordered  overseas  just  after  war  began.  Sent  to  Eng- 
land's aid,  to  serve  with  the  British  forces,  their  arrival  was 
hailed  as  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  relations  of  the 
nations — the  ' '  Return  of  the  Mayflower. ' '  And  later  went  huge 
dreadnaughts  to  the  North  Sea,  joining  the  Grand  Fleet  in  the 
mightiest  aggregation  of  naval  power  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

That  is  a  wonderful  harbor,  there  in  the  York  River,  with 
water  deep  enough  for  the  largest  battleship,  and  broad  enough 
to  accommodate  a  whole  fleet.  With  defenses  at  the  entrance 
to  Chesapeake  Bay,  and  nets,  mines  and  patrol  across  York 
River,  no  submarine  could  ever  hope  to  penetrate  to  this  safe 
haven. 

"When  the  active  fleet  arrived  in  Hampton  Roads  about  the 
1st  of  April,  after  its  training  period  in  Cuban  waters,  it  was 
in  the  best  state  of  preparedness  that  it  had  ever  been,"  said 
Admiral  Mayo,  "and  there  was  a  feeling  of  confidence  in  the 
personnel  of  being  able  to  cope  with  any  emergency." 

"At  the  end  of  March,  1917,  when  we  were  on  the  verge  of 
entry  into  the  war,"  said  Rear  Admiral  Charles  P.  Plunkett, 
Director  of  Gunnery  Exercises, ' '  the  gunnery  was  in  the  highest 
state  of  efficiency  that  it  has  been  in  the  history  of  the  American 
Navy." 


4  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

When  the  break  with  Germany  came  the  fleet  was  in  Cuban 
waters,  engaged  in  target  practice,  engineering  exercises,  and 
battle  maneuvers.  This  intensive  training  had  been  going  on 
under  regular  schedule  for  more  than  two  years.  Every  man 
in  the  fleet,  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  the  youngest 
recruit,  felt  in  his  bones  that  the  maneuvers  that  spring  were 
a  real  preparation  for  war.  Eager  to  get  a  chance  at  the  Ger- 
mans, confident  that  they  could  defeat  any  force  of  similar 
strength  and  tonnage  afloat;  they  were  just  waiting  for  the 
word  ''Go!" 

Is  there  such  a  thing  as  mental  telepathy?  Would  you  call 
it  that  or  a  mere  coincidence,  if  the  same  thought  at  almost  the 
same  moment  came  to  the  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  at  Guantanamo 
and  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  in  Washington?  That  is 
exactly  what  occurred  on  February  4,  1917.  And  the  two  dis- 
patches stating  the  same  conclusions  in  regard  to  moving  the 
fleet  were  en  route  at  the  same  time. 

At  3 :59  o  'clock  that  afternoon  Admiral  Mayo  sent  this  mes- 
sage from  his  flagship  at  Guantanamo: 

Unless  instructions  are  received  to  the  contrary,  propose  to  shift  fleet 
base  to  Gulf  of  Guacanayabo  after  spotting  practice  February  5th ;  then 
proceed  with  schedule  of  all  gunnery  exercises. 

Before  that  message  reached  Washington,  in  fact  in  less 
than  ten  minutes  after  it  was  handed  to  the  operator  in  Cuba, 
the  following  to  Admiral  Mayo  from  Admiral  William  S.  Ben- 
son, Chief  of  Operations,  was  being  sent  from  the  Department : 

Position  of  fleet  well  known  to  everybody.  If  considered  advisable 
on  account  of  submarines,  shift  base  to  Gulf  of  Guacanayabo  or  else- 
where at  discretion.    Inform  Department  confidentially. 

The  first  duty  was  protection  of  the  Fleet  from  submarine 
attack.  Four  months  before  the  U-53  had  called  at  Newport, 
and  sallying  forth,  had  sunk  British  vessels  just  off  our  coast. 
On  January  16th  a  Japanese  steamer,  the  Hudson  Maru,  cap- 
tured by  Germans,  a  prize  crew  placed  on  board,  had  put  into 
Pernambuco  with  287  survivors  from  half  a  dozen  vessels 
sunk  by  a  German  raider.  That  raider,  as  was  learned  later, 
was  the  famous  Moewe,  which  captured  twenty-six  vessels,  sink- 


WHEN  THE  WAR  CALL  CAME  5 

ing*  all  except  the  Hudson  Maru  and  the  Yarrowdale,  which 
carried  several  hundred  prisoners  to  Germany,  among  them 
fifty-nine  American  sailors. 

The  Germans  could  easily  send  their  U-boats  across  the 
Atlantic.  There  was  a  possibility  that  they  might  strike  quickly 
without  warning.  Naval  strategists  do  not  yet  understand  why 
Germany  did  not  make  an  immediate  dash  against  our  coasts 
in  the  spring  of  1917,  instead  of  waiting  until  1918.  Allied  and 
American  officers  alike  expected  the  submarines  to  extend  their 
operations  to  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  when  this  country  entered 
the  war.  It  was  necessary  to  provide  for  the  fleet  a  rendezvous 
with  which  the  Germans  were  not  familiar,  one  easily  defended, 
where  battleships  could  carry  on  their  work  free  from  attack 
until  the  time  came  to  bring  them  into  action.  But  why 
Guacanayabo? 

Though  you  would  hardly  notice  it  on  the  average  map,  the 
Gulf  of  Guacanayabo  is  a  sizeable  body  of  water,  extending  in 
a  sort  of  semicircle  some  seventy  miles,  the  broadest  part  about 
fifteen  miles  wide.  On  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba,  it  extends 
from  Santa  Cruz  del  Sur  to  below  Manzanillo,  nearly  to  Cape 
Cruz.  With  plenty  of  deep  water  inside,  once  the  main  channel 
is  closed,  only  a  navigator  familiar  with  the  turnings  and  depths 
can  navigate  safely  through  the  other  channels,  for  the  Gulf 
is  surrounded  by  a  chain  of  islands,  with  many  shoals.  Difficult 
for  submarines  to  negotiate  submerged,  it  is  easily  defended 
against  them. 

When  Admiral  Mayo  had  placed  his  ships  in  this  landlocked 
harbor,  shut  the  door  and  turned  the  key,  they  were  as  safe  as 
my  lady's  jewels  in  a  safety  deposit  vault.  At  Guacanayabo 
the  fleet  continued  its  work,  going  out  to  sea  for  battle  practice 
and  long-range  gunnery  in  the  daytime,  returning  at  night  to 
conduct  night  firing  with  the  secondary  batteries,  torpedo  at- 
tack, and  other  exercises.  There  was  even  room  in  the  Gulf 
to  carry  on  torpedo  firing  and  defense  at  10,000  yards  distance. 

There  the  fleet  remained  until  it  was  ordered  north,  on 
March  20th.  "I  feel  sure  that  if  this  force  had  engaged  an 
enemy  on  its  cruise  north  in  the  spring  of  1917,  the  victory 
would  have  been  ours,"  said  Admiral  Henry  B.  Wilson,  com- 
mander of  the  flagship,  and  Admiral  Joseph  Strauss,  in  com- 


6  OUE  NAVY  AT  WAR 

mand  of  the  Nevada,  declared:  "In  April,  1917,  we  could  have 
gone  out  in  mid-ocean  and  engaged  the  German  fleet  and  come 
out  successfully.  Our  ships  were  superior;  our  guns  were  su- 
perior; I  believe  our  morale  was  superior." 

Upon  the  arrival  of  the  fleet,  Yorktown  became  the  center 
of  battle  training.  During  the  entire  war  this  base  was  one  of 
the  busiest  places  in  America.  Every  ship  was  carrying  on  in- 
tensive training  day  and  night — training  gunners,  engineers, 
firemen,  deck  officers  and  crews,  armed  guards  for  merchant 
vessels,  men  of  every  rank  and  rating  to  man  transports,  de- 
stroyers, patrol  craft,  and  all  the  many  vessels  put  into 
European  and  trans-Atlantic  service.  In  addition  to  new  men 
in  their  own  crews,  the  special  training  squadron  of  older  bat- 
tleships trained  more  than  45,000  officers  and  men  for  service 
in  other  vessels. 

When  the  bugle  sounded,  they  all  wanted  to  get  into  action. 
They  had  looked  for  the  declaration  of  war  as  the  signal  to 
weigh  anchor  and  set  sail  for  Europe.  As  the  destroyers  and 
patrol  craft  went  overseas  and  the  cruisers  plunged  across  the 
Atlantic  escorting  troop-ships  and  convoys,  those  who  were  left 
behind  envied  those  who  had  received  such  assignments.  But 
teaching  recruits,  tame  and  tiresome  as  it  was,  was  their  job, 
most  necessary  and  useful.  Until  they  had  their  heart 's  desire 
and  were  ordered  abroad,  they  stuck  to  it  with  the  vim  and 
determination  with  which  they  afterwards  entered  upon  the 
U-boat  chase.    That  was  the  spirit  that  won. 

Three  thousand  miles  across  the  seas  the  men  on  the  British 
Grand  Fleet  were  likewise  eating  their  hearts  out  because  the 
enemy  dreadnaughts,  after  the  one  dash  at  Jutland,  were  hug- 
ging the  home  ports,  denying  to  Allied  naval  forces  the  chance 
for  which  all  other  days  had  been  but  preparation.  All  naval 
teaching  for  generations  had  instilled  into  American  and  British 
youth  the  doctrine  that,  whereas  battles  on  land  might  continue 
for  months,  domination  of  the  sea  would  be  lost  or  won  in  a  few 
moments  when  the  giant  dreadnaughts  engaged  in  a  titanic  duel. 
German  naval  strategy,  after  the  drawn  battle  at  Jutland,  de- 
feated all  naval  experience  and  expectation.  Hiding  behind 
their  strong  defenses,  never  venturing  forth  in  force,  they 
imposed  the  strain  and  the  unexciting  watchful  waiting  which 


WHEN  THE  WAR  CALL  CAME  7 

more  than  anything  else  irks  men  who  long  to  put  their  mettle 
to  the  test  by  a  decisive  encounter. 

The  acme  of  happiness  to  the  fleets  at  Yorktown  and  at 
Scapa  Flow  to  which  all  looked,  both  before  and  after  the 
American  division  joined  the  British  Grand  Fleet,  was  a  battle 
royal  where  skill  and  courage  and  modern  floating  forts  would 
meet  the  supreme  test.  It  was  not  to  be.  The  disappointment 
of  both  navies  was  scarcely  lessened  by  the  knowledge  that  they 
had  gained  a  complete  victory  through  successful  methods  which 
a  different  character  of  warfare  brought  into  existence.  They 
wished  the  glorious  privilege  of  sinking  the  ships  in  an  engage- 
ment rather  than  permitting  the  Germans  later  to  scuttle  them. 
Admiral  Beatty  voiced  the  regret  of  both  navies  in  his  farewell 
address  to  his  American  shipmates,  when  he  said:  "I  know 
quite  well  that  you,  as  well  as  all  of  our  British  comrades,  were 
bitterly  disappointed  at  not  being  able  to  give  effect  to  that 
efficiency  you  have  so  well  maintain ed." 

The  sense  of  disappointment  at  the  drab  ending  was  height- 
ened by  the  belief  entertained  that  there  had  been  times  when 
the  bold  and  daring  offensive  would  have  compelled  a  great  naval 
battle.  In  Germany,  fed  up  for  years  on  the  claim  of  naval 
superiority  and  stuffed  with  fake  stories  of  a  great  German 
victory  at  Jutland,  there  had  been  demand  that  their  navy  make 
proof  of  its  worth  by  giving  battle  instead  of  rusting  in  home 
ports.  Men  of  the  navies  that  had  produced  Nelsons,  and  Far- 
raguts  and  John  Paul  Joneses  and  Deweys  grow  restive  under 
inaction.  They  knew  that  the  existence  and  readiness  of  the 
two  great  fleets  and  of  the  French  and  Italian  fleets  held  the 
German  High  Seas  Fleet  in  behind  shore  protection,  rendering 
impotent  the  force  Von  Tirpitz  had  assured  Germany  would  sink 
enemy  ships.  But  the  dreary  program  of  blockade  carried  on 
during  four  long  years  was  not  to  their  liking.  It  succeeded,  but 
it  was  not  the  finish  for  which  they  had  trained.  They  longed 
to  the  very  end  for  the  real  fight,  the  daring  drive,  the  bringing 
of  their  big  guns  into  play,  the  final  combat  which  could  end 
only  with  annihilation  of  the  enemy's  fleet. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  wisdom  of  the  ancient  prudent 
doctrine  of  "a  fleet  in  being,"  I  shall  always  believe  that,  if, 
at  the  opportune  time,  such  fighting  sailors   as   Beatty  and 


8  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Carpenter,  Mayo  and  Rodman  and  Wilson,  could  have  joined  in 
a  combined  assault,  they  would  have  found  a  way  or  made  one, 
to  sink  the  German  fleet,  in  spite  of  Heligoland  and  all  the 
frowning  German  guns. 


CHAPTER  II 
"TO  BE  STRONG  UPON  THE  SEAS" 

PRESIDENT  IN  1914  LAID  DOWN  POLICY  WHICH  GUIDED  THE  NAVY  IN 
YEARS  OF  PREPARATION ON  VERGE  OF  WAR  IN  1916 FLEET  PRE- 
PARED TO  MOBILIZE "DEUTSCHLAND"   AND  U- 53  WARNED   US  TO 

EXPECT    SUBMARINES CONGRESS    AUTHORIZED    BUILDING    OF     157 

WARSHIPS MERCHANT  SHIPS  LISTED,   MUNITIONS  ACCUMULATED. 

country's  INDUSTRIES  SURVEYED. 

44 'I     II     7"E  shall  take  leave  to  be  strong  upon  the  seas," 

\  /  \  /     declared  President  Wilson  in  his  annual  message 

V     V       t°  Congress  in  December,  1914,  and  this  was  the 

guiding  policy  in  the  years  of  preparation  that 

preceded  the  war.    And  the  two  years  that  followed  were  the 

busiest  the  Navy  has  ever  known  in  time  of  peace. 

The  United  States  was  on  the  very  verge  of  war  a  year  be- 
fore it  was  declared.  All  preparations  were  made  to  mobilize 
the  Fleet  when  President  Wilson,  after  the  sinking  of  the 
Sussex,  sent  his  ultimatum  to  Germany  declaring: 

Unless  the  Imperial  Government  should  now  immediately  declare 
and  effect  an  abandonment  of  its  present  methods  of  submarine  warfare 
against  passenger  and  freight-carrying  vessels,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  can  have  no  choice  but  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  German  Empire  altogether. 

That  note  was  despatched  on  April  18,  1916.  Germany  did 
not  reply  promptly  and  in  a  few  days  the  following  order  was 
issued : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT 

Washington,  April  27,  1916. 
Confidential. 

From:    Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
Subject:   Mobilization  Plan. 

The  following  order  had  this  day  been  approved  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy: 

"1.  In  case  of  mobilization  for  war  in  the  Atlantic  the  organization 
of  the  naval  forces  will  be  as  indicated  in  the  mobilization  sheets  pub- 
lished from  time  to  time  by  the  Department. 

9 


10  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

"2.  Plans  will  be  developed  by  all  officers  concerned  for  execution 
upon  the  receipt  of  the  order  to  mobilize. 

"3.  The  order  to  mobilize  when  received  will  be  construed  as  an 
order  to  take  all  necessary  action  for  the  rapid  assembly  of  ships  at  the 
rendezvous  in  all  respects  ready  for  war  service. 

"4.  The  rendezvous  is  designated  as  Chesapeake  Bay." 

Copies  of  mobilization  sheets  are  forwarded  herewith. 

All  our  battleships  except  three,  and  40  of  our  47  destroyers 
were  reported  immediately  available.  Mobilization  is  the  next 
step  to  actual  hostilities  and  is  only  justifiable  when  conditions 
are  extremely  threatening.  That  was  the  case  in  the  spring  of 
1916.  In  fact,  what  threatened  then  was  what  actually  occurred 
a  year  later. 

The  German  Government  in  its  note  of  May  4th  met  all 
Wilson's  demands,  declaring  it  would  do  its  utmost  to  confine 
the  operations  for  the  rest  of  the  war  to  the  fighting  forces  of 
the  belligerent.  "Guided  by  this  idea,"  it  notified  the  United 
States  Government  that  the  German  naval  forces  had  received 
the  following  orders : 

In  accordance  with  the  general  principles  of  visit  and  search  and 
destruction  of  merchant  vessels  recognized  by  international  law,  such 
vessels,  both  within  and  without  the  area  declared  as  naval  war  zone, 
shall  not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  without  saving  human  lives, 
unless  such  ships  attempt  to  escape  or  offer  resistance. 

It  was  not  until  Feb.  1,  1917,  that  Germany  repudiated  this 
pledge  and  resumed  ruthless  U-boat  warfare.  But  it  did  give 
us  warning  that  it  could  send  its  undersea  craft  to  American 
waters  whenever  it  chose. 

If  there  ever  had  been  any  fancied  security  from  their  sub- 
marines, it  was  removed  that  Sunday,  July  9,  1916,  when  the 
Deutschland  bobbed  up  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  and  a  few  hours 
later  reached  her  dock  in  Baltimore.  Coming  from  Bremen  via 
Heligoland,  it  had  made  its  way  through  the  North  Sea  and 
around  Scotland,  crossed  the  ocean  and  entered  Hampton  Roads 
under  the  very  noses  of  the  British  cruisers  just  outside.  Two 
hundred  and  thirteen  feet  long,  with  a  displacement,  submerged, 
of  2,200  tons,  it  had  a  surface  speed  of  12  to  14  knots  an  hour, 
and  could  run  under  water  at  7y2  knots.    Though  unarmed,  and 


1  < TO  BE  STRONG  UPON  THE  SEAS"      11 

called  a  " mercantile  submarine,"  by  the  placing  of  guns  and 
torpedo  tubes  aboard,  she  could  be  quickly  converted  into  a 
man-of-war.  The  Deutschland  came  again  to  America  in  No- 
vember, going  to  New  London,  Conn.,  reaching  Germany,  on 
her  return,  December  10.  This  was  her  last  trip  as  a  merchant- 
man, for  she  was  soon  afterwards  converted  into  a  warship,  and 
was  one  of  the  submarines  sent  to  sink  shipping  in  American 
waters  in  1918. 

Even  more  startling  was  the  visit  of  the  U-53.  This  German 
submarine,  almost  as  large  as  the  Deutschland,  suddenly  ap- 
peared off  Point  Judith  and  calmly  steamed  into  Newport,  R.  I., 
the  afternoon  of  October  7th.  Flying  the  German  man-of-war 
ensign,  she  carried  two  guns  conspicuously  placed.  The  cruiser 
Birmingham,  Rear  Admiral  Albert  Gleaves  commanding,  was 
near  by,  and  the  U-53  asked  to  be  assigned  a  berth.  Kapitan 
Leutnant  Hans  Rose,  her  commander,  in  full  uniform,  called 
on  the  commandant  of  the  Naval  Station,  stating  that  his  object 
in  entering  the  port  was  to  ''pay  his  respects,"  and  that  he 
intended  to  sail  at  6  o'clock.  He  invited  our  officers  to  visit  his 
ship,  saying  he  would  be  glad  to  "show  them  around."  The 
crew  seemed  anxious  to  impress  the  Americans  with  the  boat 
and  its  mechanism. 

While  in  port,  the  U-53  was  careful  not  to  violate  neutrality 
regulations,  but  the  day  after  leaving  Newport  she  began  a 
slaughter  of  vessels.  On  October  8th,  she  sank  the  British 
steamships  Stephano,  Strathdine  and  West  Point,  the  Dutch 
steamer  Blommersdijk,  and  the  Norwegian  Chr.  Knudsen.  The 
first  two  were  attacked  within  sight  of  Nantucket  Lightship,  just 
outside  the  three-mile  limit.  The  others  sunk  were  farther 
away,  but  all  were  near  our  coast. 

The  first  news  we  had  of  this  raid  was  that  the  American 
steamer  Kansan  had  been  stopped  early  in  the  morning  by  a 
German  submarine,  which,  after  examining  her  papers,  had 
allowed  her  to  proceed.  A  short  time  later  a  radio  message  was 
received  stating  that  the  British  steamer  West  Point  was  being 
gunned.  After  that,  distress  signals  came  thick  and  fast.  Rear 
Admiral  Gleaves  immediately  ordered  our  destroyers  to  the 
relief  of  the  vessels  attacked,  and  they  rescued  crews  and  pas- 
sengers, bringing  them  safely  to  port. 


12  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Within  seven  or  eight  months  those  destroyers  were  across 
the  Atlantic,  fighting  the  undersea  raiders  in  European  waters. 
And  they  had  their  revenge  in  September,  1918,  when  an  Ameri- 
can destroyer  and  subchasers  bombed  the  U-53  with  such  effect 
that  according  to  reports,  she  abandoned  the  fight,  glad  to  be 
able  to  get  to  her  home  base. 

Thus  Germany  in  1916  gave  us  a  taste  of  submarine  warfare, 
showing  what  it  could  do  and  did  do  in  American  waters  in  1918, 
and  what  sound  strategy  caused  naval  experts  to  expect  it  to 
undertake  in  the  spring  of  1917.  The  U-53  had  been  careful  not 
to  attack  any  American  vessels,  and  had  conducted  its  opera- 
tions outside  our  territorial  waters.  But  this  piece  of  German 
bravado  aroused  the  indignation  of  the  entire  country.  It  was 
a  warning — and  probably  so  intended — that  the  Germans  could 
at  any  time  send  their  U-boats  across  the  seas  to  sink  our  ves- 
sels off  our  own  shores. 

Even  then  the  country  at  large  seemed  to  regard  our  entrance 
into  war  as  improbable,  and  to  the  average  man  it  did  seem  only 
a  remote  possibility;  but  our  attache  in  Berlin  reported  that 
Germany  was  building  U-boats  by  scores,  the  parts  being  made 
at  plants  in  various  parts  of  the  country,  and  assembled  at  coast 
shipyards.  The  Germans  continued  to  talk  peace,  but  our  Navy 
continued  to  build  ships,  enlist  men,  and  accumulate  reserves 
of  guns,  ammunition,  and  war  materials. 

Congress  on  August  29,  1916,  authorized  the  construction  of 
157  war  vessels — ten  battleships  of  the  largest  type  and  six  huge 
battle  cruisers,  larger  and  swifter  than  any  then  in  existence; 
ten  scout  cruisers,  fifty  destroyers,  nine  fleet  submarines,  fifty- 
eight  coast  submarines  and  one  of  the  Neff  type;  three  fuel 
ships,  two  destroyer  tenders,  two  gunboats  and  two  ammunition 
ships,  a  repair  ship,  a  transport,  a  hospital  ship  and  a  submarine 
tender.  Sixty-six  vessels  were  appropriated  for,  to  be  begun  in 
the  current  year.  That  bill  carried  total  appropriations  of  $312,- 
678,000,  the  largest  amount  ever  granted  for  naval  purposes  in 
time  of  peace,  and  larger  than  previous  appropriations  when 
this  country  was  actually  engaged  in  war. 

Usually,  after  vessels  are  authorized,  months  are  required 
to  prepare  the  plans  and  specifications.  That  was  not  the  case 
this  time.    The  Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair,  under  the 


"TO  BE  STRONG  UPON  THE  SEAS"      13 

direction  of  Rear  Admiral  David  W.  Taylor,  regarded  in  this 
country  and  abroad  as  one  of  the  world's  ablest  naval  con- 
structors, had  begun  work  on  the  plans  long  before.  They  were 
ready  when  the  bill  passed  Congress.  Bids  were  advertised 
for  the  next  day,  and  as  soon  as  the  law  allowed,  contracts  were 
let.  Before  the  end  of  1916,  we  had  entered  upon  the  biggest 
shipbuilding  program  ever  undertaken  by  any  navy  at  one  time. 

Providing  for  an  enlisted  strength  of  74,700  regulars,  Con- 
gress also  authorized  the  President  to  increase  the  Navy  to 
87,000  in  case  of  emergency.  This,  with  the  6,000  apprentice 
seamen,  the  Hospital  Corps,  and  allowance  for  the  sick,  pris- 
oners and  men  on  probation,  would  give  us  an  emergency 
strength  of  some  95,000 — including  both  officers  and  men,  a 
force  of  over  100,000.  Five  thousand  additional  enlisted  men 
and  255  more  officers  were  authorized  for  the  Marine  Corps, 
which  could  be  raised  in  emergency  to  17,500.  The  increases 
alone  were  larger  than  the  entire  number  of  men  employed  by 
the  Navy  in  the  Spanish  War.  The  Naval  Reserve,  instituted 
in  1915,  was  made  a  Naval  Reserve  Force  unlimited  in  numbers. 

The  Naval  Militia  had  grown  to  a  force  of  nearly  10,000,  and 
interest  had  been  stimulated  by  a  training  cruise  for  civilians 
on  eleven  war  vessels,  known  as  the  1 i  Ocean  Plattsburg. ' '  The 
Act  of  1916  laid  the  basis  for  the  enormous  personnel  we  secured 
during  the  war — over  half  a  million  men  in  the  Navy,  and  75,000 
in  the  Marine  Corps.  Immediately  after  its  passage,  a  vigorous 
recruiting  campaign  was  begun. 

Large  reserves  of  powder  and  shells  had  been  accumulated, 
but  orders  were  given  for  much  more,  and  efforts  were  made 
to  speed  up  projectiles  under  manufacture.  "We  had  at  the 
end  of  1916,"  Admiral  Strauss,  then  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
Ordnance,  stated,  "batteries  of  four  guns  each  for  189  auxiliary 
ships.  These  batteries  were  housed  at  navy  yards,  and  the  full 
supply  of  powder,  shell,  primers,  etc.,  were  all  prepared  and 
ready  for  these  ships  at  the  nearest  ammunition  depots,  so  that 
in  the  event  of  war  the  guns  could  be  secured  on  the  ships  and 
the  magazines  and  shell-rooms  supplied  at  once." 

Equipment  for  ships  to  be  converted,  and  spare  parts  of  all 
kinds  were  accumulated  and  stored  at  points  where  they  would 
be  quickly  available.    All  the  bureaus  concerned  with  construe- 


14  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

tion,  shipbuilding,  conversion,  and  repair,  engines  and  machi- 
nery, ordnance  and  supplies  were  increasing  production,  report- 
ing, as  did  our  vessels,  constant  improvement  in  ' '  readiness  for 
war. ' ' 

This  was  the  result  of  two  years'  constant  work.  Special 
duties  were  imposed  from  the  beginning  of  the  European  con- 
flict in  1914.  Only  a  few  days  after  hostilities  began,  the  cruisers 
Tennessee  and  North  Carolina  sailed,  carrying  millions  of  dol- 
lars in  gold  to  relieve  the  thousands  of  Americans  stranded  in 
Europe,  unable  to  get  home.  Naval  vessels  were  kept  busy  along 
our  coasts,  enforcing  neutrality  in  our  territorial  waters.  Naval 
censors  were  placed  at  wireless  stations,  preventing  the  sending 
of  unneutral  messages.  Intelligence  officers  were  active  in 
thwarting  the  machinations  of  German  spies  and  plotters.  But 
all  this  was  small  in  comparison  with  the  efforts  we  were  making 
to  increase  and  improve  the  Navy  in  its  every  branch  and  pre- 
pare it  for  any  emergency. 

The  sinking  of  the  Lusiiania,  May  7,  1915,  was  followed  by 
such  naval  activity  as  had  never  been  seen  before,  except  in  the 
midst  of  hostilities. 

Congress  had  created  in  the  current  naval  bill  a  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations,  charged  with  "the  operation  of  the  fleet  and 
its  readiness  for  war."  For  this  important  position,  I  had, 
after  careful  consideration,  selected  Rear  Admiral  William  S. 
Benson,  whose  ability  and  experience  admirably  fitted  him  for 
this  vital  task.  He  assumed  office  on  May  10,  three  days  after  the 
Lusitania  went  down.  It  was  a  critical  period.  The  President 
on  May  13  addressed  to  Germany  his  vigorous  note  giving  notice 
that  this  Government  would  omit  no  word  or  act  to  protect  its 
citizens  against  murder  on  the  seas.  Many  Americans  were 
urging  that  war  be  declared  at  once.  The  crisis  lasted  for  weeks, 
and  ended  only  when  the  German  government  gave  its  promise 
that  non-belligerent  vessels  would  not  be  sunk  without  warning. 

Admiral  Benson,  bureau  chiefs,  commanders,  and  officials 
devoted  every  energy  to  preparing  the  fleet  for  war.  Abolition 
of  the  cumbersome  system  of  naval  aides  brought  the  bureau 
chiefs  in  closer  touch  with  the  Secretary.  There  was  no  longer 
any  division  of  authority  and  responsibility,  and  we  could  get 
direct  action.    On  this  basis  we  built  up  a  departmental  organi- 


"TO  BE  STRONG  UPON  THE  SEAS"      15 

zation  so  efficient  that  no  change  was  found  necessary  during  the 
entire  war  period,  the  bureaus  merely  expanding  to  meet  the 
enormously  increased  demands,  each  new  activity  easily  fitting 
into  some  part  of  the  existing  organization. 

The  General  Board  of  the  Navy,  of  which  Admiral  Dewey 
was  the  head  until  his  death  Jan.  16, 1917,  had  developed  a  com- 
prehensive administrative  plan,  under  which  each  bureau  was 
required  to  report,  periodically,  on  its  readiness  for  war.  This 
enabled  us  to  keep  informed  of  exact  conditions  and  progress 
made.  The  Board  also  worked  out  a  scheme  for  development  of 
shore  bases  and  stations. 

Navy  yards  were  expanded  not  only  to  repair  and  convert 
vessels,  but  to  build  war-ships  of  every  type.  These  new  ways 
and  shops  formed  a  substantial  and  valuable  addition  to  the 
nation's  shipbuilding  facilities. 

I  created  the  Secretary's  Advisory  Council,  consisting  of  the 
Assistant  Secretary,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the 
chiefs  of  the  various  bureaus.  Meeting  regularly  once  a  week 
and  oftener  when  necessary,  this  Council  brought  together  the 
chief  administrative  officers  of  the  Department,  and  discussed 
all  matters  of  general  interest  to  the  service.  Thus  the  heads 
of  bureaus  kept  in  close  touch  with  each  other ;  having  the  advan- 
tage of  a  General  Staff  without  its  many  disadvantages. 

Comprehensive  plans  for  possible  war  against  Germany — we 
then  called  it  "war  in  the  Atlantic" — had  been  made  by  the 
General  Board,  and  were  constantly  corrected  and  brought  up 
to  date  in  accordance  with  war  developments. 

When  the  fleet  was  reviewed  by  President  Wilson  at  New 
York,  May  15,  1915,  Admiral  Dewey  wrote : 

The  people  of  New  York  have  just  cause  for  pride  in  the  fleet  now 
assembled  in  their  harbor.  Not  only  is  it  composed  of  the  finest  and 
most  efficient  warships  that  we  have  ever  had,  but  it  is  not  excelled, 
except  in  size,  by  the  fleet  of  any  nation  in  the  world.  Our  ships  and 
guns  are  as  good  as  any  in  the  world;  our  officers  are  as  good  as  any; 
and  our  enlisted  men  are  superior  in  training,  education,  physical 
development  and  devotion  to  duty  to  those  of  any  other  navy.  As  Presi- 
dent of  the  General  Board  for  the  past  fifteen  years,  I  can  say  with 
absolute  confidence  that  the  efficiency  of  the  fleet  has  steadily  progressed, 
and  has  never  been  so  high  as  it  is  today. 


16  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

For  months  we  had  been  at  work  on  a  plan  for  reorganizing 
the  fleet.  Completed  and  put  into  effect  in  July,  1915,  that  plan 
proved  so  efficient  that  it  was  continued  throughout  the  war. 
Four  battleships,  the  Pennsylvania,  Nevada,  Oklahoma  and  Ari- 
zona, ten  destroyers,  seven  submarines,  and  two  tenders,  the 
Melville  and  the  Bushnell,  were  completed  in  1915-16. 

Battle  and  target  practice  were  conducted  with  a  constant 
improvement  in  gunnery.  In  August,  1916,  there  was  held  off 
the  North  Atlantic  Coast  the  largest  "war  game"  in  the  annals 
of  the  Navy.  Eighty-three  vessels,  including  twenty-eight  bat- 
tleships and  thirteen  submarines,  engaged  in  this  strategic  ma- 
neuver, which  lasted  for  four  days,  and  simulated  the  conditions 
of  a  great  naval  battle. 

Congress  had,  in  1913-14,  authorized  the  construction  of 
five  dreadnaughts  as  compared  with  only  two  granted  by  the 
previous  Congress,  and  we  were  building  more  destroyers  and 
submarines  than  in  previous  years.  Forty-one  more  ships  were 
in  commission,  and  there  were  5,000  more  men  in  the  service 
than  there  had  been  in  1913.  The  fleet  was  incomparably 
stronger  than  it  had  ever  been  before,  but  we  were  heartily 
tired  of  the  hand-to-mouth  policy  that  had  prevailed  so  long,  a 
policy  that  made  it  impossible  to  plan  far  ahead  and  develop  a 
consistent  and  well-balanced  fleet.  In  common  with  its  officers, 
I  wanted  the  United  States  to  possess  a  navy  equal  to  any  afloat, 
and  to  initiate  a  building  program  that  should  be  continuous 
and  not  haphazard. 

Consequently,  in  July,  1915,  I  requested  Admiral  Dewey  to 
have  the  General  Board  submit  its  opinion  of  what  should  be 
done  to  give  us  a  navy  worthy  of  this  country  and  able  to  cope 
with  any  probable  enemy.  In  response  the  General  Board  set 
forth  this  policy,  which  has  guided  us  ever  since  and  is  now 
nearing  a  triumphant  reality : 

The  Navy  of  the  United  States  should  ultimately  be  equal  to  the 
most  powerful  maintained  by  any  other  nation  of  the  world.  It  should 
be  gradually  increased  to  this  point  by  such  a  rate  of  development,  year 
by  year,  as  may  be  permitted  by  the  facilities  of  the  country,  but  the 
limit  above  defined  should  be  attained  not  later  than  1925. 

It  was  in  accordance  with  this  policy,  and  at  my  direction, 
that  the  General  Board  developed  the  continuous  building  pro- 


g  S  £  2  z.  ?  • 

M.  (U  fB  05     £_   Q    _ 

»     P  55  r+J-b  ©     O  ,yi 

®     C  ^  3     ~    ^  Jg 

-       O  O  H-   3"  3    <  ^ 


3    i-fe 


5  Kjo- 

rD    H    &  _i  Hi5-*    -      CD 

©    pj  3    3  B'Ho 

3    j    "J    - J  h-  ;-;    3    H 

3  3*  *"    Cu  CD 

£  "  ?.  3  M  2  ~  ~- 

3    P^*"    Ti    GO  *    .     ^ 
CD  ^  a    3  tt* 

-     o  g        _,   g   o   ~ 

-XT'  a   *     ^   o   o   s. 

2  -  5  t  o  3  2.  t 
m.      3  a  f-b^-  <d  v 

^  W  sT  S"  GO  n  Q  ^ 

a  .    •    <j  3  h,  h  a 

-s    3T3    M    C"3"oC^ 

fD    h-  S3  3    CD    3    o 

»  s     3- w  ^  ^ 


3£ 


p,  ■     o 

.  5= 


M    O 


o 


2.  hj1-1 

3    S5    . 

§  =T  >  HI  >-  go  •     i 

P   g*  cb    ©j^H   tri  te* 

g  2  «  ""BE  o  >f 

O  o  t-b  p 

■X  3s 


£   o 


OTQ 


Ha  T> 


ggSJ 


Q 


S3     3 


O    G0H.3-        >0 
2  ^  h>CO    CD 

5"  CD  hiT  <J  ^    ce  to 

°     3"  CD     •       g     3     CD 

w*^  g.  S  S-  S-.a 

§  £  g  8  w  j§  | 


^9z 


|>  hd  H  H=  Q  g    g 


o9»Mi.o 
a  "  p  >3 


3£ 


53"  O    O   CD    3    GO" 

-     Hi  Hi  P     re     H     Q 
H-   r+    ~     "'     "     y' 

q  3-  3-  O    5'  3,  *g. 

.  ^  CD    CD     Hs    .      JL,  . 


o'wQSr 

u 

•7*  rr"  h  hs  jf       3 

— 
GO 

^  ?>Ca  h,  3 

r 

h.  ai  J;  0  -•      & 

JQ      ^1^3         •      H-    ^ 

w 

95          3   oo    £L  3*  pj 

k! 

Et.  O  B"  h       °  M 

©  =r  53  3  3j  ,_,  3. 

0 

3    B5    —  0    -^  h^H- 
CD    tO  H    CD     <     — f 

— 

j3-|  CO    53^       H  VJ    • 

go  y 


A  FRIENDLY  BOUT 
Spectators  on  the  U.  S.  S.  Bushnell  are  having  as  much  fun  as  the  boxers. 


SCHOOL  HOUR  ABOARD  A  BATTLESHIP 


1 ' TO  BE  STRONG  UPON  THE  SEAS"      17 

gram,  comprising'  157  war  vessels,  later  known  as  the  "  three- 
year  program,"  which  was  authorized  by  Congress  in  the  next 
naval  appropriation  act.  Presented  in  my  annual  report  for 
1915,  it  was  strongly  urged  by  President  Wilson  in  his  message 
to  Congress,  and  he  sounded  the  keynote  in  his  speech  at  St. 
Louis,  February  3,  1916,  when  he  declared :  ' '  There  is  no  other 
Navy  in  the  world  that  has  to  cover  so  great  an  area  of  defense 
as  the  American  Navy,  and  it  ought,  in  my  judgment,  to  be 
incomparably  the  most  adequate  Navy  in  the  world. ' ' 

With  all  the  Navy  striving  to  build  up  and  expand  the  serv- 
ice, I  turned  attention  to  other  forces  that  might  be  utilized. 
War  had  become  a  science;  inventions  were  playing  a  vastly 
greater  part  than  ever  before,  and  on  July  7,  1915,  I  wrote  to 
Mr.  Thomas  A.  Edison,  suggesting  the  formation  of  a  board  of 
eminent  inventors  and  scientists,  and  asking  if  he  would  consent 
to  become  its  head.  The  idea  appealed  to  Mr.  Edison,  as  it  did 
to  the  various  scientific  and  engineering  societies,  and  in  a  few 
weeks  the  Naval  Consulting  Board  became  a  reality.  Composed 
of  men  of  eminence  and  distinction,  this  was  the  first  of  those 
organizations  of  patriotic  civilians  which,  when  war  came,  ren- 
dered such  signal  service  to  the  nation. 

This  board  began  in  1915  a  survey  of  all  the  country's  indus- 
tries and  resources  which  might  be  employed,  in  case  of  war, 
for  the  production  of  munitions  and  supplies,  and  the  thousand 
and  one  things  required  by  armies  and  navies. 

The  Navy  made  a  survey  of  all  merchant  ships  and  privately 
owned  craft  which  might  be  utilized  as  auxiliaries.  The  Board 
of  Inspection  and  Survey  was  increased,  each  vessel  listed  for 
service  to  which  it  could  be  adapted,  and  plans  made  for  all 
the  changes  needed  to  convert  it  to  war  purposes.  This  was 
worked  out  to  the  last  detail,  even  to  the  yards  to  which  the 
vessels  would  be  sent,  and  the  accumulation  of  machinery  and 
materials  for  their  conversion.  A  standardized  schedule  was 
developed  of  all  ammunition,  materials,  equipment  and  supplies 
needed  by  vessels  in  case  of  war. 

Aviation  received  earnest  attention.  Seaplanes  and  flying 
boats  were  secured,  and  a  school  and  station  established  at  Pen- 
sacola,  Fla.,  for  the  training  of  aviators.  The  cruisers  North 
Carolina,  West  Virginia,  and  Washington  were  fitted  with  a 


18  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

launching  device,  from  which  aeroplanes  could  fly  from  ships. 
Operating  with  the  fleet,  our  aeroplanes  began  developing  the 
tactics  of  aircraft  at  sea. 

During  the  Sussex  crisis,  arrangements  were  made  for  the 
mobilization  of  the  communications  of  the  entire  United  States 
radio,  telegraph  and  telephone.  This  important  experiment 
was  carried  out  from  May  6  to  8, 1916,  and  was  a  complete  suc- 
cess, proving  that  in  a  day  we  could  link  all  methods  of  communi- 
cation and  put  in  touch  all  our  yards  and  stations  and  our  ships 
at  sea.  Congress  had  previously  authorized  the  erection  of  a 
chain  of  high  power  radio  stations  to  span  the  Pacific — at  San 
Diego,  California ;  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii ;  and  at  Cavite,  in  the 
Philippines — and  these  were  under  construction. 

The  Naval  Communication  Service  was  created  and  under 
its  direction  all  our  communications,  wire  and  wireless,  were  pre- 
pared for  war.  This  entire  service  was  mobilized  the  day  the 
United  States  severed  relations  with  Germany. 

Admiral  Dewey  said,  in  the  autumn  of  1916:  "The  last 
three  years  have  been  wonderful  years.  I  have  been  in  the 
Navy  since  1854,  and  both  in  material  and  personnel,  we  are 
more  efficient  today  than  ever  before."  Admiral  Charles  J. 
Badger,  who,  upon  the  death  of  Dewey  in  January,  1917,  be- 
came head  of  the  General  Board,  stated:  "I  do  not  mean  to 
say  that  we  had  attained  to  perfection  in  the  Navy — we  never 
shall ;  that  no  errors  of  judgment  or  mistakes  were  made — they 
will  always  occur;  but  I  assert  that  the  Navy  when  it  entered 
the  war  was  as  a  whole,  well  prepared  and  administered.' ' 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  BREAK  WITH  GERMANY 

suepkise  and  terror  planned  in  starting  u-boat  war — bern- 
storff  withheld  note  until  just  before  submarines  struck 
— America's  entrance  could  not  affect  " trend  of  the  war," 

holtzendorff    insisted fleet    put    on    war    basis plans 

made  to  cooperate  with  allies "get  and  keep  the  best 

men,"  president  told  secretaries  of  war  and  navy. 

GERMANY  struck  practically  without  warning  in  inaug- 
urating ruthless  U-boat  warfare.  Surprise  of  Allies 
and  neutrals,  giving  no  time  for  negotiations,  was  one 
thing  upon  which  its  Admiralty  insisted.  Terrorizing 
America  was  a  part  of  the  plan,  and  if  the  United  States  entered 
the  war,  the  Teuton  naval  authorities  contended  that  it  would 
exert  no  marked  influence,  and  could  furnish  little  assistance 
in  troops  or  vessels. 

Admiral  von  Holtzendorff,  head  of  the  German  Admiralty, 
set  forth  all  this  in  his  memorandum  detailing  the  arrangements 
for  the  "U-boat  war."  That  document,  one  of  the  German  of- 
ficial papers  made  public  after  the  war,  is  marked  "Strictly 
secret— B-35840-I,"  and  is  dated,  "Berlin,  Dec.  22,  1916." 

"The  beginning  and  the  declaration  of  the  unrestricted 
U-boat  war,"  said  Holtzendorff,  "must  follow  so  quickly  one 
upon  the  other  that  there  is  no  time  for  negotiations,  especially 
between  England  and  the  neutrals.  The  wholesome  terror  will 
exercise  in  this  case  upon  enemy  and  neutral  alike." 

The  submarines  were  to  begin  the  general  attack  not  later 
than  February  1,  1917.  England  was  to  be  starved  out  in  five 
months,  and  the  Allies  forced  to  surrender  by  August  1st.  This 
is  all  stated  in  that  memorandum,  and  those  exact  dates  are 
given. 

The  probable  entrance  of  the  United  States  as  a  belligerent 
was  discussed,  and  Holtzendorff  took  pains  to  set  forth  what 

19 


20  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

little  influence  this  country's  participation  could  have  upon  the 
' '  trend  of  the  war, ' '  saying : 

As  regards  tonnage  this  influence  would  be  negligible.  It  is  not  to 
be  expected  that  more  than  a  small  fraction  of  the  tonnage  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  lying  in  America  and  many  other  neutral  harbors  could 
then  be  enlisted  for  the  traffic  to  England.  For  the  far  greatest  part 
of  this  shipping  can  be  damaged  in  such  a  way  that  it  cannot  sail  in  the 
decisive  time  of  the  first  months.  Preparations  to  this  effect  have  been 
made.    There  would  also  be  no  crews  to  be  found  for  them. 

Just  as  little  decisive  effect  can  be  ascribed  to  any  considerable  extent 
to  American  troops,  which,  in  the  first  place,  cannot  be  brought  over 
through  lack  of  tonnage. 

Bernstorff,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Washington,  carried 
out  his  part  of  the  plans  to  the  letter.  It  was  not  until  a  few 
hours  before  the  submarines  were  to  strike,  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  Jan.  31,  1917,  that  he  presented  the  note  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment to  the  Secretary  of  State.  He  had  that  note  in  his  pos- 
session twelve  days  before  he  presented  it.  He  admits  that  it 
reached  the  German  Embassy  in  Washington  on  January  19,  the 
same  day  that  Zimmermann,  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  sent 
to  Mexico  his  crafty  but  absurd  proposal  that  Mexico  form  an 
alliance  with  Japan,  and  make  war  with  the  United  States  to 
recover  the  ''lost  territory"  of  New  Mexico,  Arizona,  and 
Texas.  That  proposal  also  passed  through  the  Washington  em- 
bassy, in  the  Berlin  diplomatic  code,  and  was  read  by  the  Am- 
bassador. 

Before  he  presented  the  note  declaring  submarine  warfare, 
Bernstorff  had  given  the  order  that  "the  engines  of  all  German 
ships  lying  in  American  harbors  were  to  be  destroyed."  "I  had 
already  given  instructions  to  this  effect  at  the  time  of  the  Sussex 
crisis,  and  these  instructions  had  now  been  repeated  from  Ber- 
lin," he  says  in  his  book.  "As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  dangerous 
to  allow  of  any  delay,  for  on  the  evening  of  January  31,  our 
ships  were  already  seized  by  the  American  police.  As  far  as  I 
know,  however,  all  of  them  without  exception  were  made  unfit 
for  use  before  this  occurred." 

The  day  ruthless  U-boat  warfare  began,  new  mobilization 
plans  were  prepared  and  sent  out  to  the  entire  Navy.  Formal 
action  had  not  then  been  taken  by  our  Government.    Its  course 


THE  BREAK  WITH  GERMANY        21 

was  still  under  consideration  and  the  Cabinet  was  to  meet  the 
next  day.  But  the  moment  I  read  the  German  note,  I  regarded 
a  break  as  inevitable,  and  active  hostilities  almost  certain  to 
follow. 

As  the  Cabinet  assembled  on  Friday,  February  2d,  all  of  us 
realized  the  significance  of  the  occasion.  Parley  and  negotia- 
tion were  ended.  The  time  had  come  for  decisive  action.  That 
was  the  conviction,  I  believe,  of  every  man  who  rose  to  greet  the 
President  when  he  entered  the  room.  Usually  genial  and  smil- 
ing at  the  gatherings  of  his  official  family,  he  was  now  grave  and 
serious.  The  destiny  of  a  hundred  million  people  lay  in  his 
hands,  perhaps  the  destiny  of  the  world. 

The  Cabinet  members  had,  of  course,  read  the  text  of  the 
German  note,  whose  meaning  was  plain  enough,  camouflaged  as 
it  was  in  diplomatic  terms  and  pretended  concessions.  All  had 
studied  it,  and  were  familiar  with  its  provisions.  But  the  Presi- 
dent read  it  to  us  again.  He  read  it  in  measured  tones,  giving 
weight  to  every  significant  syllable. 

His  mind  was  already  made  up,  I  felt  certain.  But  before 
giving  voice  to  his  own  decision,  he  called  upon  his  official  ad- 
visers to  state  their  views.  They  spoke  freely  and  frankly,  each 
stating  just  what  he  thought  the  situation  demanded.  Expres- 
sions varied,  of  course,  and  each  man  approached  the  problem 
in  his  own  way.  There  were  differences  of  opinion  as  to  details, 
but  none  as  to  the  main  point.  On  that,  all  were  agreed.  They 
felt  that  relations  with  Germany  must  be  severed. 

This  was  the  President's  position.  He  had  never  wavered 
from  the  firm  stand  he  had  taken  a  year  before  that,  if  unre- 
stricted submarine  warfare  was  continued,  or  resumed,  the 
United  States  could  have  no  further  relations  with  Germany. 
It  was  no  surprise  to  him  that  his  colleagues,  to  a  man,  shared 
his  views  that  the  Cabinet  was  a  unit  for  the  dismissal  of 
Bernstorff,  and  the  sharpest  possible  warning  to  the  German 
Government. 

Although  the  session  lasted  several  hours,  this  decision  was 
soon  reached.  It  had  required  no  debate.  The  German  note 
itself  was  a  compelling  argument. 

Most  of  the  time  was  devoted  to  discussing  what  steps  each 
department  should  take,  particularly  State,  War  and  Navy.    It 


22  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

was  recognized  thoroughly  that  the  severance  of  relations 
would  create  a  difficult  situation,  one  likely  in  a  few  weeks  at 
most  to  lead  to  open  warfare.  It  was  realized  that  Germany 
might  strike  without  waiting  for  formal  declaration  from  the 
United  States.  The  sinking  of  American  vessels  without  warn- 
ing would  be,  in  itself,  an  overt  act,  an  act  of  war.  We  had  to 
prepare  for  any  eventuality,  to  map  out  a  program  for  imme- 
diate action. 

The  following  telegram  was  sent  to  the  entire  Navy  that 
night : 

Six  Alnav.  In  view  of  the  present  international  situation,  take 
every  precaution  to  protect  Government  plants  and  vessels. 

All  who  received  that  message  knew  what  it  meant,  that  they 
were  to  guard  against  surprise,  and  be  ready  for  anything  that 
might  arise. 

The  next  afternoon  at  two  o'clock,  the  President,  addressing 
a  joint  session  of  the  two  houses  of  Congress,  pointed  out  that 
Germany  had  ''suddenly  and  without  prior  intimation  of  any 
kind,"  deliberately  withdrawn  the  solemn  assurances  given  in 
its  note  of  May  4,  1916,  and  announced  that  all  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Germany  had  been  severed. 

At  the  very  hour  the  President  began  his  address,  and  Bern- 
storff  was  handed  his  passports,  Admiral  Mayo,  in  Cuban 
waters,  issued  the  first  campaign  order,  putting  into  effect  the 
plan  for  the  defense  of  the  fleet  in  Guantanamo  Bay.  As  soon  as 
I  returned  from  the  Capitol,  this  order  was  sent  out : 

One  Alatl.     Radicode.     Mobilize  Naval  Communications. 

Secnav. 

That  placed  all  our  communications — radio,  telegraphs,  tele- 
phones, and  signals — on  a  war  basis.  This  message  was  just 
going  out  by  wireless,  when  I  was  called  to  the  White  House, 
where  I  found  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  had  likewise  been 
summoned. 

The  President  was  concerned  about  the  safety  of  Government 
property.  There  was  enough  cause  for  this  anxiety,  for  there 
were  thousands  of  aliens  who  could  not  be  interned  legally  unless 
or  until  war  was  declared.    Among  them  were  hostile  Germans 


THE  BREAK  WITH  GERMANY        23 

who  would  resort  to  almost  any  violence  to  vent  their  resent- 
ment or  to  cripple  this  Government  in  its  manifold  preparations 
for  war. 

Navy  yards  and  army  posts  were  closed,  and  orders  sent  to 
every  naval  and  military  plant  in  the  United  States,  Porto  Rico, 
the  Virgin  Islands,  Hawaii,  Alaska,  Guam  and  the  Philippines, 
to  exclude  all  visitors  and  strengthen  the  guards.  The  guards  in 
the  Panama  Canal  Zone  were  doubled,  and  special  precautions 
were  taken  to  protect  the  canal. 

To  prevent  information  from  reaching  Germans,  we  stopped 
publishing  the  movements  of  naval  vessels  and  the  daily  orders 
to  naval  officers.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Europe  we 
had  maintained  along  the  coast  a  number  of  naval  vessels  to 
enforce  neutrality  regulations.  Now  this  force  was  increased, 
and  a  virtual  coast  patrol  established. 

That  night  I  sent  out  the  order,  "Alnav  availability,"  which 
directed  all  vessels  to  report  their  actual  readiness  for  war. 

The  President  kept  in  close  touch  with  all  our  preparations. 
Not  satisfied  with  general  reports,  he  wanted  to  know  just  what 
was  being  done.  Monday  afternoon,  while  I  was  hard  at  work 
with  officers  on  plans  and  orders,  Mr.  Wilson  suddenly  appeared 
in  my  office.  Glad  as  I  was  to  see  him,  his  visit  was  a  surprise. 
Documents  concerning  a  number  of  the  matters  we  were  work- 
ing upon  were  on  my  desk,  and  in  a  few  moments  I  reviewed  in 
detail  the  plans,  told  him  what  we  had  done  and  were  doing,  and 
asked  his  directions  as  to  certain  operations. 

Then  he  suggested  that  we  go  to  the  War  Department,  to 
talk  matters  over  with  the  Secretary  of  War.  Mr.  Baker  was 
in  his  office  and  the  three  of  us  held  a  long  conference,  discussing 
the  situation  in  all  its  phases.  Some  things  the  President  said 
to  us  are  indelibly  impressed  on  my  memory. 

The  breach  in  diplomatic  relations,  he  pointed  out,  did  not 
necessarily  mean  war,  but  it  brought  us  so  close  to  the  possi- 
bility that  we  must  put  our  house  in  order,  and  be  ready  for 
any  emergency. 

Men  concerned  him  quite  as  much  as  measures,  and  he  in- 
quired particularly  about  the  officers  in  important  positions  and 
commands.  If  there  were  any  who  did  not  seem  equal  to  the 
tremendous  tasks  they  would  be  called  upon  to  perform,  he 


24  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

wanted  them  replaced.  If  abler  men  were  available,  he  wished 
us  to  secure  them. 

4 'Each  of  you  must  surround  yourself  with  the  ablest  men 
you  have,"  he  said.  Turning  to  me,  he  asked  whether  I  felt 
that  my  immediate  advisers,  those  in  the  Navy  Department  and 
in  command  afloat,  were  the  men  to  retain  in  those  positions. 

' '  They  are  the  best  men  in  the  Navy, ' '  I  replied. 

He  asked  the  same  question  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  Mr. 
Baker  told  him  that  the  officers  in  responsible  positions  in  the 
War  Department  and  the  Army  knew  their  jobs  and  were  going 
ahead  earnestly  with  them.  Some  were  necessarily  slated  for 
early  retirement,  but  to  anticipate  this,  he  thought,  would  be  un- 
wise, as  it  might  occasion  needless  alarm  and  disturb  morale. 

The  President  listened  intently  to  us.  When  we  finished,  he 
again  impressed  upon  us  that  only  the  ablest,  most  alert  and 
energetic  officers  should  be  put  in  places  of  responsibility. 

"Get  and  keep  the  best,"  he  said  as  our  conference  ended. 

Mr.  Wilson  had  no  sympathy  with  the  fear  of  hurting  some 
man's  " feelings, "  which,  he  said,  is  the  rock  upon  which  efficient 
public  service  often  goes  to  pieces.  The  big  job  called  for  the 
big  man,  and  no  personal  consideration  had  any  weight  with  him 
in  getting  the  thing  done,  and  done  in  the  best  way.  ' '  Get  and 
keep  the  best,"  without  regard  to  friendship,  past  performance, 
prestige,  social  or  political  pull,  guided  the  President  in  his  en- 
tire conduct  of  the  war.  It  was  that  policy  which  enabled  Amer- 
ican power  to  be  thrown  into  the  scales  so  quickly  and  decisively. 

It  is  gratifying  to  recall  that  under  the  rigid  test  of  war, 
every  responsible  officer  in  the  Navy  Department  measured  up 
to  his  full  duty.  Not  one  failed  to  meet  the  requirements  of  his 
position.  No  change  whatever  was  required.  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt  was  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Admiral  Wil- 
liam S.  Benson  was  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  Rear  Admiral 
Charles  J.  Badger  head  of  the  General  Board.  The  bureau 
chiefs  were:  Rear  Admirals  Robert  S.  Griffin,  Engineering; 
David  W.  Taylor,  Construction  and  Repair ;  Ralph  Earle,  Ord- 
nance; Leigh  C.  Palmer,  Navigation;  Samuel  McGowan,  Sup- 
plies and  Accounts ;  William  C.  Braisted,  Medicine  and  Surgery ; 
F.  R.  Harris,  Yards  and  Docks.  Captain  W.  C.  Watts  was 
Judge  Advocate  General,  and  Major  General  George  Barnett, 


THE  BREAK  WITH  GERMANY        25 

Commandant  of  the  Marine  Corps.  When  Admiral  Harris  re- 
signed in  December,  1917,  to  become  head  of  the  U.  S.  Emer- 
gency Fleet  Corporation,  he  was  succeeded  as  Chief  of  the 
Bureau  of  Yards  and  Docks  by  Rear  Admiral  Charles  W. 
Parks.  Captain  Watts,  requesting  sea  duty  in  March,  1918,  was 
succeeded  by  Rear  Admiral  George  R.  Clark  as  Judge  Advocate 
General.  Thus,  practically  all  those  who  were  in  office  when 
war  began  served  to  its  end.  And  no  men  ever  did  better 
service.  Able  and  energetic,  they  worked  together  with  a  har- 
mony and  efficiency  never  excelled. 

U-boat  warfare  being  aimed  directly  at  shipping,  our  own 
as  well  as  that  of  other  nations,  the  protection  of  American 
merchantmen  was  of  prime  importance.  As  the  President  was 
announcing  the  severance  of  relations  with  Germany,  February 
3d,  the  steamer  Housatonic  was  sunk  in  European  waters,  and 
on  February  12th,  the  schooner  Lyman  M.  Law  was  sent  down 
by  the  Germans. 

Though  he  considered  that  under  the  general  powers  of  the 
Executive  he  had  the  authority  to  arm  merchant  vessels  for 
protection,  the  President  desired,  before  taking  such  an  impor- 
tant step,  which  must  almost  inevitably  result  in  gunfire  engage- 
ments with  U-boats,  to  ask  the  support  of  Congress.  Before 
that  time,  at  a  cabinet  meeting  at  which  this  matter  was  dis- 
cussed, the  President  turned  to  me  and  asked: 

"Daniels,  has  the  Navy  the  guns  and  gunners  for  this  job?" 

"We  can  arm  them  as  fast  as  the  ships  are  ready,"  I  replied. 

On  February  26th,  in  an  address  to  the  two  houses,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  requested  that  Congress  authorize  him  to  ' '  supply 
our  merchant  ships  with  defensive  arms,  should  that  become 
necessary,  and  with  the  means  of  using  them,  and  to  employ 
any  other  instrumentalities  or  methods  that  may  be  necessary 
and  adequate  to  protect  our  ships  and  our  people  in  their  legiti- 
mate and  peaceful  pursuits  on  the  seas."  A  bill  to  this  effect, 
introduced  at  once,  promptly  passed  the  House  by  a  large  ma- 
jority, but  failed  in  the  Senate  by  reason  of  a  filibuster  con- 
ducted by  a  handful  of  Senators  who  by  continual  debate  pre- 
vented the  bill  from  coming  to  a  vote  before  the  end  of  that 
Congress  on  March  4th. 

It  was  this  filibuster  that  called  forth  the  President's  denun- 


26  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

ciation  of  the  ' ' little  group  of  willful  men"  who  had,  with  reck- 
less disregard  of  the  country's  needs,  prevented  important  legis- 
lation, and  his  suggestion  that  the  rules  of  the  Senate  be  changed 
so  as  to  make  impossible  any  such  occurrence  in  the  future. 
Before  adjournment  a  large  majority  of  the  senators  signed  a 
document  stating  that  they  favored  the  bill  to  arm  American 
merchantmen,  and  would  have  voted  for  it,  had  they  been  given 
the  opportunity. 

Confident  that  he  had  the  power  under  the  Constitution,  and 
a  large  majority  of  Congress  having  expressed  its  willingness 
to  grant  him  specific  authority,  the  President  on  March  12  di- 
rected me  to  furnish  guns  and  naval  gunners  to  American  ships. 
Guns  and  men  were  ready,  and  the  work  of  arming  merchant- 
men began  immediately.  In  two  days  guns  were  installed  on  the 
Manchuria,  St.  Louis  and  Aztec,  and  four  days  later  the  New 
York  and  St.  Paul  were  equipped.  The  Manchuria  sailed  for 
England  March  15,  and  thereafter  a  constant  succession  of  mer- 
chant ships  carrying  armed  guards  left  our  ports  for  Europe. 

The  day  after  Bernstorff  was  dismissed  the  General  Board 
had  submitted  the  following  specific  steps  to  be  taken  in  case  of 
conflict  with  Germany: 

G.  B.  No.  425.     Confidential.     Serial  No.  666. 

February  4,  1917. 
From :     Senior  member  present. 
To :     Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Subject:     Steps  to  be  taken  to  meet  a  possible  condition  of  war  with 
the  Central  European  Powers. 

On  account  of  existing  conditions,  the  General  Board  recommends 
that  the  following  steps  be  taken  to  meet  a  possible  condition  of  war 
with  the  Central  European  Powers : 

1.  Complete  complements  and  allowances  of  all  kinds,  first  of  the 
A  and  B  fleet,  then  of  the  C  fleet,  and  naval  districts. 

2.  Mobilize  the  A  fleet  in  the  Lower  Chesapeake,  and  increase  it 
immediately  to  the  B  fleet.     (See  Black  Plan.) 

3.  Dock  and  repair  all  ships  in  reserve  and  ordinary  that  will  be 
used. 

4.  Arrange  for  the  supply  of  fuel  to  the  fleet  and  stock  all  fuel 
depots  to  capacity. 

5.  Establish  additional  recruiting  stations  and  increase  personnel 
of  the  Navy  and  Marine  Corps  to  the  total  number  required  to  supply 


THE  BREAK  WITH  GERMANY        27 

complements  for  all  the  ships  built,  building,  and  authorized,  and  to 
maintain  shore  establishments  and  naval  defense  districts,  including 
aviation  service,  with  10  per  cent  additional  for  casualties  as  follows: 
Enlisted  force — Navy,  150,000;  Marines,  30,000;  officers  in  the  propor- 
tion prescribed  by  law. 

6.  Mobilize  the  naval  districts,  including  the  Coast  Guard  and 
Lighthouse  services,  and  put  patrol  vessels,  mine  sweepers,  etc.,  of  the 
Atlantic  coast  districts,  on  their  stations;  no  commercial  vessels  to  be 
mobilized  in  the  Pacific  coast  districts  at  present. 

7.  Prepare  to  the  utmost  detail  for  the  employment  of  mines  along 
our  coast  as  may  be  necessary. 

8.  Prepare  nets  and  other  obstruction  for  submarines,  ready  for 
immediate  use,  at  the  Chesapeake  Capes,  Delaware  Capes,  entrance  to 
New  York  Bay,  eastern  entrance  to  Long  Island  Sound,  Narragansett 
Bay,  Panama  Canal,  and  Guantanamo.  Other  places  as  their  need 
becomes  apparent.  The  General  Board  considers  it  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance that  net  protection  shall  be  immediately  provided  for  the 
fleet  during  its  mobilization  in  Chesapeake  Bay. 

9.  Establish  immediately  the  guards  at  all  navy  yards,  magazines, 
radio  stations,  powder  factories,  munition  plants,  bases,  ship-building 
yards,  and  naval  shore  utilities  in  accordance  with  the  mobilization 
plans. 

10.  Reduce  the  force  of  Marines  in  Haiti  and  Santo  Domingo  to  the 
smallest  number  that  can  maintain  order  there,  transferring  these  men 
to  the  United  States  to  perform  necessary  guard  duty  at  navy  yards, 
magazines,  radio  stations,  ship-building  plants,  and  to  form  cadres  for 
the  organization  of  new  regiments  as  recruits  are  obtained.  Organize 
the  advanced  base  force  and  complete  its  equipment. 

11.  Leave  in  the  Caribbean  a  sufficient  number  of  light  cruisers  to 
keep  a  lookout  for  submarines  in  those  waters  and  for  the  protection  of 
our  interests  there.  Protect  the  Canal  and  Guantanamo  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, by  the  use  of  mines  and  where  possible  by  monitors,  submarines 
and  nets. 

12.  For  the  present  use  the  greater  part  of  the  destroyer  flotillas 
as  patrol  for  submarines  in  the  vicinity  of  the  principal  ports  or  en- 
trances leading  to  them. 

13.  Base  the  submarines  at  Canal,  Guantanamo,  and  points  along 
the  coast  in  accordance  with  the  Black  Plan. 

14.  Rush  to  completion  all  naval  vessels  building  or  authorized; 
also  build  up  the  Aviation  Service  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

15.  Guard  all  bays  and  harbors  on  the  coast  of  Maine  to  prevent 
their  use  as  bases  of  supply.  Patrol  waters  of  Haiti,  Santo  Domingo, 
Porto  Rico,  and  Danish  West  Indies,  the  Cuban  Coast  Guard  Service 
to  assist  in  patrolling  all  bays  and  gulfs  of  the  coast  of  Cuba. 

16.  Prepare  to  close  entrances  to  all  ports  at  night  and  discontinue 
or  change  such  aids  to  navigation  as  may  be  necessary. 


28  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

17.  Organize  a  comprehensive  system  of  intelligence  service  cover- 
ing the  whole  theater  of  war  in  accordance  with  the  plans  of  the  Office 
of  Naval  Intelligence. 

18.  Take  possession  of  all  interned  vessels  of  war  of  Central  Powers ; 
also  take  control  of  all  commercial  vessels  of  Central  Powers  now  in 
United  States  waters. 

19.  Place  under  surveillance  all  citizens  of  the  Central  Powers  in 
the  Navy  or  in  Government  employ  in  naval  establishments,  and  remove 

\  them  from  positions  in  which  they  may  do  possible  harm. 
!       20.     Arm  our  merchant  ships  for  purposes  of  defense. 

21.  In  accordance  with  Black  Plan,  carry  out  the  following : 

j        (a)     Issue  proclamation   prescribing  defensive  sea  areas  and  put 

rules  in  regard  to  them  in  force. 

:        (b)     Issue  proclamation  prescribing  press  regulations  and   estab- 
'  lishing  censorship  of  cable  and  radio,  including  naval  control  of  all 

commercial  and  private  radio  stations. 

(c)     Issue  President's  order  in  regard  to  visit  and  search,  capture, 

etc. 

22.  And  as  most  important,  arrange,  as  soon  as  possible,  plans  of  co- 
operation with  the  naval  forces  of  the  Allies  for  the  joint  protection  of 
trans- Atlantic  commerce  and  for  offensive  naval  operations  against  the 
common  enemy. 

Chas.  J.  Badger. 

General  war  plans,  as  I  have  stated,  had  been  developed 
years  before  under  the  direction  of  Admiral  Dewey.  Among 
these  was  the  "Black  Plan"  designated  for  "war  in  the  At- 
lantic," really  for  war  with  Germany.  Revised  from  time  to 
time  as  the  progress  of  the  European  conflict  suggested  changes, 
this  was  constantly  kept  up  to  date,  and  covered  thoroughly 
general  policies  and  operations.  The  recommendations  of  Feb- 
ruary 4th  and  various  others  submitted  later  were  for  specific 
things  to  be  done  in  consonance  with  the  general  scheme. 

A  week  after  the  break  with  Germany,  I  sent  the  following 
to  the  General  Board : 

February  10,  1917. 

To:   The  General  Board. 
Subject:    Solution  of  Problem. 

1.  The  Department  desires  the  General  Board  to  consider  the  fol- 
lowing problem  and  submit  its  solution  as  soon  as  practicable : 

Problem 

General  situation — Conditions  as  at  present  except  that  war  with 
Germany  is  declared. 


THE  BREAK  WITH  GERMANY        29 

Special  situation — The  Allies  do  not  desire  our  battleship  force  at 
present. 

Kequired — Naval  estimate  of  the  situation :  first,  as  to  the  grand 
strategy  demanded  by  the  situation ;  second,  as  to  the  disposition  of  the 
battleship  force;  third,  as  to  the  method  of  assisting  in  maintaining 
communications  with  Europe,  including  scheme  for  cooperation  with 
Allies ;  fourth,  as  to  method  of  driving  submarines  from  the  sea. 

Assume — Mobilization  of  all  naval  vessels  and  possibility  of  mobiliz- 
ing merchant  vessels  as  required. 

Josephus  Daniels. 

Anti-submarine  warfare,  cooperation  with  the  Allies,  was 
the  keynote  of  all  our  plans,  as  of  this  "problem,"  the  solution 
of  which  the  General  Board  submitted  on  February  17.  We 
were  then,  as  always,  planning  "  for  the  joint  protection  of  trans- 
Atlantic  commerce,"  as  the  Board  expressed  it,  "and  for 
offensive  naval  operations  against  the  common  enemy." 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  DAY  OF  DECISION 

MOST  IMPORTANT  CABINET  MEETING  OF  WILSON  ADMINISTRATION  HELD 
MARCH    20,    1917,   WHEN   IT   WAS   DECIDED   TO   CALL   CONGRESS   IN 

SPECIAL     SESSION     TO     DECLARE     WAR "j     WANT     TO     DO     RIGHT, 

WHETHER  IT  IS  POPULAR  OR  NOT,"   SAID  THE  PRESIDENT FLEET 

ORDERED  NORTH NAVY  AND  MARINE   CORPS  INCREASED  TO   EMER- 
GENCY STRENGTH. 

TUESDAY,  March  20,  1917,  is  not  fixed  in  the  war 
chronologies,  so  far  as  I  can  find.  But  it  should  be, 
for  that  was  the  Day  of  Decision.  That  was  the  occa- 
sion of  the  most  important  Cabinet  meeting  of  the 
Wilson  administration,  in  fact  without  doubt  the  most  important 
of  our  generation. 

Eleven  days  earlier  the  President  had  called  Congress  to 
meet  in  special  session  April  16th,  ' '  to  receive  such  communica- 
tion as  may  be  made  by  the  Executive. ' '  But  events  were  mov- 
ing rapidly.  Four  American  vessels  had  been  sunk  without 
warning — the  Algonquin,  City  of  Memphis,  Illinois,  and  Vigil- 
ancia — with  the  loss  of  American  lives.  German  U-boats  were 
destroying  shipping  by  the  hundred  thousand  tons.  We  had 
been  arming  merchant  vessels,  but  it  was  evident  that  this 
" armed  neutrality"  in  itself  was  insufficient,  valuable  as  it  was. 

The  " overt  act"  had  occurred.  The  Germans  were  sinking 
our  ships,  killing  our  citizens  on  the  high  seas.  There  were 
matters  of  vital  importance  to  be  discussed  when  the  Cabinet 
met.  Congress  had  already  been  summoned  to  meet  within  a 
month.    But  every  day  counted. 

Should  the  special  session  be  called  at  an  earlier  date?  What 
message  should  be  sent  to  Congress  in  view  of  the  situation? 
These  were  the  questions  propounded  by  the  President,  who 
was  grave,  feeling  the  deep  sense  of  responsibility.    He  wished 

30 


THE  DAY  OF  DECISION  31 

every  member  of  the  Cabinet  to  state  bis  conviction  of  the 
national  duty,  he  told  us,  and  each  spoke  from  his  standpoint. 

I  have  often  wished  that  it  might  have  been  possible  to  pre- 
serve a  record  of  Cabinet  meetings,  particularly  in  the  months 
preceding  and  during  the  war.  If  the  American  people  could 
have  seen  the  President  and  heard  him  as  he  spoke  to  us  on 
(March  20th,  they  would  have  felt  a  confidence  and  admiration 
which  nothing  else  could  have  imparted.  I  do  not  feel  at  liberty 
to  give  from  memory  what  he  said,  or  the  statements  of  the 
ten  members  of  the  Cabinet.  His  severest  critics  have  praised 
President  Wilson's  power  to  express  national  sentiment  and  set 
forth  problems  and  solutions  in  living  sentences  in  his  public 
addresses.  That  power  was  even  more  markedly  displayed  in 
the  bosom  of  his  official  family. 

That  day  he  began  by  sketching  the  steps  this  country  had 
taken  to  protect  American  lives.  He  was  disinclined  to  the 
final  break.  As  he  so  often  did  in  laying  weighty  matters  be- 
fore the  cabinet,  Mr.  Wilson  clearly  stated  the  events  culminat- 
ing in  repeated  sinking  of  American  ships  by  German  sub- 
marines, and  then,  with  a  sort  of  seeming  detachment,  invited 
the  views  of  the  Cabinet. 

It  was  a  supreme  moment.  Some  of  us,  fully  in  harmony 
with  the  President's  patient  and  long  successful  efforts  to  pro- 
tect American  rights  by  peaceful  means,  had  at  last,  like  him- 
self, lost  hope  of  world  and  national  safety  without  resort  to 
war.  Others,  approving  of  steps  taken,  had  earlier  wished 
entrance  into  the  struggle.  It  is  interesting,  even  when  the 
matter  is  not  one  greater  than  life  and  death,  as  was  this  de- 
termination, to  observe  how  ten  men  with  the  same  objective 
will  differ  in  the  presentation  of  their  views  or  the  reasons 
which  prompt  their  conclusions.  No  two  of  the  Cabinet  on  that 
day  gave  expression  to  precisely  the  same  reasons,  or  rather, 
I  should  say,  aside  from  the  impelling  reason,  each  had  been 
influenced  by  some  incident  or  argument  he  presented.  But  all 
were  convinced  that  the  character  of  the  warfare  being  waged 
by  the  Central  Powers  could  no  longer  be  tolerated  and  that 
no  course  was  open  but  for  America  to  throw  the  weight  of 
its  great  power  into  the  scales  against  Germany. 

After  all  had  advised  that  Congress  be  called  in  session  as 


32  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

early  as  practicable,  one  member  read  a  number  of  telegrams 
conveying  the  impression  that  popular  opinion  was  strongly 
in  favor  of  our  early  entrance  into  the  war. 

"We  are  not  governed  by  public  opinion  in  our  conclusion," 
said  the  President.  "I  want  to  do  right  whether  it  is  popular 
or  not." 

The  next  morning  the  proclamation  was  issued  summoning 
Congress  to  meet  April  2,  "to  receive  a  communication  by  the 
Executive  on  grave  questions  of  national  policy  which  should 
be  taken  under  consideration." 

War  was  only  a  matter  of  days.  Under  the  conditions,  the 
place  for  the  fleet  was  in  home  waters.  When  I  returned  to 
the  Department  after  the  Cabinet  meeting,  orders  were  sent 
to  Admiral  Mayo  to  bring  the  fleet  north  at  once.  Some  smaller 
vessels  were  left  in  the  Caribbean  to  protect  tankers  coming 
from  Mexico  and  Texas.  Though  the  day  previous  I  had  asked 
the  General  Board  to  consider  carefully  whether  everything 
possible  was  being  done  for  the  protection  of  our  ships  entering 
the  proscribed  area,  that  afternoon,  accompanied  by  Admiral 
Benson,  I  attended  a  meeting  of  the  Board,  informing  its  mem- 
bers that  the  President  wished  them  to  outline  every  measure 
that  the  Navy  could  employ  for  protection  of  American  ship- 
ping entering  European  ports,  beyond  the  provision  of  armed 
guards  which  we  had  already  undertaken.  I  told  the  Board 
that  we  desired  the  fullest  and  most  ample  protection,  regard- 
less of  effort  or  expense. 

Replying  immediately,  the  Board  recommended: 

Escort  vessels  to  deep  water  from  our  ports,  and  similarly  from 
deep  water  to  our  ports. 

Arrange  with  British  and  French  Governments  for  the  convoy  of 
our  ships  through  the  barred  zones. 

Merchant  ships  to  proceed  on  high  seas  from  points  of  leaving  and 
receiving  escorts,  depending  upon  their  guns  for  protection  and  upon 
changes  of  course  to  follow  alternate  routes. 

Arrange  with  British  and  French  Governments  a  code  of  signals  to 
be  used  in  directing  merchant  ships  as  to  routes  to  he  followed  and 
points  of  meeting  escorts. 

Establish  a  patrol  of  the  Atlantic  coast. 

Recruit  up  to  the  limit  allowed  by  law  for  emergencies  in  order  to 
provide  crews  for  patrols  and  auxiliaries,  and  fill  battleship  complements 
which  have  been  depleted  to  supply  gun  crews  to  merchant  ships. 


THE  DAY  OF  DECISION  33 

At  the  next  meeting  of  the  Cabinet,  on  Friday,  I  presented 
the  authority  granted  by  Congress  to  increase  the  enlisted 
strength  of  the  Navy  to  87,000,  and  the  President  directed  me 
to  fill  up  the  Navy  and  Marine  Corps  to  the  full  number  author- 
ized in  case  of  national  emergency. 

On  Saturday  afternoon  the  President  called  at  the  Navy 
Department.  Mrs.  Wilson  came  with  him.  The  rapid  approach 
of  war  weighed  upon  him,  and  he  wished  to  keep  in  close  touch 
with  all  military  preparations.  It  was  then  that  I  brought  up 
the  matter  of  sending  to  London  a  naval  officer  of  high  rank, 
which  resulted,  a  few  days  later,  in  the  sending  of  Admiral  Sims. 

I  also  informed  him  of  the  result  of  the  important  confer- 
ence we  had  held  that  morning  with  shipbuilders  to  secure 
rapid  construction  of  additional  destroyers.  Before  that  time 
we  had  always  insisted  upon  and  been  able  to  secure  "fixed 
price"  contracts,  under  which  it  could  be  known  precisely  what 
a  vessel  would  cost,  the  builders  being  under  bond  to  deliver 
it  to  us  at  the  price  agreed  upon.  But  this  was  no  longer  pos- 
sible. With  the  rising  cost  of  labor  and  materials,  the  builders 
were  unwilling  to  name  specific  figures.  Reluctantly,  I  agreed 
to  a  contract  based  on  actual  cost  of  construction  with  ten  per 
cent  profit.  Destroyers  were  sorely  needed,  we  wanted  all  the 
shipyards  could  build,  and  expedition  was  worth  all  it  might 
cost.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  no  other  construction  during  the  war 
was  accomplished  with  so  little  increased  cost. 

That  night  the  President  signed  the  order  directing  that  the 
authorized  enlisted  strength  of  the  Navy  be  increased  to  87,000 
men,  and  the  next  day  I  sent  a  telegram  to  the  newspapers  of 
the  country,  more  than  a  thousand  of  them,  asking  them  to  print 
the  order  on  the  first  page  and  also  make  an  editorial  appeal 
for  recruits,  saying: 

New  ships  and  ships  in  reserve  are  being  fully  commissioned  as  rap- 
idly as  possible,  and  the  need  is  imperative  for  a  larger  enlistment  to 
man  them.  There  has  been  a  net  increase  of  over  6,500  in  enlistment 
since  Congress  recently  authorized  an  increase,  but  many  more  are 
needed  and  needed  now. 

This  appeared  in  nearly  every  paper  in  the  United  States, 
and  most  of  them  accompanied  it  with  an  editorial.    It  was  an 


34  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

example  of  the  fine  spirit  of  cooperation  and  patriotism  shown 
by  the  American  press  during  the  entire  war.  Every  recruiting 
station  was  telegraphed  to  increase  the  force  and  to  engage 
doctors  to  examine  applicants,  so  there  would  be  no  delay. 
Within  a  few  hours  after  the  President  signed  the  order  to  in- 
crease the  Navy,  the  recruiting  campaign  was  under  way  in 
every  part  of  the  Union. 

Thursday  afternoon  at  4:30  o'clock,  as  I  was  holding  the 
daily  interview  with  the  press,  President  Wilson,  unannounced, 
came  into  the  Navy  Department.  It  was  several  minutes  before 
I  knew  he  was  there.  There  had  been  a  rapid  fire  of  interroga- 
tions and  answers  between  the  Secretary  and  the  correspondents 
when  an  officer  came  to  my  desk  and  said,  "The  President  is 
here. ' '  He  was  sitting  quietly  at  the  other  end  of  the  big  room, 
listening  to  the  cross-examination  which  a  cabinet  officer  under- 
goes at  the  hands  of  press  representatives  twice  every  day. 
And  they  always  ask  "searching  questions."  As  soon  as  the 
newspaper  men  knew  the  President  was  in  the  room,  they  lost 
all  interest  in  me  and  I  asked  to  be  excused  from  further 
questioning. 

"Do  you  have  to  undergo  that  ordeal  every  day?"  Mr. 
Wilson  asked. 

"Yes,  twice  every  day,"  was  my  reply;  "but  it  is  not  usually 
an  ordeal.  Being  a  newspaper  man  myself,  I  recall  that  most 
of  my  life  has  been  spent  in  doing  to  other  public  officers  what 
those  reporters  are  doing  to  me — and,  besides,  I  rather  like  it." 

What  to  do  with  the  interned  German  ships  was  still  a 
puzzling  and  undecided  question,  and  that  was  one  of  the  mat- 
ters that  Mr.  Wilson  had  come  to  discuss. 

"We  must  keep  in  close  touch,"  he  said,  as  he  opened  the 
conversation.  He  spoke  of  the  submarine  situation  and  the  in- 
terned ships,  and  then  showed  me  a  letter  from  a  man  of  im- 
portance to  the  effect  that  an  Austrian  had  arrived  in  the 
United  States  on  a  submarine,  had  called  upon  the  Austrian 
Consul  at  New  York,  and  given  him  important  papers  which 
had  been  brought  from  Europe  in  the  undersea  boat.  He  un- 
derstood that  two  submarines  had  come  over  from  Germany, 
the  writer  said. 

While  this  seemed  improbable,  a  telegram  was  sent  in  code 


THE  DAY  OF  DECISION  35 

to  all  naval  commanders  and  stations  to  be  on  the  lookout.  That 
night  a  message  was  received  from  the  Commandant  of  the  New 
York  district  that  two  submarines  had  been  sighted  off  Montauk 
Point.  Destroyers  and  motor  boats  were  sent  there  to  search 
the  vicinity. 

This  proved  to  be  a  "false  alarm,"  as  did  so  many  reports 
which  were  sent  forth  with  every  particularity  in  that  early 
period.  But  we  had  to  investigate  all  that  seemed  possible, 
for  we  could  not  afford  to  take  any  chances  of  surprise  attacks. 


CHAPTER  V 

SENDING  SIMS  TO  EUROPE 

cooperation  with  allies  the  keynote  of  our  policy admiral 

"wilson    first    chosen sims*    mission    and    instructions 

sailed  as  "s.  w.  davidson,"  private  citizen british  had  no 

plans  that  promised  success,  lord  jellicoe  told  him — carson 
praised  America's  "speedy  action." 

THE  most  important  thing,  perhaps,  that  I  discussed  with 
the  President  when  he  visited  the  Navy  Department 
March  24th  was  sending  to  London  an  officer  of  high 
rank  who  would  put  us  in  more  intimate  touch  with  the 
British  Admiralty. 

The  text  of  that  discussion  was  the  following  cablegram  just 
received  from  the  American  Ambassador : 

London,  March  23,  1917,  7  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  State, 

"Washington. 

Mr.  Balfour  has  shown  me  the  informal  suggestion  conveyed  by  the 
Navy  Department  through  Gaunt  [British  naval  attache  on  duty  in 
Washington]  regarding  closer  relations  and  his  reply.  The  British 
Government  will  heartily  fall  in  with  any  plan  we  propose  as  soon  as 
cooperation  can  be  formally  established.  It  was  intimated  to  me  that 
a  submarine  base  on  the  coast  of  Ireland  would  then  be  assented  to. 

The  whole  subject  of  active  cooperation  and  the  best  methods  to 
bring  it  about  have  been  informally  discussed  by  me  with  Mr.  Balfour, 
Mr.  Bonar  Law,  the  Prime  Minister,  Admiral  Jellicoe,  and  others  at 
their  invitation,  and  they  will  most  gladly  assent  to  any  proposals  that 
we  are  likely  to  make.  They  withhold  proposals  of  their  own  until  the 
way  has  formally  been  opened  by  us  lest  they  should  seem  to  push 
themselves  upon  us,  which  they,  of  course,  do  not  wish  to  do. 

I  know  personally  and  informally  that  they  hope  for  the  establish- 
ment of  full  and  frank  naval  interchange  of  information  and  coopera- 
tion. Knowing  their  spirit  and  their  methods,  I  can  not  too  strongly 
recommend  that  our  government  send  here  immediately  an  admiral  of 
our  own  navy  who  will  bring  our  navy's  plans  and  inquiries.  The 
coming  of  such  an  officer  of  high  rank  would  be  regarded  as  a  com- 

36 


SENDING  SIMS  TO  EUROPE  37 

pliment  and  he  would  have  all  doors  opened  to  him  and  a  sort  of  special 
staff  appointed  to  give  him  the  results  and  methods  of  the  whole  British 
naval  work  since  the  war  began.  Every  important  ally  has  an  officer 
of  such  high  rank  here.  In  a  private  conversation  with  me  today  at 
luncheon  Mr.  Balfour  expressed  his  enthusiastic  hope  that  such  a  plan 
would  be  immediately  carried  out.  Many  things  of  the  greatest  value 
would  be  verbally  made  known  to  such  an  officer  which  would  never  be 
given  in  a  routine  way  nor  reduced  to  writing. 

Admiral  Jellicoe  has  privately  expressed  the  hope  to  me  that  our 
navy  may  see  its  way  to  patrol  our  coast  and  possibly  relieve  the  British 
cruisers  now  on  our  side  of  the  Atlantic.  He  hopes  too  that  in  case 
more  German  raiders  go  out  we  may  help  capture  them  in  waters  where 
they  prey  on  shipping  from  Mexico  or  South  America. 

If  our  Navy  Department  will  send  an  admiral  it  would  be  advan- 
tageous for  me  to  be  informed  as  soon  as  possible.  The  confidential  in- 
formation that  he  will  come  by  would  be  of  immediate  help.  Such  an 
officer  could  further  definite  plans  for  full  cooperation. 

Page. 

We  had  presented  the  proposition  informally  through  the 
British  naval  attache,  as  the  Ambassador  pointed  out.  Captain 
McDougall,  our  naval  attache  in  London,  was  given  access  to 
all  records  which  were  not  confidential,  and  his  intimate  associa- 
tion with  the  officers  of  the  Admiralty  enabled  him  to  keep  the 
Navy  Department  in  constant  touch  with  the  situation  and  to 
give  us  data  bearing  on  many  phases  of  naval  effort.  But  there 
were,  of  course,  many  things  kept  secret,  unrevealed  to  any 
neutral.  Our  break  with  Germany  brought  about  new  condi- 
tions, and  made  possible  a  more  intimate  exchange  of  views 
between  the  American  and  British  navies.  Ruthless  U-boat  war- 
fare begun  only  a  few  weeks  before,  the  Germans  sinking  ship- 
ping by  the  million  tons,  and  the  British  naturally  concealing 
their  losses  and  their  plans,  made  it  important  for  us  to  secure 
the  fullest  information  as  to  the  exact  situation,  and  what  steps 
were  being  taken  to  meet  it.  And  in  case  war  was  declared, 
to  have  in  London  an  admiral  to  aid  the  Department  in  putting 
into  immediate  effect  the  cooperation  with  the  Allies  which  we 
were  planning. 

That  Saturday  afternoon  I  discussed  Ambassador  Page's 
cablegram  and  the  whole  matter  with  the  President,  and  he 
approved  the  plan.  Then  the  question  arose  as  to  what  officer 
should  be  selected  for  this  important  mission.    The  choice  was 


38  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Admiral  Henry  B.  Wilson,  later  commander-in-chief  of  the  At- 
lantic Fleet,  then  commanding  the  battleship  Pennsylvania. 
But  we  were  creating  a  strong  patrol  force  and  Admiral  Wilson 
was  regarded  as  the  best  man  to  organize  and  command  it. 

Admiral  Jellicoe  was,  as  Ambassador  Page  said,  particularly 
anxious  that  our  Navy  might  "see  its  way  to  patrol  our  coast 
and  possibly  relieve  the  British  cruisers  now  on  our  side  of  the 
Atlantic,"  and  also,  in  case  more  German  raiders  got  out,  as 
was  feared,  to  "help  capture  them  in  waters  where  they  prey 
on  shipping  from  Mexico  or  South  America. ' '  This  was  in  line 
with  the  policy  we  had  already  adopted.  Formally  organized 
on  March  28,  Admiral  Wilson  was  put  in  command  of  this  force, 
which  accomplished  just  what  Admiral  Jellicoe  then  suggested, 
and  what  was  one  of  the  first  requests  made,  after  war  was  de- 
clared, by  Admirals  Browning  and  Grasset. 

The  Germans,  naval  officers  pointed  out,  might  well  conclude 
as  soon  as  we  declared  war  to  send  submarines  across  the  At- 
lantic to  attack  shipping  and  cut  down  the  flow  of  munitions 
and  supplies  to  Europe.  One  or  two  operating  inthe  Gulf  might 
interrupt  the  shipment  of  oil  from  Mexican  fields,  the  largest 
source  of  supply  for  the  British  Fleet.  A  strong  patrol  force 
would  not  only  protect  all  shipping  on  this  side  of  the  ocean, 
but,  well  organized  and  equipped,  would  be  ready  when  called 
upon,  to  operate  in  European  waters,  as  it  did  later  on.  So,  it 
was  determined  to  assign  Wilson  to  that  duty  and  Admiral 
William  S.  Sims  was  then  chosen  for  the  London  mission. 

On  Monday,  March  26,  I  telegraphed  him  to  come  to  Wash- 
ington. He  arrived  on  the  28th  and  came  to  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment in  the  afternoon.  Referring  to  Mr.  Page's  telegram,  I 
told  him  the  President  had  decided  to  send  an  admiral  to  Eng- 
land, and  he  had  been  selected.  Informing  him,  in  confidence, 
of  our  belief  that  the  time  was  near  at  hand  when  the  United 
States  would  enter  the  war,  I  told  him  that,  in  that  event,  we 
must  prepare  for  the  fullest  cooperation  with  the  British  Navy. 
But  his  immediate  duty,  I  pointed  out,  was  to  secure  all  pos- 
sible information  as  to  what  the  British  were  doing,  and  what 
plans  they  had  for  more  effective  warfare  against  the  sub- 
marines. 

In  the  course  of  the  conversation,  I  said:   "You  have  been 


SENDING  SIMS  TO  EUROPE  39 

selected  for  this  mission  not  because  of  your  Guildhall  speech, 
but  in  spite  of  it."  In  that  speech  Sims  had  said,  "If  the  time 
ever  comes  when  the  British  Empire  is  seriously  menaced  by 
an  external  enemy,  it  is  my  opinion  that  you  may  count  upon 
every  man,  every  dollar,  every  drop  of  blood  of  your  kindred 
across  the  sea."  Impressing  upon  him  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  was  still  neutral,  and  that  until  Congress  should  declare 
war  his  mission  must  be  a  secret  and  confidential  one,  I  informed 
him  that  it  had  been  decided  not  to  issue  written  orders  detach- 
ing him  from  his  duties  at  Newport,  but  for  him  to  go  quietly 
as  a  civilian  passenger,  and  report  to  Ambassador  Page  person- 
ally before  any  public  announcement  was  made. 

Among  the  matters  discussed  was  the  extent  of  the  sinkings 
by  submarines.  Ambassador  Page  had  written  me  confidentially 
that  the  situation  was  more  serious  than  the  British  admitted. 
I  told  Admiral  Sims  that  the  President  believed  the  British  had 
not  taken  the  necessary  vigorous  offensive  to  prevent  destruc- 
tion of  shipping  by  the  U-boats  and  that  he  strongly  believed 
two  things  ought  to  be  done : 

First,  that  every  effort  should  be  made  to  prevent  the  sub- 
marines getting  into  the  Atlantic — that  they  ought  to  be  shut 
up  in  their  own  coasts,  or  some  method  should  be  found  to  pre- 
vent their  ingress  and  egress. 

Second,  that  all  ships  ought  to  be  convoyed.  The  President 
had  been  of  this  opinion  for  a  long  time,  and  had  insisted  that 
it  was  essential  to  give  protection  to  shipping.  The  General 
Board  had  strongly  recommended  convoy,  and  I  favored  it.  But, 
as  I  told  Admiral  Sims,  I  had  taken  this  matter  up  with  naval 
officers  in  the  Department,  and  there  was  division  of  opinion, 
most  of  them  seeming  to  agree  with  the  British  Admiralty,  which 
apparently  opposed  the  convoy  system.  It  had  not  been  adopted 
abroad. 

Admiral  Sims  seemed  pleased  with  his  mission  and  instruc- 
tions. And  the  only  official  instructions  he  received  were  those 
I  gave  him.  But,  someone  may  ask  about  the  sensational  state- 
ment in  his  letter  that  he  was  given  the  explicit  admonition, 
"Don't  let  the  British  pull  the  wool  over  your  eyes.  It  is 
none  of  our  business  pulling  their  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire. 
We  would  as  soon  fight  the  British  as  the  Germans." 


40  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

I  never  heard  of  that  until  I  read  it  in  Sims'  letter  of  Jan- 
uary 7,  1920.  Later,  testifying  before  the  Senate  investigating 
Committee  he  stated  that  the  remark  was  made  by  Benson,  who 
afterwards  in  Paris  made  a  similar  statement.  "I  will  admit 
that  I  had  completely  forgotten  the  incident,"  said  Sims  in 
regard  tq  the  latter.  "It  was  recalled  to  me  by  a  member  of 
my  staff  who  was  present,  and  who  heard  it.  I  think  that  the 
reason  I  did  not  remember  that  distinctly  was  because  I  re- 
garded it  as  a  personal  idiosyncrasy  of  the  Admiral.  I  had 
known  the  general  opinion  that  he  was  intensely  anti-British, 
but  it  did  not  affect  me  particularly." 

"I  have  always  had  the  best  possible  personal  relations  with 
Admiral  Benson,"  he  continued.  "I  regard  him  as  an  up- 
standing and  honest  man  who  has  exceedingly  strong  convic- 
tions and  who  is  very  firm  in  adherence  to  those  convictions. 
I  believe  everything  he  has  done  during  the  war  has  been  done 
conscientiously,  and  to  get  along  with  the  war." 

Benson  said  he  could  not  recall  just  what  was  said ;  that  he 
strongly  approved  Sims'  selection,  but  probably  used  "very 
forcible  language"  in  impressing  upon  him  the  seriousness  of 
the  situation  and  the  importance  of  being  very  careful  that ' '  his 
feelings  toward  the  British  did  not  lead  him  into  any  indis- 
cretion." He  denied  strongly  that  his  words  could  be  inter- 
preted to  mean  anything  else. 

In  view  of  these  statements  and  the  known  fact  that  Admiral 
Benson  and  everybody  else  in  our  navy  earnestly  cooperated 
with  the  British,  and  that  Benson  had  a  large  part  in  arranging 
this  cooperation  before  Sims  reached  London,  I  think  there  is 
no  occasion  for  any  further  allusion  to  the  remark. 

On  the  last  day  of  March,  a  week  before  war  was  declared, 
Admiral  Sims  and  his  aide,  Commander  J.  V.  Babcock,  boarded 
the  steamship  New  York,  entered  upon  the  passenger  list  as 
"S.  W.  Davidson"  and  "V.  J.  Richardson."  Their  fellow  voy- 
agers had  no  idea  that  "Mr.  Davidson"  was  an  admiral  of  the 
United  States  Navy  going  abroad  on  an  important  mission,  and 
"Mr.  Richardson"  was  his  aide. 

Reaching  Liverpool  April  9th,  after  an  uneventful  voyage, 
the  New  York,  as  it  approached  the  outer  harbor,  struck  a  mine. 
Though  the  ship  was  not  damaged  beyond  repair,  it  was  crip- 


SENDING  SIMS  TO  EUROPE  41 

pled,  and  the  passengers  were  transferred  to  another  vessel  and 
taken  ashore.  At  the  dock  the  American  officers  were  welcomed 
by  Rear  Admiral  Hope,  and  they  found  that  a  special  train, 
provided  by  the  Admiralty,  was  waiting  to  take  them  to  London. 
Admiral  Sims  on  arrival  there  at  once  conferred  with  Ambas- 
sador Page  and  the  British  naval  authorities,  and  was  admitted 
to  the  confidence  of  the  Admiralty. 

Since  his  departure  from  America,  there  had  been  a  radical 
change  in  the  situation.  The  United  States  had  declared  war 
against  Germany,  and  we  were  free  to  deal  with  the  Allies  as 
associates  in  the  great  conflict.  While  Sims  was  having  his 
first  interview  with  the  authorities  in  London,  we  were  in  con- 
ference at  Washington  with  the  ranking  British  and  French 
admirals  in  the  Western  Atlantic.  In  fact  a  working  agreement 
was  perfected,  and  orders  had  been  issued  to  send  destroyers  to 
Europe  before  we  received  Sims'  first  dispatch.  Thus  Sims 
in  London  and  our  authorities  in  Washington  carried  out  with 
the  utmost  cordiality  that  splendid  cooperation  between  the 
British  and  American  navies  which  continued  throughout  the 
war  and  which  has  hardly  a  parallel  in  naval  history. 

In  his  first  cablegram  from  London,  April  14,  1917,  Sims 
reported : 

The  submarine  issue  is  very  much  more  serious  than  the  people 
realize  in  America.  The  recent  success  of  operations  and  the  rapidity 
of  construction  constitute  the  real  crisis  of  the  war.  The  morale  of 
the  enemy  submarines  is  not  broken,  only  about  fifty-four  are  known 
to  have  been  captured  or  sunk  and  no  voluntary  surrenders  have  been 
recorded.     *     *     * 

Supplies  and  communications  of  forces  on  all  fronts,  including  the 
Russians,  are  threatened  and  control  of  the  sea  actually  imperilled. 

German  submarines  are  constantly  extending  their  operations  into 
the  Atlantic,  increasing  areas  and  the  difficulty  of  patrolling.  Russian 
situation  critical.  Baltic  fleet  mutiny,  eighty-five  admirals,  captains, 
and  commanders  murdered,  and  in  some  armies  there  is  insubordination. 

The  amount  of  British,  neutral  and  Allied  shipping  lost  in  February 
was  536,000  tons,  in  March  571,000  tons,  and  in  the  first  ten  days  of 
April  205,000  tons.  With  short  nights  and  better  weather  these  losses 
are  increasing. 

The  Germans,  he  said,  had  seventy  mine-laying  submarines, 
and  were  building  new  ones  at  a  rate  approaching  three  a  week. 


42  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

What  were  the  British  doing  to  meet  this  perilous  situation? 
What  plans  did  they  have  to  defeat  the  U-boats?  That  was 
what  we  particularly  wanted  to  know,  and  were  surprised  when 
it  was  not  stated  in  that  dispatch. 

Describing  his  first  interview  with  Lord  Jellicoe,  Admiral 
Sims  says,  in  his  book,  published  three  years  later : 

"It  looks  as  though  the  Germans  were  whining  the  war,"  I 
remarked. 

"They  will  win,  unless  we  can  stop  these  losses — and  stop  them 
soon,"  the  Admiral  replied. 

' '  Is  there  no  solution  for  the  problem  ? "  I  asked. 

"Absolutely  none  that  we  can  see  now,"  Jellicoe  announced. 

What  the  British  were  doing  in  regard  to  protecting  ships 
was  set  forth  clearly  in  Sims'  letter  of  April  19,  in  which  he 
said: 

.After  trying  various  methods  of  controlling  shipping,  the  Admiralty 
now  believes  the  best  policy  to  be  one  of  dispersion.  They  use  about 
six  relatively  large  avenues  or  arcs  of  approach  to  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Channels,  changing  their  limits  or  area  periodically  if  necessity 
demands. 

There  was  considerable  criticism  of  the  Admiralty,  he  said, 
"for  not  taking  more  effective  steps,"  and  one  of  the  principal 
demands  was  for  "convoys  of  merchant  shipping,  and  more 
definite  and  real  protection  within  the  war  zone. ' '  But  not  only 
officers  but  ship  owners  and  captains  opposed  convoy,  favoring 
the  arming  of  merchant  vessels  and  independent  sailings,  he 
informed  us,  saying : 

The  Admiralty  has  had  frequent  conferences  with  merchant  masters 
and  sought  their  advice.  Their  most  unanimous  demand  is:  "Give  us 
a  gun  and  let  us  look  out  for  ourselves."  They  are  also  insistent  that 
it  is  impracticable  for  merchant  vessels  to  proceed  in  formation,  at  least 
in  any  considerable  numbers,  due  principally  to  difficulty  in  controlling 
their  speed  and  to  the  inexperience  of  their  subordinate  officers.  "With 
this  view  I  do  not  personally  agree  but  believe  that  with  a  little  ex- 
perience merchant  vessels  could  safely  and  sufficiently  well  steam  in 
open  formations. 

In  this  Sims  was  right,  as  was  shown  when,  later,  convoy 
was  adopted.     The  system  President  Wilson  had  long  advo- 


SENDING  SIMS  TO  EUROPE  43 

cated,  which  shipping  interests  and  many  naval  officers  had 
opposed,  proved  not  only  practicable,  but  a  very  effective 
measure. 

Urging  that  the  maximum  number  of  destroyers  and  anti- 
submarine craft  be  sent  to  Europe,  Sims  in  his  first  cablegram 
informed  us : 

It  is  very  likely  the  enemy  will  make  submarine  mine-laying  raids 
on  our  coasts  or  in  the  Caribbean  to  divert  attention  and  to  keep  our 
forces  from  the  critical  areas  in  the  Eastern  Atlantic  through  effect 
upon  public  opinion. 

We  had  to  expect  this  and  to  provide  against  it;  and  at  the 
same  time  extend  all  possible  aid  to  our  Allies  in  Europe. 
Destroyers  had  already  been  ordered  abroad,  the  first  arriving 
May  4,  and  others  were  sent  over  in  rapid  succession. 

Was  this  quick  response!  The  English  so  considered  it. 
Sir  Edward  Carson,  First  Civil  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  called  it 
"speedy  action"  when  he  said  in  his  address  to  the  British  Navy 
League  on  May  17 : 

"The  toast  that  I  have  to  propose  is  that  of  the  American  Navy. 
I  give  it  to  you  from  the  bottom  of  my  heart.  The  date  of  this  particular 
function  is  very  opportune.  It  almost  coincides  with  the  arrival  in 
our  seas  of  the  first  installment  of  the  assistance  which  the  American 
Navy  is  going  to  give  us  in  the  terrible  task  that  is  before  us.  It  enables 
us  who  are  members  of  our  Navy  League,  and  it  enables  me  as  for  the 
moment  presiding  over  the  great  service  of  the  Admiralty  in  this 
country,  to  express  and  demonstrate  our  appreciation  of  the  speedy 
action  of  the  American  Navy  and  to  offer  a  hearty  welcome  to  the  offi- 
cers and  men  who  have  reached  our  shores.     *     *     * 

"I  don't  underestimate  the  submarine  menace.  It  is  a  great,  a  novel, 
and  a  terrible  menace.  It  is  a  menace  that  has  been  unsolved  by  any 
navy — our  own  navy,  the  G.erman  navy,  the  Austrian  navy,  the  Italian 
navy,  or  the  American  navy.  But  don't  imagine  you  will  solve  it  by 
abuse  or  funk.  No,  the  way  to  look  upon  it  is  that  it  is  a  real  danger, 
and  it  is  the  work  of  men  to  face  and  solve  real  dangers. ' ' 

The  problem  being  still  unsolved,  it  was  up  to  our  Navy  to 
devise  some  plan  that  might  solve  it.  And  we  did  propose,  nine 
days  after  this  country  entered  the  war,  the  biggest  project  that 
was  put  into  effect — mine  barrages  to  shut  in  the  U-boats,  pre- 
venting their  egress  into  the  Atlantic.    On  April  15  our  Bureau 


44  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

of  Ordnance  presented  plans  for  mine  barriers  across  the  North 
Sea  and  the  English  Channel.  On  April  17,  I  cabled  Sims  to 
report  on  the  practicability  of  blocking  the  German  coast,  to 
prevent  submarines  from  getting  out  from  their  bases.  He  re- 
plied that  this  had  been  tried  and  found  "unfeasible,"  and  said: 

To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  experience  we  should  adopt  pres- 
ent British  methods  and  base  further  developments  only  upon  actual 
experience  in  cooperation  with  them. 

That  the  barrage  was  unfeasible  was  the  opinion  of  the 
Admiralty  officers,  but  it  was  not  the  view  of  the  Prime  Minister, 
Lloyd  George,  who  like  President  Wilson  and  our  own  ordnance 
officers,  did  not  regard  it  as  impossible,  for  Sims  in  his  mail 
report  to  us  April  19th  said: 

The  Prime  Minister  only  two  days  ago  expressed  to  me  the  opinion 
that  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  find  physical  means  of  absolutely  sealing 
up  all  escape  for  submarines  from  their  own  ports.  The  fact  that  all 
such  methods  (nets,  mines,  obstructions,  etc.)  inherently  involve  the 
added  necessity  of  continuous  protection  and  maintenance  by  our  naval 
forces  is  seldom  understood  and  appreciated.  I  finally  convinced  the 
Prime  Minister  of  the  fallacy  of  such  propositions  by  describing  the 
situations  into  which  we  would  be  led:  namely,  that  in  order  to  main- 
tain our  obstructions  we  would  have  to  match  the  forces  the  enemy 
brought  against  them  until  finally  the  majority  if  not  all  of  our  own 
forces  would  be  forced  into  dangerous  areas  where  they  would  be  subject 
to  continual  torpedo  and  other  attack,  in  fact  in  a  position  most  favorable 
to  the  enemy. 

But  the  naval  administration  at  Washington  had  faith  in  that 
idea,  and  urged  it  again  and  again,  until  it  was  adopted,  and 
the  vast  barrage  was  laid  across  the  North  Sea. 


CHAPTER  VI 
NAVAL  ALLIES  IN  HISTORIC  CONFERENCE 

FOUR  DAYS  AFTER  WAR  WAS  DECLARED,  BRITISH,  FRENCH  AND  AMERI- 
CAN ADMIRALS  MET  AT  FORTRESS  MONROE  TO  MAP  OUT  PLANS  FOR 

IMMEDIATE    COOPERATION CONFERENCE    AT    WASHINGTON,    APRIL 

11TH,   FIXED    THE   POLICY   OF    UNITED    NAVAL   EFFORT FREQUENT 

AND  FULL  INTERCHANGE  OF  OPINION  WITH  ALLIES. 

FOUR  days  after  war  was  declared,  admirals  of  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain  and  France  were  in  conference  at 
Fortress  Monroe.  Immediately  upon  the  action  of  Con- 
gress, without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Admiral  Sims, 
then  on  the  ocean  bound  for  London,  arrangements  were  made 
to  confer  with  the  commanders-in-chief  of  the  British  and 
French  forces  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  who  were  familiar 
with  conditions  overseas  as  well  as  on  this  coast.  When  they 
arrived.  Admiral  Benson  asked:  "Where  can  our  Navy  render 
the  best  immediate  service?" 

Then  these  sea  fighters  sat  down  to  an  all-day  session  to  find 
the  best  answer  to  Benson's  question.  The  Allied  admirals,  who 
had  been  in  the  war  from  the  beginning,  told  what  had  been 
attempted,  what  achieved,  and  the  ways  wherein  they  hoped 
America  could  come  to  the  rescue. 

Hampton  Roads  was  the  site  of  a  historic  conference,  be- 
tween Abraham  Lincoln  and  Alexander  H.  Stephens  and  others 
in  1865,  when  there  was  hope  that  the  War  between  the  States 
might  be  brought  to  an  end.  That  conference  failed,  but  this 
of  April  10, 1917,  was  a  pronounced  success ;  for  it  was  followed 
the  next  day  by  the  conference  at  the  Navy  Department  in  Wash- 
ington, which  laid  the  foundations  for  the  perfect  cooperation 
in  the  war  with  Allied  governments,  the  first  agreement  the 
United  States  Navy  ever  made  with  foreign  naval  officials  to 
wage  war  together.  At  the  time  even  the  fact  that  it  was  held 
was  secret,  and  its  conclusions  were  sent  abroad  only  in  code. 

45 


46  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

For  secrecy  was  necessary  in  regard  to  this  as  well  as  other 
plans  and  operations. 

Since  1914  both  the  British  and  French  navies  had  main- 
tained their  ships  in  the  Western  Atlantic  from  Halifax  to 
Southern  waters.  Vice  Admiral  Browning  and  Rear  Admiral 
Grasset,  in  command  of  the  British  and  French  forces,  respec- 
tively, were  at  Bermuda  when  war  was  declared  and  came  at 
once  to  Hampton  Roads.  Admiral  Benson,  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations,  accompanied  by  Admiral  Mayo,  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  fleet,  went  from  Washington  on  the  President's 
yacht,  the  Sylph,  and  were  joined  by  Admiral  Wilson,  in  com- 
mand of  the  United  States  Patrol  Force.  In  sight  of  the  spot 
where  the  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac  met  in  their  epoch-making 
fight  over  half  a  century  before,  these  admirals  exchanged  views 
regarding  the  naval  conduct  of  the  war.  Admiral  Browning  had 
been  in  command  of  a  squadron  in  the  North  Sea,  and  acquainted 
the  American  officers  with  conditions  abroad,  and  they  in  turn 
advised  the  visiting  admirals  of  conditions  here. 

At  the  conclusion  of  this  meeting,  all  these  admirals  came 
to  Washington  for  a  conference  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
They  sailed  on  the  Sylph,  and  the  unprecedented  spectacle  was 
witnessed  of  that  little  ship  flying  the  flags  of  staff  officers  of 
three  nations.  It  was  symbolic  of  the  unity  which  marked  their 
joint  operations  during  the  war. 

Upon  their  arrival,  in  addition  to  the  admirals  who  had  met 
them  in  Hampton  Roads,  I  invited  to  confer  with  them  the 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  the  members  of  the  Gen- 
eral Board.  ' '  This  conference, ' '  I  stated  when  we  had  assembled 
in  the  rooms  of  the  General  Board,  "has  been  called  to  consider 
and  carry  out  without  delay  the  best  plans  for  the  fullest  co- 
operation of  the  navy  of  the  United  States  with  the  allied  navies, 
and  to  place  every  ounce  of  our  naval  strength  into  the  struggle 
in  the  ways  where  it  will  do  most  to  win  victory. ' ' 

Turning  to  the  British  and  French  representatives,  I  said 
that  as  their  nations  had  been  long  in  the  war  we  desired  to 
learn  by  their  successes  and  be  warned  by  their  failures,  if  they 
had  made  any.  The  conference  was  a  protracted  one  and  dis- 
cussed every  phase  of  the  naval  situation.  The  British  and 
French  admirals  told  of  their  long  and  satisfactory  talks  with 


NAVAL  ALLIES  IN  HISTORIC  CONFERENCE      47 

Benson,  Mayo  and  Wilson,  and  stated  that  they  were  practically 
agreed  as  to  the  plans  which  they  thought  would  best  aid  in  the 
object  all  had  in  view.  They  made  certain  suggestions  and  the 
following  arrangements  were  made  by  which,  it  was  agreed,  the 
United  States  could  best  throw  its  weight  into  the  struggle : — 

1.  The  United  States  Navy  to  take  over  the  patrol  of  the 
Atlantic  coast  from  Canada  to  South  American  waters.  They 
explained  the  importance  of  that  patrol  and  why  they  had  felt 
it  essential  to  preserve  it  since  1914.  They  gave  three  reasons 
for  its  continued  maintenance:  (a)  protection  of  shipping  for 
the  Allied  armies,  including  food  for  their  civilian  populations, 
and  oil  from  Mexico  for  their  fleets  and  armies;  (b)  protection 
against  the  coming  of  U-boats,  which  was  deemed  not  only 
possible  but  probable;  and  (c)  readiness  to  destroy  German 
raiders.  They  told  us  that  if  we  could  take  over  this  patrol  it 
would  serve  the  double  purpose  of  protecting  shipping  on  this 
coast  and  releasing  their  ships,  which  were  needed  at  home. 

At  that  time  both  here  and  abroad  there  was  a  general  belief 
that  German  strategy  would  dictate  the  sending  of  U-boats  to 
our  coast.  There  was  a  fear  too  (and  there  were  many  reports), 
of  possible  submarine  bases  at  out-of-the-way  places  on  the 
Atlantic  and  Gulf.  Indeed,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  in 
1914  the  Navy  had  been  vigilant  in  sending  craft  into  all  places 
on  our  coast,  from  Canada  to  the  Panama  Canal,  which  might 
possibly  enable  U-boats  to  subsist  in  our  waters.  That  confer- 
ence agreed  that  this  vigilance  should  be  continued  and  made 
more  effective,  because  it  was  thought  the  incentive  to  sub- 
marine activity  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  would  be  stimulated 
by  the  desire  to  sink  transports  carrying  American  troops. 

2.  The  United  States  to  have  in  readiness  squadrons  to 
operate  against  any  raider  in  either  the  North  or  South  Atlan- 
tic. That  was  regarded  as  of  great  importance  by  the  French 
and  British  conferees,  and  it  was  one  of  the  chief  duties  of  our 
Patrol  Squadron.  Speaking  later  of  that,  Admiral  Badger,  head 
of  the  General  Board,  said:  "While  a  discussion  of  the  general 
subject  was  had,  the  British  and  French  admirals  were  particu- 
larly concerned  as  to  the  patrol  of  the  east  coast  of  North  and 
South  America,  for  which  their  forces  were  considered  inade- 
quate."   The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  was  directed,  at  this 


48  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

meeting,  to  strengthen  the  patrol  force  and  to  send  it  wherever 
it  would  render  the  quickest  and  best  service  against  the  enemy. 
It  was  later  sent  to  Gibraltar,  to  protect  the  vast  volume  of  ship- 
ping plying  between  the  Mediterranean  and  Northern  Europe. 
The  Pacific  fleet,  under  Admiral  William  B.  Caperton,  was  later 
on  duty  on  the  coast  of  Brazil  and  other  South  American  coun- 
tries for  the  protection  of  Allied  shipping  in  the  South  Atlantic. 

3.  Recognizing  the  accepted  naval  doctrine  of  all  countries 
that  destroyers  should  be  provided  for  operation  with  every 
dreadnaught,  the  British  and  French  admirals  said  they  hesi- 
tated to  request  the  detachment  of  any  destroyer  from  the  fleet. 
' '  Of  course  your  fleet  naturally  would  not  be  willing  to  part  with 
or  weaken  the  screen  of  destroyers,"  said  Admiral  Browning, 
but  he  expressed  the  hope  that  we  might  send  at  once  one  or  two 
destroyers  to  Europe  for  the  moral  effect  this  would  inspire,  as 
well  as  their  aid  in  combatting  submarines.  Though  the  com- 
mander-in-chief felt  it  would  be  taking  desirable  protection  from 
his  fleet,  it  was  agreed  immediately  to  send  six.  "We  will  send 
a  division  at  once, ' '  I  informed  the  British  and  French  admirals, 
"and  all  other  aid  in  our  power."  Admirals  Benson  and  Mayo 
were  then  directed  to  issue  the  necessary  orders  for  the 
destroyers  to  make  ready  for  distant  service.  Later  the  number 
was  increased,  and  by  the  end  of  May  twenty-eight  were  at  or 
on  their  way  to  Queenstown.  In  pursuance  of  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  adopted  at  this  conference,  the  American  Navy 
continued  to  send  destroyers,  submarine  chasers,  yachts  and 
other  craft  overseas  until  the  number  in  Europe  reached  373. 

4.  Our  Navy  agreed  to  look  after  the  west  coast  of  North 
America  from  Canadian  to  Colombian  boundaries. 

5.  It  was  promised  that  United  States  armed  government 
vessels  would  maintain  continuous  service  to  Chile,  from  which 
country  America  and  the  Allies  obtained  nitrates  indispensable 
for  the  manufacture  of  munitions.  All  during  the  war  there 
was  fear  that  the  steady  flow  of  nitrates  might  be  interrupted, 
and  every  effort  was  made  to  transport  large  quantities  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  It  was  gratifying  when  Admiral  Browning 
reported  that  the  British  relations  with  Chile  were  "excellent." 
While  our  relations  with  that  country  were  also  cordial,  scarcity 
of  ships  and  hazards  of  transportation  were  such  that  the  United 


NAVAL  ALLIES  IN  HISTORIC  CONFERENCE      49 

States  spent  many  millions  to  establish  nitrate  plants  within  its 
own  borders. 

6.  It  was  agreed  that  our  Asiatic  fleet  should  be  maintained. 
It  operated  in  close  cooperation  with  Allied  fleets  all  during  the 
war  and  they  acted  together  when  conditions  in  Russia  became 
acute. 

7.  Our  Navy  undertook  to  supervise  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
Central  American  waters  as  far  south  as  the  Colombian  bound- 
ary and  as  far  east  as  Jamaica  and  the  Virgin  Islands.  It  was 
through  this  area  that  Allied  navies  transported  their  oil,  chiefly 
from  Tampico.  The  protection  of  tankers  was  always  of  prime 
importance  and  the  patrol  of  those  waters,  begun  before  we 
entered  the  war,  was  carried  on  until  its  close,  first  under  Ad- 
miral Wilson  and  afterwards  by  Admiral  Anderson.  The  vig- 
ilance of  this  patrol  was  never  relaxed. 

8.  Our  Navy  assumed  the  duty  of  sending  submarines  to 
Canadian  waters,  "if  and  when  enemy  submarines  appeared 
off  that  coast. ' ' 

9.  The  French  Admiralty  was  assured  that,  as  soon  as 
possible,  we  would  send  patrol  vessels  to  the  French  coast.  This 
was  done,  our  armed  yachts  sailing  early  in  June  for  Brest. 

10.  We  also  undertook  to  send  armed  naval  transports  for 
carrying  needed  railway  material  to  France,  one  immediately, 
and  others  as  soon  as  possible. 

After  the  conference  adjourned,  I  suggested  that  the  Chief 
of  Operations  and  the  French  and  British  admirals  perfect  the 
details  of  cooperation  agreed  upon.  They  did  so,  and  a  cable- 
gram was  sent  by  these  admirals  to  their  governments  setting 
forth  the  foregoing  definite  steps  agreed  upon  for  active  partici- 
pation by  the  United  States  with  the  naval  forces  of  the  Allies. 

Many  other  conferences  followed,  some  of  them  notable,  with 
Allied  officers  and  government  officials  who  came  to  Washington 
for  consultation.  All  the  Allied  nations  sent  naval  officers  to 
Washington,  many  of  whom  remained  during  the  entire  war  for 
the  specific  duty  of  expediting  cooperation  with  our  Navy. 
Some  of  them  had  authority  virtually  to  conclude  arrangements. 
There  was  always  frequent,  frank  exchange  of  views,  and  the 
same  spirit  of  oneness  existed  on  this  as  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Atlantic. 


50  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  French  mission,  which  came  in  April,  1917,  headed  by 
Marshal  Joffre  and  Viviani,  was  a  distinguished  body,  embrac- 
ing soldiers  and  sailors  who  had  seen  hard  service.  Joffre,  the 
beloved  "hero  of  the  Marne,"  was  the  commanding  military 
figure,  and  Washington,  accustomed  as  it  was  to  celebrities,  gave 
him  a  reception  never  excelled  in  its  wild  enthusiasm.  Every- 
body fell  in  love  with  him.  Unaffected,  simple,  charming,  he  was 
the  embodiment  of  French  courage  and  comradeship.  Other 
representatives  of  foreign  governments  had  pressed  the  need  of 
money  and  ships;  but  Joffre  said,  "Send  fresh  soldiers.  We 
can  arm  them,  and  they  can  be  trained  in  France  as  well  as 
here.,, 

Marshal  Joffre  expressed  more  than  once  his  admiration  of 
the  appearance  of  the  ships  and  crews  on  the  American  warships 
which  he  visited.  "It  is  evident  from  their  appearance,  they  are 
ready,  enthusiastically  ready,  and  their  spic  and  span  appear- 
ance is  in  marked  contrast  to  the  grimness  of  the  French  naval 
vessels,"  he  said  upon  the  occasion  of  his  visit  to  Mt.  Vernon, 
where  in  his  tribute  to  Washington  he  said  the  early  coming 
of  American  troops  to  France  "will  tighten  the  links  of  affec- 
tion and  esteem  which  have  ever  united  France  and  the  United 
States." 

With  Joffre  came  Admiral  Chocheprat  of  the  French  Navy. 
He  was  met  at  Hampton  Roads  by  Assistant  Secretary  Franklin 
} ).  Roosevelt,  and  came  to  Washington  for  conference  with  naval 
( fficials,  who  obtained  from  him  valuable  information  from  the 
seat  of  war.  This  enabled  our  Navy  to  render  better  assistance 
ia  French  waters  and  led  to  the  opening  of  more  French  ports 
for  the  landing  of  American  troops  and  the  quicker  turn- 
around of  transports. 

The  British  mission,  which  was  headed  by  the  distinguished 
Mr.  Balfour,  arrived  on  April  21st.  Its  members  brought  the 
inside  story  of  conditions,  particularly  in  the  desperate  fight 
against  the  submarine.  They  had  been  met  at  Halifax  and  wel- 
comed on  behalf  of  the  Navy  by  Admiral  Frank  F.  Fletcher, 
who  accompanied  them  to  Washington.  Mr.  Balfour  had,  until  a 
short  time  before,  been  First  Civil  Lord  of  the  Admiralty.  With 
him  as  naval  representative  was  Admiral  Dudley  S.  de  Chair. 
They  emphasized  the  seriousness  of  the  submarine  sinkings, 


NAVAL  ALLIES  IN  HISTORIC  CONFERENCE      51 

holding  back  nothing.  American  officials  discussed  the  necessity 
of  new  naval  offenses ;  attacking  the  German  bases  or  construct- 
ing mine  barrages  to  prevent  egress  and  ingress  of  submarines 
and  other  plans  to  end  the  U-boat  menace.  As  representative 
of  the  foremost  sea  power,  the  interchange  of  views  between 
Admiral  de  Chair  and  our  naval  experts  was  most  helpful.  The 
Admiral  was  well  pleased  with  the  arrangements  completed 
earlier  in  the  month  with  Admiral  Browning  and  with  our  broad 
plans  and  construction  program. 

Naval  Allied  cooperation  was  strengthened  by  conferences 
with  the  Prince  of  Udine,  and  the  Italian  mission ;  the  Belgian 
mission  headed  by  Baron  Ludovic  Moncheur ;  the  Russian  mis- 
sion, whose  naval  representative  was  the  ill-fated  Admiral 
Kolchak;  the  Japanese  mission,  which  included  the  able  Vice 
Admiral  Takeshita — all  these  and  other  special  representatives 
who  came  from  time  to  time  or  remained  attached  to  their 
embassies  in  Washington.  Later  the  British  Admiralty  sent 
as  its  representative  Admiral  Lowther  Grant,  who  was  in  al- 
most daily  touch  with  officers  of  the  Navy  Department  until  the 
close  of  the  war  and  won  the  regard  of  all. 

Through  the  United  States  Naval  Representative  in  London, 
American  admirals  on  duty  at  Brest  and  Gibraltar  and  naval 
attaches  abroad,  the  representatives  of  the  Allied  navies  in 
Washington,  who  were  kept  fully  informed  by  their  govern- 
ments, and  the  diplomatic  and  naval  missions,  the  Navy  De- 
partment was  enabled  to  reach  its  decisions  with  all  the  pos- 
sible lights  before  it.  It  never  had  to  depend  upon  any  single 
source  of  information. 

These  conferences  at  Washington  were  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance because  all  large  policies  had  to  be  settled  by  the  Navy 
Department.  Officers  abroad  were  in  command  of  ships  as- 
signed to  them,  and  in  emergencies  upon  their  own  initiative 
employed  their  forces  to  the  best  advantage.  The  ships  over- 
seas never  were  under  independent  command,  but,  as  distinctly 
stated  in  orders,  constituted  a  ' '  task  force  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet. ' ' 
Their  orders  stated:  "The  individuality  of  the  United  States 
forces  should  be  such  that  they  may  be  continuously  ready  to 
change  their  areas  of  operations  as  may  be  made  necessary  or 
by  orders  of  the  Navy  Department." 


52  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

In  the  World  War  it  was  necessary  for  the  Navy  to  maintain 
close  relationship  with  the  President,  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  the  State  and  War  Departments,  the  War  Industries 
Board,  the  War  Trade  Board,  the  Shipping  Board  and  other 
war  agencies,  and  the  supply  system  for  Army  as  well  as  Navy. 
It  was  essential  to  be  in  constant  touch  with  the  plans  for  the 
sending  of  troops  and  to  have  daily  interchange  of  views  with 
representatives  of  Allied  navies.  Intimate  contact  made  for 
prompt  action.  The  efficiency  secured  and  maintained  would 
have  been  impossible  if  the  naval  control  had  ever  passed  from 
Washington. 

The  decisions  to  establish  bases  at  Brest,  at  Gibraltar  and 
in  the  Azores  were  made  by  the  Navy  Department  in  Wash- 
ington after  conference  with  Allied  powers.  The  result  of  their 
establishment  justified  the  action  taken.  Routing  of  ships  called 
for  joint  action  between  Allied  and  American  naval  agencies 
working  together  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  The  movement 
of  vessels  carrying  troops  and  supplies  was  necessarily  de- 
pendent upon  daily  conference  with  War  Department  officials 
in  Washington.  Admiral  William  V.  Pratt,  who  was  Assistant 
Chief  of  Operations  during  the  war,  thus  stated  the  main  naval 
duty:  "Our  total  naval  effort  in  this  war  consisted  less  in  the 
operation  of  forces  at  the  front  than  in  a  logistic  effort  in  the 
rear,  in  which  the  greatest  problems  we  had  to  contend  with 
originated  and  had  to  be  solved,  here  at  home.  It  must  be 
noted  that  in  this  war  the  main  united  naval  effort  was  one 
of  logistics.' ' 

Building  ships  by  the  hundred ;  training  men  by  the  hundred 
thousand  to  operate  them;  producing  munitions,  materials  and 
supplies  by  millions  of  tons ;  providing  vessels  to  carry  troops 
and  men-of-war  to  protect  them — all  these  problems  of  produc- 
tion and  transportation  were  necessarily  settled  in  Washington. 
It  was  this  vast  effort  in  America,  directed  from  the  Navy  De- 
partment, which  made  possible  all  our  activities  in  Europe,  all 
the  assistance  we  were  able  to  render  to  the  Allies  and  the 
general  cause. 


H  ft) 

CD  Q 

p,  >- 

C5  H 

2  " 

0>5  ft) 

t  ° 

cs  CO 

o 

g  .© 


ii 

CD      ^ 

P   M 

> 
ft 
to 
o 


CHAPTER  VII 

'  'WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR" 

DESTROYERS,  AFTER  3,000-MILE  VOYAGE,  PREPARED  FOR  IMMEDIATE 
SERVICE FIRST  OF  AMERICAN  FORCES  SENT  TO  EUROPE DEAD- 
LIEST   FOE    OF    U-BOATS,    THEY    SAILED    VAST    AREAS,    PROTECTING 

TROOPS  AND  CARGOES 256  ATTACKS  ON  SUBMARINES "FANNING" 

SANK    U-58     AND    CAPTURED    CREW NO    RANK    IN     SACRIFICE     OR 

HONORS. 


F 


((  1  lIT  out  for  long  and  distant  service!"  was  the  order 
the  Eighth  Destroyer  Division  received  from  the  flag- 
ship of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  the  night  of  April  14,  1917. 
It  was  then  9 :30  p.  m.,  and  they  were  directed  to  sail 
at  daylight.  At  five  o  'clock  next  morning  they  started  for  their 
home  navy  yards. 

Speeding  to  New  York  and  Boston,  the  ships  went  into  dry- 
dock,  made  repairs,  tuned  up  machinery,  and  took  aboard  three 
months'  stores  and  provisions — all  in  ten  days. 

Sailing  from  Boston  April  24th,  under  sealed  orders,  it  was 
not  until  midnight,  when  they  were  fifty  miles  at  sea,  that  the 
officers  of  the  flotilla  knew  its  destination.  Breaking  the  seal, 
the  commander  read  the  following,  the  first  operating  order 
issued  to  any  American  force: 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 

Office  of  Naval  Operations 

Washington,  D.  C,  April  14. 
Secret  and  Confidential. 
To :    Commander,   Eighth  Division,   Destroyer   Force,   Atlantic   Fleet ; 

U.  S.  S.  Wadsworth,  flagship. 
Subject:   Protection  of  commerce  near  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain  and 

Ireland. 

1.  The  British  Admiralty  have  requested  the  cooperation  of  a 
division  of  American  destroyers  in  the  protection  of  commerce  near  the 
coasts  of  Great  Britain  and  France. 

53 


54  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

2.  Your  mission  is  to  assist  naval  operations  of  Entente  Powers  in 
every  way  possible. 

3.  Proceed  to  Queenstown,  Ireland.  Report  to  senior  British  naval 
officer  present,  and  thereafter  cooperate  fully  with  the  British  Navy. 
Should  it  be  decided  that  your  force  act  in  cooperation  with  French 
naval  forces,  your  mission  and  method  of  cooperation  under  French 
Admiralty  authority  remain  unchanged. 

Route  to  Queenstown :  Boston  to  latitude  50  N.,  Long.  20  W.,  to 
arrive  at  daybreak,  then  to  latitude  50  N.,  Long.  12  W.,  thence  to 
Queenstown. 

When  within  radio  communication  of  the  British  naval  forces  off 
Ireland,  call  GCK  and  inform  the  Vice  Admiral  at  Queenstown  in 
British  general  code  of  your  position,  course,  and  speed.  You  will  be 
met  outside  of  Queenstown. 

4.  Base  facilities  will  be  provided  by  the  British  Admiralty. 

5.  Communicate  your  orders  and  operations  to  Rear  Admiral  Sims 
at  London  and  be  guided  by  such  instructions  as  he  may  give  you. 
Make  no  report  of  arrival  to  Navy  Department  direct. 

Josephus  Daniels. 

Signed  only  three  days  after  the  conference  with  British  and 
French  admirals  in  Washington,  this  put  into  effect  the  verbal 
orders  given  the  moment  they  requested  that  one  or  two  destroy- 
ers be  sent.  Six  were  on  the  way — the  Wadsworth,  Conyngham, 
Porter,  McDougal,  Davis  and  Wainwright.  They  were  the  first 
of  the  United  States  forces  despatched  to  Europe,  the  pioneers 
of  the  large  fleet  we  sent  across  the  Atlantic. 

It  was  no  smooth  voyage  they  had  in  that  long  trip.  Caught 
in  a  southeast  gale  which  lasted  for  seven  days,  they  were  so 
tossed  about  by  the  heavy  seas  that  they  could  not  even  set  the 
mess-tables.  "We  ate  off  our  laps,"  one  officer  remarked.  But 
the  welcome  received  when  they  reached  port  more  than  made 
up  for  these  hardships.  Nearing  the  coast,  the  ninth  day  out, 
a  British  destroyer,  the  Mary  Rose,  was  sighted,  flying  the  in- 
ternational signal,  "Welcome  to  the  American  colors!" 

1 '  Thank  you,  we  are  glad  of  your  company, ' '  the  Americans 
replied. 

Next  morning,  Friday,  May  4th,  they  reached  Queenstown. 
Though  efforts  had  been  made  to  keep  secret  their  coming,  the 
American  flag  floated  from  public  buildings,  business  houses 
and  residences,  and  from  vessels  in  the  harbor.     Crowds  as- 


"WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  55 

sembled  on  the  hills  and  along  the  shore,  cheering  as  the  ships 
from  over  the  sea  hove  in  sight. 

It  was  a  brilliant  scene,  flooded  with  sunshine — a  historic 
day,  marking  the  arrival  of  the  first  American  forces  to  take 
part  with  the  Allies  in  the  struggle  against  the  Central  Powers. 
Through  cheering  crowds  the  Navy  boys  proceeded  to  the 
American  Consulate,  where  the  lord  mayors  of  Queenstown  and 
Cork  extended  a  formal  welcome.  Sir  John  Jellicoe,  First  Sea 
Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty,  in  a  letter  to  Commander  J.  K. 
Taussig,  in  command  of  the  flotilla,  offered  the  "warmest  wel- 
come possible  in  the  name  of  the  British  nation  and  the  British 
Admiralty,"  concluding:  "May  every  good  fortune  attend  you, 
and  speedy  victory  be  with  us." 

Vice  Admiral  Sir  Lewis  Bayly,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Coasts  of  Ireland,  invited  the  destroyer  commanders  to  dine 
with  him  that  evening,  closing  his  invitation  with  the  character- 
istic note :  ' '  Dine  in  undress ;  no  speeches. ' '  Able  and  energetic, 
he  was  known  as  a  "hard  driver";  a  man  of  few  words  who 
hated  talk  and  demanded  results. 

1 '  When  will  you  be  ready  to  go  to  sea  ? ' '  was  about  the  first 
question  he  asked.  He  naturally  supposed  that,  after  a  long 
and  stormy  voyage,  they  would  ask  some  time  for  rest  and 
repairs. 

"We  are  ready  now,  sir,"  Commander  Taussig  replied; 
"that  is,  as  soon  as  we  finish  refueling." 

"I  will  give  you  four  days  from  the  time  of  arrival,"  the 
Admiral  said.    "Will  that  be  sufficient?" 

"Yes,"  was  the  answer,  "that  will  be  more  than  ample 
time." 

Four  days  later  they  were  all  at  sea,  hunting  submarines. 
Before  the  month  was  out  they  were  swearing  by  Admiral  Bayly, 
and  he  was  calling  them  "my  boys." 

"Things  were  looking  black,"  Commander  Taussig  said. 
"In  the  three  previous  weeks  the  submarines  had  sunk  152 
British  merchant  ships-  The  night  before  we  entered  the  harbor 
a  German  submarine  had  planted  twelve  mines  right  in  the 
channel.  Fortunately  for  us  they  were  swept  up  by  the  ever 
vigilant  British  mine-sweepers  before  we  arrived.  The  day  fol- 
lowing our  arrival,  one  of  the  British  gunboats  from  our  station 


56  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

was  torpedoed  and  her  captain  and  forty  of  her  crew  were  lost. 
Patrol  vessels  were  continually  bringing  in  survivors  from  the 
various  ships  as  they  were  sunk." 

The  convoy  system  had  not  then  been  instituted,  the  British 
depending  on  patrol.  This  was  trying  duty,  searching  for  the 
U-boat  that  might  be  anywhere  within  four  or  five  hundred 
square  miles,  for  the  ocean  was  strewn  with  wreckage  for  three 
hundred  miles  from  shore. 

The  Queenstown  "area"  comprised  twenty-five  thousand 
square  miles,  and  yet  this  wide  zone  of  trans-Atlantic  shipping, 
west  and  south  of  Ireland,  had  been  left  almost  unprotected. 
"Sometimes  only  four  or  five  British  destroyers  were  operating 
in  this  great  stretch  of  waters,"  said  Admiral  Sims,  "and  I  do 
not  think  the  number  ever  exceeded  fifteen." 

Soon  after  the  Americans  arrived,  the  few  British  destroyers 
at  Queenstown  were  withdrawn.  Urging  the  sending  of  all 
floating  craft  available,  Sims  had  informed  us  in  his  cablegram 
of  April  28th: 

Yesterday  the  War  Council  and  Admiralty  decided  that  cooperation 
of  twenty-odd  American  destroyers  with  base  at  Queenstown  would  no 
doubt  put  down  the  present  submarine  activity  which  is  dangerous  and 
keep  it  down.  The  crisis  will  be  passed  if  the  enemy  can  be  forced  to 
disperse  his  forces  from  this  critical  area. 

Within  a  month  twenty-eight  destroyers  and  two  tenders 
were  either  in  Queenstown  or  on  the  way  there.  On  May  17th  a 
second  division  arrived,  followed  by  two  other  divisions,  and  two 
additional  destroyers  and  the  tenders  Melville  and  Dixie.  The 
Melville,  which  arrived  May  22nd,  was  the  "mother  ship"  and 
became  the  flagship  of  the  United  States  forces  stationed  there. 
On  June  1st,  Sims  wrote  to  the  Navy  Department: 

It  is  gratifying  to  be  able  to  report  that  the  operations  of  our  forces 
in  these  waters  have  proved  not  only  very  satisfactory,  but  also  of 
marked  value  to  the  Allies  in  overcoming  the  submarine  menace.  The 
equipment  and  construction  of  our  ships  have  proved  adequate  and 
sufficient  and  the  personnel  has  shown  an  unusually  high  degree  of 
enthusiasm  and  ability  to  cope  with  the  situation  presented. 

As  a  special  compliment  to  the  American  Navy,  Admiral 
Sims  had  been  invited,  a  few  days  before,  to  assume  command 


"WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  57 

at  Queenstown  in  the  absence  of  Admiral  Bayly  on  a  brief  vaca- 
tion, and  for  several  days  the  American  flag  floated  from  Ad- 
miralty House.  "So  far  as  exercising  any  control  over  sea 
operations  was  concerned,  this  invitation  was  not  particularly 
important,"  said  Admiral  Sims.  "Matters  were  running 
smoothly  at  the  Queenstown  station;  Admiral  Bayly's  second  in 
command  could  have  kept  the  machine  in  working  order ;  it  was 
hardly  likely  in  the  few  days  that  I  was  to  command  that  any 
changes  in  policy  would  be  initiated.  The  British  Admiralty 
merely  took  this  way  of  showing  a  great  courtesy  to  the  Amer- 
ican Navy,  and  of  emphasizing  to  the  world  the  excellent  rela- 
tions that  existed  between  the  two  services." 

In  his  book,  "The  Victory  at  Sea,"  Admiral  Sims  said: 

One  day  Admiral  Bayly,  Captain  Pringle  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Melville, 
Captain  Campbell,  the  Englishman  whose  exploits  with  mystery  ships 
had  given  him  world-wide  fame,  and  myself,  went  out  on  the  Active  to 
watch  certain  experiments  with  depth-charges.  It  was  a  highly  im- 
prudent thing  to  do,  but  that  only  added  to  the  zest  of  the  occasion 
from  Admiral  Bayly's  point  of  view. 

' '  What  a  bag  this  would  be  for  the  Hun, ' '  he  chuckled.  ' '  The  Ameri- 
can Commander-in-Chief,  the  British  admiral  commanding  in  Irish 
waters,  a  British  and  an  American  captain." 

In  our  mind's  eye  we  could  see  our  picture  in  the  Berlin  papers,  four 
distinguished  prisoners  standing  in  a  row. 

The  destroyers  which  escorted  the  first  troop  convoys  were, 
after  they  reached  St.  Nazaire,  sent  to  the  base  in  Ireland.  By 
July  5th  we  had  thirty-four  destroyers  at  Queenstown.  Thirty- 
seven  vessels  of  the  Force — 35  destroyers  and  two  tenders — had 
been  sent  to  Europe,  as  follows : 

Destroyers  and  Date  of  Sailing  Commanding  Officer 

Wadsworth — April  24 Lt.  Comdr.  J.  K.  Taussig 

ComjngJiam — April  24 Lt.  Comdr.  A.  W.  Johnson 

Porter— April  24 Lt.  Comdr.  W.  K.  Wortman 

McDougal— April  24 Lt.  Comdr.  A.  P.  Fairfield 

Davis — April  24 Lt.  Comdr.  R.  F.  Zogbaum 

Wainwright — April  24 Lt.  Comdr.  F.  H.  Poteet 

Rowan — May  7 Lt.  Comdr.  C.  E.  Courtney 

Tucker— May  7 Lt.  Comdr.  B.  B.  Wygant 

Cassin — May  7 Lt.  Comdr.  W.  N.  Vernou 

Ericsson — May  7 Lt.  Comdr.  C.  T.  Hutchins 

Winslow— May  7 Lt.  Comdr.  N.  E.  Nichols 


58  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Destroyers  and  Date  of  Sailing  Commanding  Officer 

Jacob  Jones — May  7 Lit.  Comdr.  D.  W.  Bagley 

Melville  (tender) — May  11 Commander  H.  B.  Price 

disking — May  15 Lt.  Comdr.  D.  C.  Hanrahan 

Nicholson — May  15 Lt.  Comdr.  B.  A.  Long 

Sampson — May  15 Lt.  Comdr.  B.  C.  Allen 

dimming s — May  15 Lt.  Comdr.  G.  F.  Neal 

Benham — May  15 Lt.  Comdr.  J.  B.  Gay 

O'Brien— May  15 Lt.  Comdr.  C.  A.  Blakely 

Patterson — May  21 Lieut.  J.  H.  Newton 

Warrington — May  21 Lieut.  I.  F.  Dortch 

Drayton — May  21 Lieut.  D.  L.  Howard 

Jenkins — May  21 Lieut.  W.  H.  Lee 

Paulding — May  21 Lieut.  J.  S.  Barleon 

Trippe— May  21 Lieut.  R.  C.  Giffen 

Sterrett — May  23 Lieut.  G.  \V.  Simpson 

Walke— -May  23 Lieut.  C.  F.  Russell 

Jarvis — May  25 Lieut.  L.  P.  Davis 

Perkins — May  25 Lieut.  F.  M.  Knox 

Dixie  (tender) — May  31 Commander  J.  R.  P.  Pringle 

Burrows — June  14 Lieut.  H.  V.  McKittrick 

Fanning — June  14 Lieut.  A.  S.  Carpender 

Allen — June  14 Commander  S.  W.  Bryant 

Wilkes — June  14 Lt.  Comdr.  J.  C.  Fremont 

Ammen — June  17 Lieut.  G.  C.  Logan 

Shaw — June  17 Lt.  Comdr.  M.  S.  Davis 

Parker — June  17 Lt.  Comdr.  H.  Powell 

Others  were  sent  as  they  became  available,  and  new  destroy- 
ers, in  course  of  construction  when  war  began,  were  dispatched 
to  Europe  upon  completion.  All  but  two  of  the  destroyers  we 
had  in  April,  1917,  served  in  foreign  waters.  We  also  sent  to 
Europe  nine  of  the  old  type  later  designated  as  "  coast  torpedo 
vessels" — the  Bainbridge,  Barry,  Chauncey,  Dale,  Decatur, 
McDonough,  Stewart,  Truxtun  and  W  or  den — and,  old  and 
small  as  they  were,  they  did  excellent  service.  Eighty-five 
destroyers,  in  all,  saw  service  in  the  "war  zone." 

Hunting  U-boats,  going  to  the  relief  of  vessels  attacked, 
rescuing  survivors,  and  later,  when  the  convoy  system  was  put 
into  effect,  escorting  vessels — troop  and  supply  ships,  passenger 
steamers  and  merchantmen — through  the  danger  zones  to  and 
from  port,  the  destroyers  had  plenty  to  do. 

Finding  a  "sub"  was  the  hardest  part  of  the  game,  for  the 
mere  glimpse  of  a  destroyer  through  a  periscope  was  sufficient 


° » 

O 
S5    oa 


O    p        cj 


9  B" 

6  ctq 


O     r-t- 

i-i    CD 


CREW  OF  THE  FANNING,  WHICH  SANK  THE  U-58 
The  star  on  the  funnel  indicates  a  submarine  victim. 


"WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  59 

for  the  submarine  to  submerge  and  scurry  away.  Yet  our 
vessels  in  European  waters  were  credited  with  256  attacks  on 
U-boats,  and  there  were  not  a  few  exciting  encounters. 

No  more  striking  example  of  prompt  action  and  quick  re- 
sults occurred  during  the  entire  war  than  that  of  the  Fanning 
and  the  Nicholson  when  they  "got"  a  German  submarine,  the 
U-58,  on  November  17,  1917.  Sailing  along  with  a  convoy,  at 
4 :10  p.  m.  Coxswain  David  D.  Loomis,  lookout  on  the  Fanning, 
caught  a  glimpse  of  a  periscope.  It  was  a  finger  periscope,  a  tiny 
thing  an  inch  and  a  half  in  diameter,  no  larger  than  a  walking 
stick.  It  was  lifted  for  only  a  few  seconds,  but  the  keen  eyes 
of  Loomis  spied  it,  and  he  estimated  its  distance  and  location — 
three  points  on  the  port  bow,  400  yards  distant,  moving  across 
the  bow  at  two  knots '  speed.  The  Fanning  headed  for  the  spot, 
full  speed,  and  as  it  crossed  the  course  dropped  a  depth-bomb. 
Changing  course,  the  Nicholson  was  dashing  across  to  drop  an- 
other charge  when  the  conning  tower  appeared.  The  Nicholson 
headed  for  the  submarine,  and  the  Fanning  turned  in  her  wake 
to  attack.  Dropping  a  depth-charge  alongside  the  U-boat,  the 
Nicholson  turned,  firing  from  her  stern  gun.  The  sub's  bow 
came  up  rapidly.  She  seemed  to  be  down  by  the  stern  and  was 
evidently  badly  damaged,  but  tried  to  right  herself  and  increased 
her  speed.  As  the  Nicholson  cleared,  the  Fanning  opened  fire 
with  her  bow  gun.  At  the  third  shot  the  German  crew  came  on 
deck,  and  held  up  their  hands  shouting,  "Kamerad!"  At  4:28 
the  submarine  surrendered.  It  had  been  only  18  minutes  since 
Loomis  had  sighted  her  periscope. 

Getting  a  line  to  the  crippled  craft,  the  destroyers  prepared 
to  take  it  in  tow.  But  two  of  her  crew  disappeared  for  a  mo- 
ment. They  scuttled  the  boat.  As  it  sank,  the  Germans  jumped 
into  the  water  and  swam  for  the  Fanning.  Heaving  lines  were 
thrown  to  them,  and  all  but  one,  Franz  Glinder,  managed  to 
get  aboard.  When  it  was  seen  that  he  was  sinking,  two  of  the 
Fanning 's  crew,  Chief  Pharmacist's  Mate  Elzer  Harwell  and 
Coxswain  Francis  G.  Connor,  jumped  overboard  to  rescue  him. 
They  got  him  aboard  the  ship,  but  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to 
resuscitate  him,  he  died. 

The  commander,  Kapitan-Leutnant  Gustav  Amberger,  his 
three  other  officers  and  thirty-five  men  were  prisoners.     They 


60  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

were  given  hot  coffee,  sandwiches  and  cigarettes,  and  men  of  the 
Fanning  loaned  their  warm  clothing.  No  prisoners  were  ever 
better  treated.  As  they  entered  the  boats  that  were  to  take 
them  ashore,  they  cheered  the  Fanning  and  its  crew. 

A  larger  volume  than  this  would  be  required  to  detail  all 
the  exploits  of  our  destroyers  in  European  waters,  or  even  to 
give  the  reports  of  their  contacts  with  submarines.  But  a  few 
examples  will  give  some  idea  of  the  work  they  did. 

Not  long  after  her  arrival  in  Queenstown,  the  O'Brien 
(Lieutenant  Commander  C.  A.  Blakely)  defeated  a  U-boat  which 
was  trying  to  attack  the  British  steamer  Elysia,  twelve  miles 
south  of  Ballycotton  Light,  off  the  Irish  coast.  This  encounter 
occurred  at  4:21,  June  16,  1917,  and  the  London  Headquarters' 
report  of  June  20th,  said : 

It  is  reasonably  certain  now  that  the  O'Brien  destroyed  the  sub- 
marine mentioned.  She  was  escorting  a  valuable  ship  when  the  two 
periscopes  of  a  submarine  were  observed  about  800  yards  on  her  bow. 
She  altered  course  immediately,  headed  for  it,  and  increased  to  full 
speed.  The  periscopes  were  again  seen  about  a  minute  later  about  100 
yards  dead  ahead,  the  submarine  having  apparently  attempted  to  avoid 
the  O'Brien  and  torpedo  her  escort  astern  of  her.  From  the  last  position 
sighted,  the  submarine  apparently  started  to  dive,  and  must  have  barely 
escaped  being  rammed. 

The  lookout  on  the  top  observed  her  hull  distinctly  alongside  the 
O'Brien  and  gradually  disappearing  as  she  proceeded  downward,  on 
almost  exactly  the  opposite  course  to  the  O'Brien.  A  depth-charge  was 
dropped  when  the  submarine  was  under  the  after  deck-house,  and  al- 
though the  O'Brien  was  making  20  knots  by  this  time,  less  than  three 
minutes  after  the  submarine  had  been  sighted,  the  explosion  of  the 
depth-charge  gave  the  ship  a  very  severe  shaking.  The  O'Brien  circled 
over  the  spot,  but  saw  no  evidence  of  damage.  A  British  destroyer  pass- 
ing over  the  same  spot,  nearly  three  hours  later  found  and  reported 
large  patches  of  strong-smelling  oil.  The  Cushing,  on  the  following 
morning,  passed  the  same  area  and  also  reported  a  large  amount  of  oil. 
This  incident  occurred  just  off  Queenstown  entrance  and  was  unfortu- 
nately one  of  those  cases  the  exact  results  of  which  cannot  be  determined. 

The  Trippe,  Warrington,  Jenkins,  Wadsivorth,  Cummings, 
Wilkes  and  Benham  all  had  encounters  in  July  which  were  not 
only  successful  but  showed  evidence  that  the  U-boats  were  dam- 
aged, if  not  disabled.  The  Parker  (Lieutenant  Commander 
Halsey  Powell)  on  August  3rd  had  a  long  U-boat  encounter. 


"WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  61 

With  the  Fanning  and  Nicholson,  she  had  been  escorting  steam- 
ers and  had  just  returned  to  patrol  when  a  submarine  was  re- 
ported about  30  miles  away.  Speeding  to  the  locality,  at  2:15 
she  found  the  steamship  Newby  Hall  had  been  attacked,  and  was 
told  that  the  U-boat  had  submerged  probably  six  miles  distant. 
Escorting  the  steamer  toward  port,  the  Parker,  at  4:10  p.  m. 
turned  her  over  to  the  Burrows,  and  returned  to  look  for  the 
1 '  sub. ' '  The  steamship  Rio  Verde,  which  was  in  the  vicinity,  was 
escorted  out  of  the  dangerous  locality,  and  the  destroyer  re- 
sumed the  hunt  for  the  enemy. 

At  6 :50  the  Parker  sighted  the  submarine,  which  submerged 
when  the  destroyer  came  within  8,000  yards.  But  the  U-boat 
left  a  long  oil  slick  which  the  Parker  followed  down.  "On 
reaching  the  end  of  the  slick,  saw  submarine  underneath  the 
end  of  the  bridge,"  the  commander  reported.  "Dropped  two 
depth-charges  on  the  submarine  and  from  all  evidence  she  was 
very  probably  sunk.  There  was  practically  simultaneous  ex- 
plosion of  the  depth-charges,  followed  by  another  explosion. 
There  was  discovered  on  the  surface  of  the  water  air  bubbles, 
and  a  heavy  scum  of  oil,  and  particles  of  what  appeared  to  be 
cork."  As  no  wreckage  or  prisoners  were  obtained,  the  Ad- 
miralty gave  the  credit  "probably  seriously  damaged";  but 
the  men  aboard  the  Parker  were  convinced  that  the  submarine 
had  been  destroyed. 

The  Jacob  Jones,  Davis  and  McDougal  were  credited  with 
successful  encounters  in  September,  the  McDougal  being  cred- 
ited in  Admiral  Sims'  Headquarters'  report  of  Sept.  15th,  with 
"protection  of  two  meeting  convoys  against  enemy  submarine," 
and  "possible  destruction"  of  the  U-boat. 

While  escorting  a  New  York  convoy  the  McDougal  (Com- 
mander A.  P.  Fairfield)  at  1 :21  a.  m.  sighted  the  submarine  on 
the  surface,  and  gave  chase.  The  "sub"  submerged  500  yards 
ahead.  Dropping  two  depth-charges,  the  McDougal  circled 
around  the  spot,  and  soon  noticed  oil  rising,  apparently  from 
the  U-boat.  A  northbound  convoy  from  France  to  Wales  was 
sighted  only  a  half  mile  away.  "One  or  more  ships  of  convoy 
were  undoubtedly  saved  by  the  fact  that  the  submarine  was 
forced  to  submerge  hastily,"  said  the  Headquarters '  report. 
"Submarine  believed  to  be  damaged  or  sunk." 


62  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

When  the  large  British  steamship  Orama  was  torpedoed 
October  19,  1917,  the  U.  S.  8.  Conyngham  attacked  and  drove 
off  the  submarine,  saving  other  ships  of  the  convoy.  Her  com- 
manding officer,  Commander  A.  W.  Johnson,  made  this  report : 

During  the  afternoon  Conyngham  hailed  H.  M.  S.  Orama  and  sug- 
gested that,  due  to  submarine  reported  ahead,  convoy  change  course. 
This  was  not  thought  advisable  by  the  commanding  officer  of  H,  M.  8. 
Orama  and  convoy  proceeded  on  original  course. 

At  5 :30  p.  m.  Parker,  in  position  48  degrees  N.  09-20  W.,  escort 
about  two  miles  ahead  of  convoy,  reported  sighting  discolored  water 
(brownish). 

At  5 :50  p.  m.,  while  Conyngham  was  alongside  starboard  side  of 
Orama  passing  her  recognition  signals,  a  torpedo  crossing  Clan  Lindsay's 
bow  struck  H.  M.  8.  Orama  in  port  side,  about  No.  3  hold.  A  distinct 
report  was  heard,  followed  immediately  by  cloud  of  smoke  arising  from 
Orama  forward  of  her  bridge.  Orama  listed  to  port  and  began  to  sink 
by  the  bow.  Conyngham  by  radio  ordered  convoy  to  disperse.  Conyng- 
ham sounded  general  quarters  and  went  full  speed  ahead  and  crossed 
Orama' 's  bow  by  going  full  left  rudder,  then  proceeded  to  make  circle 
between  VA  and  VR  columns. 

When  circling,  a  wake  was  sighted  on  starboard  quarter.  A  periscope 
about  one  foot  emerged  visible  for  few  seconds  only  was  seen  in  this 
wake.  A  short  time  afterwards  a  periscope  was  sighted  sharp  on  our 
starboard  bow.  This  periscope  submerged  almost  immediately,  but  wake 
was  plainly  visible.  Conyngham,  then  a  few  yards  from  the  periscope, 
headed  for  same  and  dropped  depth-charge  over  the  wake.  An  ex- 
plosion resulted.  Large  quantities  of  discolored  water  was  seen  to  rise 
in  the  air  and  a  number  of  crew  and  officers  distinctly  made  out  a  quan- 
tity of  wreckage,  one  piece  of  which  might  have  been  the  wireless  mast 
of  the  submarine,  when  Conyngham  circled  near  the  spot  of  the 
explosion. 

The  Jacob  Jones  and  the  Conyngham  remained  by  the  Orama 
to  save  life.  It  was  night  when  the  vessel  began  to  settle  and 
was  abandoned  by  her  crew7.  But  the  destroyers  rescued  all  the 
478  persons  who  were  on  board  the  Orama. 

American  destroyers  had  been  operating  in  European  waters 
six  months  with  no  damage  from  enemy  action,  when,  on  October 
15th,  the  Cassin  (Lieutenant  Commander  W.  N.  Vernou)  was 
torpedoed.  Her  rudder  was  blown  off,  a  gun  blown  overboard, 
and  the  after  part  of  the  ship  wrecked ;  yet  by  expert  seaman- 
ship she  was  kept  afloat  and  taken  to  port,  repaired  and  put 
back  into  service.    Nine  men  of  the  crew  were  wounded,  but  only 


'  'WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  63 

one  was  killed — Gunner's  Mate  Osmond  K.  Ingram,  who  gave 
his  life  to  save  the  ship. 

Patrolling  off  the  Irish  coast,  20  miles  south  of  Mine  Head, 
at  1:30  p.  m.  the  Cassin  sighted  a  submarine,  but  it  vanished 
before  the  destroyer  could  get  close  to  it.  Half  an  hour  later 
Commander  Vernou  sighted  a  torpedo  running  at  high  speed 
toward  the  ship.  Double  emergency  full  speed  was  rung,  the 
rudder  put  hard  left,  and  for  a  moment  it  looked  as  if  the  tor- 
pedo might  pass  astern.  When  only  fifteen  or  twenty  feet 
away,  it  porpoised,  leaving  the  water  and  sheering  to  the  left ; 
and  struck  the  vessel  well  aft,  on  the  port  side. 

When  the  torpedo  was  sighted,  Ingram,  who  was  at  his  gun, 
realized  that  if  it  struck  among  the  depth-bombs  astern,  the 
explosion  might  sink  the  ship.  Instantly,  he  ran  aft  to  strip 
these  charges  and  throw  them  overboard.  He  was  blown  to 
pieces  when  the  torpedo  struck.  The  memory  of  this  heroic 
gunner 's  mate,  who  made  the  supreme  sacrifice  to  save  his  ship- 
mates, is  preserved  in  the  name  of  one  of  our  new  destroyers, 
the  Ingram,  the  first  naval  vessel  ever  named  for  an  enlisted 
man.    There  is  no  rank  in  sacrifice  or  honors. 

The  officers  and  men  worked  heroically  to  save  the  Cassin. 
Her  rudder  gone,  she  was  moving  in  circles.  Efforts  were  made 
to  steer  by  use  of  the  engines,  but  something  carried  away  and 
put  the  starboard  engine  out  of  commission.  The  ship  seemed 
absolutely  unmanageable.  All  was  dark  below,  the  electric  gen- 
erator having  been  disabled.  Radio  apparatus  broken,  a  tem- 
porary auxiliary  antenna  had  to  be  rigged  up  before  assistance 
could  be  summoned  by  wireless.  But  the  crew  were  undismayed, 
the  gunners  were  at  their  stations,  and  when,  at  2:30  o'clock, 
a  conning  tower  was  sighted,  the  Cassin  opened  fire.  Two  shots 
struck  close  to  the  U-boat,  which  submerged  and  did  not  again 
attempt  to  attack  the  crippled  ship. 

Just  before  4  o'clock  the  U.  S.  S.  Porter  arrived.  At  9  the 
British  ships  Jessamine  and  Tamarisk  appeared  on  the  scene. 
But  the  sea  was  rough,  the  wind  high,  and  it  was  not  until  2 :30 
a.  m.  that  a  hawser  was  made  fast  and  the  Tamarisk  started 
towing  the  Cassin.  An  hour  later  the  hawser  parted.  The 
Tamarisk,  two  trawlers  and  a  tug  worked  until  morning,  at- 
tempting to  get  the  vessel  in  tow  again.    But  it  was  not  until 


64  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

10 :37  a.  m.  that  a  towing  line  from  the  Snowdrop  was  made  fast, 
and  the  Cassin  taken  to  port. 

Thirty-five  feet  of  the  stern  was  blown  off.  Living  compart- 
ments and  store-rooms  in  the  after  part  of  the  ship  were 
wrecked  or  gone.  The  equivalent  of  850  pounds  of  TNT,  in 
torpedo  and  depth-charges,  had  exploded  on  the  Cassin's  fan- 
tail.  Twenty-odd  men  were  in  the  wrrecked  living  compartments 
when  the  torpedo  exploded.  Their  escape  was  almost  miracu- 
lous. Dazed  by  the  shock,  they  automatically  closed  water-tight 
doors  and  performed  other  emergency  duties,  but  could  never 
tell  just  how  they  did  it  or  got  away.  All  declared  that  from 
the  instant  of  the  explosion  they  were  absolutely  blinded. 
Forty-five  members  of  the  crew,  including  the  chief  petty  offi- 
cers, lost  all  their  belongings  except  the  clothes  they  had  on. 
But  that  did  not  bother  them.  The  ship  was  saved,  they  were 
still  alive,  and  that  was  happiness  enough. 

The  Chauncey,  one  of  our  small,  old-type  destroyers,  was 
rammed  and  sunk  by  the  steamship  Rose  near  Gibraltar  at  1 :46 
a.  m.,  November  19th.  Three  of  the  officers — Lieutenant 
Commander  "Walter  E.  Reno,  commanding,  Lieutenant  (junior 
grade)  C.  F.  Wedderburn,  and  Ensign  H.  G.  Skinner — and  18 
men  were  lost. 

On  December  6th,  the  Jacob  Jones  was  sunk,  with  the  loss 
of  two  officers — Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  Stanton  F.  Kalk,  of 
"Washington,  D.  C,  and  Gunner  Harry  R.  Hood,  of  Atlanta,  Ga. 
— and  62  men  of  the  crew.  The  Jones  was  proceeding  alone  from 
off  Brest  to  Queenstown  when,  at  4:21  p.  m.,  a  torpedo  was 
sighted  rushing  toward  the  ship.  The  rudder  was  put  hard  left, 
the  destroyer  put  on  all  its  speed,  but  could  not  maneuver  in 
time  to  escape. 

Broaching  and  jumping  clear  of  the  water,  the  torpedo  sub- 
merged again  50  or  60  feet  from  the  ship,  striking  in  the  fuel- 
oil  tank,  three  feet  below  the  water-line.  The  deck  was  blown 
clear  for  twenty  feet,  a  number  of  men  were  killed ;  the  auxiliary 
room  wrecked,  a  torpedo-tube  thrown  into  the  air,  the  mainmast 
and  radio  apparatus  were  carried  away.  The  vessel  settled  aft 
immediately,  and  the  after  deck  was  awash.  The  gunnery 
officer,  Lieutenant  J.  K.  Richards,  ran  aft  to  set  the  depth- 
charges  "safe";  but  they  were  already  under  water.    Rafts  and 


"WE  AEE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  65 

lifeboats  were  launched,  circular  lifebelts  and  splinter  masts 
set  adrift  to  provide  floatage  for  the  crew. 

The  ship  went  down  in  eight  minutes.  Most  of  the  men 
were  on  rafts  or  wreckage,  but  some  were  swimming  astern  of 
the  vessel.  Lieutenant  Commander  David  W.  Bagley  and  other 
officers  jumped  overboard  as  the  destroyer  began  to  sink. 
Officers  and  men  bore  themselves  with  great  coolness.  "  Bagley 's 
handling  of  the  situation  after  his  ship  was  torpedoed," 
Wrote  Admiral  Sims,  "was  everything  I  expected  in  the  way 
of  efficiency,  good  judgment,  courage,  and  chivalrous  action." 

Going  down  stern-first  the  destroyer  twisted  through  180 
degrees,  as  she  swung  upright.  As  she  turned,  her  depth- 
charges  exploded,  killing  or  stunning  the  men  near  by. 

Twenty  minutes  later  the  submarine  appeared,  two  or  three 
miles  distant,  then  gradually  approached  and  picked  up  two 
men  from  the  water,  Albert  De  Mello  and  John  F.  Murphy, 
whom  she  carried  to  Germany  as  prisoners.  All  the  survivors 
in  sight  were  collected,  and  rafts  and  boats  gotten  together. 
The  ship's  radio  had  been  wrecked,  preventing  the  sending  out 
of  distress  signals.  Two  shots  had  been  fired  from  her  guns 
in  the  hope  of  attracting  some  near-by  ship,  but  none  was  in 
hearing.  There  seemed  no  prospect  of  assistance  except  from 
shore,  and  leaving  Lieutenant  Richards  in  charge  of  the  rafts, 
Lieutenant  Commander  Bagley,  the  ship's  commander,  and 
Lieutenant  Norman  Scott,  the  navigating  officer,  with  four  men, 
started  to  row  to  the  nearest  land  to  secure  assistance. 

Night  soon  came  on,  and  the  men  on  the  rafts  prepared  for 
a  long  vigil.  When  help  would  arrive,  none  could  tell.  Shiver- 
ing from  cold,  shaken  by  the  experience  through  which  they  had 
passed,  the  survivors  kept  up  their  courage  with  the  amazing 
cheerfulness  of  the  sailor  in  stress  and  disaster.  Their  very 
lives  depending  on  keeping  warm,  men  who  had  thick  clothing 
divided  it  with  those  more  thinly  clad.  Officers  and  men  shared 
their  belongings  and  worked  together  for  the  common  safety. 

One  small  raft,  which  had  been  separated  from  the  others, 
was  picked  up  at  8  p.  m.  by  the  steamship  Catalina.  The  other 
survivors  remained  in  their  perilous  position  all  night,  and  it 
was  not  until  8:30  o'clock  next  morning  when  they  were  dis- 
covered and  rescued  by  the  British  steamship  Camellia. 


66  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

One  brave  young  officer  died  before  relief  arrived.  Though 
still  suffering  from  the  effects  of  the  explosion,  which  had 
stunned  him,  and  weakened  by  his  efforts  after  the  ship  sank, 
Lieutenant  Kalk  swam  from  one  raft  to  another  to  equalize  the 
weight  on  them.  Striving  for  the  safety  of  his  men,  he  over- 
taxed his  own  strength,  and  died  of  exhaustion  and  exposure. 
Men  who  were  on  the  raft  with  him  said,  "He  was  game  to  the 
last."  His  courage  and  self-sacrifice  are  commemorated  in  a 
destroyer  that  bears  his  name. 

There  was  no  other  serious  damage  to  destroyers  until 
March  19,  1918,  when  a  British  vessel  collided  with  the  Manley. 
The  collision  exploded  the  depth-charges  on  her  decks,  killing 
Lieutenant  Commander  Richard  McC.  Elliot,  of  New  York,  and 
33  enlisted  men,  and  injuring  22  others.  The  Manley,  though 
badly  damaged,  was  gotten  to  port  and  repaired. 

The  destroyers  never  halted  in  their  warfare  on  the  sub- 
marines, and  many  encounters  were  reported  in  the  early  part 
of  1918,  probably  the  most  notable  being  those  of  the  Allen, 
Feb.  2d;  the  Reid,  March  18th;  the  Isabel;  the  Stewart,  April 
23 ;  the  Porter,  April  28 ;  the  joint  attack  of  the  Patterson,  Beale, 
Burrows  and  Allen  on  May  19th,  and  that  of  the  Sterrett  on 
June  1st.  All  these  were  given  official  credits  by  the  British 
Admiralty,  which  also  gave  the  Tucker  (Lieutenant  Commander 
W.  H.  Lassing),  which  bombed  and  sent  down  a  U-boat  on 
August  8th,  the  credit  "possibly  sunk." 

The  armed  yachts,  the  subchasers  and  all  the  rest  played 
well  their  parts.  But  after  all  it  was  the  gallant  destroyers 
which  did  most  to  combat  the  submarine  menace.  At  sea  two- 
thirds  of  the  time,  they  escorted  thousands  of  vessels  in  and 
out  of  European  ports.  Some  of  them  made  astounding  records. 
The  first  year  after  we  entered  the  war  at  least  three,  the  Porter, 
Davis  and  Conyngham,  steamed  nearly  65,000  miles  each,  over 
twice  the  distance  around  the  globe,  while  the  Caldwell  for  some 
time  averaged  8,500  miles  a  month,  over  280  miles  a  day.  No 
class  of  ship,  big  or  little,  ever  excelled  these  records. 

Commander  Byron  McCandless,  who  commanded  the  Cald- 
well, went  to  Mare  Island  Navy  Yard  not  long  after  her  keel 
was  laid,  and  banged  away  so  persistently  to  get  his  ship  finished 
that  the  workmen  called  him  "Captain  Bing-Bang."     It  was 


1 'WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  67 

completed  in  quick  time,  and  for  its  trial  trip  made  a  record  run 
from  San  Francisco  through  the  Panama  Canal  to  Hampton 
Roads,  going  thence  across  the  Atlantic  and  into  service  in  the 
war  zone. 

There  were  many  stories  of  the  destroyers'  efficiency,  and 
one  told  me  by  a  gentleman  on  his  return  from  Europe  impressed 
me  particularly.  Making  its  way  across  the  North  Atlantic,  a 
convoy  of  troop-ships  was  still  some  three  hundred  miles  from 
land  when  a  voyager,  who  was  making  his  first  trip  across,  re- 
marked: "All  you  can  hear  about  nowadays  is  the  Navy.  It 
is  the  Navy  this,  the  Navy  that;  but  as  far  as  I  can  see, .the 
Navy  is  not  doing  much  in  this  war." 

One  of  the  civilians  in  the  party  who  had  a  son  in  the  Navy, 
rose  to  his  feet,  pulled  out  his  watch  and  said :  "In  ten  minutes 
six  United  States  destroyers  will  meet  this  convoy." 

"What  are  you  talking  about?"  asked  the  voyager.  "How 
do  you  know?" 

"Well,"  was  the  confident  answer,  "it  is  now  4:05  o'clock. 
The  destroyers  are  ordered  to  meet  this  convoy  at  4:15,  and 
they  will  be  on  time." 

The  party  went  out  on  deck  to  watch,  and  on  the  minute,  at 
4 :15,  destroyers  hove  in  sight.  Swinging  into  line,  on  each  side 
of  the  convoy,  the  saucy  little  vessels,  heaving  foam  and  spray 
from  bow  to  stern,  spanked  along  through  the  heavy  seas. 

"Good  heavens!"  exclaimed  the  doubting  Thomas,  "if  these 
little  destroyers  can  come  three  hundred  miles  to  sea  in  any 
kind  of  weather,  keep  their  schedule,  and  locate  a  convoy  on 
the  dot,  I  will  believe  anything  I  hear  regarding  the  Navy." 
That's  just  an  example  of  the  way  our  destroyer  boys  went  at 
the  job,  and  they  kept  it  up  until  the  last  horn  blew. 

Their  skill  in  navigation,  in  locating  convoys  or  vessels  in 
distress  or  boats  containing  survivors  was  positively  uncanny. 
When  the  President  Lincoln  was  sunk  five  hundred  miles  at  sea, 
the  Smith  and  the  Warrington,  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
away,  hurried  to  the  rescue.  A  wireless  message  stating  the 
locality  was  all  they  had  to  steer  by.  It  was  11  p.  m.  when  they 
arrived.  Boats  and  rafts  had  drifted  fifteen  miles.  But  so 
accurately  had  the  destroyer  officers  estimated  the  drift  that 
in  the  darkness  they  almost  ran  into  the  rafts! 


68  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

American  destroyers  at  Brest  operated  under  direct  com- 
mand of  Admiral  Wilson  and  those  at  Gibraltar  under  command 
of  Admiral  Niblack.  Though  operating  under  Admiral  Bayly 
and  subject  to  his  orders,  our  Destroyer  Force  at  Queenstown 
had  its  own  organization.  The  chief-of-staff  was  Captain  J.  R.  P. 
Pringle,  whose  ability  and  untiring  energy  won  the  respect  and 
regard  of  British  and  Americans  alike.  The  senior  commander 
was  Commander  David  C.  Hanrahan,  of  the  Cushing,  whose 
enterprise  and  energy  were  a  fine  example  to  his  juniors. 

The  splendid  work  done  by  our  vessels,  the  excellent  con- 
dition in  which  they  were  maintained,  the  superb  morale  of  the 
entire  force,  called  for  the  highest  praise.  A  year  after  the 
arrival  of  the  first  group,  Admiral  Bayly  issued  the  following 
order : 

On  the  anniversary  of  the  arrival  of  the  first  United  States  men- 
of-war  at  Queenstown,  I  wish  to  express  my  deep  gratitude  to  the 
United  States  officers  and  ratings  for  the  skill,  energy  and  unfailing 
good  nature  which  they  have  all  consistently  shown  and  which  qualities 
have  so  materially  assisted  in  the  war  by  enabling  ships  of  the  Allied 
Powers  to  cross  the  ocean  in  comparative  freedom. 

To  command  you  is  an  honor,  to  work  with  you  is  a  pleasure,  to 
know  you  is  to  know  the  best  traits  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race. 

A  thrilling  example  of  the  courage,  quick  decision  and 
prompt  action  that  characterized  the  Destroyer  Force  was  that 
of  the  Shaw  October  9,  1918.  Escorting  the  British  transport 
Aquitania,  the  Shaw  was  just  completing  the  right  leg  of  a  zig- 
zag that  brought  her  close  to  the  convoy,  when  her  rudder 
jammed.  As  the  huge  transport  turned,  the  destroyer  was  aimed 
straight  toward  her  side.  Commander  William  Glassford,  cap- 
tain of  the  Shaiv,  saw  that  a  collision  was  inevitable.  Either 
destroyer  or  transport  would  be  sacrificed.  If  the  sharp-prowed 
Shaw  struck  the  Aquitania,  the  big  troop-ship,  with  eight  thou- 
sand men  aboard,  might  be  ripped  and  sunk,  with  heavy  loss 
of  life. 

Glassford  decided  instantly  to  sacrifice  his  own  ship.  Un- 
able to  turn  it  aside,  he  gave  the  order,  ''Full  speed  astern!"  A 
moment  later,  the  Aquitania  struck  the  destroyer  and  sliced  her 
almost  in  two,  passing  through  her  without  even  slowing  speed. 
Striking  just  forward  of  the  bridge,  the  Aquitania  cut  off  ninety 


THEY,  TOO,  WEEB  BEADY 

Above,  a  view  through  the  stern  of  the  Cassin  after  she  had  been  hit  by  a  tor- 
pedo; although  crippled,  she  continued  the  search  for  the  submarine.  Inset,  Gun- 
ner's Mate  Osmond  K.  Ingram,  who  gave  his  life  to  save  the  Cassin.  Below,  the 
U.  S.  S.  Shaw  alongside  deck  after  her  collision  with  the  Aquitania. 


^^mPMUPPPPi 


THE  SEATTLE  AND  REAR  ADMIRAL  ALBERT  GLEAVES 
The  Commander  and  Flagship  of  the   Cruiser  and  Transport  Force. 


From  the  pnintinp  by  Burnett  Toole 

A  DASH  THROUGH  THE  DANGER  ZONE 
The  Leviathan,  largest  of  the  transports,  escorted  by  the  Kiinberly. 


"WE  ARE  READY  NOW,  SIR"  69 

feet  of  the  Shaw's  bow  and  raked  the  whole  length  of  her  side, 
stripping  open  the  forward  boiler  room,  and  tearing  out  the 
mainmast,  which,  in  falling,  jammed  the  starboard  engine. 
Sparks  ignited  the  oil  in  the  forward  tank,  setting  fire  to  the 
vessel.  The  Duncan  and  the  Kimberly  went  to  her  assistance, 
the  Kimberly  rescuing  the  survivors  in  the  bow,  which  was  float- 
ing two  hundred  yards  from  the  remainder  of  the  ship. 

That  the  vessel  kept  afloat  at  all  seemed  remarkable ;  to  get 
her  to  port  appeared  almost  impossible.  But  those  brave  men 
of  the  Shaw  put  out  the  fire,  in  the  face  of  bursting  ammunition. 
They  rigged  up  her  engines  and  got  them  working  again,  and 
repaired  the  steering  gear.  And  they  navigated  that  remnant 
of  a  ship  to  port,  reaching  Portland  at  1:30  in  the  afternoon. 
Two  of  her  officers  and  ten  men  of  her  crew  were  dead,  killed 
in  the  collision.  Three  officers  and  twelve  men  were  injured. 
Her  bow  and  most  of  the  forward  part  of  the  ship  was  gone. 
But  what  was  left  of  her  was  taken  to  a  shipyard,  and  a  new  for- 
ward part  was  built.  Some  months  afterwards,  on  a  visit  to 
Portsmouth,  England,  where  she  was  repaired,  I  saw  her  again 
in  commission,  doing  splendid  service  in  the  Navy. 

Could  there  be  a  better  tribute  than  that  to  the  staunchness 
of  our  destroyers  and  the  undying  spirit  and  superb  efficiency 
of  their  officers  and  men? 


CHAPTER  VIII 
RACE    BETWEEN   WILSON   AND    HINDENBURG 

BIGGEST    TRANSPORTATION     JOB    IN     HISTORY TWO     MILLION     TROOPS 

CARRIED    3,000     MILES    OVERSEAS FIRST    CONVOYS    ATTACKED    BY 

U-BOATS NO     AMERICAN     TROOP-SHIP     SUNK,     NOT     ONE     SOLDIER 

ABOARD  LOST  THROUGH  ENEMY  ACTION,  ON  THE  WAY  TO  FRANCE 

NAVAL    TRANSPORTS    TOOK    911,000    TO    EUROPE,    BROUGHT    HOME 
1,700,000 — U.  S.  NAVY  PROVIDED  FOUR-FIFTHS  OF  ESCORTS. 

i '  T     X     JTHAT  was  the  greatest  thing  America  did  in  the 

\  /  \  /     World  War  1 ' '    That  is  a  question  I  have  often 

V     V      been  asked,  and  it  is  easily  answered.    It  was  the 

raising  and  training  of  an  army  of  4,000,000  men, 

a  navy  of  over  600,000,  and  the  safe  transportation  of  more  than 

two  million  troops  to  Europe.    And  all  this  was  accomplished 

in  eighteen  months. 

When  the  issue  hung  in  the  balance,  in  the  spring  of  1918, 
Lloyd  George  said:  "It  is  a  race  between  Wilson  and  Hinden- 
burg. ' '  Could  America  land  enough  soldiers  in  France  in  time 
to  check  the  German  offensive  I    That  was  the  one  vital  question. 

Carrying  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  across  the 
Atlantic  and  bringing  our  troops  home  has  been  justly  termed 
the  "biggest  transportation  job  in  history."  Sailing  through 
submarine-infested  seas,  they  constantly  faced  the  menace  of 
attack  from  an  unseen  foe,  as  well  as  the  perils  of  war-time 
navigation.  Yet  not  one  American  troop-ship  was  sunk  on  the 
way  to  France,  and  not  one  soldier  aboard  a  troop  transport 
manned  by  the  United  States  Navy  lost  his  life  through  enemy 
action. 

That  achievement  has  never  been  equalled.  It  was  not  only 
the  most  important  but  the  most  successful  operation  of  the 
war.    The  Germans  never  believed  it  could  be  done. 

70 


RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       71 

When  Rear  Admiral  Albert  Gleaves,  commander  of  the 
Cruiser  and  Transport  Force,  came  to  Washington  for  his  final 
instructions,  just  before  the  first  troop  convoys  sailed  for 
Europe,  as  he  was  leaving  my  office,  I  said  to  him : 

Admiral,  you  are  going  on  the  most  important,  the  most  difficult, 
and  the  most  hazardous  duty  assigned  to  the  Navy.    Good  bye. 

That  was  not  overstating  it  in  any  particular.  No  nation  in 
history  had  ever  attempted  to  transport  so  huge  an  army  over- 
seas. It  would  have  been  difficult  enough  under  the  most  ideal 
conditions,  with  nothing  to  hinder  or  molest. 

The  German  navy  could  have  no  greater  object  than  to  pre- 
vent our  troops  from  getting  to  France.  There  could  have  been 
no  greater  victory  for  them  than  to  have  sunk  a  transport  loaded 
with  American  soldiers.  Words  can  hardly  express  the  strain 
of  those  anxious  days  when  our  first  transports  were  running 
the  gauntlet  to  France ;  or  our  relief  when  we  received  the  news 
that  they  had  all  arrived  safely  at  St.  Nazaire. 

Sailing  in  a  dense  fog  on  June  14,  1917,  the  first  group  ar- 
rived on  June  26th ;  the  last,  the  cargo  ships,  on  July  2nd.  The 
first  group,  Gleaves  reported,  was  attacked  by  submarines  the 
night  of  June  22nd,  at  10 :15  p.  m. ;  the  second  group  encountered 
two,  and  a  torpedo  was  fired  at  the  fourth  group  on  June  28th. 
That  they  had  escaped  the  submarines  was  an  added  cause  for 
rejoicing.  Not  a  ship  was  damaged  or  a  man  injured,  and  an 
officer  reported:  "We  didn't  lose  but  one  horse,  and  that  was 
a  mule.' ' 

' '  The  German  Admiralty  had  boasted  that  not  one  American 
soldier  should  set  foot  in  France,''  Gleaves  said.  "The  bluff 
had  been  called,  and  it  could  not  have  been  called  at  a  more 
psychological  moment. ' ' 

The  question  of  the  hour  had  been  successfully  answered; 
France,  as  well  as  America,  celebrated  the  event  in  a  very  de- 
lirium of  rejoicing.  This  was  the  beginning  of  that  vast  stream 
of  troops  and  supplies  that  poured  across  the  Atlantic  until  the 
Germans  were  overwhelmed. 

Getting  that  first  group  of  transports  together  was  a  job. 
The  army  had  only  a  few  troop-ships,  none  of  them  fitted  for 
trans-Atlantic  service.    The  Navy  had  only  three — the  Render- 


72  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

son,  just  completed ;  the  Hancock,  and  the  former  German  com- 
merce raider,  Prince  Eitel  Friedrich,  which  we  converted  into 
an  auxiliary  cruiser  and  renamed  the  DeKalb.  The  Army  se- 
cured fourteen  mail  and  cargo  steamships,  and  hastily  converted 
them.  It  had  to  be  quick  work.  We  had  not  contemplated  send- 
ing troops  so  soon.  From  a  military  standpoint  it  would  have 
been  better,  many  experts  in  this  country  and  Europe  held,  to 
have  retained  the  regulars  for  a  while  to  aid  in  training  the 
new  officers  and  raw  recruits,  and  not  to  have  begun  transporta- 
tion until  we  had  a  larger  army. 

But  war-weary  France,  grimly  holding  back  the  Germans, 
and  England,  beset  by  submarines,  needed  cheering  up ;  needed 
visible  evidence  that  reenforcement  was  certain,  that  the  Amer- 
icans were  coming.  Marshal  Joffre  asked  that  some  troops  be 
sent  at  the  earliest  possible  moment — "a  regiment  or  two,  if 
possible  a  division."  He  told  Secretary  Baker  that  he  looked 
forward  to  the  day  when  the  United  States  should  build  up  its 
"  splendid  army  of  400,000  or  500,000."  What  must  he  have 
thought  when  he  saw  an  American  army  of  4,000,000  men,  with 
two  millions  of  them  in  France !  He  appreciated  the  necessity, 
he  said,  of  retaining  the  regulars  to  train  the  new  army,  and 
knew  that  few  could  be  spared.  But  the  very  sight  of  American 
troops  on  French  soil,  of  our  men  marching  through  the  streets 
of  Paris,  would  be  a  tremendous  inspiration  to  all  France.  The 
wise  old  Marshal  was  right. 

Secretary  Baker  immediately  began  his  preparations  to  send 
troops.  When  he  told  Congress  he  would  have  an  army  of 
500,000  men  in  France  in  the  summer  of  1918,  a  leading  senator 
declared  it  was  "impossible."  It  was  impossible  to  those  with- 
out vision.  But  the  Secretary  of  War's  figures  were  increased 
three-fold. 

General  Pershing  was  chosen  to  command  the  forces  to  be 
sent  to  Europe,  and  was  summoned  from  the  Mexican  border. 
He  arrived  in  Washington  May  10th.  Preparations  were  al- 
ready under  way  by  both  Army  and  Navy.  Officers  of  both 
services  were  working  out  in  detail  the  system  by  which  they 
were  to  secure  ships  and  cooperate  in  transportation. 

I  selected  Gleaves,  then  in  command  of  our  destroyer  force, 
to  direct  the  troop  transportation,  and  I  never  had  reason  to 


EACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       73 

regret  this  choice.  No  man  could  have  done  a  big  job  better; 
no  job  was  ever  better  done.  On  May  23,  he  was  summoned  to 
Washington  and  informed  that  he  had  been  chosen  to  command 
the  first  expedition  to  France-. 

General  Pershing  and  his  staff  sailed  May  28th  on  the  Baltic 
and  arrived  at  Liverpool  June  8,  reaching  France  at  Boulogne, 
June  13th.  The  troop  convoys  sailed  from  New  York  the  next 
day.  Admiral  Gleaves,  on  his  flagship,  the  cruiser  Seattle,  was 
in  command.  The  vessels  were  arranged  in  four  groups,  which 
sailed  six  hours  apart: 

Group  1 — Transports:  Saratoga,  Havana,  Tenadores,  Pastores. 
Escort:  Seattle,  armored  cruiser;  DeKalb,  auxiliary  cruiser;  Corsair, 
converted  yacht ;  Wilkes,  Terry,  Roe,  destroyers. 

Group  2 — Transports :  Henderson,  Momus,  Antilles,  Lenape.  Escort : 
Birmingham,  scout  cruiser ;  Aphrodite,  converted  yacht ;  Burrows,  Fan- 
ning, Lamson,  destroyers. 

Group  3 — Transports:  Mallory,  Finland,  San  Jacinto.  Escort: 
Charleston,  cruiser;  Cyclops,  fuel  ship;  Allen,  McCall,  Preston, 
destroyers. 

Group  4 — Transports:  Montanan,  Dakotan,  El  Occidente,  Edward 
Luckenbach.  Escort:  St.  Louis,  cruiser;  Hancock,  cruiser  transport; 
Shaw,  Parker,  Ammen,  Flusser,  destroyers. 

No  convoy  that  ever  sailed  had  a  stronger  escort  or  was  more 
closely  guarded.  Their  protection  was  our  supreme  duty.  Be- 
fore they  left,  I  cabled  Admiral  Sims:  "I  hereby  instruct  you 
to  furnish  escorts,  to  consist  of  one  division  of  destroyers  for 
each  convoy  group  from  the  point  of  meeting  to  the  point  of 
debarkation." 

Submarines  were  reported  operating  in  the  area  that  had 
to  be  crossed.  Three  of  the  groups  encountered  U-boats,  Ad- 
miral Gleaves  reported,  and  Admiral  Sims  cabled  on  June  30th, 
"First  group  attacked  by  submarines,  longitude  25  degrees  30, 
before  arriving  at  first  rendezvous;  second  group  attacked 
longitude  8";  and  the  next  day  he  cabled:  "It  is  practically 
certain  that  enemy  knew  position  of  the  first  rendezvous  and 
accordingly  sent  a  submarine  to  intercept  before  juncture  with 
destroyers." 

About  10 :15  p.  m.,  June  22,  the  officer  of  the  deck  and  others 
on  the  bridge  of  the  Seattle,  which  was  leading  the  first  group, 


74  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

saw  a  white  streak  about  50  yards  ahead  of  the  ship,  crossing 
from  starboard  to  port.  The  cruiser  was  immediately  run  off 
90  degrees  to  starboard  at  full  speed.  The  officer  of  the  deck 
said,  "  Report  to  the  admiral  a  torpedo  has  just  crossed  our 
bow. "  General  alarm  was  sounded,  torpedo  crews  being  already 
at  their  guns.  When  Gleaves  reached  the  bridge,  the  DeKalb 
and  one  of  the  transports  astern  had  opened  fire,  the  former's 
shell  fitted  with  tracers.  Other  vessels  of  the  convoy  turned 
to  the  right  and  left.  The  destroyer  Wilkes  crossed  the  Seattle's 
bow  at  full  speed  and  turned  toward  the  left  column  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  firing. 

Two  torpedoes  passed  close  to  the  DeKalb  from  port  to  star- 
board, one  about  30  yards  ahead  of  the  ship  and  the  other  under 
her  stern,  as  the  ship  was  turning  to  the  northward.  Captain 
Gherardi  stated  that  at  10 :25  the  wake  of  a  torpedo  was  sighted 
directly  across  the  DeKalb's  bow.  A  second  torpedo  wake  was 
reported  ten  minutes  later  by  the  after  lookouts. 

The  torpedoes  fired  at  the  Havana  passed  from  starboard  to 
port  about  40  yards  ahead  of  the  ship,  leaving  a  distinct  wake 
which  was  visible  for  400  or  500  yards. 

The  submarine  sighted  by  the  Seattle  was  seen  by  the  Wilkes 
and  passed  under  that  ship,  Lieutenant  Van  Metre  reported, 
stating  that  the  oscillator  gave  unmistakable  evidence  of  the 
presence  of  a  submarine.  The  radio  operator  at  the  receiver  re- 
ported, " Submarine  very  close  to  us."  As  the  U-boat  passed, 
it  was  followed  by  the  Wilkes,  which  ran  down  between  the 
columns,  chasing  the  enemy. 

The  Birmingham,  leading  the  second  group,  encountered  two 
submarines,  the  first  about  11:50  a.  m.,  June  26,  in  latitude 
47°  01'  N.  longitude  06°  28'  W.,  about  a  hundred  miles  off  the 
coast  of  France,  and  the  second  two  hours  later.  The  Wads- 
worth  investigated  the  wake  of  the  first  without  further  dis- 
covery. The  Cummings  sighted  the  bow  wave  of  the  second  at 
a  distance  of  1,500  yards,  and  headed  for  it  at  a  speed  of  25 
knots.  The  gun  pointers  at  the  forward  gun  saw  the  periscope 
time  and  again,  but  as  the  ship  was  zigzagging,  it  disappeared 
each  time  before  they  could  fire  at  it.  The  Cummings  passed 
about  25  yards  ahead  of  a  mass  of  bubbles  which  were  coming 
up  from  the  wake  and  let  go  a  depth-charge  just  ahead.    Several 


RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       75 

pieces  of  timber,  quantities  of  oil,  bubbles  and  debris  came  to 
the  surface.  Nothing  more  was  seen  of  the  submarine.  The 
attacks  on  the  second  group  occurred  about  800  miles  to  the 
eastward  of  where  the  attacks  had  been  made  on  the  first  group. 

The  voyage  of  the  third  group,  Admiral  Gleaves  reported, 
was  uneventful;  but  the  Kanawha,  with  the  fourth  group,  on 
June  28th,  fired  on  what  was  believed  to  be  a  submarine.  The 
Kanawha's  commander  saw  the  object;  and  a  minute  or  two 
later  the  port  after  gun's  crew  reported  sighting  a  sub- 
marine, and  opened  fire.  The  lookouts  said  they  saw  the  U-boat 
under  the  water's  surface,  about  where  the  shots  were  landing. 
Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  Lee  C.  Carey,  in  charge  of  the  firing, 
reported  that  he  saw  the  submarine  fire  two  torpedoes  in  the 
direction  of  the  convoy,  which  sheered  off  when  the  alarm  was 
sounded.  ''All  the  officers  and  men  aft  had  observed  the  tor- 
pedoes traveling  through  the  water  and  cheered  loudly  when 
they  saw  a  torpedo  miss  a  transport,"  reported  the  Kanawha's 
commander. 

When  he  was  in  Paris  Admiral  Gleaves  was  shown  a  confi- 
dential bulletin  of  information  issued  by  the  French  General 
Staff,  dated  July  6,  which  contained  the  following : 

Ponta  Delgada  was  bombarded  at  9  a.  m.,  July  4.  This  is  un- 
doubtedly the  submarine  which  attacked  the  Fern  Leaf  on  June  25,  four 
hundred  miles  north  of  the  Azores  and  sank  the  Benguela  and  Syria 
on  the  29th  of  June  100  miles  from  Terceira  (Azores).  This  submarine 
was  ordered  to  watch  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Azores  at  such  a  distance 
as  it  was  supposed  the  enemy  American  convoy  would  pass  from  the 
Azores. 

"It  appears  from  the  French  report  just  quoted  above  and 
from  the  location  of  the  attack  that  enemy  submarines  had  been 
notified  of  our  approach  and  were  probably  scouting  across  our 
route,"  Gleaves  said. 

On  the  evening  of  July  3rd,  I  had  the  pleasure  of  announcing 
the  safe  arrival  of  all  our  convoys,  without  the  loss  of  a  man. 
This  occasioned  general  rejoicing  in  France,  England  and  Italy, 
as  well  as  America.  For  us,  the  national  holiday  that  followed 
was  truly  a  glorious  Fourth.  Secretary  Baker  wrote  the  thanks 
of  the  Army,  adding:  "This  splendid  achievement  is  an  aus- 
picious beginning,  and  it  has  been  characterized  throughout  by 


76  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  most  cordial  and  effective  cooperation  between  the  two  mili- 
tary services. ' '  In  replying,  ' '  in  behalf  of  the  men  whose  cour- 
age gave  safe  conduct  to  courage,"  I  said  that  the  Navy  waited 
"in  full  confidence  for  the  day  when  the  valor  of  your  soldiers 
will  write  new  and  splendid  chapters  in  the  history  of  our 
liberty-loving  land." 

The  policy  of  the  Department,  with  reference  to  the  safety 
of  ships  carrying  troops  to  France,  was  laid  down  in  this  cable- 
gram which  I  wrote  with  my  own  hand : 

Washington,  D.  C,  July  28,  1917. 
Admiral  Sims: 

The  paramount  duty  of  the  destroyers  in  European  waters  is  prin- 
cipally the  proper  protection  of  transports  with  American  troops.  Be 
certain  to  detail  an  adequate  convoy  of  destroyers  and  in  making  the 
detail  bear  in  mind  that  everything  is  secondary  to  having  a  sufficient 
number  to  insure  protection  to  American  troops. 

Josephus  Daniels. 

From  the  small  beginning  was  built  up  the  great  Cruiser  and 
Transport  Force  which  took  to  France  911,047  American  sol- 
diers, and  brought  home  1,700,000— a  total  of  2,600,000  carried 
across  the  Atlantic  in  naval  transports.  In  less  than  a  year  this 
Force  grew  to  a  fleet  of  83  vessels,  and  after  the  armistice  com- 
prised 142  vessels  carrying  troops,  with  facilities .  for  13,914 
officers  and  349,770  men.  Rear  Admiral  Gleaves'  headquarters 
were  at  Hoboken,  N.  J.,  where  most  of  the  transports  docked. 
His  chief  of  staff  was  Captain  De  W.  Blamer.  The  Newport 
News  Division  was  commanded  by  Rear  Admiral  Hilary  P. 
Jones,  now  commander-in-chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  with 
Captain  J.  F.  Hines  as  his  chief  of  staff. 

Of  the  194,965  troops  which  sailed  before  the  end  of  1917, 
113,429  were  carried  in  American  vessels,  all  but  8,535  of  these 
in  our  transports;  and  75,500  were  taken  in  British  ships.  In 
January,  February  and  March,  1918,  British  vessels  carried 
57,399;  U.  S.  naval  transports,  123,917.  Foreign  shipping  in 
large  quantity  did  not  become  available  until  after  the  famous 
"March  drive"  made  by  the  Germans  in  1918.  Then  the  most 
important  thing  to  all  the  Allies  was  getting  American  soldiers 
to  Europe,  and  British,  French  and  Italian  ships  in  numbers 
were  furnished.     In  April,  1918,  67,553  sailed  in  U.  S.  trans- 


RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       77 

ports,  47,362  in  British  ships.  In  May  the  British  carried  more 
than  we  did,  133,795  to  our  99,561,  besides  12,127  carried  in 
Italian  vessels  leased  by  the  British.  In  the  next  five  months 
up  to  the  armistice,  520,410  were  carried  in  U.  S.  naval  trans- 
ports, and  28,973  in  other  American  ships ;  British  vessels  car- 
ried 692,931;  British-leased  Italian  ships  53,493  and  French, 
Italian  and  other  foreign  ships,  38,218. 

The  records  of  the  Cruiser  and  Transport  Force  show  that, 
in  all,  2,079,880  American  troops  were  transported  to  France 
before  the  armistice — 952,581  in  American  vessels,  911,047  of 
these  in  U.  S.  naval  transports ;  1,006,987  in  British  ships ;  68,246 
in  British-leased  Italian  vessels;  52,066  in  French,  Italian  and 
other  foreign  ships.  American  vessels  carried  46.25  per  cent, 
43.75  of  this  in  U.  S.  Naval  transports;  British  vessels  48.25 
per  cent ;  British-leased  Italian  ships,  3  per  cent ;  French,  Italian 
and  others,  2.5  per  cent. 

The  purely  naval  duty  was  escorting  these  vessels,  guarding 
them  against  attack  by  raiders  or  submarines.  Of  this  the 
British  navy  performed  14.125  per  cent,  the  French  3.125,  and 
the  United  States  Navy  82.75  per  cent,  over  four-fifths.  Of  the 
total  number  of  troops,  61,617  were  under  French  escort,  297,903 
under  British  escort,  and  1,720,360  sailed  under  the  escort  of 
the  United  States  Navy. 

But  that  is  only  half  the  story.  When  hostilities  ended,  that 
vast  army  had  to  be  brought  back  from  Europe.  For  this,  very 
little  foreign  shipping  was  available.  Of  the  1,933,156  Ameri- 
cans returned  from  November  11,  1918,  to  the  end  of  September, 
1919,  the  Navy  brought  home  1,675,733 ;  all  other  vessels,  Ameri- 
can and  foreign,  257,423.  During  hostilities  we  had  returned 
11,211  sick,  wounded,  casuals,  etc.;  some  were  returned  after 
September,  so  that  the  total  number  brought  by  the  Navy  from 
Europe  to  America  ran  well  over  1,700,000. 

Of  the  total  troop  and  official  passenger  movement  incident 
to  the  war,  approximately  4,000,000,  the  Navy  transported  more 
than  2,600,000.  Not  only  did  the  Navy  man  and  operate  the 
United  States  transports,  but  provided  the  food  for  this  vast 
army  of  soldiers  en  route.  And  during  the  entire  war  period, 
four-fifths  of  all  the  American  troops  who  sailed  were  guarded 
by  American  cruisers,  destroyers  and  patrol  craft. 


78  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

This  country  could  not  have  sent  over  nearly  so  many  troops 
as  it  did,  if  we  had  not  been  aided  by  the  British,  French  and 
Italian  vessels.  This  was  no  gift,  of  course.  The  United  States 
Government  paid  for  every  soldier  transported  on  a  foreign 
vessel.  The  aid  of  our  Allies  was  invaluable,  and  highly  appre- 
ciated. They  should  be  given  full  credit  for  all  they  did;  but 
this  should  not  detract  one  iota  from  the  great  task  performed 
by  our  Navy,  which  was  the  biggest  factor  in  putting  through 
this  biggest  job  of  the  war. 

Not  a  single  vessel  of  the  Cruiser  and  Transport  Force  was 
torpedoed  on  the  way  to  France.  Two,  the  President  Lincoln 
and  the  Covington,  were  sunk  returning,  as  was  also  the  An- 
tilles, an  Army  chartered  transport  not  manned  by  the  Navy. 
Two  American  transports  were  torpedoed,  the  Finland,  manned 
by  a  civilian  crew,  and  the  Mount  Vernon,  manned  by  the  Navy; 
but  both  were  successfully  navigated  to  port  and  repaired.  The 
Tuscania  and  the  Moldavia,  sunk  while  carrying  American 
troops  to  Europe,  were  British  chartered  vessels,  as  was  also  the 
Dwinsk,  which  was  sunk  while  returning. 

The  first  transport  lost  was  the  Antilles,  October  17,  1917, 
two  days  out  of  Brest.  Eleven  days  later  the  Finland  was  struck 
by  a  torpedo.  In  both  cases  there  was  loss  of  life  and  confusion 
among  the  civilian  crews.  After  these  experiences,  it  was  de- 
cided to  man  all  American  troop-ships  entirely  by  naval  per- 
sonnel; and  it  was  not  until  May  31st  that  another  was  lost. 

Returning  to  America,  in  company  with  the  Susquehanna, 
Antigone  and  Rijndam,  the  President  Lincoln  (Commander  P. 
W.  Foote),  was  steaming  along,  500  miles  from  land.  At  9 
o'clock  a  terrific  explosion  occurred  on  the  port  side  of  the 
Lincoln,  120  feet  from  the  bow.  In  an  instant  there  was  another 
explosion  in  the  after  part  of  the  vessel.  The  ship  had  been 
struck  by  three  torpedoes,  fired  in  a  salvo  from  a  submarine. 
Two  struck  together  near  the  bow,  the  other  near  the  stern. 
Officers  and  lookouts  had  sighted  the  wakes,  but  the  torpedoes 
were  so  close  that  it  was  impossible  to  avoid  them. 

There  were  715  persons  on  board,  including  30  officers  and 
men  of  the  army,  a  number  of  whom  were  sick,  two  helpless  from 
paralysis.  It  was  realized  that  the  vessel  could  not  long  remain 
afloat,  but  there  was  no  confusion.    Crew  and  passengers  coolly 


RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       79 

waited  for  and  obeyed  orders.  Boats  were  lowered  and  life- 
rafts  placed  in  the  water.  Fifteen  minutes  after  the  torpedoes 
struck,  all  hands  except  the  guns '-crews  were  ordered  to  aban- 
don the  ship. 

Gunners  stood  at  their  stations,  awaiting  any  opportunity 
for  a  shot  at  the  submarine.  Commander  Foote  and  several 
other  officers  remained  aboard.  All  the  rest  of  the  ship's  com- 
pany were  in  the  boats  or  on  the  rafts.  When  the  guns  began 
firing,  they  broke  into  cheers.  The  firing  was  kept  up  until  the 
water  covered  the  main  deck,  and  the  gunners  did  not  leave  their 
posts  until  they  were  ordered  off  just  before  the  ship  sank. 

With  her  colors  flying,  twenty-five  minutes  after  the  tor- 
pedoes exploded,  the  Lincoln  went  down.  Three  officers  and  23 
men  were  lost.  Seven  working  below  decks  were  either  killed 
by  the  explosion,  or  drowned  by  the  inrush  of  water.  Sixteen 
men  on  a  raft  alongside  were  caught  by  the  current  and  carried 
under  as  the  ship  went  down.  The  officers  lost  were  Passed 
Assistant  Surgeon  L.  C.  Whiteside,  the  ship's  medical  officer; 
Paymaster  Andrew  Mowat,  the  supply  officer,  and  Assistant 
Paymaster  J.  D.  Johnson.  Dr.  Whiteside  and  Paymaster  Mowat 
had  seen  that  the  men  under  their  charge  had  gotten  away 
safely,  the  doctor  having  attended  to  placing  the  sick  in  the 
boat  provided  for  them.  Paymaster  Johnson  was  on  the  raft 
which  was  pulled  down  as  the  ship  plunged. 

Admiral  Sims  cabled  that  the  ''small  loss  of  life  is  due  to 
thorough  discipline  of  ship's  company,  and  excellent  seaman- 
ship of  Commander  Foote.' '  This  he  said  was  "evidenced  by 
actual  results  even  after  the  ship  had  sunk  and  the  personnel 
was  adrift  in  boats  and  on  rafts."  Admiral  Gleaves  wrote  to 
Foote:  "Your  action  and  judgment  under  such  trying  condi- 
tions were  in  accord  with  the  best  traditions  of  the  service." 
Half  an  hour  after  the  ship  went  down  a  large  submarine 
emerged,  and  went  among  the  boats  and  rafts,  seeking  the  com- 
mander and  other  senior  officers,  whom  they  wished  to  take  pris- 
oners. The  Germans  could  identify  only  one  officer,  Lieutenant 
Edouard  Victor  M.  Isaacs,  who  was  taken  on  board  and  carried 
away.  The  submarine — it  was  the  U-90, — remained  in  the  vicin- 
ity for  two  hours,  and  returned  again  in  the  afternoon,  evidently 
seeking  to  attack  other  vessels  of  the  convoy.    But  they  were 


80  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

far  away,  having,  in  accordance  with  standard  instructions  to 
avoid  attack,  put  on  all  steam  and  left  the  scene  as  Sv,on  as  the 
Lincoln  was  hit. 

The  U-boat  was  so  menacing  that  some  feared  it  would  fire 
upon  the  life-craft.  When  several  of  the  crew  went  to  its  gun, 
apparently  preparing  it  for  action,  a  man  in  one  of  the  boats 
exclaimed :  ' '  Good  night !    Here  come  the  fireworks ! ' ' 

By  dark  the  boats  and  rafts  had  been  lashed  together. 
Lighted  lanterns  were  hoisted  and  flares  and  signal  lights 
burned  every  few  minutes.  None  knew  when  aid  would  arrive. 
Distress  signals  had  been  sent  out,  but  the  nearest  destroyers 
were  250  miles  away,  protecting  another  convoy.  Military 
necessity  might  prevent  their  being  detached. 

Five  hundred  miles  from  land,  waiting  for  aid  until  far  in 
the  night,  the  men  cheered  and  sang  such  songs  as  "Over 
There,"  "Keep  the  Home  Fires  Burning,"  "Hail,  Hail,  the 
Gang 's  All  Here, ' '  and  ' '  Where  do  we  go  from  here,  boys  ? "  At 
11  p.  m.  the  destroyers  Smith  (Lieutenant  Commander  Kenyon) 
and  Warrington  (Lieutenant  Commander  Klein)  arrived.  With 
only  the  wireless  distress  message  sent  at  9  a.  m.  to  guide  them, 
they  had  located  the  life-craft  in  the  middle  of  the  night,  though 
boats  and  rafts  had  drifted  15  miles.  The  hundreds  of  survivors 
were  taken  aboard  the  destroyers,  which  remained  until  daylight 
to  search  for  survivors,  departing  at  6  a.  m. 

Though  their  decks  were  crowded  with  the  Lincoln's  officers 
and  men,  the  Smith  and  Warrington  made  a  fast  run  to  Brest, 
arriving  there  next  day.  En  route  they  sighted  the  wake  of  a 
periscope  and  rained  depth-bombs  on  the  very  submarine  which 
had  sunk  the  Lincoln,  but  by  descending  to  a  great  depth  the 
U-90  escaped. 

That  it  was  the  same  U-boat  was  learned  positively  when, 
months  afterward,  Lieutenant  Isaacs  escaped  from  prison.  His 
experiences  aboard  the  submarine  and  in  Germany  make  a  thrill- 
ing story.  Describing  his  capture,  after  the  sinking  of  the 
Lincoln,  and  his  being  taken  aboard  the  U-boat,  Lieutenant 
Isaacs  said: 

We  passed  north  of  the  Shetlands  into  the  North  Sea,  the  Skagerrak, 
the  Cattegat,  and  the  Sound  into  the  Baltic.  Proceeding  to  Kiel,  we 
passed  down  the  canal  through  Heligoland  Bight  to  Wilhelmshaven. 


t± 

-: 

d 

-' 

- 

a? 

^3 

^J 

o 

a> 

Hj 

i 

^ 

JO 

o 

CO 

Hi 

o 

CO 

O 

CB 

*"* 

^ 

hj 

THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY  WITH  CAPTAIN  DISMUKES  AND 
THE  MEN  WHO  SAVED  THE  MOUNT  VERNON 


THE  MOUNT  VERNON,  FORMERLY  THE  GERMAN  LINER  KRONPRTN- 

ZESSIN   CECILIE,   SAFELY   IN   PORT    AFTER   BEING    TORPEDOED, 

SEPTEMBER  5,  1918. 


RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       81 

On  the  way  to  the  Shetlands  we  fell  in  with  two  American  de- 
stroyers, the  Smith  and  the  Warrington,  who  dropped  22  depth  bombs 
on  us.  We  were  submerged  to  a  depth  of  60  meters  and  weathered  the 
storm,  although  five  bombs  were  very  close  and  shook  us  up  considerably. 
The  information  I  had  been  able  to  collect  was,  I  considered,  of  enough 
importance  to  warrant  my  trying  to  escape.  Accordingly  in  Danish 
waters  I  attempted  to  jump  from  the  deck  of  the  submarine,  but  was 
caught  and  ordered  below. 

The  German  Navy  authorities  took  me  from  Wilhelmshaven  to 
Karlsruhe,  where  I  was  turned  over  to  the  army.  Here  I  met  officers 
of  all  the  Allied  armies,  and  with  them  I  attempted  several  escapes,  all 
of  which  were  unsuccessful.  After  three  weeks  at  Karlsruhe  I  was  sent 
to  the  American  and  Russian  officers'  camp  at  Villingen.  On  the  way 
I  attempted  to  escape  from  the  train  by  jumping  out  of  the  window. 
With  the  train  making  about  40  miles  an  hour,  I  landed  on  the  opposite 
railroad  track  and  was  so  severely  wounded  by  the  fall  that  I  could  not 
get  away  from  my  guard.  They  followed  me,  firing  continuously.  When 
they  recaptured  me  they  struck  me  on  the  head  and  body  with  their 
guns  until  one  broke  his  rifle.  It  snapped  in  two  at  the  small  of  the 
stock  as  he  struck  me  with  the  butt  on  the  back  of  the  head. 

I  was  given  two  weeks  solitary  confinement,  for  this  attempt  to 
escape,  but  continued  trying,  for  I  was  determined  to  get  my  informa- 
tion back  to  the  Navy.  Finally,  on  the  night  of  October  6,  assisted  by 
several  American  Army  officers,  I  was  able  to  effect  an  escape  by  short- 
circuiting  all  lighting  circuits  in  the  prison  camp  and  cutting  through 
barbed-wire  fences  surrounding  the  camp.  This  had  to  be  done  in  the 
face  of  a  heavy  rifle  fire  from  the  guards.  But  it  was  difficult  for  them 
to  see  in  the  darkness,  so  I  escaped  unscathed. 

In  company  with  an  American  officer  in  the  French  Army,  I  made 
my  way  for  seven  days  and  nights  over  mountains  to  the  Rhine,  which 
to  the  south  of  Baden  forms  the  boundary  between  Germany  and 
Switzerland.  After  a  four-hour  crawl  on  hands  and  knees  I  was  able 
to  elude  the  sentries  along  the  Rhine.  Plunging  in,  I  made  for  the 
Swiss  shore.  After  being  carried  several  miles  down  the  stream,  being 
frequently  submerged  by  the  rapid  current,  I  finally  reached  the  oppo- 
site shore  and  gave  myself  up  to  the  Swiss  gendarmes,  who  turned  me 
over  to  the  American  legation  at  Berne.  From  there  I  made  my  way 
to  Paris  and  then  London  and  finally  Washington,  where  I  arrived  four 
weeks  after  my  escape  from  Germany. 

It  was  my  pleasure  to  greet  Lieutenant  Isaacs  on  his  return, 
congratulate  him  on  his  escape,  and  commend  him  for  the  heroic 
courage  and  enterprise  he  had  displayed  under  such  trying  cir- 
cumstances. 

The  Covington  (Captain  R.  D.  Hasbrouck)  was  torpedoed 
July  1st  at  9 :15  p.  m.,  the  torpedo  smashing  a  hole  in  the  vessel's 


82  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

side  and  throwing  into  the  air  a  column  of  water  higher  than  the 
smokestacks.  Engine  and  fire  rooms  quickly  filled,  the  ship  lost 
headway  rapidly  and  in  fifteen  minutes  lay  dead  in  the  water. 

Listing  heavily  to  port,  it  was  feared  the  vessel  might  take 
a  lurch  and  sink  suddenly.  Twenty-one  boats  were  lowered, 
three  had  been  smashed  by  the  explosion.  ' '  Abandon  ship, ' '  was 
ordered.  The  bugle  sounded  "Silence,"  and  silently  the  men 
went  down  the  Jacob 's  ladders  as  if  they  were  at  drill.  The  de- 
stroyer Smith  stood  close  by,  taking  the  men  from  the  boats. 
Thirty  officers  and  men  remained  aboard  with  the  Captain  until 
an  hour  after  the  torpedo  struck. 

Hoping  to  save  the  transport,  a  salvage  party  was  organized, 
to  go  on  board  as  soon  as  the  men  could  be  collected  from  rafts 
and  boats.  The  little  Smith,  which  in  addition  to  its  own  crew 
of  one  hundred,  had  aboard  800  of  the  Covington's  officers  and 
men,  encircled  the  transport  to  keep  off  the  submarine  and  pre- 
vent it  from  firing  another  torpedo. 

Another  destroyer,  the  Reade,  came  to  the  rescue;  at  4:20 
a.  m.  the  British  salvage  tugs,  Revenger  and  Woonda  arrived, 
and  at  5 :30  o'clock  the  American  tug  Concord  reached  the  scene. 
The  Smith,  which  was  ordered  to  take  to  port  all  the  crew  not 
needed,  at  5 :20  left  for  Brest.  By  6  o  'clock  the  three  tugs  had 
the  Covington  in  tow,  and  were  making  from  five  to  six  knots 
through  the  water.  Two  more  destroyers  joined  shortly  after 
to  guard  the  crippled  ship  from  attack.  She  was  then  listed 
about  twenty  degrees  to  port,  and  about  noon  took  a  quick  list  of 
ten  degrees  more. 

By  1:30  p.  m.  she  had  heeled  to  an  angle  of  45  degrees. 
Sensing  sinking  conditions,  the  working  party  was  directed  to 
leave  the  ship,  the  Nicholson  taking  them  off.  At  2 :30  the  Cov- 
ington began  to  sink  rapidly  by  the  stern  and  disappeared  two 
minutes  later.    The  ship  went  down  with  her  colors  flying. 

The  only  fighting  ship  of  the  Cruiser  and  Transport  Force 
that  was  sunk — in  fact,  the  only  large  United  States  naval  vessel 
lost  during  the  war — was  the  armored  cruiser  San  Diego  (Cap- 
tain H.  H.  Christy)  sunk  by  a  mine  off  Fire  Island,  N.  Y.,  July 
19,  1918. 

Proceeding  from  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  to  New  York,  the  cruiser 
was  steering  what  wars  regarded  as  a  safe  course  to  avoid  the 


RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       83 

submarines,  then  operating  in  Atlantic  waters,  and  the  mines 
they  had  laid.  Lookouts,  gun-watches,  fire  control  parties  were 
at  their  stations,  the  whole  crew  on  the  alert.  There  was  no  sign 
of  any  U-boat  or  mine. 

Suddenly,  at  11:05  a.  m.,  there  was  an  explosion  at  frame 
No.  78,  on  the  port  side  well  below  the  water  line.  ' '  Full  speed 
ahead,"  was  rung  by  the  Captain,  who  hoped  the  ship  could 
be  kept  afloat,  and  the  starboard  engine  operated  until  it  was 
stopped  by  rising  water. 

Machinist 's  Mate  Hawthorne,  who  was  at  the  throttle  in  the 
port  engine  room,  was  blown  four  feet  under  a  desk.  He  got 
up,  closed  the  throttle  on  the  engine,  which  had  already  stopped, 
and  then  escaped  up  the  ladder.  The  lieutenant  on  watch  in 
the  starboard  engine  room,  closed  the  water  tight  doors,  and 
gave  instructions  to  the  fireroom  to  protect  the  boilers. 

The  vessel  listed  to  port  so  heavily  that  water  entered  the 
gun  ports  on  the  gun  deck.  Listing  8  degrees  quickly,  the  vessel 
hung  for  seven  minutes ;  then  gradually  turned  until  35  degrees 
was  reached.  At  this  time  the  port  quarter-deck  was  three  feet 
under  water.    The  cruiser  then  rapidly  turned  turtle  and  sank. 

Captain  Christy  was  last  to  leave  the  ship.  Going  from  the 
bridge  down  two  ladders  to  the  boat  deck,  he  slid  down  a  line 
to  the  armor  belt,  then  dropped  four  feet  to  the  bilge  keel,  and 
thence  to  the  docking  keel.  From  there  he  jumped  into  the 
water.  The  men  cheered  their  captain  as  he  left  the  ship.  On 
the  rafts  they  sang  "The  Star  Spangled  Banner"  and  "My 
Country  'Tis  of  Thee,"  and  more  cheers  arose  when  the  United 
States  ensign  was  hoisted  on  the  sailboat. 

Two  dinghies  with  six  officers  and  twenty-one  men  pulled  to 
shore,  arriving  at  1 :20  p.  m.  The  steamer  Maiden  picked  up  370 
officers  and  men,  the  Bossom  708 ;  the  E.  P.  Jones  78.  Six  men 
were  lost,  three  of  these  being  killed  by  the  explosion.  The  court 
of  inquiry  reported  that  "the  conduct  of  the  Captain,  officers 
and  crew  was  in  the  highest  degree  commendable,"  and  that  "the 
remarkably  small  loss  of  life  was  due  to  the  high  state  of  disci- 
pline maintained  on  board." 

This  was  the  last  loss  sustained  by  the  Cruiser  and  Transport 
Force  until  September  5th.  Then  the  troopship  Mt.  Vernon 
(Captain  D.  E.  Dismukes)  was  torpedoed,  but  by  splendid  sea- 


84  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

manship  was  taken  to  port  under  her  own  steam.  The  Mi. 
Vernon,  homeward  bound,  was  250  miles  from  the  coast  of 
France  when  she  was  struck.  The  explosion  was  so  terrific  that 
for  an  instant  it  seemed  that  the  ship  was  lifted  clear  out  of 
the  water  and  torn  to  pieces.  Men  at  the  after  guns  and  depth- 
charge  stations  were  thrown  to  the  deck,  and  one  gun  thrown 
partly  out  of  its  mount.  The  torpedo  struck  fairly  amidship, 
destroying  four  of  the  eight  boiler-rooms  and  flooding  the  middle 
portion  of  the  vessel  from  side  to  side  for  a  length  of  150  feet. 
The  vessel  instantly  settled  10  feet  increase  in  draft,  but 
stopped  there.  This  indicated  that  the  water-tight  bulkheads 
were  holding,  and  she  could  still  afford  to  go  down  two  or  three 
feet  more  before  she  would  lose  her  floating  buoyancy.  The 
immediate  problem  was  to  escape  a  second  torpedo.  Depth- 
charge  crews  jumped  to  their  stations,  and  started  dropping  a 
depth-bomb  barrage. 

Men  in  the  flrerooms  knew  that  the  safety  of  the  ship  de- 
pended on  them.  The  shock  of  the  explosion,  followed  by  instant 
darkness,  falling  soot  and  particles;  the  knowledge  that  they 
were  far  below  the  water  level  inclosed  practically  in  a  trap; 
the  imminent  danger  of  the  ship  sinking,  the  added  threat  of 
exploding  boilers — all  these  dangers  and  more  must  have  been 
apparent  to  every  man  below,  said  Captain  Dismukes,  and  yet 
not  one  man  wavered  in  standing  by  his  post  of  duty. 

C.  L.  O'Connor,  water  tender,  was  thrown  to  the  floor  and 
enveloped  in  gas  flames  from  the  furnaces.  Instead  of  rushing 
to  escape,  he  turned  and  endeavored  to  shut  a  water-tight  door 
leading  into  a  large  bunker  abaft  the  fireroom,  but  the  hydraulic 
lever  that  operated  the  door  had  been  damaged  and  failed  to 
function.  Three  men  at  work  in  this  bunker  were  drowned.  If 
O'Connor  had  succeeded  in  shutting  the  door,  all  would  have 
been  saved.  Caught  in  the  swirl  of  inrushing  water,  O'Connor 
was  thrust  up  a  ventilator  leading  to  the  upper  deck. 

The  torpedo  exploded  on  a  bulkhead  separating  two  fire- 
rooms,  the  explosive  effect  being  apparently  about  equal  in  both 
firerooms,  yet  in  one  fireroom  not  a  man  was  saved,  while  in  the 
other  two  of  the  men  escaped.  The  explosion  blasted  through 
the  outer  and  inner  skin  of  the  ship  and  through  an  intervening- 
coal  bunker  and  bulkhead,  hurling  overboard  750  tons  of  coal. 


RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       85 

The  two  men  saved  were  working  the  fires  within  30  feet  of  the 
explosion  and  just  below  the  level  where  the  torpedo  struck. 
How  they  escaped  is  a  miracle.  One  of  the  men,  P.  Fitzgerald, 
landed  on  the  lower  grating.  Groping  his  way  through  the  dark- 
ness, trying  to  find  the  ladder  leading  above,  he  stumbled  over 
the  body  of  a  man  apparently  dead.  Finding  he  was  only  uncon- 
scious, Fitzgerald  aroused  him  and  took  him  to  safety.  The  man 
would  have  been  lost,  for  the  water  rose  10  feet  above  this  grat- 
ing as  the  ship  settled. 

Shortly  after  the  Mt.  Vernon  arrived  at  Brest,  Captain  Dis- 
mukes  received  this  letter  from  Brigadier  General  George  H. 
Harries,  U.  S.  A. : 

Sorrow  mingled  with  pride,  for  those  who  died  so  nobly.  Congratu- 
lations on  the  seamanship,  discipline  and  courage.  It  was  a  great  feat 
you  accomplished. 

Passengers  whom  I  have  seen  this  morning  are  unable  to  fully  or 
fitly  voice  their  praises  of  your  always  worthy  self  or  of  your  ship's 
company. 

The  best  traditions  of  our  Navy  have  been  lifted  to  a  higher  plane. 
What  a  fine  thing  it  is  to  be  an  American  these  days ! 

The  olive  drab  salutes  the  blue. 

Every  American  vessel  available  was  pressed  into  service  to 
bring  the  troops  home  after  the  war. 

Fifty-six  cargo  vessels  were  converted  into  troop-carriers. 
Nine  of  the  German  vessels  turned  over  under  the  armistice 
were  assigned  to  us — the  Imperator,  Kaiserin  Augusta  Vic- 
toria, Prim  Friedrich  Wilhelm,  Zeppelin,  Cap  Finisterre,  Graf 
Waldersee,  Patricia,  Pretoria,  and  Mobile.  The  capacity  of  all 
our  transports  was  considerably  increased. 

But  more  was  needed,  and  I  gave  orders  to  use  our  old  battle- 
ships and  cruisers  to  carry  troops.  Naval  officers  objected,  say- 
ing these  warships  were  not  fitted  for  such  duty.  I  was  told  the 
soldiers  on  board  would  be  uncomfortable,  and  would  return 
home  with  a  grouch  against  the  Government  and  the  Navy. 
What  happened?  Army  officers  and  men  were  glad  of  the 
chance  to  come  home  on  a  warship.  It  was  an  experience  no 
other  soldiers  had  enjoyed.  Once  aboard,  they  fell  to  and  made 
themselves  thoroughly  at  home.  Upon  the  arrival  at  Hampton 
Roads  of  the  first  battleship  bringing  troops,  the  Army  officers 


86  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

sent  me  a  letter  of  thanks  for  the  fine  voyage  and  the  oppor- 
tunity to  return  on  a  naval  vessel,  and  later  other  officers  ex- 
pressed themselves  in  similar  fashion. 

In  a  few  months  we  had  in  operation  142  vessels  carrying 
troops  with  facilities  for  363,684  officers  and  men.  The  maxi- 
mum was  reached  in  June,  when  340,946  embarked  from  France, 
314,167  of  them  in  United  States  transports.  This  exceeded  the 
largest  number  carried  overseas  by  all  American  and  Allied 
vessels  in  any  one  month  during  the  war.  By  the  end  of  July, 
1919,  1,770,484  men  had  been  returned  to  America.  The  big 
troop  movement  was  virtually  over  by  October  1st,  at  which 
time  nearly  two  million  had  been  returned,  1,675,733  of  them 
in  naval  transports.  Several  thousands  more  came  later,  and 
11,211  had  returned  previous  to  the  armistice. 

The  record  of  the  ten  leading  vessels  of  the  Cruiser  and 
Transport  Force,  in  troops  carried  to  Europe  and  passengers 
and  sick  and  wounded  returned,  was : 

Transported 
to   Europe 

Leviathan    96,804 

America  37,768 

George  Washington    48,373 

Agamemnon    36,097 

President  Grant  39,974 

Mount  Vernon   33,692 

Siboney    20,299 

Mongolia   19,013 

Manchuria   14,491 

Great  Northern   28,248 


Transported   From    Europe 
Passengers     Sick  and  Wounded 

Total 
Carried 

93,746 

10,913 

192,753 

46,823 

4,668 

86,801 

34,142 

5,085 

83,350 

41,179 

4,425 

78,249 

37,025 

3,301 

77,129 

12,500 

4,015 

76,402 

34,702 

5,307 

55,169 

34,813 

2,707 

54,337 

39,501 

6,186 

54,230 

22,852 

5,522 

54,085 

374,679        427,283  52,129        812,505 

These  ships  also  brought  back  2,366  passengers  before  the 
armistice,  which  are  included  in  the  total  numbers  carried. 

The  other  vessels  used  in  transporting  to  France,  as  well  as 
returning  troops  were : 


Aeolus 

Finland 

K.  der  Nederlanden 

Antigone 

Hancock 

Kroonland 

Calamares 

Harrisburg 

Lenape 

Covington 

Henderson 

Louisville 

DeKalb 

Huron 

Madawaska 

RACE  BETWEEN  WILSON  AND  HINDENBURG       87 


H.  R.  Mallory 

Martha  Washington 

Matsonia 

Maui 

Mercury 

Northern  Pacific 

Orizaba 


Pastores 

Plattsburg 

Pocahontas 

P>owhatan 

President  Lincoln 

Princess  Matoika 

Rijndam 


Sierra 

Susquehanna 

Tenadores 

Von  Steuben 

Wilhelmina 

Zeelandia 


The  battleships  and  cruisers  employed  in  troop  transporta- 
tion brought  back  more  than  145,000  men,  as  follows : 

Battleships — Connecticut,  4,861;  Georgia,  5,869;  Kansas,  7,486; 
Louisiana,  4,714;  Michigan,  1,052;  Minnesota,  3,955;  Missouri,  3,278; 
Nebraska,  4,530 ;  New  Hampshire,  4,900 ;  New  Jersey,  4,675 ;  Ohio,  778 ; 
Rhode  Island,  5,303;  South  Carolina,  4,501;  Vermont,  4,795;  Virginia, 
5,784;  total,  66,481. 

Cruisers — Charleston,  7,704;  Frederick,  9,659;  Huntington,  11,913; 
Montana,  8,800 ;  North  Carolina,  8,962  -,-Pueblo,  10,136 ;  Rochester,  317 ; 
Seattle,  9,397 ;  South  Dakota,  3,463 ;  St.  Louis,  8,437 ;  total,  78,788. 

Merchant  ships  converted  into  troop-carriers,  and  used  in 
bringing  soldiers  home  were : 


Alaskan 

Amphion 

Ancon 

Arcadia 

Arizonian 

Artemis 

Black  Arrow 

Buford 

Callao 

Canandaigua 

Canonicus 

Cape  May 

Comfort 

Dakotan 

Eddelyn 

El  Sol 

El  Oriente 

Etten 

Eurana 

Floridian 

Freedom 

Gen.  Goethals 

Gen.  Gorgas 

Housatonic 


Iowan 
Kentuckian 
Lancaster 
Liberator 

E.  F.  Luckenbach 
Edward  Luckenbach 

F.  J.  Luckenbach 
Julia  Luckenbach 
Katrina  Luckenbach 
K.  I.  Luckenbach 
W.  A.  Luckenbach 
Marica 

Mercy 

Mexican 

Minnesotan 

Montpelier 

Nansemond 

Ohioan 

Otsego 

Panaman 

Paysandu 

Peerless 

Philippines 

Radnor 


Roanoke 
Santa  Ana 
Santa  Barbara 
Santa  Cecilia 
Santa  Clara 
Santa  Elena 
Santa  Elisa 
Santa  Leonora 
Santa  Malta 
Santa  Olivia 
Santa  Paula 
Santa  Rosa 
Santa  Teresa 
Scranton 
Shoshone 
Sol  Navis 
South  Bend 
Suwanee 
Texan 
Tiger 
Troy 

Virginian 
Yale 


88  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

These  converted  cargo  ships  brought  441,986  passengers, 
10,452  wounded;  total  452,438.  The  nine  German  passenger 
ships  employed  after  the  armistice  brought  back  138,928. 

When  the  troop  movement  was  near  its  close,  in  September, 
1918,  Admiral  Gleaves,  who  had  been  in  charge  from  the  begin- 
ning, was  made  commander-in-chief  of  the  Asiatic  fleet.  He  was 
succeeded  by  Captain  C.  B.  Morgan.  The  Cruiser  and  Trans- 
port Force,  which  at  its  maximum  comprised  a  fleet  of  142  ves- 
sels, of  2,341,038  tons  displacement,  carried  across  the  Atlantic, 
going  to  or  returning  from  Europe,  approximately  2,600,000 
persons.  And  this  without  the  loss,  through  navigation  or 
enemy  action,  of  any  soldier  entrusted  to  its  care. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  FLEET  THE  KAISER  BUILT  FOR  US 

EX-GERMAN  VESSELS  CARRIED  557,000  AMERICAN  TROOPS  TO  EUROPE 

ENGINES   AND   MACHINERY    WRECKED    BY    THEIR    CREWS,   GERMANS 

BELIEVED   THEY   COULD    NEVER  BE   USED NAVY   REPAIRED   LINERS, 

AND  HAD  ALL  RUNNING  IN  TRANSPORT  SERVICE  IN  A  FEW  MONTHS 
TRIUMPH  OF  AMERICAN  GENIUS  AND  ENGINEERING  SKILL RE- 
MARKABLE RECORD  MADE  BY  " LEVIATHAN." 

MORE  than  half  a  million  of  the  troops  that  defeated 
the  Germans  were  transported  across  the  Atlantic  in 
German  vessels.  I  sometimes  wonder  if  the  Kaiser 
ever  dreamed,  when  his  liners  came  scurrying  into 
American  ports  in  1914,  that  he  was  presenting  us  with  the  one 
thing  we  needed  most,  a  lot  of  the  finest  transports  that  ever 
sailed  the  sea. 

That  could  not  happen  according  to  the  Teuton  mind.  They 
had  figured  it  all  out.  If  America  kept  out  of  the  conflict,  their 
ships  would  be  as  safe  here  as  in  their  home  ports.  If  we  did 
enter  the  war,  they  would  be  so  badly  damaged  that  we  could 
not  use  them.  This  was  all  carried  out  according  to  schedule. 
Before  ruthless  U-boat  warfare  was  declared,  BernstorfT  had 
issued  his  orders,  and  all  the  interned  vessels  were  disabled, 
their  engines  and  machinery  smashed. 

' '  Some  you  may  get  running  in  a  year ;  some  you  can  never 
use,"  boasted  the  German  crews. 

"If  America  can  repair  this  ship,  I  will  eat  my  hat,"  said 
another.  He  has  not  yet  tested  his  digestion  by  a  diet  of  head- 
gear. 

But  they,  like  the  Kaiser  and  Admiral  Von  Holtzendorfr*, 
underestimated  American  ingenuity  and  enterprise.  By  using 
new  methods,  and  keeping  at  the  task  day  and  night,  in  a  few 
months  all  these  vessels  were  repaired  and  in  service,  carrying 
troops  and  supplies. 

89 


90  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  German  Vaterland,  re-christened  the  Leviathan,  alone 
carried  nearly  a  hundred  thousand  troops  to  Europe.  When 
she  was  performing  such  prodigies  for  us  it  interested  me  to 
recall  an  occurrence  when  this  great  vessel,  the  largest  afloat, 
reached  New  York  on  its  first  voyage,  not  long  before  the  war 
began  in  1914.  Glorying  in  the  attention  it  evoked,  the  Vater- 
land''s  officers  gave  a  dinner,  inviting  leading  American  ship- 
builders and  engineers,  as  well  as  prominent  citizens,  to  view 
this  latest  creation  in  marine  construction. 

1 'It  is  a  veritable  floating  palace  for  voyagers  to  Europe," 
remarked  one  of  its  officers,  "but  that  is  not  the  best  or  most 
important  thing  about  the  Vaterland." 

"Well,  what  is  it?"  asked  the  visitors. 

"Come  below,"  said  he,  "and  I  will  show  you." 

Below  went  the  party,  and  there  they  were  shown  how  the 
whole  vessel  had  been  planned  so  that  it  could  quickly  be  con- 
verted into  a  carrier  for  10,000  soldiers.  "In  a  remarkably 
short  time,  if  need  arises,"  the  officer  remarked,  "it  can  be 
turned  into  a  troop  transport." 

He  was  right.  We  proved  it  in  1917,  not  only  in  regard  to 
the  Vaterland,  but  the  other  Teuton  liners. 

Repaired,  renamed,  manned  and  operated  by  United  States 
naval  officers  and  men,  those  former  German  vessels  carried  to 
Europe  557,788  American  soldiers.    Here  is  the  record  in  detail : 

German  Name  American  Name  U.  S.  Troops  Carried 

Vaterland   Leviathan   96,804 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  II Agamemnon   36,097 

Koenig  Wilhelm  II Madawaska   17,931 

President  Lincoln President  Lincoln 20,143 

President  Grant   President  Grant 39,974 

Barbarossa  Mercury 18,542 

Grosser  Kurfurst Aeolus  24,770 

Hamburg Powhatan    14,613 

FriedWich  der  Grosse Huron  20,871 

Prinzess  Irene Pocahontas 20,503 

George  Washington George   Washington 48,373 

Martha  Washington Martha  Washington 22,311 

Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich DcKalb    11,334 

Amerika   America    39,768 

Neckar Antigone   16,526 


THE  FLEET  THE  KAISER  BUILT  FOR  US         91 

German  Name  American  Name  U.  S.  Troops  Carried 

Cincinnati Covington   21,628 

Kronprinzessin  Cecelie  . .  .Mount  Vernon 33,692 

Prinzess  Alice  Princess  Matoika 21,216 

Rhein    Susquehanna 18,345 

Kronprinz  Wilhelm Von  Steuben 14,347 


Total 557,788 

The  repair  of  those  vessels  was  a  triumph  of  ingenuity  and 
engineering  skill.  But  they  were  not  the  only  interned  ships 
the  Navy  restored.  "When  war  was  declared  there  were  seized 
German  merchant  vessels  aggregating  592,195  gross  tons, 
Austrian  ships,  40,461  tons — a  total  of  632,656  tons  of  shipping 
placed  under  the  United  States  flag  from  these  two  sources. 

The  machinery  was  so  badly  damaged  that  those  in  charge 
had  practically  decided  that  new  cylinders  and  various  other 
parts  would  have  to  be  manufactured  and  installed.  This  would 
have  caused  many  months'  delay.  Captain  E.  P.  Jessop,  en- 
gineering officer  of  the  New  York  Navy  Yard,  who  had  been 
acting  as  advisory  officer  in  connection  with  these  ships  before 
they  were  turned  over  to  the  Navy,  was  confident  that  the  most 
serious  breaks  could  be  repaired  by  electric  welding.  Rear  Ad- 
miral Burd,  industrial  manager  of  the  New  York  Yard,  was  of 
the  same  opinion,  as  were  engineering  experts  in  the  Navy 
Department.  But  there  was  doubt  among  other  engineers,  and 
strong  opposition  to  the  new  method.  The  vessels  were  then 
under  control  of  the  Shipping  Board,  but  it  was  expected  that 
those  to  be  used  as  troop-ships  would  be  assigned  to  the  Navy. 
Anticipating  such  action,  Admiral  Griffin,  Chief  of  the  Bureau 
of  Engineering,  in  June  sent  his  assistant,  Captain  0.  W. 
Koester,  to  New  York  to  make  a  thorough  investigation.  He 
returned  convinced  that  repairs  could  be  successfully  made  by 
electric  welding,  and  this  process  was  immediately  adopted. 

Sixteen  of  these  vessels  were  turned  over  to  the  Navy  on 
July  11,  1917.  Work  was  begun  the  next  morning.  Cylinders 
had  been  broken,  throttle  and  engine  valves  destroyed,  pipes 
cut,  fittings  smashed.  Parts  easily  removable  had  been  thrown 
away.  The  German  crews  had  done  all  they  could  to  put  the 
ships  out  of  business.     Memorandums  found  aboard  bore  the 


92  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

frequent  comment,  "Cannot  be  repaired."  There  were  serious 
injuries  that  had  been  carefully  concealed,  evidently  with  the 
idea  of  disabling  the  vessels  if  they  ever  got  to  sea.  Important 
parts  were  cut  in  half,  then  replaced  so  the  cut  would  not  be 
discovered.  Obstructions  were  placed  in  cylinders  to  wreck  the 
engines  as  soon  as  steam  was  turned  on.  Every  inch  of  the 
machinery  had  to  be  examined  inside  and  out.  The  fact  that 
nothing  escaped  detection  is  evidence  of  the  thoroughness  with 
which  the  work  was  done. 

The  Barharossa,  which  we  renamed  the  Mercury,  was  the 
first  ship  repaired  by  the  new  welding  process.  Given  a  sea 
trial  of  48  hours,  she  was  put  to  every  imaginable  test.  The 
results  proved  satisfactory  in  every  particular.  On  all  the  other 
vessels,  virtually  the  same  methods  were  used — electric  or  oxy- 
acetylene  welding,  mechanical  patching,  and  at  times  a  combina- 
tion of  these.  Each  ship  was,  upon  completion,  tested  by  long 
runs  at  sea,  so  that  no  doubt  might  exist  as  to  the  safety  of  the 
troops  they  were  to  carry.  It  is  noteworthy  that  no  weakness 
ever  developed  in  the  engines  so  repaired. 

Of  the  103  German  and  Austrian  vessels  seized,  the  Navy 
converted  34  into  troop  and  freight  transports.  Subsequently 
it  repaired  20  more  for  the  Shipping  Board. 

To  build  new  cylinders,  replace  burned-out  boilers  and  other 
machinery,  would  have  required  at  least  a  year,  perhaps  more, 
it  was  estimated.  By  using  new  methods,  the  Navy  quickly 
restored  the  ships  assigned  to  it.  In  a  few  months  all  were  in 
service — and  some  of  them  were  running  at  higher  speed  than 
the  Germans  had  ever  been  able  to  attain. 

Twelve  months  in  time  was  saved,  during  which  these  ves- 
sels transported  hundreds  of  thousands  of  troops.  The  entire 
saving  was  estimated  at  more  than  $20,000,000. 

Until  the  United  States  declared  war,  these  vessels  were, 
under  strict  interpretation  of  international  law,  not  liable  to 
seizure.  They  could  not  leave  our  ports,  but  the  crews  remained 
aboard  and,  though  under  constant  surveillance  to  prevent  un- 
neutral acts,  they  caused  the  American  authorities  considerable 
trouble.  There  were  nine  German  liners  at  their  piers  in 
Hoboken  when  Germany  declared  war.  All  had  been  ordered 
not  to  sail.    Being  a  part  of  the  German  Naval  Reserve,  they 


THE  FLEET  THE  KAISER  BUILT  FOR  US         93 

were  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  German  Admiralty.  The 
Vaterland  was  scheduled  to  sail  that  day,  having  booked  some 
3,600  passengers.  Angry  crowds  who  had  purchased  tickets 
stormed  the  piers,  and  extra  guards  had  to  be  placed  around 
the  vessel.  German  crews  held  a  mass-meeting  in  Hoboken,  dis^ 
cussing  mainly  how  they  could  get  back  to  Germany.  Ten 
thousand  reservists  on  August  6th  demanded  of  the  German 
Consul  that  he  send  them  back  on  the  Vaterland  to  rejoin  their 
regiments.  But  not  one  of  those  vessels  ever  escaped  from 
American  ports. 

Their  crews,  however,  were  always  seeking  to  help  Germany 
and  injure  the  Allies.  Most  of  their  plots  and  plans  were  foiled, 
though  they  did  succeed,  now  and  then,  in  "putting  something 
over."  The  Grosser  Kurfurst  (Aeolus)  was,  we  found  later, 
used  as  a  sort  of  "clearing  ship"  for  German  officers  in  this 
country.  They  had  secret  orders  to  go  aboard  her  and  stay 
until  arrangements  could  be  made  for  them  to  travel  aboard 
outbound  steamers.  Disguised,  often  carrying  forged  or  ille- 
gally-obtained passports,  some  of  them  managed  to  get  to  Ger- 
many. The  captain  of  the  Aeolus,  its  chief  engineer  and  purser 
were  among  those  who  successfully  ran  the  British  blockade. 
Given  command  of  a  Zeppelin,  the  captain  took  part  in  several 
airship  raids,  but  was  brought  down  and  killed  near  London. 
When  news  of  his  death  came,  the  flags  on  all  the  German  in- 
terned ships  were  placed  at  half-mast. 

When  the  ship-bomb  conspiracy  was  unearthed — the  scheme 
to  place  explosives  in  cargoes,  timed  to  go  off  and  sink  vessels 
when  they  were  far  out  at  sea — it  was  found  that  men  on  board 
the  Friedrich  der  Grosse  (Huron)  had  been  making  parts  of 
these  bombs,  which  were  assembled  at  a  plant  in  Hoboken.  This 
plot,  however,  was  nipped  in  the  bud.  The  sailors  and  others 
involved  were  promptly  arrested,  tried,  convicted,  and  sent  to 
jail. 

When  the  Lusitania  was  sunk  in  1915  the  German  sailors 
held  a  celebration.  Thinking  war  with  the  United  States  was 
imminent,  they  prepared  to  destroy  the  ships,  only  waiting  for 
the  word  to  carry  out  the  orders  previously  given  them.  This 
was,  again,  the  case  in  1916,  when  we  came  so  near  wTar  after 
the  sinking  of  the  Sussex.    But  the  orders  did  not  finally  come 


94  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

until  January  31,  1917,  when,  obeying  Ambassador  Bernstorff  's 
instructions,  they  smashed  the  machinery  of  the  vessels. 

They  regarded  it  as  a  huge  joke  when,  on  the  morning  of 
April  1st,  a  naval  vessel  anchored  off  Pier  2,  and  set  watch 
over  them.  But  they  laughed  on  the  other  side  of  their  mouths 
when,  four  days  later,  United  States  officials  rounded  up  officers 
and  men,  and  sent  them  to  Fort  Oglethorpe,  Ga.,  and  other 
Federal  prisons  and  internment  camps. 

The  Vaterland  was  taken  over  at  4  a.  m.,  April  5th.  On  that 
day  the  United  States  armed  forces  seized  91  German  ships  in 
various  ports.  The  night  before,  U.  S.  Government  officials  held 
a  conference  on  the  Vaterland  with  the  German  commanders, 
who  were  warned  against  any  violence.  There  was  no  resist- 
ance when  the  ships  were  seized. 

The  Vaterland,  with  a  displacement  of  69,000  tons,  was  the 
biggest  craft  afloat.  There  was  no  drydock  in  America  large 
enough  to  hold  her.  When  the  engineering  officers  reported  to 
Captain  J.  W.  Oman,  her  commander,  that  the  former  Vaterland 
(she  had  been  renamed  the  Leviathan)  was  "in  all  respects 
ready  for  sea,"  it  was  decided  to  test  her  out  by  a  longer  run 
than  that  to  which  any  other  vessel  had  been  subjected,  making 
a  trial  trip  to  Cuba. 

On  her  return,  the  ship  was  carefully  gone  over  again,  every 
part  put  in  prime  condition,  and  on  December  15,  1917,  in  a 
snowstorm,  she  sailed  on  her  first  trip  across  the  Atlantic.  The 
ship's  complement  was  68  officers  and  2,240  men.  She  had 
aboard  7,254  troops,  including  base  hospitals  31  and  34,  the 
163rd  and  164th  Infantry,  and  headquarters  of  the  82nd  Brigade, 
Brigadier  General  Edward  Vellruth  commanding. 

Running  for  the  first  day  or  two  at  20  knots,  the  ship  then 
speeded  up  to  2iy2  knots.  The  Leviathan  had  "struck  her 
gait."  She  made  the  run  across  in  record  time.  In  describing 
this  voyage,  the  "History  of  the  Leviathan"  says: 

On  the  morning  of  December  23rd,  at  4  a.  m.,  out  of  the  black  sky, 
just  before  dawn  and  in  a  heavy  sea  with  a  strong  wind  blowing,  a 
small  white  wake  was  seen  by  the  lookout  on  the  bridge.  At  first  it  was 
taken  for  the  wake  of  a  periscope  and  the  gun  crews  were  called  to 
quarters,  then  as  the  guns  were  trained  on  it,  a  small  white  flash  was 
seen  blinking  the  American  recognition  signal,  and  we  then  knew  that 


THE  FLEET  THE  KAISER  BUILT  FOR  US         95 

it  was  one  of  our  destroyers.  We  picked  them  up  out  of  the  black  sky 
and  a  heavy  sea  until  there  were  seven  little  wasps  that  spelled  danger 
to  the  Hun  submarine.  They  sped  along  with  us  while  we  zigzagged  in 
and  out  on  our  course.  They  crossed  our  bow  and  ran  in  and  far  out 
on  each  side  of  us,  always  looking  for  the  "sub"  that  might  be  lying  in 
wait  for  us.  Their  motto  was,  "Go  get  'em."  They  never  waited  for  a 
"sub"  to  attack  first,  they  always  started  the  fight  provided  that  "Fritz" 
was  willing  to  show  himself;  and  we  want  to  say  right  here  that  he 
was  very  reluctant  to  do  so  when  an  American  destroyer  showed  itself. 

That  night  the  Leviathan  dropped  anchor  outside  Liverpool, 
proceeding  next  morning,  Dec.  24th,  to  the  landing-stage, 
where  the  soldiers  disembarked.  The  ship  had  to  be  sent  into 
drydock  to  have  her  bottom  thoroughly  scraped  and  cleaned. 
Three  years  in  disuse,  she  was  covered  with  barnacles,  and 
even  oysters  were  found  attached  to  her  keel.  The  Gladstone 
Dock  at  Liverpool  was  the  only  drydock  outside  of  Germany 
which  would  accommodate  her.  Even  then,  she  had  to  wait  more 
than  two  weeks  for  a  tide  high,  enough  to  float  her  in.  Docking 
was  completed  successfully,  but  there  was  considerable  delay 
before  the  big  boat  could  get  away,  and  it  was  not  until  Lincoln's 
birthday  that  she  started  back  for  America,  reaching  New  York 
Feb.  19th.  On  her  second  trip,  sailing  March  4,  1918,  the 
Leviathan  carried  8,242  troops,  under  command  of  Major  Gen- 
eral J.  T.  Dickman.  Liverpool  was  again  the  destination  and  she 
arrived  there  March  12th.  Going  up  St.  George 's  channel,  there 
was  considerable  excitement  when  the  destroyer  Manley,  head 
of  the  escort,  sighting  signs  that  led  her  to  believe  a  submarine 
was  near,  swerved  out  of  position,  and  began  firing.  One  depth- 
bomb  it  dropped  shook  the  Leviathan  from  stern  to  stern,  and 
many  persons  aboard  thought  she  had  struck  a  mine.  But  she 
got  in  safely,  and  soon  landed  all  her  troops. 

Low  water  again  held  the  Leviathan  in  port  for  weeks,  and 
it  was  not  until  April  10th,  that  she  was  able  to  sail.  This  was 
the  last  time  she  was  sent  to  Liverpool.  Thereafter,  she  went 
direct  to  Brest,  and  there  were  no  more  delays.  In  fact,  on 
the  third  trip,  when  she  carried  8,909  soldiers,  under  command 
of  Brigadier  General  Walter  H.  Gordon,  she  disembarked  her 
troops,  took  aboard  4,600  tons  of  coal,  and  the  third  evening  after 
her  arrival  was  on  the  way  back  to  New  York. 


96  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  Leviathan  was  so  big  a  target  and  the  German  eager- 
ness to  sink  her  was  so  well  known  that  there  was  at  first  opposi- 
tion to  the  use  of  this  big  vessel  as  a  troop-ship,  and  Admiral 
Sims  wrote  to  me  on  November  2,  1917 : 

I  have  previously  reported  against  using  the  Vaterland  for  the 
present  until  we  have  a  little  more  experience  in  handling  the  other 
large  transports.  The  Vaterland  is,  of  course,  a  much  larger  target, 
and  injury  to  her  would  be  a  serious  affair.  I  am  assuming  too  that 
all  of  the  troops  that  we  have  to  transport  for  the  next  few  months  can 
be  accommodated  in  other  transports,  assisted  by  British  liners.  When- 
ever the  situation  becomes  pressing,  I  presume  we  shall  have  to  use  the 
Vaterland  and  take  the  additional  risk. 

We  did  use  the  former  Vaterland  with  such  success  that 
during  all  the  Avar  she  was  never  touched  by  the  enemy;  but 
the  fears  entertained  of  attack  on  this  biggest  transport  afloat 
were  justified.  On  the  fourth  voyage,  when  in  sight  of  the  coast, 
May  30,  1918,  the  Leviathan  recorded  her  first  encounter  with 
a  submarine,  following  being  the  entry  in  the  ship 's  log : 

12 :29  p.  m. — Sighted  submarine  pursuing  us  on  our  port  quarter  about 
1,500  yards  distant.  Ordered  full  speed,  165  revolutions.  Opened  fire 
with  Number  Six  and  Number  Eight  guns,  three  shots.  Stopped  zig- 
zagging.    Changed  course  12  :40  p.  m. 

12  :59  p.  m. — Submarine  appeared  again.  Opened  fire  with  Number 
Six  and  Number  Eight  guns.    Nine  shots. 

1 :19  p.  m. — Submarine  appeared  again.  Opened  fire  with  Number 
Six  and  Number  Eight  guns.     Seven  shots. 

1 :34  p.  m. — Threw  in  maneuvering  combination.  Standard  speed 
112  revolutions. 

1 :45  p.  m. — Entering  harbor  at  various  courses  and  speeds. 

Of  this  attack,  the  Leviathan  History  says : 

The  coolness  of  our  commanding  officer,  Captain  H.  F.  Bryan,  and 
the  splendid  coordination  of  the  entire  crew  were  so  perfect,  that  only 
three  distinct  orders  were  issued  in  this  moment  of  peril  as  follows: 
1.  Hold  your  course.  2.  Open  fire  on  submarine,  port  quarter.  3.  Sound 
General  Alarm. 

Every  shot  fired  was  greeted  by  cheers  and  shouts  of  encouragement 
from  the  enthusiastic  soldiers  on  the  decks,  who  crowded  to  favorable 
positions  to  witness  the  accurate  firing  of  our  gun-crews.  The  Army 
nurses  left  their  luncheon  to  take  a  peek  at  the  "fun,"  and  their  calm- 
ness and  enthusiasm  in  the  face  of  a  deadly  menace  were  an  inspiration 
to  the  sailors  manning  the  big  guns. 


THE  FLEET  THE  KAISER  BUILT  FOR  US         97 

Sailing  the  afternoon  of  June  1st,  accompanied  by  the 
destroyers  Nicholson  and  Wadsworth,  at  7 :16  o'clock  a  periscope 
wake  was  sighted  on  the  starboard  quarter.  "Full  speed 
ahead!"  was  rung,  and  the  Leviathan  sprang  forward,  a  cloud 
of  black  smoke  pouring  from  her  funnels.  Her  guns  began 
firing,  and  from  the  signal  bridge  floated  the  green-and-white 
submarine  warning  flag.  The  destroyers  turned  quickly  and 
charged  down  the  wake,  laying  a  barrage  of  depth-bombs  which 
shook  the  Leviathan,  by  that  time  nearly  two  miles  away.  The 
Nicholson's  blinker  lights  flashed: 

We  saw  periscope  of  submarine  and  laid  barrage  of  depth-charges 
around  the  spot.    Will  report  to  Force  Commander. 

The  Wadsworth  then  inspected  the  locality,  but  soon  sig- 
naled, "We  see  no  submarine  now."  A  few  minutes  later  both 
destroyers  steamed  up  to  the  big  vessel  and  resumed  escort. 

Twilight  had  come,  and  it  was  an  impressive  scene  when  the 
chaplain  (always  called  the  sky  pilot),  as  was  his  daily  custom, 
went  to  the  navigation  bridge  and  offered  the  sunset  prayer  at 
sea — a  prayer  for  the  safety  of  captain,  officers  and  crew;  for 
soldiers,  passengers  and  all  on  board. 

Making  the  most  of  her  speed,  the  Leviathan  traveled  alone, 
except  for  man-of-war  escort,  until  August.  Then  she  was 
accompanied  by  the  Great  Northern  and  Northern  Pacific,  and 
these  fast  ships  made  several  voyages  together.  After  arrival 
from  her  eighth  trip,  Sept.  19th,  Captain  William  W.  Phelps  be- 
came the  Leviathan's  commanding  officer,  succeeding  Captain 
Bryan.  In  April,  1919,  he  was  succeeded  by  Captain  E.  H.  Durell. 

There  were  rumors  of  peace  when  the  Leviathan  sailed  on 
her  tenth  trip  October  27th,  and  as  the  destroyers  met  her  they 
signaled  that  all  the  German  submarines  in  that  area  had  been 
recalled  October  21st.  Arriving  at  Liverpool  November  3rd, 
she  landed  her  last  load  of  troops  going  to  the  front.  A  week 
later,  when  she  was  in  drydock  undergoing  repairs,  the  armistice 
was  signed;  the  fighting  was  over.  The  Leviathan  had  trans- 
ported to  Europe  96,804  officers  and  men  of  the  American  Army. 
She  had  carried  across  119,215  persons,  including  her  crew  and 
naval  supernumeraries.  She  had  carried  on  a  single  voyage  as 
many  as  10,860. 


98  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

In  returning  the  troops  all  war-time  records  were  broken. 
On  the  sixteenth  west-bound  trip,  there  were  on  board,  including 
the  naval  crew,  14,300  persons.  The  vessel  brought  home  93,746 
soldiers.  She  carried  to  or  from  Europe,  including  naval  per- 
sonnel and  passengers,  over  200,000  persons. 

Completed  in  1914,  the  Leviathan  made  but  one  round  trip 
under  the  German  flag.  She  had  just  arrived  in  New  York  on 
her  second  voyage  when  war  broke  out  in  Europe.  That  was 
all  the  use  the  Germans  ever  got  of  this  wonder  of  the  seas, 
which  cost  millions  to  build  and  was  the  pride  of  Germany. 


CHAPTEE  X 
GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE 

BKEST  THE  CENTER  OF  GREAT  SYSTEM  UNDER  COMMAND  OF  WILSON — 

PATROL    SQUADRON    SENT    OVER    IN    JUNE,     1917 ARMED    YACHTS 

AND    DESTROYERS    ENABLED    TROOPS    TO    REACH    PORTS    SAFELY 

" STEWART"  PLOWED  THROUGH  BLAZING  AMMUNITION  TO  RESCUE 
SURVIVORS   OF   " FLORENCE   H." — WRESTLE   WITH   DEPTH-BOMB. 

ON  the  anniversary  of  the  fall  of  the  Bastille,  the  French 
national  holiday,  July  14,  1917,  our  naval  forces  began 
work  with  the  French,  whose  vessels  under  DeGrasse 
had,  136  years  before,  given  such  signal  aid  to  America 
in  its  struggle  for  liberty. 

France  was  the  center  of  American  activities,  military  and 
naval,  and  our  most  important  operations  in  Europe  were  in 
French  waters.  It  was  the  vast  system  built  up  by  the  Navy, 
the  splendid  work  of  our  armed  yachts  and  destroyers  and  air- 
craft, which  kept  the  sea  lanes  clear,  protected  transports,  and 
enabled  American  troops  and  supplies  to  reach  French  ports 
in  safety. 

Sending  naval  vessels  to  France,  and  establishing  bases  were 
two  of  the  first  things  considered  by  the  Navy  Department.  They 
were  discussed  with  the  French  mission,  with  Marshal  JofTre  and 
Admiral  Chocheprat,  when  they  reached  Washington  in  April. 
They  recommended  Brest  and  Bordeaux  as  the  principal  ports 
to  be  used  by  the  Americans,  and  we  decided  to  establish  bases 
there  as  well  as  at  St.  Nazaire,  where  our  first  troops  landed. 

Preparations  were  at  once  begun  to  send  patrol  craft,  and 
for  this  purpose,  the  largest  and  best  of  American  yachts, 
stripped  of  their  luxurious  fittings,  were  armed  and  converted 
into  men-of-war.  A  special  force  was  organized  under  com- 
mand of  Eear  Admiral  William  B.  Fletcher,  and  on  June  9, 

99 


100  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  first  of  the  "U.  S.  Patrol  Squadrons  Operating  in  European 
Waters,"  sailed  from  New  York  for  France.  In  this  group 
were  the  Noma,  (Lieutenant  Commander  L.  R.  Leahy) ;  Vedette, 
(Lieutenant  Commander  C.  L.  Hand) ;  Christabel,  (Lieutenant 
Commander  H.  B.  Riebe) ;  Kanawha,  (Lieutenant  Commander 
H.  D.  Cooke) ;  Harvard,  (Lieutenant  Commander  A.  G.  Stirling), 
and  the  Sultana,  (Lieutenant  Commander  E.  G.  Allen).  Pro- 
ceeding by  way  of  the  Azores,  they  reached  Brest  July  3.  Two 
speedier  yachts,  the  Corsair  (Lieutenant  Commander  T.  A. 
Kittinger),  and  the  Aphrodite  (Lieutenant  Commander  R.  P. 
Craft),  sailed  from  New  York  with  the  first  troop  convoy  June 
14,  reaching  St.  Nazaire  June  27,  and  arriving  at  Brest  July  2. 

Protection  of  vessels  carrying  troops  was  the  primary  mis- 
sion of  our  forces  in  France,  and  after  that  the  storeships  loaded 
with  munitions,  materials  and  supplies  for  the  Army.  But  this 
was  by  no  means  all  their  work.  They  escorted  convoys  sailing 
from  Verdon,  vessels  coming  from  Bordeaux,  Pauillac  and  other 
points  up  the  Gironde  river;  from  Brest;  from  Quiberon  Bay 
(St.  Nazaire);  ships  of  all  kinds  sailing  along  the  coast  of 
France,  for  England  or  southern  ports. 

With  headquarters  at  Brest,  where  the  American  admiral 
had  his  offices  next  to  those  of  the  French  Chief  of  the  Brittany 
Patrol,  Vice  Admiral  Schwerer,  who  acted  directly  under  Vice 
Admiral  Moreau,  senior  Allied  naval  officer,  an  organization 
was  built  up  extending  all  along  the  French  coast.  Working  in 
closest  cooperation  with  the  French,  our  forces  were  always 
under  American  command,  first  under  Admiral  Fletcher,  and 
then  under  Admiral  Henry  B.  Wilson,  who  succeeded  him  on 
Nov.  1,  1917. 

Captain  T.  P.  Magruder  was  made  senior  naval  officer  at 
Lorient,  with  a  division  of  mine-sweepers  to  keep  clear  the  ap- 
proaches to  St.  Nazaire.  Captain  N.  A.  McCully  commanded 
the  Rochefort  district,  which  extended  from  the  Lorient  line  to 
the  Spanish  coast.  Six  yachts  were  based  at  Rochefort,  to  give 
prompt  service  to  convoys  entering  the  Gironde  River,  for  Bor- 
deaux or  Pauillac.  The  Brest  district,  from  Cape  Brehat  to 
Penmarch  Point,  was  in  command  of  Captain  H.  H.  Hough,  and 
the  Cherbourg  district,  north  of  this,  was  assigned  to  Com- 
mander David  Boyd.     Naval  port  officers,  stationed  at  Brest, 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  101 

Havre,  Cherbourg,  Rouen,  St.  Malo,  Granville,  St.  Nazaire, 
Nantes,  Quiberon  Bay,  Sables  d'  Olonne,  Bordeaux,  La  Pallice, 
Rochefort,  Royan,  Verdon,  Pauillac  and  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  kept 
in  touch  with  Army  officials  and  shipmasters,  expediting*  dis- 
patch of  vessels  and  the  flow  of  transportation  and  commerce. 
Military  and  naval  officers  pulled  together  with  a  will,  and  the 
saying  was:  '•There  is  no  Army  and  Navy  at  Brest.  It's  all 
one  gang!" 

From  Brest  radiated  lines  of  command,  communication,  and 
cooperation — to  our  own  forces,  and  the  French  naval  com- 
manders on  the  coast;  our  naval  representatives  and  naval  at- 
tache in  Paris,  and  the  French  Ministry  of  Marine ;  through  the 
superintendent  of  ports  and  coding  officer  to  Army  officials, 
those  in  charge  of  troops  and  supply  transport ;  to  the  Chief  of 
Aviation  and  the  American  and  French  air  forces ;  and  to  U.  S. 
Naval  Headquarters  in  London. 

The  development  of  this  organization  brought  such  success 
in  anti-submarine  operations  as  the  French  coast  had  never 
known,  changing  the  entire  situation  in  these  waters,  not  only 
for  our  vessels  but  for  all  Allied  shipping.  Here  is  a  chart 
record  of  vessels  sunk  by  submarines  on  the  west  coast  of 
France  for  six  months  and  it  tells  the  story : 

October,  1917   21 

November,  1917 13 

December,  1917 4 

January,  1918 9 

February,  1918 1 

March,  1918 0 

Describing  an  evening  with  Admiral  Wilson,  Reginald 
Wright  Kauffman  wrote: 

The  Admiral  and  his  staff  sleep  in  rooms  just  below  their  office. 
That  is,  they  say  they  sleep.  I  asked  the  Admiral's  orderly  if  he  had 
ever  seen  him  in  bed,  and  he  said,  ''No,  sir." 

The  Admiral,  after  a  long  day's  work,  spoke  of  how  good  it  was  to 
draw  his  chair  close  to  the  open  fire.  One  of  the  three  guests  had  to 
leave  early,  because,  although  he  is  our  host's  nephew,  he  had  volunteered 
as  a  common  seaman  and  had  to  be  aboard  ship  betimes.  That  orderly 
of  the  commander,  a  Lehigh  graduate  with  six  months '  experience  of  the 
service,  muttered  in  the  hall : 

"This  is  the  most  democratic  Navy  I  ever  saw;  an  Admiral  helping 
a  gob  on  with  his  coat ! ' ' 


102  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

That  intimate  view  of  Admiral  Wilson  shows  the  side  of  his 
character  which  makes  officers  and  men  love  him.  Strict  in 
discipline,  firm  in  administration,  a  master  of  his  profession, 
he  illustrates  the  military  truth  that  he  is  the  greatest  officer 
who  is  the  best  shipmate.  It  was  this  combination  of  qualities 
which  enabled  him  to  do  the  big  job  in  France,  where  he  was 
beloved  and  honored  by  the  French  as  well  as  the  Americans. 

What  Mr.  Kauffman  described  at  Brest  was  characteristic  of 
our  Navy  in  the  war,  as  it  was  of  our  crews  on  the  French  coast. 
In  one  gun's  crew  a  young  New  York  millionaire  served  with 
a  former  mechanic  and  an  erstwhile  clerk  from  the  East 
Side.  In  the  crew  of  a  yacht  was  a  Philadelphia  policeman  and 
a  Texas  ranger;  the  first  boatswain's  mate  had  his  sheepskin 
from  Cornell;  there  was  a  Lehigh  senior  in  the  forecastle  and 
a  Harvard  post-graduate  assisting  in  the  radio  room.  Several 
young  men  served  as  sailors  on  ships  their  fathers  owned,  and 
had  turned  over  to  the  Government  for  war  use. 

They  were  nearly  all  reservists  or  recent  recruits,  the  crews 
of  the  armed  yachts  and  sub-chasers.  But  they  put  it  over  like 
veterans,  and  took  things  as  they  came.  And  they  had  some 
lively  brushes  with  the  "subs." 

The  yachts  got  a  taste  of  U-boat  warfare  on  the  way  over. 
The  Corsair  was  with  the  troop-ships  when  the  group  she  was 
escorting  was  attacked  by  submarines.  Nearing  the  French 
coast  on  July  2,  the  Noma  sighted  a  periscope,  and  with  the 
Kanawha  circled  the  vicinity  for  some  time,  but  without  result. 
The  next  evening  the  Sultana,  which  was  somewhat  behind  the 
other  yachts,  arrived  at  Brest,  bringing  37  of  the  crew  and  13 
of  the  armed  guard  of  the  American  steamship  Orleans,  which 
had  been  sunk,  apparently  by  the  same  submarine  which  had 
been  sighted  by  the  Noma. 

The  day  after  they  began  patrol  duty,  the  Harvard  brought 
into  port  59  survivors  picked  up  from  two  British  ships  that 
had  been  torpedoed.  A  torpedo  was  fired  at  the  Noma  on 
July  19,  and  on  August  8th  she  took  part  in  a  fight  between  a 
noted  British  decoy-ship — "Q-boats,"  they  were  called — and  a 
submarine  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay. 

"SOS,"  came  the  distress  call  from  the  Dunraven,  "Shelled 
by  submarine."    The  Noma  had  just  finished  repairing  one  of 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  103 

her  boilers,  but  she  put  on  all  steam  and  headed  for  the  scene. 
As  she  came  up,  the  vessel,  torpedoed,  seemed  to  be  sinking. 
The  submarine,  which  was  close  to  the  steamer,  was  still  shelling 
her.  The  Noma  headed  for  the  U-boat,  attempting  to  ram  her, 
but  she  submerged  and  the  yacht  dropped  depth-bombs  around 
the  spot.  Then  she  turned  attention  to  the  Dunraven.  This 
decoy  ship,  commanded  by  Captain  Gordon  Campbell,  most 
noted  of  "Q-boat"  captains,  had  pursued  its  usual  tactics  when 
the  "sub"  was  sighted,  part  of  the  crew,  disguised  as  merchant 
sailors,  taking  to  the  life-boats,  leaving  hidden  aboard  the  gun- 
ners ready  to  fire  shells  or  torpedo  when  the  submarine  ven- 
tured nearer.  But  this  time  the  U-boat  got  the  best  of  it.  One 
of  its  shells  struck  the  steamer  and  blew  up  a  depth-bomb.  Two 
more  shots  landed,  and  set  the  ship  afire.  The  flames  swept 
down  to  where  ammunitiou,  shells  and  torpedoes  were  piled, 
and  they  exploded,  hurling  gun  and  gun-crew  into  the  air. 

Then  came  the  torpedo,  which  as  it  hit  the  ship  caused  an- 
other big  explosion.  But  the  Dunraven  fought  on,  and  it  was 
only  after  she  had  fired  two  torpedoes  at  the  "sub,"  and  many 
of  her  crew  were  wounded,  that  she  sent  out  the  distress  call. 

The  "sub"  driven  off,  the  Noma  circled  the  vicinity,  keeping 
a  sharp  lookout  for  the  enemy.  Two  British  destroyers  arrived 
shortly  afterward,  and  with  the  Noma  rescued  the  decoy-ship's 
crew.  One  of  them,  the  Christopher,  took  the  Dunraven  in  tow, 
the  Noma  acting  as  escort  until  the  next  day,  when  she  was  re- 
lieved by  a  French  destroyer.  But  the  Dunraven  was  too  badly 
damaged  to  remain  afloat,  and  sank  before  she  reached  port. 

Our  forces  in  French  waters  were  reinforced  in  August  and 
September  by  nineteen  more  vessels,  these  being : 

Second  Patrol  Division,  Commander  F.  N.  Freeman — Alcedo,  (Lieu- 
tenant Commander  W.  T.  Conn)  ;  Remlik,  (Lieutenant  Commander  I.  C. 
Johnson) ;  Wanderer,  (Lieutenant  Commander  P.  L.  Wilson) ;  Guinevere, 
(Lieutenant  Commander  Guy  Davis) ;  Corona,  (Lieutenant  Commander 
L.  M.  Stevens) ;  Carola,  (Lieutenant  Commander  H.  R.  Keller) ;  and  the 
Emeline,  (Lieutenant  Commander  R.  C.  Williams). 

Third  Division,  Captain  T.  P.  Magruder — Wakiva,  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander T.  R.  Kurtz),  armed  yacht;  Anderton,  (Boatswain  H.  Miller)  ; 
Cahill,  (Lieutenant  A.  E.  Wills)  ;  Rehobath  and  McNeal,  (Lieutenant 
C.  N.  Hinkamp)  ;  the  Lewes,  James,  Douglas,  Bauman,  Courtney,  and 
Hinton,  (Lieutenant  A.  McGlasson),  mine-sweepers ;  Bath,  supply  ship. 


104  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Sixteen  American-built  submarine  chasers,  which  we  had 
turned  over  to  the  French  Government,  also  arrived  in  Sep- 
tember, and  began  patrol  off  the  French  coast,  and  soon  after- 
ward the  yachts  Nokomis,  (Commander  D.  Boyd) ;  May,  (Com- 
mander F.  T.  Evans),  and  Rambler,  (Lieutenant  E.  G.  Rose) 
and  the  mine-sweeper  Hubbard  were  added  to  our  force  at  Brest. 

All  along  the  French  coast  and  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay  our 
vessels  were  kept  busy,  escorting  convoys,  troop  and  cargo  ships 
and  hunting  U-boats.  This  was  done  so  effectively  that  we  had 
no  loss  until  October,  when  a  mine-sweeper,  the  Rehoboth, 
foundered,  the  Army  transport  Antilles  and  the  yacht  Alcedo 
were  sunk,  and  the  Finland  torpedoed. 

Two  days  out  from  Quiberon  Bay,  on  October  17th,  the 
Antilles,  bound  for  America,  was  proceeding  with  the  Henderson 
and  Willehad,  escorted  by  the  Corsair  and  Alcedo,  when  she 
was  struck  by  a  torpedo.  Shivering  from  stern  to  stern,  she 
listed  immediately  to  port  and  began  to  sink.  One  of  the  look- 
outs in  the  main-top  was  thrown  clear  over  the  five-foot  canvas 
screen,  and  killed  as  he  struck  a  hatch.  Everyone  in  the  engine- 
room  was  killed  or  disabled  except  one  oiler,  who  crawled 
through  the  skylight  just  as  the  ship  went  down.  Of  the  21  men 
in  the  engine  and  fire-rooms,  only  three  survived — the  oiler, 
and  two  firemen  who  escaped  through  a  ventilator. 

Commander  Daniel  T.  Ghent,  senior  naval  officer  on  board, 
gave  the  order  to  abandon  ship.  Boats  were  lowered,  distress 
signals  sent  out.  Guns  were  manned  in  the  hope  of  getting  a 
shot  at  the  submarine.  There  the  gunners  remained  until  or- 
dered to  leave,  and  two  of  them — John  Walter  Hunt  and  J.  C. 
McKinney — went  down  with  the  ship. 

The  vessel  sank  in  four  and  a  half  minutes.  Commander 
Ghent  said: 

The  behavior  of  the  naval  personnel  throughout  was  equal  to  the 
best  traditions  of  the  service.  The  two  forward  guns'  crews,  in  charge 
of  Lieutenant  Tisdale,  remained  at  their  gun  stations  while  the  ship  went 
down,  and  made  no  move  to  leave  until  ordered  to  save  themselves. 
Radio  Electrician  C.  L.  Ausburne  went  down  with  the  ship  while  at 
his  station  in  the  radio  room.  When  the  ship  was  struck  Ausburne  and 
McMahon  were  asleep  in  adjacent  bunks  opposite  the  radio  room. 
Ausburne,  realizing  the  seriousness  of  the  situation,  told  McMahon  to 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  105 

get  his  life  preserver  on,  saying,  as  he  left  to  take  his  station  at  the 
radio  key,  "Good-bye,  Mac."  McMahon,  later  finding  the  radio  room 
locked  and  seeing  the  ship  was  sinking,  tried  to  get  Ausburne  out,  but 
failed. 

Radio  Electrician  H.  F.  Watson  was  also  lost.  He  remained 
with  Commander  Ghent  on  the  bridge  until  the  guns'  crews  were 
ordered  to  leave,  and  was  on  his  way  to  a  lifeboat  when  last 
seen. 

The  Alcedo  rescued  117  and  the  Corsair  50  of  the  234  persons 
who  were  on  the  Antilles.  Sixty-seven  were  lost — 4  men  of 
the  Navy,  16  of  the  Army;  45  of  the  ship's  merchant  crew;  a 
civilian  ambulance  driver  who  had  been  serving  with  the  French 
army,  and  a  colored  stevedore. 

Rafts,  set  free  by  the  blast  of  the  explosion,  were  spread 
broadcast.  Men  who  had  been  unable  to  get  into  the  boats 
swam  for  them,  and  for  boxes,  planks  or  anything  floating  they 
could  reach.  As  the  Corsair  was  picking  up  the  survivors,  a- 
sailor  was  seen  calmly  roosting  on  a  box.  As  the  yacht  steamed 
for  him,  he  stood  up  and,  waving  his  arms,  wigwagged : 

"Don't  come  too  close,  box  contains  live  ammunition!" 

They  rescued  him  with  care,  and  with  due  respect  for  the 
explosive  as  well  as  for  the  gunner  who  considered  the  ship's 
welfare  before  he  thought  of  his  own  safety. 

Eleven  days  later  the  Finland  was  torpedoed,  the  explosion 
blowing  in  her  side  for  35  feet,  the  V-shaped  hole  running  down 
to  the  bilge-keel.  Three  of  the  naval  gun-crew,  James  W.  Henry, 
Newton  R.  Head  and  Porter  Hilton;  two  men  of  the  Army,  a 
colored  transport  worker,  and  six  of  the  ship's  merchant  crew 
were  lost.  But  the  vessel,  under  the  skilful  direction  of  the 
senior  naval  officer,  Captain  S.  V.  Graham,  made  port  under  her 
own  steam,  was  repaired  and  put  back  into  service. 

Repairing  this  ship  was  a  striking  example  of  the  versatility 
of  the  American  Army  in  France.  The  repairs  were  undertaken 
by  the  French  naval  arsenal,  but  man-power  was  scarce  and  the 
work  was  going  slowly.  A  regiment  of  U.  S.  Army  engineers, 
stationed  at  a  point  not  far  distant,  offered  assistance.  Among 
them  were  a  number  of  locomotive  boiler  riveters,  and  struc- 
tural workers.  It  was  these  American  "engineers"  who  came 
to  the  bat  and  actually  repaired  the  Finland. 


106  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Neither  the  Antilles  nor  the  Finland  was  a  naval  transport, 
both  being  chartered  by  the  Army,  and  manned  by  civilian  crews, 
the  only  Navy  personnel  aboard  being  the  senior  naval  officer, 
the  armed  guard  and  the  radio  operators.  It  was  the  experience 
with  these  undisciplined  crews  which  hastened  the  arrangement 
by  which  the  Navy  manned  and  operated,  as  well  as  escorted, 
all  American  troop-ships. 

Only  one  of  our  armed  yachts  in  French  waters  was  sunk, 
the  Alcedo,  torpedoed  at  1:45  a.  m.,  November  5,  1917.  She 
sank  in  eight  minutes.  About  75  miles  west  of  Belle  He,  she 
was  escorting  a  convoy,  when  a  submarine  was  sighted,  and 
then  a  torpedo,  which  struck  the  ship  under  the  port  forward 
chain-plates.  Boats  were  lowered,  and  as  the  vessel  began  go- 
ing down,  Commander  W.  T.  Conn,  Jr.,  the  commanding  officer, 
ordered  the  men  who  were  still  aboard  to  jump  over  the  side, 
intending  to  follow  them.  Before  he  could  jump,  however,  the 
vessel  listed  heavily  to  port,  plunging  by  the  head,  and  sank, 
carrying  him  down  with  the  suction.  Coming  to  the  surface, 
he  swam  to  a  raft,  and  later  got  to  a  whaleboat,  which,  with 
several  dories,  went  among  the  wreckage,  picking  up  survivors. 

Half  an  hour  after  the  Alcedo  sank,  the  submarine  ap- 
proached, but  after  remaining  twenty  or  thirty  minutes  steered 
off  and  submerged.  After  searching  the  vicinity  for  three  hours, 
Commander  Conn's  boat  and  the  others  with  him,  containing  3 
officers  and  40  men,  headed  for  Penmarch  Light.  They  rowed 
until  1 :15  that  afternoon,  when  they  were  picked  up  by  a  French 
torpedo-boat.  Reaching  Brest  at  11  p.  m.,  Commander  Conn 
was  informed  that  two  other  dories,  containing  3  officers  and  25 
men,  had  landed  at  Penmarch  Point.  One  of  the  Alcedo' s  offi- 
cers, Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  John  T.  Melvin  of  Selma,  Ala., 
and  20  enlisted  men  were  lost. 

This  was  the  last  American  naval  or  troop-vessel  sunk  in 
many  months  by  the  submarines,  which  were  kept  on  the  run 
by  our  forces.  The  Wakiva,  Noma,  and  Kanawha  fought  off 
two  U-boats  and  it  is  believed  sank  one,  which  appeared  as 
they  were  escorting  the  storeships  Koln  and  Medina  on  Novem- 
ber 28,  1917.  At  6:20  p.  m.,  the  lookout  on  the  Kanawha  re- 
ported a  periscope  on  the  port  beam,  heading  towards  the 
Medina.    It  disappeared,  but  at  6 :50  the  Noma  saw  a  periscope 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  107 

on  her  starboard  beam.  Twelve  minutes  afterward  the  Wakiva 
sighted  a  periscope  heading  towards  the  convoy.  Swinging  into 
position  to  fire  a  torpedo  at  the  Wakiva,  the  submarine  crossed 
the  yacht's  wake.  The  Wakiva  fired  three  shots,  apparently 
striking  the  periscope,  which  disappeared.  She  also  let  go  two 
depth-charges. 

As  the  Wakiva  approached,  what  appeared  to  be  the  conning 
tower  of  the  submarine  emerged.  The  yacht  fired  at  it,  and  the 
conning  tower  sank.  The  Wakiva  dropped  numerous  depth- 
charges  and  after  they  exploded  her  commander  saw  what 
seemed  to  be  three  men  clinging  to  a  piece  of  wreckage.  He 
hailed  them,  but  received  no  response,  and  when  the  yacht  went 
near  the  place  they  had  disappeared.  In  the  meantime  the 
Noma  had  continued  search,  and  sighted  a  periscope  on  her  star- 
board bow,  turned  toward  it,  and  let  go  several  depth-charges. 
Officers  were  convinced  that  there  were  two  submarines,  and 
that  one  of  them  was  sunk  by  the  Wakiva. 

The  Christabel,  smallest  of  the  converted  yachts,  surprised 
her  big  sisters  by  smashing  up  a  submarine  so  badly  that  it  was 
just  able  to  reach  a  Spanish  port,  where  U-boat  and  crew  were 
interned  for  the  remainder  of  the  war.  Escorting  the  Danse, 
a  British  steamer  which  had  fallen  behind  its  convoy  two  miles 
from  He  de  Yeu,  on  May  21,  1918,  the  Christ ab el  at  8 :52  p.  m. 
sighted  a  periscope,  and  made  for  it,  firing  two  depth-bombs. 
As  the  second  charge  exploded,  there  followed  another  violent 
explosion  which  threw  up,  between  the  Christabel  and  the  water 
column  raised  by  the  bomb,  a  large  amount  of  water  and  debris. 
Heavy  black  oil  and  a  number  of  splintered  pieces  of  wood  rose 
to  the  surface. 

That  was  the  last  the  Christabel  saw  of  the  "sub,"  but  three 
days  later  the  report  came  that  the  UC-56  had  arrived  at  San- 
tander,  Spain,  too  seriously  damaged  to  attempt  to  return  to 
Germany.  Its  officers  and  men  were  glad  enough  to  escape  with 
their  lives. 

Fine  as  was  the  record  of  the  armed  yachts,  it  was  more 
than  equaled  by  the  destroyers,  which  bore  the  heaviest  part 
in  escorting  the  vast  number  of  troop  and  cargo  ships  sent  to 
France.  This  duty  was  performed  at  first  by  our  force  at 
Queenstown,  but  from  October  on,  when  the  tender  Panther 


108  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

(Commander    A.    M.    Procter)    and    five    destroyers    arrived, 
destroyers  were  sent  to  Brest  as  follows : 

Reid,  (Commander  C.  C.  Slayton)  ;  Flusser,  (Lieutenant  Commander 
R.  G.  Walling)  ;  the  Preston,  (Lieutenant  Commander  C.  W.  Magruder)  ; 
Lamson,  (Lieutenant  Commander  W.  R.  Purnell)  ;  Smith,  (Commander 
J.  H.  Klein)  ;  Monaghan,  (Lieutenant  Commander  J.  F.  Cox)  ;  Roe, 
(Lieutenant  Commander  G.  C.  Barnes)  ;  Warrington,  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander G.  W.  Kenyon)  ;  Whipple,  (Lieutenant  Commander  H.  J. 
Abbett)  ;  Trmtun,  (Lieutenant  Commander  J.  G.  Ware)  ;  Stewart, 
(Lieutenant  Commander  H.  S.  Haislip)  ;  Worden,  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander J.  M.  B.  Smith)  ;  Isabel,  (Lieutenant  Commander  H.  E.  Shoe- 
maker) ;  Nicholson,  (Lieutenant  Commander  J.  C.  Fremont). 

Recounting  what  they  accomplished,  Admiral  Wilson  said: 

The  record  of  the  service  of  these  vessels  on  the  coast  of  France 
furnishes  one  of  the  finest  tributes  in  the  history  of  our  Navy  to  the 
soundness  of  their  construction  and  to  the  ability  of  the  personnel  under 
trying  conditions. 

Until  about  the  first  of  June,  1918,  when  the  original  lot  of  destroyer 
captains  was  detached  and  ordered  to  the  United  States  to  fit  out  new 
vessels,  no  American  destroyers  sent  from  France  had  ever  missed  con- 
tact with  a  convoy;  no  destroyer  dispatched  with  a  mission  had  ever 
returned  to  port  before  the  completion  of  her  duty,  and  furthermore, 
during  this  period,  after  the  torpedoing  of  the  Finland,  on  October  28, 
1917,  no  vessel  en  route  from  America  to  France  or  from  France  to 
America,  when  escorted  by  American  vessels  based  on  France,  had  ever 
been  torpedoed  or  successfully  attacked  on  the  high  seas. 

The  Jarvis  (Lieutenant  Commander  R.  C.  Parker),  and  the 
Drayton  (Lieutenant  Commander  G.  N.  Barker),  two  of  the  740- 
ton  oil-burning  destroyers,  joined  the  force  on  February  15, 
1918;  then  on  March  4th,  the  Wadsworth  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander C.  E.  Smith).  The  following  destroyers  that  had  also 
previously  operated  out  of  Queenstown  were  sent  to  Brest  in 
June : 

Sigoumey,  (Commander  W.  N.  Vernou)  ;  Wainwright,  (Commander 
R.  A.  Dawes)  ;  Farming,  (Lieutenant  Commander  F.  Cogswell)  ;  Tucker, 
(Lieutenant  Commander  W.  H.  Lassing)  ;  Winslow,  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander F.  W.  Rockwell)  ;  Porter,  (Lieutenant  Commander  A.  A.  Cor- 
win)  ;  O'Brien,  (Commander  M.  K.  Metcalf)  ;  Cummings,  (Lieutenant 
Commander  0.  Bartlett)  ;  Benham,  (Lieutenant  Commander  F.  J. 
Fletcher)  ;  Cushing,   (Commander  W.  D.  Puleston)  ;  Burrows,   (Lieu- 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  109 

tenant  Commander  A.  Steckel)  ;  Ericsson,  (Lieutenant  Commander  R.  B; 
Stewart) ;  and  on  July  23,  the  McDougal,  (Lieutenant  Commander 
V.  K.  Coman). 

The  Navy  Department  had  decided  that  all  additional  de- 
stroyers built  would  be  sent  to  Brest  and  to  Gibraltar,  and 
Admiral  Wilson's  forces  were  augmented  from  time  to  time 
by  these  new  destroyers : 

Little,  (Captain  J.  K.  Taussig) ;  Conner,  (Captain  A.  G.  Howe) ; 
Taylor,  (Commander  C.  T.  Hutchins) ;  Stringham,  (Commander  N.  E. 
Nichols)  ;  Bell,  (Lieutenant  Commander  D.  L.  Howard)  ;  Murray, 
(Lieutenant  Commander  R.  G.  Walling)  ;  Fairfax,  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander G.  C.  Barnes) . 

For  more  than  a  year  American  mine  sweepers  pursued  their 
dangerous  but  tedious  task,  sweeping  up  mines  and  keeping 
clear  the  channels  leading  to  ports.  Mainly  converted  fishing 
boats,  the  constant  duty  along  the  coast  was  not  easy  for  them. 
The  Rehoboth  foundered  off  Ushant  in  a  heavy  sea  October  4, 
1917.  Steaming  in  a  fog  near  Concarneau,  January  12,  1918, 
the  Bauman  struck  one  of  the  numerous  rocks  that  make  naviga- 
tion in  that  region  so  dangerous.  Though  she  was  badly  dam- 
aged, Ensign  P.  J.  Ford,  her  executive  officer,  and  several  of 
her  crew  remained  aboard,  hoping  to  save  her,  and  theAnderton 
started  to  tow  her  to  Lorient,  but  she  sank  before  reaching  port. 
Soon  afterwards,  on  January  25,  the  Guinevere,  attempting  to 
get  to  Lorient  in  a  dense  fog,  ran  on  the  rocks. 

The  mine  force  was  not  infrequently  called  upon  to  reinforce 
coastal  convoys  or  go  to  the  aid  of  vessels  grounded  or  in  dis- 
tress. When  the  U-boats  began  attacking  coastal  convoys  near 
Penmarch  in  January,  1918,  the  sweepers  were  sent  out  to 
patrol  those  waters  at  night.  Lying  in  darkness,  they  spent  long 
hours  listening  through  the  * '  C ' '  tubes  for  any  sound  of  a  '  *  sub. ' ' 
They  were  often  hurried  out  to  sweep  mines  discovered  at  va- 
rious points.  In  a  heavy  sea,  the  Hinton,  Cahill  and  James 
swept  up  a  mine  field  near  Belle  He  in  record  time,  the  James 
cutting  four  mines  in  fifteen  minutes.  These  are  only  a  few 
instances  of  the  fine  work  they  continually  performed. 

Heroes  ?  There  were  plenty  of  them  in  our  forces  in  France, 
as  there  were  everywhere  else  in  the  Navy — men  who  feared  no 


110  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

danger  and,  when  necessity  arose,  risked  their  lives  without  a 
thought  of  self.  Hear  the  story  of  the  Florence  H.  The  rescue 
of  her  survivors  when  that  munition  ship  blew  up  off  Quiberon 
Bay,  April  17,  1918,  is  one  of  the  war's  most  thrilling  events. 

The  night  was  dark  and  cloudy,  the  sea  smooth.  Steaming 
along  quietly,  the  convoy  was  nearing  port.  At  10 :45  someone 
was  seen  signaling  with  a  searchlight  from  the  bridge  of  the 
Florence  H.  An  instant  later  the  vessel  burst  into  flames,  which 
soon  enveloped  the  ship,  and  rose  a  hundred  feet  into  the  air.  In 
ten  minutes  the  vessel  split  open  amidships  and  five  minutes 
later  went  down,  blazing  like  a  torch.  Smoke  and  flames  pre- 
vented those  on  the  ships  around  from  seeing  what  had  occurred 
aboard  the  steamship.  Survivors  reported  later  that  there  was 
a  tremendous  explosion  in  No.  2  hatch  which  lifted  the  deck  and 
blew  out  the  ship 's  starboard  side.  Her  chief  engineer,  John  B. 
Watson,  said :  i '  She  just  burned  up  and  melted  in  about  twenty 
minutes." 

The  whole  thing  occurred  so  suddenly  that  a  naval  com- 
mander, as  he  saw  the  flash,  remarked :  ' '  Not  a  living  soul  will 
get  off  that  ship. ' ' 

Rescue  seemed  almost  hopeless.  The  waters  around  were 
covered  with  flaming  powder-cases  and  wreckage,  so  thickly 
packed  that  they  spread  to  leeward  like  enormous  rafts.  All 
over  the  vicinity  ammunition  was  exploding,  shooting  flame  and 
gas  ten  to  twenty  feet  into  the  air. 

As  soon  as  the  fire  broke  out,  two  naval  vessels  started  for 
the  stricken  ship.  As  they  got  near,  the  ammunition  on  the 
deck  of  the  Florence  H.  began  to  explode,  showering  up  like 
fireworks.  Then  her  guns  went  off.  For  the  wooden  yachts 
to  venture  into  that  sea  of  flame  was  almost  certain  destruction. 
The  destroyers,  their  decks  laden  with  depth-charges,  were  in 
almost  equal  danger.  When  the  Stewart  drew  near  the  ship, 
the  senior  commander  signalled  her  to  be  careful.  It  seemed 
hardly  possible  that  any  of  the  Florence  H.'s  crew  had  escaped. 
But  Lieutenant  Commander  H.  S.  Haislip  heard  cries  in  the 
water.  That  meant  that  there  were  men  still  alive,  struggling 
in  that  horror. 

There  was  only  one  way  to  rescue  them.  That  was  to  plough 
through  the  blazing  wreckage.    Haislip  knew  what  chances  he 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  111 

was  taking,  risking  his  ship  and  crew.  But  it  was  to  save  human 
lives  and  he  did  not  hesitate  a  moment.  The  Stewart  led  the 
way,  and  the  other  destroyers,  the  Whipple  and  the  Truxtun, 
followed.  Pushing  through  bursting  powder-casks,  and  burning 
boxes,  they  made  a  path  for  the  other  ships. 

Lines  were  thrown  out  and  seamen  jumped  overboard  to 
hold  up  men  who  were  blinded  or  drowning.  Lifeboats  put  out 
from  half  a  dozen  ships.  The  flames  lit  up  the  whole  area  so 
that  it  was  almost  as  bright  as  day.  Men  could  be  seen  clinging 
to  ammunition  boxes,  and  the  rescuers  rowed  or  swam  to  them. 

Three  men  were  found  in  a  blazing  lifeboat  hemmed  in  by 
wreckage.  A  naval  vessel  steamed  alongside  and  pulled  them 
aboard.  F.  M.  Upton,  quartermaster  third  class,  and  J.  W. 
Covington,  ship's  cook,  plunged  overboard  to  rescue  a  sailor 
too  exhausted  to  help  himself.  Chaplain  William  A.  Maguire 
assisted  in  the  rescue,  going  out  in  a  lifeboat  which  had  to  pole 
its  way  through  the  smouldering  wreckage.  Surgeons  J.  A. 
Flautt  and  G.  E.  Cram  and  Pharmacist's  Mate  W.  Lorber  were 
out  in  small  boats,  giving  aid  to  the  wounded,  many  of  whom 
were  burned  about  the  head  and  arms. 

Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  M.  L.  Coon,  took  a  boat  into  the 
wreckage  and  rescued  three  men.  A  motor-boat  in  charge  of 
Lieutenant  H.  R.  Eccleston  ploughed  its  way  through  to  a  man 
who  could  not  be  reached  by  the  rowers.  Other  boats  were 
assisting  in  the  rescue,  directed  by  Lieutenant  (junior  grade) 
H.  E.  Snow,  and  Ensigns  William  0.  Harris,  Sherburne  B.  Rock- 
well and  R.  A.  Johnston. 

All  the  naval  vessels  did  splendid  work — the  destroyers 
Stewart  (Lieutenant  Commander  Haislip) ;  Whipple  (Lieuten- 
ant Commander  H.  J.  Abbett),  and  Truxtun  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander J.  G.  Ware) ;  the  yachts  Wanderer  (Lieutenant  Com- 
mander P.  L.  Wilson) ;  Sultana  (Lieutenant  Commander  F.  A. 
LaRoche) ;  Christabel  (Lieutenant  Commander  M.  B.  McComb), 
and  Corona  (Lieutenant  H.  H.  J.  Benson).  More  than  a  dozen 
officers  and  fifty  enlisted  men  performed  deeds  for  which  they 
were  officially  commended.  Upton  and  Covington  were  awarded 
the  Medal  of  Honor.  But  Haislip,  born  in  Virginia,  appointed 
to  the  Naval  Academy  from  Wisconsin,  his  later  home  in  Cali- 
fornia, won  most  distinction,  the  highest  honors  we  could  bestow. 


112  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  French  Vice  Admiral  praised  his  courage  and  decision,  say- 
ing that  he  exhibited  not  only  ' '  superb  contempt  of  danger, ' '  but, 
" remarkable  qualities  of  seamanship." 

Thirty-two  of  the  77  men  aboard  the  Florence  H.  were  res- 
cued. Had  it  not  been  for  the  heroic  work  of  these  men  of  the 
Navy,  not  one  would  have  escaped  alive. 

Thrilling  as  Victor  Hugo's  description  of  the  cannon  which 
broke  loose  and  threatened  the  ship,  was  John  Mackenzie's 
wrestle  with  a  depth-bomb  on  the  Remlik.  A  storm  was  raging 
in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  the  Remlik,  patrolling  off  the  French 
coast,  was  having  a  hard  time  weathering  the  gale.  Suddenly 
a  periscope  was  sighted,  and  there  was  a  cry  from  the  lookout : 
' '  Submarine  400  yards  off  starboard  beam ! ' ' 

"General  quarters"  alarm  was  sounded,  and  stations 
manned.  Heavy  seas  were  breaking  over  the  vessel,  but  the 
after  gun's  crew  stayed  at  its  post,  trying  to  get  a  shot  at  the 
U-boat.  Before  they  could  fire  the  submarine  submerged.  Then 
followed  one  of  the  queerest  of  situations  at  sea,  patrol  ship  and 
submarine  both  so  tossed  by  wave  and  wind  that  they  could  not 
use  their  weapons  against  each  other. 

The  U-boat  poked  up  its  double  periscope  three  times,  each 
time  submerging  as  she  saw  the  patrol  ship's  guns  turned 
toward  her.  She  could  not  launch  a  torpedo  with  any  success 
in  that  raging  sea ;  neither  could  the  Remlik  drop  a  depth-bomb 
on  her,  as  the  Remlik  could  make  only  two  knots  against  the  gale 
and  a  bursting  depth-charge  might  damage  her  as  much  as  it 
would  the  ' '  sub. ' '  There  they  maneuvered  like  two  tigers,  un- 
able to  spring  at  each  other.  After  a  few  minutes  the  sub- 
marine, which  had  never  shown  enough  of  herself  for  our  gun- 
ners to  plant  a  shell  in  her,  finally  submerged  and  stayed  under. 
The  Americans  kept  sailing  over  the  locality,  hoping  she  would 
reappear;  but,  not  wanting  to  risk  a  gunfire  contest,  the  "sub" 
had  given  up  the  fight. 

Tossed  about  by  that  stormy  sea,  a  more  imminent  danger 
threatened  the  Remlik.  The  waves  breaking  over  the  stern  tore 
loose  one  of  the  huge  depth-bombs.  The  box  that  held  it  fell 
overboard,  but  the  bomb  was  hurled  in  the  opposite  direction. 
There  it  went,  rolling  around  the  deck,  while  the  crew  amidships 
watched  it  with  the  fascination  of  danger. 


BEEST,  CENTER  OF  THE   GREAT  SYSTEM  OF  NAVAL  OPERATIONS 

IN  FRANCE 


A    GEKMAN    "SUB"    AND   SOME   OF    ITS    ENEMIES 

Above:  The  German  submarine  UC-56  in  Lnternment  al  Santander,  Spain,  where 
it  was  forced  by  the  Christabel,  the  smallest  of  the  American  armed  yachts  in  Euro- 
pean waters. 

Inset:  Hiyii  ofliccrs  of  the  French  and  American  Navies.  Left  to  right:  Vice 
Admiral  Moreau,  Assistant  Secretary  Roosevelt,  Vice  Admiral  Schwerer,  Rear  Ad- 
miral Benoit,  Vice  Admiral  Wilson. 

Below:  Patrol  Boats  and  Sub-Chasers  at  Finisterre  Dock,  Brest,  Base  Section 
Number  5. 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  113 

"The  safety-pin's  come  out!"  some  one  shouted. 

They  all  knew  what  that  meant.  If  the  firing  mechanism 
should  hit,  sending  off  that  bomb;  if  its  300  pounds  of  TNT 
should  explode,  the  Remlik  would  be  shattered. 

To  catch  and  hold  that  heavy  bomb,  with  the  vessel  rolling 
and  pitching  as  it  was,  seemed  almost  impossible.  Even  to  ven- 
ture into  that  part  of  the  ship  was  to  risk  life.  The  seas  were 
breaking  over  it,  threatening  to  sweep  off  anyone  who  went 
down  the  deck.  All  knew  the  ship  faced  destruction ;  that  any- 
one who  went  after  that  bomb  risked  being  swept  overboard  or 
blown  to  pieces.    But  quickly  a  voice  rang  out : 

"Watch  me;  I'll  get  it!" 

Mackenzie  dashed  down  the  deck  and  flung  himself  upon  the 
plunging  cylinder.  He  almost  had  his  arms  around  it,  when  it 
broke  away.  He  jumped  for  it  again,  and  again  it  tore  loose 
from  him. 

"Hey!"  he  yelled.  "Stand  by  and  lend  a  hand.  It  won't 
do  for  this  colt  to  get  away  from  me. ' ' 

As  he  grabbed  for  it  the  third  time,  the  big  charge  lurched, 
and  falling,  came  near  crushing  him.  But  he  caught  his  footing, 
and  on  the  fourth  attempt  got  a  firm  grip  on  it.  Exerting  all  his 
strength,  he  heaved  the  "can"  up  on  end,  and  then  sat  on  it 
and  held  it  down.  Holding  on  firmly,  he  managed  to  retain  his 
grip  until  lines  could  be  run  to  him,  and  the  bomb  lashed  down. 
Mackenzie  had  risked  his  life,  but  he  had  saved  his  ship  and 
shipmates. 

Recommending  that  the  Medal  of  Honor  be  bestowed  on 
Mackenzie,  the  first  reservist  to  whom  it  was  awarded,  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  Remlik  said : 

Mackenzie,  in  acting  as  he  did,  exposed  his  life  and  prevented  serious 
accident  to  the  ship  and  probably  loss  of  the  ship  and  entire  crew.  Had 
this  depth-charge  exploded  on  the  quarterdeck  with  the  sea  and  wind 
that  existed  at  the  time,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  ship  would  have 
been  lost. 

There  was  no  more  striking  instance  of  resourcefulness  and 
good  seamanship  than  the  double  service  of  the  Americans  in 
rescuing  the  survivors  of  the  French  light  cruiser  Dupetit 
Thouars,  and  salvaging  and  taking  350  miles  to  port  the  Ameri- 


114  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

can  steamship  Westward  Ho.  The  steamer  was  in  a  convoy 
from  New  York  to  the  Bay  of  Biscay  which  had  been  escorted 
across  the  Atlantic  by  the  French  cruiser.  At  10  o'clock,  the 
night  of  August  7, 1918,  the  Dupetit  Thouars  was  torpedoed,  and 
soon  sank.  The  destroyers  Winsloiv,  Porter,  Drayton,  Tucker, 
Fanning  and  Warrington  went  to  her  aid  and  rescued  the  sur- 
vivors. 

The  next  morning  at  6:40  the  destroyers  caught  a  distress 
signal,  found  that  the  Westivard  Ho  had  been  torpedoed,  and 
took  aboard  her  crew.  The  American  yachts  May  and  Noma 
and  the  French  sloop  Cassiopee  soon  afterwards  arrived  and 
found  the  ship  still  afloat.  But  she  was  apparently  in  a  sinking 
condition,  so  deep  in  the  water  that  attempts  to  tow  her  failed.  A 
volunteer  crew  from  the  May  headed  by  Lieutenant  T.  Blau,  went 
aboard  and  though  they  had  no  experience  with  oil  burning  or 
turbine  machinery,  got  up  steam,  started  the  pumps,  and  at  last 
got  the  engines  going.  She  was  so  deep  in  the  water  forward 
that  they  could  not  make  much  headway  steering  the  ship  bow 
first.  So  the  volunteer  crew  turned  her  around,  and  with  the 
two  yachts  towing  and  the  French  sloop  looking  out  for  sub- 
marines, ran  that  big  steamship  backwards  three  hundred  and 
fifty  miles,  and  got  her  safely  into  harbor. 

A  week  later  another  surprising  feat  was  accomplished. 
Proceeding  in  convoy  400  miles  from  the  French  coast,  the  West 
Bridge,  on  August  15,  stripped  her  main  turbine  and  lay  help- 
less. She  had  hardly  sent  a  radio  to  Brest,  asking  assistance, 
when  the  convoy  was  attacked  by  a  submarine.  The  Montanan 
was  torpedoed,  and  after  she  went  down,  the  U-boat  turned  its 
attention  to  the  West  Bridge.  Struck  by  two  torpedoes,  she  was 
apparently  about  to  founder.  But  the  destroyer  Smith  went 
to  her  aid,  and  a  volunteer  crew  under  Lieutenant  R.  L.  Connolly 
went  aboard  the  disabled  steamer.  There  was  no  possibility 
of  raising  steam.  She  had  to  be  steered  by  hand.  Eventually 
four  tugs  arrived  and  with  the  yacht  Isabel  started  to  tow.  The 
well-deck  forward  of  the  ship's  bridge  was  flush  with  the  sea, 
the  waves  broke  over  her  in  a  constant  roar.  Holds,  engine  and 
fire  rooms  were  flooded.  Keeping  her  afloat  and  keeping  her 
moving  was  slow  and  hard  work.  For  five  days  and  nights  those 
men  struggled  to  save  that  ship,  and  at  last  they  got  her  to  port. 


GUARDING  THE  COAST  OF  FRANCE  115 

When  she  reached  Brest  they  beached  her  on  a  flat.  The  officers 
who  examined  her  for  repairs  declared  she  did  not  have  a  hun- 
dred tons  of  positive  buoyancy,  hardly  enough  to  keep  her  up 
an  hour.  Yet  those  Navy  men  had  kept  her  afloat  for  five  days 
and  pulled  her  four  hundred  miles  to  port ! 

The  spirit  of  America  in  Europe,  its  high  ideals,  the  attitude 
of  officers  and  men  could  not  have  been  better  expressed  than  in 
this  open  letter  of  Admiral  Wilson  to  the  forces  under  his  com- 
mand in  France : 

We  are  guests  in  the  house  of  another  people.  Our  home  will  be 
judged  by  our  conduct  in  theirs.  We  still  live  under  the  rules,  laws, 
and  spirit  of  the  place  from  which  we  come. 

Every  great  nation  in  history  has  stood  for  some  one  definite  idea: 
Greece  for  beauty,  Rome  for  law,  Israel  for  religion.  America,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world,  stands  preeminently  for  freedom  and  the  ideal  of 
manhood.  We  must  not  shake  that  opinion  but  do  all  that  we  can  to 
strengthen  it. 

We  have  come  to  this  side  of  the  world  to  record,  by  the  indelible 
imprint  of  arms,  our  protest  against  that  which  is  brutal,  wicked,  and 
unjust,  to  give  expression  to  that  measure  of  indignation  stirred  in  the 
hearts  of  America  by  the  deeds  of  terror  which  the  enemy  has  written 
across  the  face  of  France.  Our  Nation  stands  for  everything  that  is 
contrary  to  the  spirit  of  arrogant  power  and  tyranny.  Let  us  prove 
that  by  our  lives  here. 

The  only  history  of  America  that  many  of  the  people  of  Europe  will 
ever  read  is  that  which  is  recorded  by  our  lives. 

Live  here  the  proud,  manly  existence  that  is  justly  expected. 

Be  courteous,  temperate  and  self-controlled. 

We  fight  against  the  Hun's  ill-treatment  of  women;  let  no  man  be 
tempted  to  do,  by  insinuation,  what  we  charge  our  enemies  with  doing 
by  force.  Let  the  women  of  France  remember  the  men  of  America  as 
those  who  would  shield  them  against  all  harm,  even  that  which  might 
spring  from  their  defenders. 

You  would  fight  the  man  who  insulted  your  uniform ;  do  not  insult 
it  yourself.  Let  it  not  be  carried  into  places  of  disrepute  or  into  any 
discrediting  act.  We  are  here  for  a  great,  high,  and  solemn  purpose. 
Let  every  personal  desire  be  subordinated  to  that  righteous  purpose, 
then  we  will  return  to  our  homes  clean  and  proud  and  victorious. 


CHAPTER  XI 
GIBRALTAR  AND  THE  CONVOY 

AMERICAN  VESSELS  ESCORTED  NINETY  PER  CENT  OF  SHIPPING  BETWEEN 

ENGLAND  AND   MEDITERRANEAN GREAT    WORK   ACCOMPLISHED   BY 

SHIPS     UNDER     COMMAND     OF     ADMIRAL     NIBLACK U.     S.     NAVAL 

FORCES  MADE  POSSIBLE  OPERATION  OF  CONVOY  SYSTEM.  ONE  OF  THE 
MOST  EFFECTIVE  MEASURES  OF  THE  WAR. 

GIBRALTAR  was  the  gateway  through  which  passed 
one-fourth  of  all  the  shipping  of  the  Allies.  When  the 
convoy  system  was  applied  to  the  Mediterranean,  July, 
1917,  it  became  the  principal  convoy  port  of  the  world. 

United  States  naval  vessels  furnished  ocean  escort  both  go- 
ing and  returning  for  90  per  cent  of  all  convoys  between  Gibral- 
tar and  Great  Britain — 200  of  the  225  groups  which  sailed,  4,269 
ships,  representing  12,000,000  gross  tons.  The  Mediterranean 
escort  protected  5,120  vessels;  our  destroyers  in  that  region, 
1004 ;  our  Marseilles  escort  73 ;  and  our  men-of-war  accompanied 
12  other  special  ships,  transports,  cable  layers  and  submarines. 
Thus  the  United  States  vessels  of  this  force  escorted  a  total  of 
10,478  ships. 

Realizing  the  strategic  importance  of  Gibraltar,  the  Navy 
Department,  on  July  5,  1917,  decided  to  establish  a  base  there, 
and  on  July  14th,  directed  11  vessels,  including  gunboats  and 
light  cruisers,  under  command  of  Admiral  Wilson,  to  prepare 
for  distant  service,  and  sail  for  Gibraltar  at  the  earliest  possible 
date.  This  base,  one  of  the  most  important  in  Europe,  was 
established  by  the  Navy  Department  on  its  own  initiative,  as 
had  been  the  bases  at  Brest  and  Bordeaux  and  the  Azores.  By 
the  time  our  vessels  arrived  it  became,  for  protection  of  Allied 
shipping,  a  point  of  prime  importance. 

The  convoy  system  was  inaugurated  in  the  Mediterranean, 
by  British  Admiralty  order,  on  July  22,  1917.    Five  days  after- 

116 


GIBRALTAR  AND  THE  CONVOY  117 

wards  the  first  regular  convoy  of  14  ships  sailed  for  England. 
August  6th  the  vanguard  of  the  United  States  naval  vessels,  the 
cruiser  Sacramento  (Captain  T.  T.  Craven)  reached  Gibraltar. 
On  the  17th  Admiral  Wilson  arrived  in  the  Birmingham  (Cap- 
tain C.  L.  Hussey),  followed  next  day  by  the  Nashville  (Captain 
H.  E.  Yarnell).  Other  ships  followed— the  gunboats  Castine 
(Captain  W.C.  Asser son), Machias  (Commander  Austin  Kautz), 
Wheeling  (Commander  H  .W.  Osterhaus),  Paducah  (Commander 
H.  H.  Royall),  the  cruiser  Chester  (Captain  Philip  Williams), 
the  Coast  Guard  cutters  Seneca  (Captain  W.  J.  Wheeler),  Man- 
ning (Lieutenant  Commander  A.  J.  Henderson),  Tampa  (Lieu- 
tenant Commander  Charles  C.  Satterlee),  Ossipee  (Lieutenant 
Commander  W.  H.  Munter),  Yamacraw  (Lieutenant  Commander 
Randolph  Ridgely),  Algonquin  (Lieutenant  Commander  G.  C. 
Carmine),  the  converted  yachts  Yankton  (Lieutenant  G.  E. 
Lake),  Nahma  (Lieutenant  Commander  E.  Ifriedrick),  Druid 
(Lieutenant  Commander  J.  F.  Connor),  Wenonah  (Lieutenant 
Commander  P.  E.  Speicher),  Arcturus  (Lieutenant  Commander 
C.  F.  Howell),  Lydonia  (Lieutenant  Commander  R.  P.  McCul- 
lough),  Cythera  (Lieutenant  Commander  W.  G.  Roper),  Wadena 
(Lieutenant  Commander  W.  M.  Falconer),  and  Venetia  (Com- 
mander L.  B.  Porterfield),  the  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey  vessel 
Surveyor  (Commander  R.  E.  Pope),  the  destroyers  Bainbridge 
(Lieutenant  T.  A.  Thomson,  Jr.),  Barry  (Lieutenant  H.  P.  Samp- 
son), Chauncey  (Lieutenant  Commander  W.  E.  Reno),  Dale 
(Lieutenant  Roy  Pfafr"),  Decatur  (Lieutenant  Ralph  R.  Stew- 
art), Gregory  (Commander  A.  P.  Fairfield),  Dyer  (Commander 
F.  H.  Poteet),  Stribling  (Commander  G.  C.  Logan),  Luce  (Com- 
mander R.  C.  Parker),  Israel  (Lieutenant  Commander  G.  N. 
Barker),  Maury  (Commander  J.  H.  Newton),  Lansdale  (Lieu- 
tenant Commander  C.  W.  Magruder),  and  Schley  (Lieutenant 
Commander  R.  C.  Giffen),  and  the  destroyer  tender  Buffalo 
(Captain  C.  M.  Tozer). 

American  vessels  took  a  prominent  part  in  escort  duty  prac- 
tically from  the  beginning  of  convoy  in  that  region,  becoming 
in  a  short  time,  the  largest  factor  in  the  system.  In  the  latter 
part  of  October,  Admiral  Wilson  was  ordered  to  command  our 
forces  on  the  French  coast,  and  was  succeeded  by  Admiral  A.  P. 
Niblack,  who  directed  our  forces  at  Gibraltar  to  the  end  of  the 


118  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

war,  with  fine  judgment  and  ability.  He  and  his  force  became 
a  tower  of  strength  in  that  region,  to  the  Allies  as  well  as  our 
own  Navy. 

As  the  American  vessels  arrived,  they  were  immediately 
placed  on  duty  with  convoys  and  as  danger-zone  escorts.  The 
ships  of  the  Allies  were  employed  almost  exclusively  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, with  headquarters  at  Malta,  and  our  naval  vessels 
did  nearly  all  the  escort  duty  between  Gibraltar  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  They  also  convoyed  over  4,000  vessels  in  local  Medi- 
terranean traffic,  or  bound  for  Mediterranean  and  Far  Eastern 
ports;  ships  supplying  the  American  army  through  Marseilles, 
the  French  forces  in  North  Africa;  the  Allied  armies  at  Salo- 
nika; the  British  in  Egypt  and  Palestine;  and  the  forces  of 
Italy. 

Soon  after  our  vessels  arrived  in  August,  1917,  Rear  Admiral 
H.  S.  Grant,  British  Royal  Navy,  senior  naval  officer  in  com- 
mand at  Gibraltar,  drew  up  the  plans  by  which  the  "H.  G." 
(Home-Gibraltar)  and  "G.  H."  (Gibraltar-Home)  convoys  were 
organized  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Mediterranean. 
These  also  included  ships  bound  to  and  from  French  ports  in 
the  Bay  of  Biscay  and  ships  bound  to  the  United  States. 
Destroyers,  sloops  and  special  service  vessels  accompanied  each 
convoy  as  a  danger-zone  escort  through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar 
to  10  degrees  west  longitude  and  there  waited  for,  or  met,  an 
incoming  convoy  from  England.  Men-of-war  acted  as  ocean 
escort  to  the  convoys  from  that  point  to  British  waters,  where 
they  were  met  by  a  danger-zone  escort  at  the  end  of  the  route. 

At  the  beginning  of  October,  1917,  a  system  of  fast  convoys, 
sailing  every  sixteen  days,  between  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Port  Said,  and  vice  versa,  was  organized.  These  were  met  at 
a  rendezvous  in  approximately  longitude  10  degrees  west  by 
naval  vessels  which  escorted  them  to  Gibraltar,  where  they  were 
relieved  usually  by  ships  from  the  Malta  command,  to  take  them 
through  the  Mediterranean.  These  convoys  were  joined  at  Gib- 
raltar by  ships  of  over  IOV2  knots  speed,  which  were  taken  out 
by  relief  escorts  and  joined  the  convoy  off  Europa  Point.  The 
first  of  the  through  outward-bound  convoys,  O.  E.  1  (outward 
eastward)  passed  Gibraltar  October  11th,  and  the  first  through 
homeward  bound  convoy,  //.  E.  1,  passed  on  November  26th. 


GIBRALTAR  AND  THE  CONVOY  119 

By  December  most  merchantmen  which  arrived  at  Gibraltar 
had  been  in  convoy  at  one  time  or  another,  and  it  was  possible 
to  sail  ships  bound  for  North  and  South  American  ports  in 
separate  small  convoys,  with  one  master  and  commodore, 
escorted  through  the  danger  zone  to  longitude  10  degrees  west. 
Between  that  time  and  the  middle  of  February,  1918,  207  ships 
were  thus  sailed  to  the  Americas. 

More  escort  ships  being  available,  and  enemy  submarine 
cruisers  becoming  active,  ships  for  United  States  and  South 
American  ports  were,  beginning  February  27,  formed  into  con- 
voys, two,  a  fast  and  a  slow  one,  sailing  on  the  same  day,  each, 
accompanied  by  the  danger-zone  escort  to  longitude  30  degrees 
west,  then  proceeding  "on  their  own"  to  longitude  70  degrees 
west  to  be  dispersed  to  their  proper  destinations.  Under  this 
revised  system  there  were  sailed  to  American  ports  1,013  ships, 
totalling  4,371,063  gross  tons.  These  were  called  W.  A.  Con- 
voys (Western  Atlantic). 

The  main  artery  for  supply  of  the  Allied  armies  operating 
in  Egypt,  Palestine,  Greece,  Italy,  Northern  Africa  and  South- 
ern France  ran  through  the  Gibraltar  area,  requiring  a  great 
amount  of  offensive  work  against  enemy  submarines,  in  addi- 
tion to  escorting  convoys.  Patrol  of  the  Straits  was  carried  on 
by  torpedo  boats,  motor  launches,  sub-chasers  and  vessels  of 
small  displacement,  entailing  hardships  and  exposure  in  every 
kind  of  weather. 

Numerous  attacks  on  U-boats  were  reported  in  this  region. 
The  British  Admiralty  credited  the  TJ.  S.  S.  Lydonia  (Lieutenant 
Commander  R.  P.  McCullough)  and  H.  M.  S.  Basilisk  with  sink- 
ing a  submarine  while  escorting  a  Mediterranean  convoy,  May 
8,  1918.  In  latitude  38  degrees  06'  north,  longitude  3  degrees 
3'  east,  the  Lydonia  sighted  the  wake  of  a  torpedo  which  sank 
the  British  steamship  Ingleside.  The  British  and  American 
ships  immediately  attacked,  dropping  a  barrage  of  depth- 
charges,  which  destroyed  the  enemy.  The  submarine  was  the 
German  UB-70,  and  the  British  Admiralty  awarded  these  ves- 
sels the  credit,  rarely  given,  of  "known  sunk." 

Commander  Richard  P.  McCullough,  commanding  the  Ly- 
donia, was  officially  commended  by  the  British  Admiralty  and 
the  British  senior  naval  officer  at  Gibraltar,  as  well  as  by  our 


120  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

own  authorities.  Lieutenant  Claud  F.  Reynaud,  the  executive 
officer,  was  also  given  special  commendation.  Sighting  the  tor- 
pedo at  the  instant  it  was  fired,  Reynaud  started  his  stop-watch, 
timed  the  run  of  the  torpedo,  made  immediate  change  of  course 
to  the  position  of  the  submarine  and  noted  its  bearings.  This 
enabled  the  commanding  officer  to  track  the  probable  movements 
of  the  submarine,  which  was  destroyed  by  depth-charges  from 
the  Lydonia  and  the  Basilisk. 

Credit  was  also  given  for  the  sinking  of  a  submarine  by  the 
Wheeling,  Surveyor  and  Venetia.  While  on  escort  duty,  May  15, 
1918,  in  latitude  36-03  N.,  longitude  1-47  W.,  these  vessels 
sighted  the  track  of  a  torpedo  which  struck  a  merchant  ship  of 
the  convoy.  They  dashed  down  the  wake  made  by  the  U-boat's 
periscope,  dropping  depth-charges  which  soon  put  the  submarine 
out  of  business. 

The  notable  record  of  the  Venetia  is  recited  in  Admiral  Nib- 
lack's  recommendation  of  its  commanding  officer,  Commander 
L.  B.  Porterfield,  for  special  commendation: 

While  escorting  Gibraltar-Bizerta  convoy,  on  May  11, 1918,  an  enemy 
submarine,  which  was  not  seen,  torpedoed  the  French  steamship  Susetie 
Fraisenette  at  3 :39  a.  m.  With  excellent  judgment  he  assumed  that 
submarine  had  dived  under  the  convoy,  and  in  following  out  the  theory 
sighted  the  submarine  on  the  surface  at  daylight,  compelling  it  to 
submerge.  This  submarine  was  subsequently  sunk  in  the  Adriatic,  and 
the  survivors  testified  that  the  attack  of  the  Venetia  on  this  occasion 
drove  them  off,  and  saved  the  convoy  from  further  attack.  Commended 
in  British  Senior  Naval  Officer's  letter  78-14  of  24th  May,  1918,  and 
British  Commander-in-Chief's  Mediterranean  letter  No.  2089-93  of  23 
June,  1918. 

While  escort  to  Gibraltar-Bizerta  convoy  on  May  17,  1918,  the  British 
steamship  Sculptor  was  torpedoed  at  6 :48  p.  m.  Submarine  was  not  seen, 
but  the  Venetia-,  having  been  previously  detailed  to  attack  with  depth- 
charges,  and  remain  behind  four  hours  to  keep  down  submarine,  did  so. 
At  7 :02  p.  m.  wake  of  submarine  was  sighted  and  depth-charges  dropped. 
On  May  18th  an  enemy  submarine  interned  at  Cartagena,  Spain,  and 
was  officially  assumed  to  have  been  damaged  by  the  Venetia: 

While  on  escort  duty,  Gibraltar-Genoa,  the  British  steamship  Messidor 
was  torpedoed  at  7  :24  p.  m.,  July  23,  1918,  and  the  Venetia  instantly 
made  attack,  dropping  thirteen  depth-charges  on  prearranged  plan. 

The  cruiser  Chester  had  two  encounters  with  submarines. 
While  on  convoy  duty  November  9, 1917,  it  attacked  with  gunfire 


GIBRALTAR  AND  THE  CONVOY  121 

a  submarine  which  had  sunk  one  of  the  vessels  of  the  convoy, 
compelling  the  U-boat  to  submerge.  On  September  5,  1918,  at 
1 :04  a.  m.,  the  Chester,  on  ocean  escort,  sighted  a  submarine 
close  aboard  on  the  starboard  bow.  First  the  cruiser  attempted 
to  ram  the  enemy,  then  attacked  the  undersea  craft  with  depth- 
charges,  which  apparently  damaged  the  U-boat. 

Four  days  later  a  submarine  attacked  Convoy  GGA-54,  tor- 
pedoing and  sinking  the  British  steamship  Arabis.  The  Paducah 
attacked  with  depth-bombs  and,  according  to  reports,  damaged 
the  submarine.  The  Seneca  en  September  16th  drove  off  a  sub- 
marine which  attacked  Convoy  OM-99.  The  U.  S.  S.  Druid  and 
H.  M.  S.  Gilia  repulsed  an  attack  on  Convoy  BG-65,  on  Sep- 
tember 22nd.  Escorting  Convoy  BG-67,  on  September  30th,  the 
Seneca  sighted  a  periscope  and  attacked  with  depth-charges  and 
gunfire. 

Convoy  BG-68,  escorted  by  the  Cythera,  was  attacked  the 
night  of  October  3rd,  and  two  steamships,  the  British  Ariel  and 
the  French  St.  Luc,  were  torpedoed.  The  Cythera  went  for  the 
submarine,  laying  a  pattern  of  depth-charges.  While  being 
escorted  through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  by  H.  M.  S.  Defender 
and  the  U.  S.  S.  Decatur,  H.  M.  S.  Britannia  was  torpedoed  and 
sunk  at  7  a.  m.,  November  9,  1918.  The  Decatur  attacked  with 
depth-charges.  The  same  day  a  torpedo  was  fired  at  the  Parker, 
which  was  on  temporary  duty  on  the  western  barrage  line,  in 
the  Straits.  But  the  torpedo  missed,  and  the  Parker  went  after 
the  U-boat,  dropping  depth-bombs  around  her. 

German  submarine  activity  around  Gibraltar  continued  up 
to  the  very  end  of  hostilities.  On  November  10,  1918,  the  day 
before  the  armistice,  the  Israel,  which  was  operating  on  the 
barrage  line  with  a  sub-chaser,  discovered  and  attacked  a  U-boat, 
and  the  same  day  Sub-chaser  Unit  C,  while  patrolling  off  Point 
Boassa,  also  made  contact  with  a  submarine. 

Two  vessels  of  the  Gibraltar  force  were  lost — the  destroyer 
Chauncey,  sunk  in  collision  with  the  British  steamship  Rose, 
November  19,  1917,  and  the  Coast  Guard  cutter  Tampa,  sunk  in 
British  waters  September  30,  1918. 

The  six  little  destroyers  sent  from  the  Philippines  to  Gib- 
raltar made  the  long  voyage  of  12,000  miles  under  their  own 
steam,  arriving  in  October.    The  work  they  did  was  amazing, 


122  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

when  their  small  size  and  age  are  considered.  One  of  them, 
the  Decatur,  420  tons  displacement,  which  had  been  condemned 
as  not  seaworthy  enough  to  venture  out  of  sight  of  land,  suc- 
cessfully negotiated  the  long  voyage  from  Manila,  and  in  service 
at  Gibraltar  steamed  over  48,000  miles,  making  a  total  of  60,000 
miles  steaming  before  her  departure  for  the  United  States. 

The  Wenonah,  an  armed  yacht  of  hardly  more  than  200  tons, 
steamed  in  escort  work  29,979  miles.  The  U.  S.  Coast  Guard 
cutter  Seneca,  which  arrived  at  Gibraltar  September  4,  1917, 
escorted  600  ships  in  convoys,  carrying  total  cargoes  of  2,100,000 
tons.    These  are  only  a  few  of  the  phenomenal  records  made. 

United  States  naval  vessels  based  on  Gibraltar  assisted  in 
escorting  562  convoys,  and  79  single  ships,  furnishing  an  aver- 
age of  fifty  per  cent  of  all  escorts.  Under  way  46  per  cent  of 
the  time  and  68  per  cent  available  at  all  times  for  operation, 
our  vessels  were,  in  addition  to  the  Gibraltar-England  service 
and  danger  zone  escort,  employed  in  escorting  ships  to  Bizerta, 
Genoa,  Oran  and  Marseilles.  They  maintained  a  monthly  service 
to  the  Azores,  escorted  cable  ships,  and  also  did  other  odd  jobs. 

No  vessels  performed  more  convoy  duty  than  these,  and 
Admiral  Niblack,  who  commanded  them,  thus  states  what  was 
expected  of  the  system : 

(a)  That  a  relatively  small  number  of  escort  vessels  could  protect 
more  ships  if  they  were  in  convoy  than  in  any  other  way. 

(b)  That  ships  in  convoy  could  not  be  visited  and  sunk  by  bombs, 
as  were  single  ships. 

(c)  That  ships  in  convoy  would  not  be  attacked  by  gunfire  by  sub- 
marines. 

(d)  That  convoys,  being  few  in  number,  would  be  difficult  to  find 
and  consequently  fewer  attacks  could  be  made  by  torpedo. 

(e)  That  in  the  danger  zones  near  ports  where  submarines  would 
lay  for  convoys  the  escort  by  antisubmarine  craft  could  be  made  so 
strong  as  to  make  the  risk  to  submarines  very  hazardous. 

''The  great  advantage  of  the  convoy, "  said  he,  "was  that 
the  ships  arrived  in  the  danger  zone  collectively  and  at  a  definite 
time,  where  an  adequate  danger  zone  escort  could  be  assembled, 
which  was  fitted  with  depth-charges  and  was  in  such  numbers  as 
to  make  the  chances  of  submarines  extremely  small  if  it 
attempted  to  attack  the  convoy." 


GIBRALTAB  AND  THE  CONVOY  123 

But,  in  considering  the  effect  of  convoy  in  lessening  sinkings, 
Admiral  Niblack  said : 

I  think  we  should  take  into  consideration,  as  Admiral  Mayo  points 
out,  the  employment  of  new  and  offensive  measures  through  the  use 
of  the  depth-charges,  mystery  ships,  airships,  kite  balloons,  the  laying 
of  mine  barrages,  the  firing  of  torpedoes  from  Allied  submarines,  com- 
bined with  the  use  of  organized  patrols  fitted  with  listening  devices 
and  hunting  the  submarine  systematically.     *     *     *     * 

One  very  important  phase  of  the  discussion  of  the  convoy  system 
which  has  been  entirely  overlooked  is  that  during  the  entire  war  only 
one  escorted  convoy  crossed  from  the  United  States  to  Gibraltar.  *  *  * 
All  the  rest  of  the  million  tons  of  shipping  which  crossed  from  the  United 
States  to  Gibraltar  went  across  as  single  ships,  going  "on  their  own," 
as  it  were.  These  ships  depended  on  their  armed  guard  gun  crews,  and 
were  independent  of  the  convoy  system.  They  actually  encountered 
submarines,  but  they  relied  on  their  guns  for  protection. 

The  convoy  system,  however,  accomplished  all  that  was  ex- 
pected of  it,  and  was  markedly  successful. 

It  was  our  destroyers  at  Queenstown,  our  forces  on  the 
French  coast  and  at  Gibraltar,  our  cruisers  escorting  convoys 
crossing  the  Atlantic,  that  made  it  the  success  it  was — and  it 
was  one  of  the  most  successful  measures  of  the  war. 

President  Wilson,  as  I  have  said,  favored  its  adoption  from 
the  beginning ;  in  fact,  wondered  why  the  Allies  had  not  adopted 
it  upon  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe.  It  was  one  of  the  first 
measures  recommended  by  the  General  Board.  But  at  the  time 
this  country  entered  the  war,  the  Allies  were  pursuing  exactly 
the  opposite  method ;  that  is,  dispersion  of  shipping. 

When  troop  transportation  was  first  determined  upon,  in 
May,  1917,  we  adopted  the  convoy  system  for  troop-ships.  It 
was  in  that  month  that  the  British  decided  to  try  out  the  plan 
for  merchant  ships,  to  see  whether  it  would  work.  The  first  ex- 
perimental convoy  arrived  in  England  from  Gibraltar,  May  20. 
A  few  convoys  were  despatched  in  June,  and  on  June  22  Sims 
cabled  me:  "The  British  Admiralty  have  now  adopted  the 
convoy  system  and  will  put  it  into  effect  as  fast  as  ships  can 
be  obtained  for  high  sea  convoy  against  raiders,  and  destroyers 
for  escort  duty  in  submarine  zone."  He  reported  two  routes 
in  operation,  stated  that  eight  convoys  a  week  were  planned,  and 
recommended  that  we  furnish  one  cruiser  or  battleship  a  week 


124  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

for  high  sea  escort.  On  June  30, 1  informed  him  that  the  Depart- 
ment would  assign  seven  cruisers  for  this  duty.  Our  destroyers 
were  engaged  in  the  danger-zone  from  the  time  the  first  trans- 
Atlantic  convoys  were  started. 

Putting  the  convoy  system  into  effect  was  a  big  job,  involv- 
ing the  larger  part  of  the  world's  shipping — a  reversal  of 
method  that  necessitated  a  radical  change  in  the  naval  scheme. 
Concerning  the  part  the  United  States  Navy  played  in  this  great 
task,  Admiral  Sims  wrote  in  the  World's  Work: 

I  do  not  wish  to  say  that  the  convoy  would  not  have  been  established 
had  we  not  sent  the  destroyers  for  that  purpose,  yet  I  do  not  see  how 
it  could  have  been  established  in  any  complete  and  systematic  way  at 
such  an  early  date.  And  we  furnished  other  ships  than  destroyers,  for, 
besides  providing  what  I  have  called  the  modern  convoy — protecting 
the  compact  mass  of  vessels  from  submarines — it  was  necessary  also  to 
furnish  escorts  after  the  old  Napoleonic  plan.  It  was  the  business  of 
the  destroyers  to  conduct  merchantmen  only  through  the  submarine 
zone.  They  did  not  take  them  the  whole  distance  across  the  ocean,  for 
there  was  little  danger  of  submarine  attack  until  the  ships  reached  the 
infested  waters.  This  would  have  been  impossible  in  any  case  with  the 
limited  number  of  destroyers. 

But,  from  the  time  the  convoys  left  the  home  port,  say  New  York 
or  Hampton  Roads,  there  was  the  possibility  of  the  same  kind  of  attack 
as  that  to  which  convoys  were  subjected  in  Nelsonian  days — that  is, 
from  raiders  or  cruisers.  We  always  feared  that  German  cruisers  or 
raiders  of  the  Moewe  type  might  escape  into  the  ocean  and  attack  these 
merchant  ships,  and  we  therefore  had  to  escort  them  across  the  ocean 
with  battleships  and  cruisers  just  as  they  did  a  century  ago.  The  British 
did  not  have  ships  enough  available  for  this  purpose,  and  here  again 
the  American  Navy  was  able  to  supply  the  lack;  for  we  had  a  number 
of  pre-dreadnaughts  and  cruisers  that  were  ideally  adapted  to  this  kind 
of  work. 


%  ** 


sK.-r  * 


AT  GIBRALTAE,  KEY  TO   THE  MEDITERRANEAN 

Above:    U.  S.  S.  Buffalo,  Schley  and  Jupiter. 

Inset:    Rear  Admiral  Albert  P.  Niblack,  commanding  American  naval  forces  in 
the  Mediterranean. 

Below:    The  signal  tower  and  American  sub-chasers. 


THE  GREAT  MINE  BARRAGE  AGAINST  THE  SUBMARINES 

This  map  shows  the  location  of  the  mine  barrage  across  the  North  Sea  as  well 
as  the  smaller  one  across  the  English  Channel.  The  dangers  of  this  barrage,  more 
than  any  other  single  factor,  destroyed  the  morale  of  the  German  submarine  crews. 


CHAPTER  XII 
SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS 

MINE  BAEKAGE  ACROSS   NORTH   SEA  A  TERROR   TO    U-BOATS — GERMANS 
PLANNED   BIG   DRIVE,   BUT   SUBMARINE    CREWS    REFUSED   TO    GO   TO 

SEA MORALE     SHATTERED,     KAISER  *S     NAVY     WAS     WRECKED     BY 

MUTINY PROPOSED   BY   U.    S.    NAVY   IN    APRIL,    1917,   EIGHTY   PER 

CENT  OF  BARRAGE  WAS  LAID  BY  AMERICANS. 

GERMANY  planned  a  great  naval  offensive  in  the  fall  of 
1918 — that  is,  the  German  authorities  did,  the  High 
Command.    Why  was  it  never  carried  out?    Why  were 
the  U-boats  recalled?     Why  did  the  Kaiser's  High 
Seas  Fleet  surrender  without  striking  a  blow? 

When  Sir  Eric  Geddes,  First  Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty, 
visited  Washington  in  October,  1918,  he  told  me  that  we  might 
expect  a  decided  increase  in  submarine  activity,  a  German  drive 
at  sea.  In  the  official  conferences  we  held,  Sir  Eric  and  his 
associates  predicted  that,  notwithstanding  all  the  efforts  we 
were  making,  vastly  more  tonnage  might  be  sunk  in  the  ensuing 
months.  The  British  were  striving  to  increase  ship  production, 
and  put  as  many  war  vessels  as  possible  into  commission. 

The  next  day  I  telegraphed  the  leading  shipbuilders  of  the 
country,  asking  them  to  come  to  Washington.  Over  200 
destroyers  were  under  construction  or  contracted  for,  and  rapid 
progress  was  being  made  on  them.  But  I  thought  that,  by  spe- 
cial effort,  we  might  rush  a  larger  number  to  completion.  The 
critical  situation  outlined  by  the  British  authorities  was  ex- 
plained to  the  builders,  and  they  were  directed  to  make  construc- 
tion continuous — to  run  three  shifts  of  eight  hours  each,  work- 
ing day,  night  and  Sundays,  and  to  speed  up  to  the  utmost  on 
destroyers  and  all  anti-submarine  craft.  They  pledged  their 
earnest  assistance,  proposing  to  increase  forces,  if  labor  could 
be  secured,  and  to  push  the  program  already  undertaken  on  the 
highest  gear. 

125 


126  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

While  the  visit  of  the  British  mission  as  announced  was  to 
" discuss  certain  matters  concerning  the  naval  situation,"  and 
its  conferences  were  confidential,  its  members  in  public  state- 
ments made  clear  their  belief  that  easy  or  early  victory  was  not 
to  be  expected. 

"I  have  made  it  the  keynote  of  all  my  policy  and  all  my 
advice  to  others  not  to  be  deluded  with  hopes  of  an  early  peace, 
but  to  prepare  for  an  ever-receding  duration  of  the  war,"  said 
Sir  Eric  Geddes.  "We  must  always  be  prepared  for  two  years 
more,  and  then  only  shall  we  have  the  sure  means  of  victory  in 
our  hands." 

More  significant  still,  more  to  the  point,  was  the  remark  made 
by  Sir  Eric  just  before  he  sailed  for  Europe : 

"A  great  renewed  effort  on  Germany's  part  is  impending. 
We  know  it,  and  its  extent. ' ' 

Before  he  reached  England,  U-boat  warfare  was  practically 
ended.  Within  ten  days  the  submarines  were  recalled  to  their 
home  bases.  As  they  were  returning  to  Germany  they  sank  a 
few  ships.  But  these  were  the  last  few  examples  of  German 
frightfulness  on  the  seas. 

What  had  brought  about  that  tremendous  change  ?  It  was  not 
due  to  any  lack  of  determination  on  the  part  of  the  German 
Admiralty,  or  the  Kaiser.  But  they  found  that  the  big  stick 
with  which  they  were  to  strike  was  only  a  broken  reed.  The 
morale  of  their  navy  was  shattered.  Officers  were  willing 
enough  to  obey  orders,  but  their  men  refused  to  fight. 

The  U-boat  crews,  for  years  the  pick  and  pride  of  the  service, 
refused  to  go  to  sea.  Germany  was  building  hundreds  of  sub- 
marines, they  were  being  turned  out  by  the  score.  She  might 
soon  have  sent  out  a  dozen  for  every  one  she  had  when  ruthless 
warfare  began.    But  willing  crews  were  lacking  to  man  them. 

This  was  a  complete  reversal  of  previous  experience.  A  year 
before  U-boat  duty  had  been  the  most  sought-for  branch  of  the 
service.  Essaying  long  voyages  in  the  Atlantic  or  the  Mediter- 
ranean, cruising  for  weeks  around  the  waters  of  England  and 
France,  their  officers  and  men  had  braved  many  dangers,  and 
returning  were  hailed  by  their  countrymen  as  conquering  heroes. 

Sinkings  had  been  made  more  difficult  by  the  convoy  system. 
Listening  devices  had  made  it  more  dangerous  for  submarines 


SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  127 

to  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  naval  vessels.  Patrol,  by  surface 
ships  and  aircraft,  had  become  more  efficient.  Shipping  was 
more  difficult  to  get  at  and  destroy.  More  submarines  were  be- 
ing sunk  than  in  the  early  days.  But,  with  all  these  operating 
against  them,  the  U-boats,  even  if  they  could  not  make  such  high 
scores  in  tonnage,  had  more  than  an  even  chance  to  reach  their 
home  bases  unscathed. 

Now  was  another  danger  to  face,  however;  one  that  was 
hidden  and  deadly,  and  it  had  to  be  faced  by  every  boat  depart- 
ing or  returning.  Some  U-boats,  putting  out  to  sea  from  their 
nesting  places  on  the  German  coasts,  vanished  utterly.  No  trace 
was  left,  no  record  of  what  fate  befell  them. 

Others,  badly  damaged,  limped  back  to  port.  Survivors  told 
of  colliding  with  mines  hidden  far  below  the  surface,  whose  pres- 
ence could  not  be  guessed.  No  vigilance  could  locate  or  action 
avoid  them.  They  might  run  into  them  anywhere  within  hun- 
dreds of  miles.  This  was  a  terror  the  undersea  boatmen  were 
unwilling  to  face.  The  revolt  of  the  U-boat  crews  spread  to 
other  branches  of  the  naval  service,  and  the  entire  German  navy 
began  to  disintegrate. 

The  mutiny  in  the  German  sea  forces,  the  demoralization  of 
its  personnel,  has  no  parallel  in  naval  history.  This  was  un- 
doubtedly due  to  various  causes,  but,  in  my  belief,  there  was  no 
one  thing  that  had  more  influence  in  breaking  the  German 
morale,  particularly  in  the  U-boat  service,  than  did  the  Northern 
Mine  Barrage. 

Stretching  across  the  North  Sea,  from  Norway  almost  to 
the  Orkneys,  this  heavy  barrier  of  powerful  mines  opposed  any 
enemy  vessels  which  attempted  to  make  their  way  around  the 
north  of  Scotland  into  the  Atlantic.  The  Germans  had  only  two 
exits  from  the  North  Sea,  the  one  covered  by  this  mine  barrier, 
and,  to  the  south,  the  narrow  Straits  of  Dover,  also  partially 
mined  and  guarded  by  the  famous  Dover  Patrol. 

It  was  a  new  factor  in  war,  this  vast  barrage,  the  most  suc- 
cessful innovation,  the  biggest  new  naval  offensive  put  forth 
after  our  entrance  into  the  war.  American  in  conception,  it 
was  also  mainly  American  in  construction.  A  joint  British  and 
American  undertaking,  as  it  was,  four-fifths  of  the  mines  laid 
were  of  American  design  and  manufacture,  made  in  this  country, 


128  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

taken  across  the  Atlantic  in  American  ships,  and  laid  by  Ameri- 
can naval  vessels. 

Though  not  actually  laid  until  the  summer  of  1918,  this  was 
the  first  big  project  proposed  by  the  United  States  Navy  after 
our  entrance  into  the  war.  In  fact,  it  was  only  nine  days  after 
war  was  declared  that  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  presented  an 
elaborate  memorandum,  outlining  the  proposition.  But  the 
British  Admiralty,  without  whose  consent  and  cooperation  it 
could  not  be  constructed,  and  Admiral  Sims  pronounced  it  ' '  im- 
practical" and  " unfeasible."  It  was  not  until  six  months  later 
that  Ave  secured  the  Admiralty's  approval,  and  the  great  project 
got  under  way. 

The  first  mine  was  laid  on  June  8,  1918.  "The  barrier  be- 
gan to  take  toll  of  the  enemy's  submarines  as  early  as  July  9, 
when  one  was  disabled  on  the  barrier  and  compelled  to  return 
to  Germany,"  reported  Admiral  Joseph  Strauss,  commander  of 
American  mining  operations  in  the  North  Sea.  "  It  is  not  known 
how  many  submarines  were  sunk  or  disabled  in  the  mine  field. 
It  has  been  placed  as  high  as  twenty-three.  My  own  estimate, 
based  on  known  sinkings,  is  ten,  although  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  is  a  modest  one." 

Captain  Reginald  R.  Belknap,  commander  of  Mine  Squad- 
ron 1,  says  the  barrage  began  to  yield  results  before  it  was  half 
way  across.  "From  the  nature  of  the  case  it  may  never  be 
known  definitely  how  many  actually  did  come  to  grief  there," 
he  said;  "but  the  best  information  gives  a  probable  ten  before 
the  middle  of  October,  with  a  final  total  of  seventeen  or  more. 
In  addition  to  this  toll,  the  squadron  should  be  given  credit  for 
two  submarines  lost  in  the  field  of  British  mines  laid  by  the 
Baltimore  off  the  Irish  coast." 

Eight  and  one-half  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  sub- 
marines lost  during  the  war  were  brought  into  the  list  of  missing 
by  the  barrage,  was  the  estimate  of  Admiral  Ralph  Earle,  Chief 
of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  under  whose  administration  and 
leadership  the  mine  barrage  was  conceived,  projected  and  con- 
structed.   Admiral  Earle  reported  to  me : 

It  has  been  established  that  six  submarines  were  lost  in  the  barrage 
and  three  more  so  badly  damaged  that  they  never  again  put  to  sea. 
However,  from  further  evidence,  the  British  Admiralty  officially  credit 


era  ►§ 

o   SD 


; rT-ft;.  J  i 


■  -  »**■ .," . 


? 


a  eS       _ 

ft  »os 

bD  .  -*  S  ST 
si_i  a  «  w  o  * 
'  ^  -S  M  o  o  „  ^ 

c«-^    fHao2p^o^Sor   , 

.9  bjo^y  Ph^  &e,3  g  a  &  -g  s  .a  s 

^.9ph  §  ^  .s  ph  .§  «*  §  J  <  a  p. 


bn 

bfi 

bn 

bn 

bo 

bO 

Ph 

h 

Ph 

^ 

N 

Uh 

SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  129 

the  barrage  with  fourteen  additional,  or  a  total  of  twenty-three.  Two 
hundred  German  U-boats  were  destroyed  in  the  war,  or  fifty  more  than 
the  Allies  could  account  for.  To  err  on  the  conservative  side,  we  claim 
but  eight  out  of  the  fourteen  credited  the  barrage  by  the  British  Ad- 
miralty, or  a  total  of  seventeen.  This  is  also  the  figure  arrived  at  by 
Captain  R.  R.  Belknap,  commander  of  Mine  Squadron  1.  What  does  this 
figure  show?  Eight  and  one-half  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  sub- 
marines lost  during  the  war  were  brought  into  the  list  of  missing  by 
the  barrage,  which  existed  for  only  six  per  cent  of  the  period  of  the 
war.  Such  results  more  than  justified  the  effort  and  time  and  funds 
expended. 

The  barrage  did  more  than  take  toll  of  submarines  sent  to 
kingdom  come  by  its  mines.  "There  is  no  doubt,"  reported 
Sims  in  the  "Summary  of  Activities  of  American  Forces  in 
European  Waters,"  "that  the  barrage  had  a  considerable  moral 
effect  on  the  German  naval  crews,  for  it  is  known  that  several 
submarines  hesitated  some  time  before  crossing.  Also,  reports 
from  German  sources  are  that  the  barrage  caused  no  small 
amount  of  panic  in  some  of  the  submarine  flotillas.  It  is  also 
probable  that  the  barrage  played  a  part  in  preventing  raids  on 
Allied  commerce  by  fast  enemy  cruisers." 

Admiral  Strauss,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  Investi- 
gating Committee,  declared  that  if  the  Northern  Barrage  and 
that  across  the  Straits  of  Dover  had  been  fully  completed  as  we 
planned,  ' '  it  would  have  ended  the  submarine  menace,  so  far  as 
submarines  going  from  the  North  Sea  into  the  Atlantic  were 
concerned;"  and  that  the  building  of  the  mine  barriers  across 
the  Adriatic  and  Aegean  seas,  for  which  we  were  preparing 
materials,  "would  have  actually  ended  submarine  operations." 

Could  it  have  been  built  in  1917,  a  year  earlier  than  it  was? 
Strauss  said  it  could,  and  this  was  the  firm  belief  of  Earle  and 
other  ordnance  experts.  True,  the  antenna  mine  we  developed 
later  was  a  big  improvement,  superior  to  any  previously  de- 
vised. It  would  have  taken  two  or  three  times  as  many  mines 
of  the  type  then  in  use,  perhaps  180,000  of  them,  as  was  esti- 
mated. We  manufactured  100,000  of  the  antenna  type,  and  could 
have  made  as  many  more,  if  necessary.  The  British  had  no 
antenna  mines,  Admiral  Strauss  pointed  out,  and  all  the  mines 
they  laid  in  the  barrage  were  of  the  older  type.    After  all  the 


130  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

objections  were  presented  to  him,  Admiral  Strauss,  when  asked 
if  he  still  considered  it  would  have  been  feasible  to  have  gone 
ahead  with  the  barrage  in  1917,  unhesitatingly  answered: 
"Yes." 

Not  laying  that  barrage  earlier — in  fact,  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible moment — was,  in  my  opinion,  the  greatest  naval  error  of 
the  war.  If  the  British  had  erected  it  early  in  the  war,  and  put 
a  similar  effective  barrier  across  the  Straits  of  Dover  and 
Otranto,  the  Germans  would  have  been  so  restricted  that  wide- 
spread U-boat  warfare,  with  its  terrible  destruction  of  life  and 
shipping,  would  have  been  impossible. 

"Shutting  up  the  hornets  in  their  nests,"  as  President  Wil- 
son expressed  it,  was  the  first  idea  that  occurred  to  us  when 
we  went  to  war.  The  Bureau  of  Ordnance  on  April  15,  1917, 
submitted  a  memorandum  urging  that  we  ' '  stop  the  submarines 
at  their  source"  and  suggesting  that  mine  barriers  be  laid 
across  the  North  Sea,  the  Adriatic  and  the  Dardanelles.  "The 
northern  barrier,"  it  stated,  "would  extend  from  the  mid- 
eastern  coast  of  Scotland  to  the  Norwegian  coast,  a  distance  of 
about  250  miles,"  and  the  southern  (that  is,  to  close  the  Straits 
of  Dover)  would  extend  "from  the  southeast  coast  of  England 
and  to  a  point  on  the  French  coast  near  the  Belgian  frontier,  a 
distance  of  about  forty  miles."  Next  day  I  cabled  Admiral 
Sims,  who  had  just  arrived  in  London : 

Is  it  not  practicable  to  blockade  German  coast  efficiently  and  com- 
pletely, thus  making  practically  impossible  the  egress  and  ingress  of 
submarines?  The  steps  attempted  or  accomplished  in  this  direction 
are  to  be  reported  at  once. 

Two  days  later  came  the  answer: 

To  absolutely  blockade  the  German  and  Belgian  coast  against  the 
entrance  and  departure  of  submarines  has  been  found  quite  unfeasible. 

The  next  day  he  wrote  a  long  letter,  amplifying  the  difficul- 
ties and  reporting  against  any  such  barriers.  But  our  ordnance 
experts  were  thoroughly  convinced  the  project  was  feasible.  On 
May  9th  they  outlined  their  plans  in  a  memorandum  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  British  Admiralty,  and  on  May  11th  I  cabled  to 
Admiral  Sims:   "Much  opinion  is  in  favor  of  concerted  efforts 


SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  131 

by  the  Allies  to  establish  a  complete  barrier  across  the  North 
Sea,  Scotland  to  Norway,  either  direct  or  via  the  Shetlands, 
to  prevent  the  egress  of  German  submarines."  I  added,  "The 
difficulty  and  size  of  the  problem  is  recognized,  but  if  it  is  pos- 
sible of  accomplishment  the  situation  would  warrant  the  effort. ' ' 
He  was  directed  to  consult  with  the  British  Admiralty  regarding 
this  plan.    Two  days  later  came  the  reply : 

From  all  experience  Admiralty  considers  project  of  attempting  to 
close  exit  to  North  Sea  to  enemy  submarines  by  the  method  suggested 
to  be  quite  impracticable.  Project  has  previously  been  considered  and 
abandoned. 

In  a  dispatch  on  May  14th  Sims  said:  "The  abandonment 
of  any  serious  attempts  at  blockading  such  passages  as  Scot- 
land-Norway, the  Skagerrack  and  Scotland  to  Shetland  has 
been  forced  by  bitter  and  expensive  experience." 

"As  may  well  be  imagined,"  he  wrote  later,  "this  whole 
subject  has  been  given  the  most  earnest  consideration,  as  it  is, 
of  course,  realized  that  if  submarines  could  be  kept  from  coming 
out,  the  whole  problem  would  at  once  be  solved."  But  he  said, 
"I  cannot  too  strongly  emphasize  the  fact  that  during  nearly 
three  years  of  active  warfare  this  whole  question  had  been  the 
most  serious  subject  of  consideration  by  the  British  Ad- 
miralty," which  had  concluded  that  no  "barrier  can  be  com- 
pletely effective." 

This,  however,  did  not  deter  our  ordnance  experts.  The 
more  they  studied  the  question,  the  more  were  they  convinced 
that  the  barrier  could  be  "put  across."  Believing  in  mines, 
preparing  for  mine  operations  on  a  large  scale,  they  were  aston- 
ished when,  on  May  31st,  Sims  reported  that,  instead  of  our 
giving  attention  to  mine  production,  the  British  Admiralty 
"consider  we  can  more  profitably  concentrate  on  other  work." 

Earle  and  his  associates  in  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  never 
doubted  final  success.  They  experimented  with  mines,  firing  and 
anchoring  devices,  and  on  July  30th  announced  the  development 
of  a  new  type  of  mine,  particularly  adapted  to  deep  waters. 
A  unique  feature  of  this  mine  was  that  it  did  not  have  to  be 
struck  to  explode,  but  would  explode  if  a  submarine  passed  close 
to  it.    This  was  due  to  the  firing  apparatus,  which  was  evolved 


132  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

from  an  electrical  device  submitted  by  Mr.  Ralph  C.  Browne, 
of  Salem,  Mass.,  to  be  used  on  a  submerged  gun.  Officers  of  the 
Bureau  concluded  this  could  be  adapted  to  mines,  and  in  May 
began  work  to  that  end.  Commander  S.  P.  Fullinwider,  chief 
of  the  Mine  Section,  was  aided  by  Mr.  Browne,  Lieutenant  Com- 
mander T.  S.  Wilkinson,  Jr.,  and  Commodore  S.  J.  Brown  in 
producing  this  firing  device,  and  others  who  assisted  in  develop- 
ing the  mine  were  Lieutenant  Commanders  0.  W.  Bagby,  J.  A. 
Schofield,  W.  A.  Corley,  C.  H.  Wright  and  H.  E.  Fischer,  Lieu- 
tenant S.  W.  Cook  and  Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  B.  W.  Grimes. 

With  this  improved  mine  as  an  argument,  our  ordnance 
officers  renewed  the  proposal  of  a  mine  offensive  in  the  North 
Sea.  The  memorandum  the  Bureau  submitted  was  comprehen- 
sive, and  contained  all  the  essential  features  of  the  barrage  plan 
that  was  later  adopted  and  carried  into  effect. 

How  could  the  project  be  best  presented  to  the  British  Ad- 
miralty again?  Admiral  Mayo  was  preparing  to  sail  within  a 
short  time  for  Europe.  Just  before  his  departure  the  entire 
project  was  discussed  and  the  operation  of  the  improved  mines 
explained,  as  he  was  to  bring  the  whole  matter  to  the  attention 
of  the  British  Admiralty  and  the  Allied  Naval  Council.  To 
prevent  loss  of  time  and  further  insure  the  Admiralty's  consid- 
eration, on  August  17th,  before  Mayo  sailed,  I  cabled  Sims : 

Bureau  of  Ordnance  has  developed  a  mine  which  it  hopes  may  have 
decisive  influence  upon  operations  against  submarines.  Utmost  secrecy 
considered  necessary.  Request  that  an  officer  representing  the  Ad- 
miralty, clothed  with  power  to  decide,  be  sent  here  to  inspect  and  thor- 
oughly test  mine,  and,  if  found  satisfactory,  arrange  for  cooperation  in 
mining  operations. 

The  Allied  Naval  Conference,  held  in  London  September  4th 
and  5th,  which  Mayo  attended,  took  up  not  only  the  barrage 
project,  but  another  proposition  our  Navy  Department  had  sug- 
gested months  before,  a  close  offensive  in  German  waters.  After 
the  meeting  Mayo  cabled : 

Conference  completed  after  agreement  upon  the  following  points: 
1.     That  close  offensive  in  German  waters  should  be  carefully  con- 
sidered by  Allies,  after  which  they  should  indicate  to  British  Admiralty 
contribution  of  old  war  ships  they  are  prepared  to  furnish  should  offen- 
sive prove  practicable. 


SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  133 

2.  That  alternative  offensive  employing  effective  mine  field  or  mine 
net  barrage  to  completely  shut  in  North  Sea  not  practicable  until  ade- 
quate supply  satisfactory  type  mines  assured,  and  that  pending  such 
supply,  extension  present  system  mine  fields  desirable  and  that  mine 
net  barrage  impracticable. 

This  indicated  to  us  that  the  British  still  doubted  the  effec- 
tiveness of  a  barrage,  as  well  as  our  ability  to  furnish  an  ade- 
quate supply  of  mines.  It  was  evident  that,  after  five  months 
of  earnest  advocacy,  further  urging  was  needed  to  secure  ap- 
proval of  the  project.  Benson,  therefore,  on  September  12th, 
cabled  Mayo : 

There  are  great  possibilities  in  the  satisfactory  solution  of  the  mine 
and  depth-charge  question.  Officers  sent  over  here  most  satisfactory 
and  remarkably  well  posted.  I  think  it  would  help  the  whole  situation 
wonderfully  if  Commodore  Gaunt  could  visit  the  Admiralty  for  a  few 
days  and  have  a  heart-to-heart  talk.    No  time  to  be  lost. 

What  happened  next  ?  The  day  after  Benson 's  message  was 
received,  the  British  Admiralty  made  out  for  Mayo  a  paper 
entitled,  ''General  Future  Policy,  Including  Mine  Policy,"  with 
an  appendix,  "Mine  Barrage  Across  the  North  Sea."  The 
policy  outlined  by  the  Admiralty,  announced  September  14th, 
was  the  same  the  Navy  Department  had  suggested  nearly  five 
months  previous. 

Even  then  there  was  delay.  On  October  9th,  Sims  reported 
that  the  Admiralty  was  "thoroughly  investigating  the  question" 
and  that  ' '  the  discussion  of  this  question  will  probably  be  post- 
poned by  the  Admiralty  until  the  return  of  the  commander-in- 
chief.  ' '  We  were  still  not  certain  as  to  whether  the  British  were 
ready  to  put  it  through.  But,  believing  that  the  plan  must 
finally  be  put  into  effect,  our  Bureau  of  Ordnance  went  ahead, 
and  let  the  contracts  for  100,000  mines.  Upon  Mayo's  return 
October  15th,  the  amendments  suggested  by  the  British  were 
approved  by  the  General  Board  and  accepted  by  the  Department. 
Nothing  definite,  however,  had  come  from  London  and  on 
October  20th  Sims  was  cabled: 

The  Department  requests  to  be  informed  whether  the  plan  for  the 
placing  of  a  mine  barrier  across  the  North  Sea  on  the  Aberdeen- 
Egersund  line  has  the  approval  of  the  Admiralty. 


134  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Finally  on  October  22nd,  an  answer  direct  from  the  British 
Admiralty  said,  "Admiralty  has  approved  mine  barrier  and 
now  confirms  approval. ' ' 

All  the  details  were  then  perfected — this  required  several 
days — and  on  October  29th  I  received  and  approved  the  com- 
pleted plans.  The  President,  who  for  months  had  been  im- 
patient of  delay,  gave  his  approval  as  soon  as  they  were  laid 
before  him.  This  was  at  a  cabinet  meeting  on  October  30th. 
The  same  day  a  cable  was  sent  to  the  Admiralty  that  we  had 
taken  steps  to  fit  out  mine-planters;  that  shipment  of  mines 
would  begin  the  first  of  January,  and  officers  would  be  sent  in  a 
few  days  to  arrange  details. 

So  after  months  of  opposition,  doubt  and  indecision,  the 
two  navies  united  in  the  construction  of  this  most  stupendous 
job  of  the  kind  ever  conceived  or  undertaken.  It  was  well  done 
and  the  result  demonstrated  its  effectiveness.  Admiral  Sims 
himself,  after  its  completion  and  success,  said  that  "no  such 
project  has  ever  been  carried  out  more  successfully"  and  that 
"as  an  achievement  it  stands  as  one  of  the  wonders  of  the  war." 

I  am  not  giving  these  details  in  any  spirit  of  criticism  of  the 
British  Admiralty  or  our  representative  in  London,  but  to  do 
justice  to  the  vision,  initiative  and  resource  of  the  American 
Navy.  It  was,  indeed,  a  bold  and  gigantic  experiment,  calling 
for  many  millions  of  money  and  the  strenuous  and  dangerous 
work  of  many  men.  That  it  was  so  successfully  done  reflects 
credit  alike  on  Britons  and  Americans,  and  both  share  in  the 
honor  of  its  accomplishment. 

Manufacturing  100,000  mines  was  a  big  order,  but  that  was 
only  the  beginning.  They  had  to  be  shipped  3,500  miles  over- 
seas, which  necessitated  a  fleet  of  mine-carriers.  Twenty-three 
cargo  vessels  were  converted,  and  assigned  to  this  duty.  To 
fill  the  mines  with  explosives  a  mine-loading  plant  of  22  build- 
ings was  erected  at  St.  Julien's  Creek,  Va.,  capable  of  receiving, 
loading  and  shipping  1,000  mines  a  day.  Advanced  bases,  for 
inspection  and  assembly  of  the  mines,  were  established  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1918,  on  the  east  coast  of  Scotland,  at  Inverness  and 
Invergordon,  with  Captain  O.  G.  Murfin  in  charge. 

For  the  work  of  mine-laying,  a  Mine  Squadron  was  created, 
under  command  of  Captain  Reginald  R.  Belknap.     This  con- 


SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  135 

sisted  of  the  flagship  San  Francisco  (Captain  H.  V.  Butler),  and 
her  consort,  the  Baltimore  (Captain  A.  W.  Marshall),  " crack 
cruisers  of  the  vintage  of  1890,"  as  Captain  Belknap  called  them ; 
and  eight  former  merchant  vessels  converted  into  naval  mine 
planters.  Four  of  these  were  Southern  Pacific  or  Morgan  liners, 
carrying  freight  between  New  York  and  Galveston,  renamed 
the  Roanoke  (Captain  C.  D.  Stearns),  Canonicus  (Captain  T.  L. 
Johnson),  Housatonic  (Captain  J.  W.  Greenslade),  and  Canan- 
daigua  (Commander  W.  H.  Reynolds).  Two  were  the  Old 
Dominion  passenger  liners  Jefferson  and  Hamilton,  running  be- 
tween New  York  and  Norfolk,  renamed  Quinnebaug  (Com- 
mander D.  Pratt  Mannix),  and  Saranac  (Captain  Sinclair 
Gannon).  The  remaining  two  were  the  fast  Boston  and  New 
York  passenger  steamers,  Massachusetts  and  Bunker  Hill,  of 
the  Eastern  Steamship  Corporation,  renamed  Shawmut  (Cap- 
tain W.  T.  Cluverius),  and  Aroostook  (Captain  J.  Harvey 
Tomb).  They  were  accompanied  abroad  by  several  seagoing 
tugs,  the  Sonoma,  Ontario,  Patapsco  and  Patuxent. 

Admiral  Strauss,  who  was  in  general  command  of  mining 
operations,  went  to  England  in  March,  inspected  the  bases,  and 
conferred  with  the  British  authorities  as  to  the  general  ar- 
rangements. His  flagship  was  the  Black  Hawk  (Captain  R.  C. 
Bulmer),  which  was  also  the  repair  vessel  of  the  mine  force. 
The  British  began  mine  laying  in  March,  but  one  of  their  vessels, 
the  Gailardia,  was  sunk;  and  operations  were  suspended  for  a 
time  until  the  safety  of  the  mines  could  be  assured. 

The  Baltimore,  the  first  of  our  vessels  sent  over,  arrived  in 
the  Clyde  in  March.  Submarines  were  very  active  in  Irish 
waters,  and  the  Admiralty  decided  to  lay  a  deep  mine-field  off 
the  north  coast  of  Ireland,  in  the  North  Channel.  As  all  British 
mine-layers  were  employed  elsewhere,  the  Admiralty  requested 
the  use  of  the  Baltimore.  This  was  readily  granted  and  the 
Baltimore  engaged  in  this  from  April  13th  until  the  latter  part 
of  May,  joining  our  squadron  in  Scotland  June  2nd.  The 
Roanoke,  sent  over  to  assist  her,  was  instead  ordered  to  £>ur 
base  at  Invergordon. 

Sailing  from  Newport,  May  12th,  the  San  Francisco  and 
other  vessels  arrived  at  Inverness,  May  26th,  all  ready  to  begin 
operations.    Twelve  days  later  the  squadron  started  on  its  first 


136  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

mine-planting  ' '  excursion. ' '  On  these  expeditions,  which  lasted 
usually  from  40  to  80  hours,  the  squadron  was  regarded  as  a 
part  of  the  British  Grand  Fleet.  Screening  it  against  sub- 
marines, and  hostile  mines  casually  placed,  was  an  escort  of 
eight  to  twelve  British  destroyers,  which  formed  around  the 
squadron  upon  its  leaving  the  base  and  kept  with  it  until  its 
return.  To  guard  against  attack  from  enemy  cruisers,  while 
away  from  the  coast,  the  squadron  was  accompanied  by  a  sup- 
porting force,  consisting  of  a  battleship  or  battle-cruiser  squad- 
ron and  a  light-cruiser  squadron  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  sometimes 
by  all  three,  according  to  the  estimated  probabilities  of  attack. 
On  the  second  mining  excursion  the  support  was  the  Sixth  Battle 
Squadron,  the  American  battleships,  commanded  by  Admiral 
Rodman.  Captain  Belknap  gave  a  vivid  picture  of  the  danger- 
ous character  of  mine-laying  when  he  said : 

One  may  imagine  with  what  feelings  we  saw  our  own  great  ships 
file  out  of  Scapa  Flow,  form  line  on  our  quarter,  and  slowly  disappear 
in  the  haze,  as  they  swept  off  to  the  southeastward.  It  will  be  readily 
understood  that  the  way  had  to  be  made  smooth  for  the  mine  planters. 
As  long  as  it  was  so,  all  would  go  well ;  but  a  single  well  placed  torpedo 
or  mine,  or  a  few  enemy  shells,  would  certainly  finish  one  vessel,  and 
probably  destroy  all  ten  of  them.  Each  mine  planter  carried  from  24 
to  120  tons  of  high  explosive,  a  total  of  nearly  800  tons  in  the  squadron, 
many  times  more  than  the  amount  that  devastated  Halifax.  "With  this 
on  board,  the  squadron  was  hardly  a  welcome  visitor  anywhere. 

Operations  as  a  whole  were  conducted  in  conjunction  with  a 
British  mine-laying  squadron  of  four  vessels,  under  command 
of  Rear  Admiral  Clinton-Baker.  American  and  British  squad- 
rons often  went  out  at  the  same  time,  under  protection  of  the 
same  heavy  vessels,  but  except  on  two  occasions  they  worked 
separately,  in  different  parts  of  the  barrage  area.  Thus  there 
were  altogether  fourteen  mine  planters  at  work  at  the  same 
time. 

On  the  first  excursion,  June  7th,  the  American  squadron 
planted  a  mine  field  47  miles  long,  containing  3,400  mines,  in 
3  hours  and  36  minutes.  Everything  went  without  a  hitch.  One 
ship  emptied  herself  of  675  mines  without  a  single  break,  one 
mine  every  11%  seconds  through  more  than  two  hours,  a  record 
never  before  equalled. 


*'"X     "*""* 


ONE  OF  THE  PERILS  OF  MINE-SWEEPING 

An   explosion   close   astern   of   the   Patapseo.      The   greatest   care   was   exercised 
to  avoid  accidents  of  this  character,  but  to  eliminate  them  entirely  was  impossible. 


THE  MINESWEEPERS   PROVED   WONDERFUL   SEA  BOATS 
These  tiny  craft  rode  many  a  rough  sea  which  worried  larger  and  more  powerful  ships. 


UXITED  STATES  NAVAL  OFFICES  IN  IMPORTANT  COMMANDS 

Left    to    right:      Admiral    Sims,    Admiral    Mayo,    Captain    Nathan    C. 
Twining,   Captain   O.    P.   Jackson,   Admiral   Wilson. 


AMERICAN  AND  BPTTTSn  NAVAL  OFFICIALS 

Left  to  right:      Admiral  Benson,  Secretary  Daniels,  Sir  Eric   Geddes, 
Admiral  Duff. 


SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  137 

Dangerous  as  was  the  work,  there  were  very  few  casualties. 
One  man  fell  overboard  from  the  Saranac  and  was  drowned, 
but  he  was  the  only  man  lost  at  sea,  and  there  were  but  four 
other  deaths  in  that  force  of  4,000.  Laden  with  high  explosives, 
navigating  waters  where  enemy  mines  had  been  laid,  operating 
near  mine  fields,  and  in  danger  of  premature  explosion  from 
those  they  themselves  had  laid,  it  is  remarkable  that  not  one 
of  these  ships  was  lost  or  seriously  damaged. 

The  eighth  excursion  in  which  British  and  American  squad- 
rons joined,  both  in  command  of  Admiral  Strauss,  closed  the 
western  end  of  the  barrier,  off  the  Orkneys.  The  next  expedi- 
tion was  conducted  in  the  same  manner,  with  Rear  Admiral 
Clinton-Baker,  of  the  British  Navy,  in  command.  The  American 
squadron  made  fifteen  excursions,  the  British  eleven,  operations 
being  completed  October  26th.  In  four  hours  on  one  expedition, 
6,820  mines  were  planted,  5,520  by  our  vessels,  1,300  by  the 
British.  Our  squadron  alone  planted  a  field  73  miles  long  in 
one  day. 

Seventy  thousand,  two  hundred  and  sixty-three  mines  were 
laid — 13,652  British,  56,611  American.  Numerous  lines  were 
laid  near  the  surface ;  others  were  placed  at  from  90  to  160  feet ; 
and  the  lowest  went  to  depths  from  160  to  240  feet. 

Beginning  near  the  northern  Orkneys,  the  barrier  ran  to 
Udsire  Light,  near  Bergen,  on  the  coast  of  Norway,  230  miles. 
Its  average  width  was  25  miles,  in  some  places  it  was  35  miles 
across,  and  at  no  point  was  it  less  than  15  miles  wide.  At  its 
narrowest,  this  meant  more  than  an  hour's  run  for  a  submarine. 
Mines  were  planted,  row  after  row,  at  various  depths.  If  a 
U-boat  proceeded  on  or  near  the  surface,  it  would  encounter 
from  six  to  ten  lines  of  mines.  If  it  tried  to  break  through 
by  going  deeper,  there  were  more  of  the  deadly  explosives. 
Submergence  was,  in  fact,  as  dangerous  as  running  the  gauntlet 
on  the  surface.  No  matter  how  far  the  sub  went  down  there 
were  mines  to  meet  it,  to  the  furthest  limit  of  submarine  descent. 
One  touch — even  a  slight  jar  from  the  vibration  of  the  U-boat — 
was  enough  to  set  off  one  of  these  mines,  and  when  it  exploded 
the  U-boat  was  done  for. 

Mine-laying  was  not  the  only  role  played  by  the  American 
force,  Captain  Belknap  wrote: 


138  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

In  addition  to  the  value  of  the  barrage  itself,  in  keeping  the  enemy 
submarines  in  or  from  their  bases,  the  mine  squadrons  were  expected 
to  serve  as  bait,  to  draw  out  the  German  fleet;  the  squadrons'  role 
being  neatly  expressed  by  one  high  officer  as  "an  important  military 
offensive  with  a  front  seat  at  the  Second  Battle  of  Jutland."  This 
ever  present  possibility  and  the  fact  that  the  working  ground  lay  in 
the  principal  thoroughfare  of  enemy  submarines,  with  attendant  in- 
cidents of  periscope  sightings,  submarine  reports,  depth  charges,  smoke 
screens,  floating  mines,  and  dead  Germans  floating  by,  lent  spice  to 
the  work,  which,  like  the  proverbial  sporting  life,  was  often  hard  but 
never  dull.     *     *     * 

On  every  excursion,  during  the  mine  laying,  one  or  more  of  the 
mines  would  go  off  fairly  close  astern — lest  we  forget !  The  mines  were 
very  sensitive,  and  no  witness  of  an  excursion  could  retain  any  doubt 
as  to  the  fate  of  a  submarine  that  "luckless  dares  our  silent  wake." 

The  eastern  end  of  the  barrage  extended  to  the  territorial 
waters  of  Norway.  That  country  being  neutral  we  could  not, 
of  course,  mine  to  its  shores.  With  the  growth  of  the  barrier, 
U-boats  took  advantage  of  this,  going  within  the  three-mile  limit 
to  slip  by  into  the  open  sea.  The  Norwegian  Government  then 
announced  its  decision  to  mine  its  waters,  which  closed  that  gap. 

Our  original  plan  wras  to  plant  mines  clear  to  the  Orkneys, 
and  this  we  urged.  But  Admiral  Beatty  and  others  strongly 
objected,  fearing  that  it  might  hamper  the  operations  of  the 
Grand  Fleet.  So  the  mine-fields  ended  ten  miles  east  of  the 
islands.  But  this  ten-mile  passage  was  heavily  patroled,  and 
any  "sub"  attempting  to  pass  that  way  must  run  the  risk  of 
attack  by  numerous  naval  vessels.  Thus  the  U-boats  could  not 
get  through  anywhere  except  at  great  risk.  Months  were  re- 
quired to  lay  that  barrier,  and  during  that  time  there  were  un- 
mined  areas  through  which  vessels  could  pass. 

The  barrage  was  completed  October  26th,  almost  coincident 
with  Germany's  recall  of  its  U-boats,  which  practically  ended 
submarine  warfare.  Some  of  those  recalled  did  not  reach  these 
waters  until  the  armistice  had  been  signed,  hostilities  were 
over,  and  they  wrere  immune  from  attack.  Some  "ran"  the 
barrage,  and  several  met  the  fate  of  the  U-l  56,  one  of  the  under- 
sea cruisers  which  operated  off  our  own  coasts.  Attempting  to 
get  through  the  barrier,  she  struck  a  mine  and  went  down.  So 
far  as  known,  only  21  of  her  crew  wrere  saved. 


SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  139 

The  Northern  Barrage  cost  us  approximately  $80,000,000. 
Shipping  sunk  by  submarines  averaged,  for  a  long  period,  over 
$70,000,000  a  month,  at  times  ran  over  $80,000,000,  in  actual 
monetary  value,  not  counting  the  resultant  military  effect  of  its 
loss.  Admiral  Sims  estimates  that  the  war  cost  the  Allies 
$100,000,000  a  day.  Thus,  if  the  Northern  Barrage  shortened 
the  war  one  day,  it  more  than  repaid  its  cost. 

Our  mining  projects  were  not  confined  to  the  North  Sea. 
Plans  had  been  accepted  and  mines  were  in  process  of  manu- 
facture for  a  like  barrage  across  the  Straits  of  Otranto,  from 
Brindisi,  the  heel  of  Italy,  to  Saseno  Island.  This  would  have 
effectually  shut  up  German  and  Austrian  submarines  in  the 
Adriatic.  We  had  also  agreed  to  undertake  to  provide  and  lay 
26,800  mines  for  a  barrage  in  the  Aegean  Sea  from  Euboea 
Island  to  Cape  Kanaptitza,  except  for  the  part  resting  on 
Turkish  territorial  waters,  which  was  to  be  established  by  Great 
Britain,  since  the  United  States  was  not  at  war  with  Turkey. 
The  armistice  made  these  barrages  unnecessary. 

But  our  mining  operations  were  by  no  means  concluded  with 
the  cessation  of  hostilities.  Clearing  the  seas  was  our  next 
duty,  for  navigation  would  not  be  safe  until  the  many  thousands 
of  mines  were  removed.  This  work  was  divided  among  the  va- 
rious nations.  The  United  States  volunteered  to  remove  all  the 
mines  we  had  laid. 

Admiral  Strauss,  in  charge  of  these  operations,  had  his  base 
at  Kirkwall,  and  his  force  comprised  34  mine-sweepers,  24  sub- 
chasers, two  tugs,  two  tenders  and  20  British  trawlers,  which 
were  also  manned  by  U.  S.  naval  personnel : 

Repair  Ships  and  Force  Auxiliaries — Black  Hawk  (flagship)  ; 
Panther,  Seneca,  Chesapeake,  Aspenleaf,  Crenella,  and  the  British  ves- 
sels Hickorol,  Petronel  and  Hopkiln. 

Submarine  Chasers— Numbers  37,  38,  40,  44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  95,  110, 
164,  178,  181,  182,  206,  207,  208,  254,  256,  259,  272,  329,  354,  and  356. 

Mine-Sweepers — Auk,  Avocet,  Bobolink,  Chewink,  Cormorant,  Cur- 
lew, Eider,  Falcon,  Finch,  Flamingo,  Grebe,  Heron,  Kingfisher,  Lapwing, 
Lark,  Mallard,  Oriole,  Osprey,  Pelican,  Penguin,  Quail,  Bail,  Robin, 
Sanderling,  Seagull,  Swallow,  Swan,  Tanager,  Teal,  Thrush,  Turkey, 
Whippoorwill,  Widgeon,  Woodcock,  Patapsco,  Patuxent. 

Trawlers — William  Johnson,  Richard  Bulkeley,  Thos.  Blackhorne, 
Thomas  Buckley,  George  Cochrane,  John  Collins,   William   Caldwell, 


140  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

George  Clarke,  William  Darnold,  Siam  Duffey,  John  Graham,  Thomas 
Laundry,  William  Ashton,  George  Burton,  John  Dunkin,  Thomas  Gra- 
ham, Thomas  Henrix,  John  Fitzgerald,  John  Clay,  Pat  Caharty. 

I  had  the  pleasure  of  visiting  our  mine  base  in  Scotland  just 
before  the  squadron  sailed  on  its  first  expedition.  Everything 
was  ready  for  operations.  The  spirit  of  officers  and  men  was 
inspiring.  Not  minimizing  for  a  moment  the  difficulties  they 
had  to  face,  all  were  eager  to  begin  the  task. 

They  were  to  set  forth  on  April  28th,  but  the  heaviest  snow- 
storm of  the  year  was  raging,  causing  24  hours  delay.  The  next 
morning  the  sweepers  and  a  division  of  sub-chasers  got  under 
way  for  the  barrage,  while  the  Black  Hawk  and  other  chasers 
proceeded  to  the  new  base  at  Kirkwall.  That  excursion,  which 
was  experimental,  was  completed  May  2nd. 

Mines  sometimes  fouled  in  the  *  'kites"  which  picked  them 
up,  and  exploded  as  the  sweep  was  being  hauled  in.  The 
Patuxent  was  the  victim  of  an  accident  of  this  kind  on  May  12th. 
Severed  by  an  explosion,  its  sweep  had  to  be  hauled  on  board 
to  be  repaired.  When  the  kite  came  within  sight,  a  mine  was 
seen  hanging  by  its  towing  cable.  The  commanding  officer  sent 
all  hands  forward  to  a  place  of  safety,  going  aft  himself  to 
clear  it,  with  the  assistance  of  his  chief  boatswain's  mate.  When 
the  mine  got  within  ten  feet  of  the  ship,  it  exploded.  Several 
men  were  blown  overboard  by  the  mass  of  flying  water,  but  all 
were  rescued.  The  commanding  officer  had  a  narrow  escape. 
Only  a  few  feet  from  the  exploding  mine,  his  thumb  was  cut 
off  by  a  flying  fragment  of  steel,  but  luckily  he  escaped  further 
injury. 

Two  days  later,  the  same  accident  befell  the  Bobolink,  killing 
its  commanding  officer,  Lieutenant  Frank  Bruce,  and  badly  dam- 
aging the  ship.  Seeking  first  the  safety  of  his  crew,  Lieutenant 
Bruce  went  aft  to  clear  the  mine.  Before  anything  could  be  done, 
it  exploded,  killing  him  and  blowing  the  boatswain  and  three 
other  men  into  the  water.  All  four  were  rescued,  though  the 
boatswain  was  unconscious  from  the  shock.  The  Teal  took  her 
in  tow  and,  accompanied  by  the  Sivallow  and  sub-chaser  No.  45, 
towed  her  to  Scapa  Flow. 

While  clearing  the  largest  mine-group  in  June  the  force 
found  impressive  evidence  of  the  success  of  the  barrage.    Cross- 


SHUTTING  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN  THEIR  NESTS  141 

ing  the  lines  of  mines,  the  Heron  and  the  Sanderling  were 
brought  to  a  standstill  by  an  obstruction  which  fouled  their 
sweeps.  Oil  rose  to  the  surface,  and  spread  out  astern,  giving 
evidence  of  the  wreck  of  a  submarine  underneath.  This  was  the 
locality  in  which  the  mine-laying  squadron  had  sighted  the  body 
of  a  German  sailor  floating  in  the  water.  From  the  records  of 
the  Admiralty,  it  appeared  that  the  obstruction  was  the  wreck 
of  the  German  submarine  UB-127. 

Six  mines  exploded  under  and  around  the  Pelican  one  day 
in  July.  Deluged  by  the  mass  of  water  thrown  up  by  the  ex- 
plosion, the  forward  part  of  the  ship  ruptured  and  flooded,  the 
mine-sweeper  was  rapidly  sinking.  Captain  R.  C.  Buhner,  di- 
recting the  operations,  went  at  once  to  her  assistance.  Placing 
his  flagship,  the  Auk,  alongside  the  Pelican,  he  connected  his 
wrecking  hose  with  the  forward  compartments,  and  set  the 
pumps  going  to  keep  the  damaged  ship  afloat.  The  Eider  got 
on  the  other  side,  and  did  the  same  thing.  The  Teal  took  the 
three  ships  in  tow,  and  the  four,  lashed  together,  headed  slowly 
for  port.  The  bow  of  the  Pelican  was  hardly  above  water,  but 
for  several  hours  constant  pumping  held  her  up. 

Then  a  heavy  head  sea  arose,  and  the  pump-lines  were  car- 
ried away.  Water  rose  in  the  Pelican,  buckling  the  forward 
bulkhead,  and  the  vessel  was  liable  to  burst  at  any  moment, 
going  down  in  a  flash.  Every  man  on  her  was  in  danger,  and 
it  was  decided  to  leave  aboard  only  a  few  men  to  do  necessary 
work.  Twelve  volunteers  were  called  for.  Every  member  of 
her  crew  stepped  forward.  The  dozen  strongest  were  chosen 
and  the  others,  against  their  will,  were  ordered  off  the  ship. 

Fifty  miles  of  open  sea  were  still  to  be  traversed.  Darkness 
had  fallen.  Crews  of  Auk  and  Eider  struggled  desperately  to 
get  the  lines  repaired  and  pumps  going.  Men  stood  by  with 
axes  to  cut  the  mooring  lines,  in  case  the  Pelican  should  sink. 
All  through  the  night  this  struggle  continued,  and  there  was  a 
sigh  of  relief  when  day  dawned  with  the  vessel  still  afloat,  and 
the  ships  reached  the  shelter  of  Tresness  Bay. 

A  curious  accident  befell  the  Flamingo.  While  weighing 
anchor,  steel  touched  copper  and  exploded  a  mine  which  her 
anchor  had  fouled,  damaging  her  rudder,  bending  her  skeg, 
and  dishing  in  her  stern. 


142  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  most  serious  disaster  encountered  in  all  our  mine  sweep- 
ing occurred  on  July  12th,  the  sinking  of  the  Richard  Bulkeley. 
Caught  in  its  kite,  a  mine  was  seen  close  to  her  stern,  near  the 
surface.  To  get  it  further  away  the  kite  wire  was  being  veered 
when  the  mine  exploded.  The  after  part  of  the  ship's  hull  was 
shattered.    She  sank  in  seven  minutes. 

Commander  Frank  R.  King,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
division  of  trawlers  as  well  as  the  Bulkeley,  went  down  with  the 
vessel.  When  the  blast  came,  his  first  thought  was  the  safety 
of  his  crew.  Half  stunned  by  the  explosion,  one  man,  whose 
life-preserver  had  been  blown  off,  struggled  to  the  deck.  Com- 
mander King  took  off  his  own  life-belt,  buckled  it  around  the 
sailor,  and  helped  him  get  clear  of  the  ship  before  she  took  her 
final  plunge.  Until  the  vessel  disappeared  he  was  still  hunting 
for  members  of  the  crew  who  might  be  left  aboard.  When  last 
seen,  as  the  Bulkeley  went  lower  into  the  water,  he  was  on  the 
bridge.  He  went  down  with  his  ship,  a  heroic  figure,  sacrificing 
his  life  to  save  his  men.  It  was  a  solemn  privilege  to  me,  a 
few  months  later,  to  pay  tribute  to  the  memory  of  this  gallant 
officer  by  naming  one  of  our  new  destroyers  in  his  honor. 

Altogether,  two  officers  and  nine  men  were  killed  during  these 
hazardous  operations,  and  23  ships  were  damaged.  Regrettable 
as  was  this  loss  of  life,  it  was  small  in  comparison  with  that  of 
our  comrades  in  the  British  mine-sweeping  service. 

The  mine  field  was  removed,  consisting  of  50,000  mines, 
spread  over  an  area  of  some  6,000  square  miles  of  the  stormy 
North  Sea,  and  the  entire  barrage  swept  up  by  September  30th. 
On  that  day  the  hazard  to  shipping  by  this  vast  enterprise  in 
the  North  Sea  was  removed. 

When  the  Mine  Force  returned  to  the  United  States,  it  was 
given  a  welcome  as  genuine  as  that  accorded  our  battleships 
when  they  returned  from  service  abroad.  As  the  vessels  steamed 
up  North  River,  November  24,  1919,  they  were  reviewed  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  distinguished  officers  and  citizens  on 
Admiral  Strauss'  flagship,  the  Black  Hawk. 

This  marked  the  end  of  that  enterprise  which  "shut  up  the 
hornets  in  their  nests" — that  bold  adventure  which  was  the 
greatest  new  naval  offensive  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  Xin 

PRESIDENT  WILSON  AS  A  STRATEGIST 

SPEAKING  TO  OFFICERS  OF  THE  FLEET  AT  YORKTOWN,  HE  ADVOCATED 

NEW  AND  BOLD  METHODS "WHY  NOT  SHUT  UP  THE  HORNETS  IN 

THEIR  NESTS?" — " LEAVE  OUT  OF  YOUR  VOCABULARY  THE  WORD 
' PRUDENT';  DO  THE  THING  THAT  IS  AUDACIOUS  TO  THE  UTMOST 
POINT  OF  RISK  AND  DARING." 

THE  world  knows  President  Wilson  as  a  scholar,  teacher 
and  historian;  as  executive  and  statesman.  But  it  does 
not  know  him,  as  we  did,  as  a  master  of  military- 
strategy. 

His  grasp  of  the  whole  situation,  his  clear  conception  of 
Army  and  Navy  policies  and  operations,  his  rare  judgment  were 
demonstrated  in  important  decisions,  and  his  personal  interest 
and  influence  had  a  marked  effect  on  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

Always  interested  in  the  Navy,  he  kept  up  with  all  that  was 
being  done  and  planned,  and  his  suggestions  and  directions 
proved  of  the  utmost  value  to  officers  and  officials. 

"We  shall  take  leave  to  be  strong  upon  the  seas,"  he  said 
not  long  after  the  beginning  of  the  European  war.  In  his  ad- 
dress at  St.  Louis,  early  in  1916,  he  declared  that  ours  should 
be  "the  most  adequate  navy  in  the  world."  At  the  next  cabinet 
meeting  a  member  expressed  surprise  at  the  President's  ad- 
vocacy of  so  vigorous  a  naval  policy,  and  asked  if  he  had  been 
correctly  quoted  in  the  newspapers. 

"Yes,"  replied  the  President,  "and  it  is  one  thing  I  said  in 
my  swing  around  the  circle  that  I  absolutely  believe." 

He  strongly  urged  the  big  construction  program  presented 
several  months  before,  and  exercised  a  potent  influence  in  put- 
ting through  Congress  the  "three  year  program"  which 
authorized  building  157  naval  vessels. 

Long  before  we  entered  the  war,  when  the  Allied  navies 

143 


144  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

seemed  impotent  before  the  onslaughts  of  the  submarines,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  pointed  to  the  vigorous  policies  which  later  proved 
so  successful. 

''Daniels,  why  don't  the  British  convoy  their  merchant  ships 
and  thus  protect  them  from  submarines?"  he  asked  me  early 
in  the  war.  As  sinkings  increased,  he  pointed  out  that  their 
practice  of  sailing  ships  separately  had  proved  a  failure,  and 
asked,  "Why  now,  with  their  distressing  experiences,  do  they 
hesitate  about  adopting  the  convoy  system?" 

He  could  not  comprehend  why  the  British,  as  soon  as  Ger- 
many declared  war,  had  not  mined  the  English  Channel  so  that 
no  submarine  could  pass  through  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  strange 
as  it  seems,  the  channel  from  Dover  to  Calais  never  was  a  com- 
plete barrier  to  submarines,  though  the  Dover  Patrol  did  bril- 
liant service,  and  the  United  States  Navy  insisted  that  closing 
this  channel  was  one  of  the  first  steps  toward  defeating  the 
U-boats. 

"Why  don't  the  British  shut  up  the  hornets  in  their  nests?" 
he  asked  me  just  before  we  entered  the  war,  and  after  we  were 
embarked  upon  it  he  declared  that  we  must  insist  upon  some 
plan  that  would  prevent  the  egress  of  the  U-boats  from  their 
bases.  When  our  Bureau  of  Ordnance  proposed,  in  April,  1917, 
the  construction  of  a  mine  barrage  across  the  North  Sea,  he 
was  deeply  interested  in  the  plan  and  heartily  approved  it. 
That  carried  out  the  idea  he  believed  the  Allies  should  have  put 
into  effect  earlier  in  the  war.  As  that  plan  was  debated  and 
delayed,  and  characterized  in  London  as  "impracticable,"  he 
grew  impatient  of  the  long  delay  in  adopting  this  or  some  other 
vigorous  offensive  against  the  submarines. 

On  July  4,  1917,  he  sent  the  following  cablegram  to  London : 

"Strictly  confidential."    From  the  President  for  Admiral  Sims. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  I  have  been  greatly  surprised  at  the 
failure  of  the  British  Admiralty  to  use  Great  Britain's  great  naval 
superiority  in  an  effective  way.  In  the  presence  of  the  present  sub- 
marine emergency  they  are  helpless  to  the  point  of  panic.  Every  plan 
we  suggest  they  reject  for  some  reason  of  prudence.  In  my  view  this 
is  not  a  time  for  prudence  but  for  boldness,  even  at  the  cost  of  great 
losses. 

In  most  of  your  dispatches  you  have  quite  properly  advised  us  of 
the  sort  of  aid  and  cooperation  desired  from  us  by  the  Admiralty.    The 


PRESIDENT  WILSON  AS  A  STRATEGIST        145 

trouble  is  that  their  plans  and  methods  do  not  seem  to  us  efficacious.  I 
would  be  very  much  obliged  to  you  if  you  would  report  to  me,  con- 
fidentially, of  course,  exactly  what  the  Admiralty  has  been  doing,  and 
what  they  have  accomplished,  and,  added  to  the  report,  your  own  com- 
ments and  suggestions,  based  upon  independent  thought  of  the  whole 
situation,  without  regard  to  the  judgment  of  any  one  on  that  side  of 
the  water. 

The  Admiralty  was  very  slow  to  adopt  the  protection  of  convoy  and 
it  is  not  now,  I  judge,  protecting  convoys  on  adequate  scale  within  the 
danger  zone,  seeming  to  keep  small  craft  with  the  Grand  Fleet.  The 
absence  of  craft  for  convoy  is  even  more  apparent  on  the  French  coast 
than  on  the  English  coast  and  in  the  Channel.  I  do  not  see  how  the 
necessary  military  supplies  and  supplies  of  food  and  fuel  oil  are  to  be 
delivered  at  British  ports  in  any  other  way  within  the  next  few  months 
than  under  adequate  convoy.  There  will  presently  not  be  ships  or 
tankers  enough  and  our  shipbuilding  plans  may  not  begin  to  yield 
important  results  in  less  than  eighteen  months. 

I  believe  that  you  will  keep  these  instructions  absolutely  and  en- 
tirely to  yourself,  and  that  you  will  give  me  such  advice  as  you  would 
give  if  you  were  handling  the  situation  yourself,  and  if  you  were  running 
a  Navy  of  your  own. 

Woodrow  "Wilson. 

Admiral  Sims  made  an  extended  and  detailed  reply  to  this 
cablegram,  but  it  evidently  did  not  satisfy  the  President,  as 
was  shown  a  month  later,  in  his  address  to  the  Fleet. 

That  visit  to  the  Fleet,  August  11,  1917,  was  a  notable  occa- 
sion. It  was  the  first  time,  I  believe,  that  a  President  has,  in 
the  midst  of  war,  gone  to  the  chief  naval  rendezvous  and  gath- 
ered the  officers  about  him  for  a  heart-to-heart  talk.  Standing 
on  the  quarter  deck  of  the  Pennsylvania,  surrounded  by  ad- 
mirals, captains,  commanders  and  other  ranks,  he  could  see  all 
around  him  the  dreadnaughts  which  are  the  embodiment  of 
national  strength  and  naval  power.  In  the  background  was 
Yorktown,  where  CornwalhV  surrender  marked  the  culminat- 
ing victory  of  the  Revolution.  And  in  this  historic  spot  Ameri- 
can forces  were  again  making  history. 

The  President  had  slipped  away  so  quietly  from  Washing- 
ton that  few  knew  he  was  gone.  Not  only  the  speech  he  made, 
but  the  very  fact  of  his  visit  was  long  kept  secret.  But  that 
address,  informal  and  confidential  as  it  was,  deserves  a  place 
in  naval  history. 


146  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Disclaiming  any  idea  that  he  had  come  "with  malice  pre- 
pense to  make  a  speech,"  he  told  the  officers  that  he  had  come 
to  have  a  look  at  them  and  say  some  things  that  might  be  best 
said  intimately  and  in  confidence.  "One  of  the  deprivations 
which  any  man  in  authority  experiences,"  he  exclaimed,  "is 
that  he  cannot  come  into  constant  and  intimate  touch  with  the 
men  with  whom  he  is  associated  and  necessarily  associated  in 
action."  "The  whole  circumstance  of  the  modern  time,"  is 
extraordinary,  calling  for  extraordinary  action,  he  pointed  out 
and  said : 

Now,  the  point  that  is  constantly  in  my  mind,  gentlemen,  is  this: 
This  is  an  unprecedented  war  and,  therefore,  it  is  a  war  in  one  sense 
for  amateurs.  Nobody  ever  before  conducted  a  war  like  this  and  there- 
fore nobody  can  pretend  to  be  a  professional  in  a  war  like  this.  Here 
are  two  great  navies,  not  to  speak  of  the  others  associated  with  us,  our 
own  and  the  British,  outnumbering  by  a  very  great  margin  the  navy 
to  which  we  are  opposed  and  yet  casting  about  for  a  way  in  which 
to  use  our  superiority  and  our  strength,  because  of  the  novelty  of  the 
instruments  used,  because  of  the  unprecedented  character  of  the  war; 
because,  as  I  said  just  now,  nobody  ever  before  fought  a  war  like  this, 
in  the  way  that  this  is  being  fought  at  sea,  or  on  land  either,  for  that 
matter.  The  experienced  soldier, — experienced  in  previous  wars, — is 
a  back  number  so  far  as  his  experience  is  concerned;  not  so  far  as  his 
intelligence  is  concerned.  His  experience  does  not  count,  because  he 
never  fought  a  war  as  this  is  being  fought,  and  therefore  he  is  an 
amateur  along  with  the  rest  of  us.  Now,  somebody  has  got  to  think 
this  war  out.  Somebody  has  got  to  think  out  the  way  not  only  to  fight 
the  submarine,  but  to  do  something  different  from  what  we  are  doing. 

We  are  hunting  hornets  all  over  the  farm  and  letting  the  nest  alone. 
None  of  us  knows  how  to  go  to  the  nest  and  crush  it,  and  yet  I  despair 
of  hunting  for  hornets  all  over  the  sea  when  I  know  where  the  nest 
is  and  know  that  the  nest  is  breeding  hornets  as  fast  as  I  can  find 
them.  I  am  willing  for  my  part,  and  I  know  you  are  willing,  because 
I  know  the  stuff  you  are  made  of — I  am  willing  to  sacrifice  half  the 
navy  Great  Britain  and  we  together  have  to  crush  that  nest,  because 
if  we  crush  it,  the  war  is  won.  I  have  come  here  to  say  that  I  do  not 
care  where  it  comes  from,  I  do  not  care  whether  it  comes  from  the 
youngest  officer  or  the  oldest,  but  I  want  the  officers  of  this  Navy  to 
have  the  distinction  of  saying  how  this  war  is  going  to  be  won. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  I  have  just  been  talking  over  plans 
for  putting  the  planning  machinery  of  the  Navy  at  the  disposal  of  the 
brains  of  the  Navy  and  not  stopping  to  ask  what  rank  that  brains  has, 
because,  as  I  have  said  before  and  want  to  repeat,  so  far  as  experience 
in  this  kind  of  war  is  concerned  we  are  all  of  the  same  rank.    I  am  not 


PRESIDENT  WILSON  AS  A  STRATEGIST        147 

saying  that  I  do  not  expect  the  admirals  to  tell  us  what  to  do,  but  I 
am  saying  that  I  want  the  youngest  and  most  modest  youngster  in  the 
service  to  tell  us  what  we  ought  to  do  if  he  knows  what  it  is.  Now  I  am 
willing  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  that.  I  mean  any  sacrifice  of  time 
or  anything  else.  I  am  ready  to  put  myself  at  the  disposal  of  any  officer 
in  the  Navy  who  thinks  he  knows  how  to  run  this  war.  I  will  not  under- 
take to  tell  you  whether  he  does  or  not,  because  I  know  I  cannot, 
but  I  will  undertake  to  put  him  in  communication  with  those  who  can 
find  out  whether  his  idea  will  work  or  not.  I  have  the  authority  to  do 
that  and  I  will  do  it  with  the  greatest  pleasure.  The  idea  that  is  in  my 
mind  all  the  time  is  that  we  are  comrades  in  this  thing." 

"I  wish  that  I  could  think  and  had  the  brains  to  think  in  the 
terms  of  marine  warfare,"  he  remarked,  "because  I  would  feel 
then  that  I  was  figuring  out  the  future  history  of  the  political 
freedom  of  mankind. ' ' 

"We  have  got  to  throw  tradition  to  the  winds,"  he  ex- 
claimed, and  went  on  to  say : 

Now,  as  I  have  said,  gentlemen,  I  take  it  for  granted  that  nothing 
that  I  say  here  will  be  repeated  and  therefore  I  am  going  to  say  this : 
Every  time  we  have  suggested  anything  to  the  British  Admiralty  the 
reply  has  come  back  that  virtually  amounted  to  this,  that  it  had  never 
been  done  that  way,  and  I  felt  like  saying,  "Well,  nothing  was  ever 
done  so  systematically  as  nothing  is  being  done  now."  Therefore,  I 
should  like  to  see  something  unusual  happen,  something  that  was  never 
done  before;  and  inasmuch  as  the  things  that  are  being  done  to  you 
were  never  done  before,  don't  you  think  it  is  worth  while  to  try  some- 
thing that  was  never  done  before  against  those  who  are  doing  them  to 
you?  There  is  no  other  way  to  win,  and  the  whole  principle  of  this 
war  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  ought  to  hearten  and  stimulate  America. 

America  has  always  boasted  that  she  could  find  men  to  do  anything. 
She  is  the  prize  amateur  nation  of  the  world.  Germany  is  the  prize 
professional  nation  of  the  world.  Now,  when  it  comes  to  doing  new 
things  and  doing  them  well,  I  will  back  the  amateur  against  the  profes- 
sional every  time,  because  the  professional  does  it  out  of  the  book  and 
the  amateur  does  it  with  his  eyes  open  upon  a  new  world  and  with  a 
new  set  of  circumstances.  He  knows  so  little  about  it  that  he  is  fool 
enough  to  try  the  right  thing.  The  men  that  do  not  know  the  danger 
are  the  rashest  men,  and  I  have  several  times  ventured  to  make  this 
suggestion  to  the  men  about  me  in  both  arms  of  the  service:  Please 
leave  out  of  your  vocabulary  altogether  the  word  "prudent."  Do  not 
stop  to  think  about  what  is  prudent  for  a  moment.  Do  the  thing  that 
is  audacious  to  the  utmost  point  of  risk  and  daring,  because  that  is 
exactly  the  thing  that  the  other  side  does  not  understand,  and  you  will 


148  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

win  by  the  audacity  of  method  when  you  cannot  win  by  circumspection 
and  prudence. 

I  think  that  there  are  willing  ears  to  hear  this  in  the  American  Navy 
and  the  American  Army,  because  that  is  the  kind  of  folks  we  are.  We 
get  tired  of  the  old  ways  and  covet  the  new  ones. 

So,  gentlemen,  besides  coming  down  here  to  give  you  my  personal 
greeting  and  to  say  how  absolutely  I  rely  on  you  and  believe  in  you, 
I  have  come  down  here  to  say  also  that  I  depend  on  you,  depend  on 
you  for  brains  as  well  as  training  and  courage  and  discipline.  You  are 
doing  your  job  admirably,  the  job  that  you  have  been  taught  to  do ; 
now  let  us  do  something  that  we  were  never  taught  to  do  and  do  it 
just  as  well  as  we  are  doing  the  older  and  more  habitual  things,  and 
do  not  let  anybody  ever  put  one  thought  of  discouragement  into  your 
minds.  I  do  not  know  what  is  the  matter  with  the  newspapers  of  the 
United  States.  I  suppose  they  have  to  vary  the  tune  from  time  to  time 
just  to  relieve  their  minds,  but  every  now  and  then  a  wave  of  the  most 
absurd  discouragement  and  pessimism  goes  through  the  country  and  we 
hear  nothing  except  of  the  unusual  advantages  and  equipment  and 
sagacity  and  preparation  and  all  the  other  wonderful  things  of  the  Ger- 
man Army  and  Navy.  My  comment  is  always  the  very  familiar  com- 
ment, "Rats!"  They  are  working  under  infinite  disadvantages.  They 
not  only  have  no  more  brains  than  we  have,  but  they  have  a  different  and 
less  serviceable  kind  of  brains  than  we  have,  if  we  will  use  the  brains 
we  have  got.  I  am  not  discouraged  for  a  moment,  particularly  because 
we  have  not  even  begun  and,  without  saying  anything  in  disparagement 
of  those  with  whom  we  are  associated  in  the  war,  I  do  expect  things  to 
begin  when  we  begin.  If  they  do  not,  American  history  will  have 
changed  its  course;  the  American  Army  and  Navy  will  have  changed 
their  character.  There  will  have  to  come  a  new  tradition  into  a  service 
which  does  not  do  new  and  audacious  and  successful  things. 

A  short  time  after  the  President  made  this  declaration  on  his 
flag-ship,  Admiral  Mayo  was  dispatched  to  Europe,  where  he 
pressed  upon  the  British  Admiralty  the  necessity  of  construct- 
ing the  North  Sea  barrage.  Finally  in  October,  six  months  after 
the  plan  had  been  presented,  this  great  project,  in  line  with 
President  Wilson's  idea  of  bold  and  new  things  in  naval  war- 
fare, was  undertaken. 

From  many  quarters  tips  came  to  the  President  of  possible 
surprise  action  and  not  a  few  orders  to  Naval  Intelligence  to 
send  out  secret  service  men  to  run  down  a  clue  were  the  result 
of  suggestions  emanating  from  the  President.  Sometimes, 
unannounced  and  unheralded,  during  the  war,  he  would  drop  in 
at  the  Navy  Department,  and  quite  as  often  at  the  War  Depart- 


PRESIDENT  WILSON  AS  A  STRATEGIST        149 

ment,  and  he  never  came  merely  to  visit,  agreeable  as  social 
intercourse  would  have  been.  He  had  an  idea  every  time,  a 
practical  suggestion,  or  a  desire  to  be  informed  of  progress  in 
some  particular  undertaking  which  he  was  following  with  deep 
interest. 

Sometimes  when  he  dropped  in  unexpectedly  to  make  a  sug- 
gestion— (he  had  a  habit  of  calling  directions  "suggestions" 
when  speaking  to  a  Cabinet  member) — I  sometimes  wondered  if 
he  was  not  as  much  influenced  in  making  his  personal  calls  to 
give  encouragement  and  support,  and  the  helpful  personal  touch, 
as  to  discuss  strategy  or  tactics  or  policy.  Certainly  these  visits 
heartened  and  strengthened  those  of  us  who  in  trying  times  were 
charged  with  heavy  responsibility.  He  knew,  too,  what  was 
going  on.  He  often  surprised  me  by  his  knowledge  of  the  com- 
parative qualities  of  men  he  had  never  seen — how  accurate  was 
his  appraisement,  how  his  questioning  of  them  showed  the  mili- 
tary leadership  which  few  people  thought  the  college  professor 
possessed.  He  never  left  my  office,  and  I  never  left  the  White 
House,  after  a  conference  during  the  war,  without  the  reflection 
that  the  world  had  lost  a  great  military  leader  when  it  gained 
a  great  educator  and  executive. 

When  we  were  transporting  soldiers  through  the  infested 
zones  he  was  anxious,  intensely  interested,  and  read  every  cable- 
gram concerning  the  troopships.  When  he  did  not  come  in  per- 
son, in  crucial  days,  there  would  come  from  the  White  House 
frequent  memoranda  written  by  himself  on  his  little  typewriter, 
asking  for  some  information  or  making  an  illuminating  sugges- 
tion, signed  "  W.  W. ' '  Those  "  W.  W. ' '  notes  never  had  a  spare 
word,  and  they  showed  the  same  clearness  and  vision  which 
John  Hay  tells  us  Lincoln  had  when  he  would  go  over  to  see 
Stanton,  or  Gideon  Welles  in  the  dark  days  of  Civil  War. 

There  is  a  feeling  among  many  military  men  that  ci\  Hans 
"butt  in"  when  they  give  their  views  on  strategy.  It  is 
notorious  how  some  of  the  generals  in  the  War  between  the 
States  resented  the  suggestions  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  suggestions 
which  as  a  rule  displayed  sounder  judgment  of  the  way  to  win 
battles  than  the  military  experts  had  shown. 

I  recall  one  admiral  during  the  war,  who,  upon  receiving, 
through   the   diplomatic  representatives   of  our   Government, 


150  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

President  Wilson's  strong  opinion  that  a  certain  important 
offensive  should  be  adopted,  asked:  ''What  does  the  President 
want  to  butt  in  for?  What  does  he  know  about  it?"  As  to  that 
particular  matter  the  President,  from  long  study  and  reflection, 
found  that  it  was  necessary  to  "butt  in,"  because  some  naval 
leaders  of  more  than  one  nation  lacked  the  vision  to  do  the  bold 
and  the  new  thing  to  win. 

President  Wilson  took  no  perfunctory  interest  in  the  Navy. 
In  fact,  he  had  the  keenest  naval  instinct.  People,  you  know, 
are  born  with  a  passion  for  some  one  thing,  or  in  their  youth 
it  comes  to  them.  When  Thomas  Woodrow  Wilson  was  a  boy — 
(he  had  not  then  dropped  the  Thomas) — he  picked  out  for  him- 
self a  naval  career.  What  a  jolly  good  captain  he  would  have 
made  of  the  "Virginia"  or  the  "New  Jersey!"  Living  as  a  boy 
on  a  river,  he  loved  boating  next  to  books,  or  even  before  books. 
He  had  a  penchant  for  sailing  and  loved  sea  stories,  and  his 
ambition  was  to  follow  Jones  and  Farragut. 

When  the  opportunity  was  within  reach  to  go  to  the  Naval 
Academy  at  Annapolis,  his  father,  a  scholarly  Presbyterian 
preacher  of  the  old  school,  who  knew  his  son's  real  mission  in 
life  better  than  Thomas  Woodrow,  said,  in  substance,  "  No ;  you 
are  not  meant  for  the  sea;  letters,  literature,  books,  statesman- 
ship for  you."  I  do  not  know  whether  the  future  President 
accepted  the  parental  dictum  with  the  nautically  cheerful ' '  Aye, 
aye,  sir,"  but  he  accepted  it,  and  the  Navy  lost  an  officer  who 
would  probably  have  destroyed  many  precedents  and  won  many 
victories,  when  the  father  snatched  him  from  the  topsail  and 
sent  him  down  below  to  the  drudgery  of  learning  languages  and 
political  economy. 

I  do  not  know  a  civilian  who  employs  more  naval  terms.  The 
call  to  the  sea  is  in  his  blood.  His  father  kept  him  out  of  the 
Navy,  but  he  could  not  keep  the  Navy  out  of  him,  or  the  Navy 
lore  and  lingo,  any  more  than  you  can  keep  the  Quaker  out  of  a 
Quaker  by  turning  him  out  of  meeting.  At  sea  President  Wil- 
son loved  to  wear  whites  or  blues,  as  near  regulation  as  a 
civilian  can,  to  don  a  cap,  to  watch  the  heaving  of  the  lead  and 
the  weighing  of  the  anchor,  and  listen  to  the  ' '  shiver-my-tim- 
bers"  talk  that  one  overhears  from  the  older  sailors  on  duty. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

COMRADES  OF  THE  MIST 

U.     S.     BATTLESHIPS     WITH     BRITISH     GBAND     FLEET DREADNAUGHTS 

UNDER     RODMAN     FORMED     SIXTH     BATTLE     SQUADRON ASSIGNED 

POST    OF    HONOR ATTACKED   SIX   TIMES   BY    SUBMARINES U-BOAT 

RAMMED  THE  "NEW  YORK,"   CAUGHT  IN   ITS   PROPELLER THREE 

BATTLESHIPS,   UNDER   RODGERS,   AT   BANTRY    BAY — SURRENDER    OF 
GERMAN  FLEET. 

THERE  was  a  thrill  through  all  the  Grand  Fleet,  a  storm 
of  cheers  sweeping  from  Admiral  Beatty  's  flagship  down 
to  the  last  destroyer  that  December  morning  when  the 
United  States  dreadnaughts,  under  Admiral  Hugh  Rod- 
man, steamed  around  the  headlands,  up  the  curved  channel,  and 
down  the  long  line  of  British  battleships,   dropping   anchor 
among  them. 

Twelve  days  at  sea,  weathering  a  gale  that  raged  for  three 
days,  they  had  had  a  hard  voyage.  Nearing  the  coast  in  the 
pitch-black  darkness  of  a  starless  night,  they  had,  a  few  hours 
before,  been  met  by  a  division  of  destroyers  which  escorted  them 
to  port.  The  sun,  which  rises  late  in  that  northern  clime,  broke 
through  the  mist  as  they  reached  the  entrance  to  the  harbor. 
Seaplanes  circled  the  vessels,  and  a  kite  balloon's  heliograph 
flashed  its  welcome. 

The  New  York  led  the  way,  Admiral  Rodman  and  his  staff 
on  the  bridge,  while  Admiral  Beatty,  commander-in-chief,  sur- 
rounded by  his  crew,  stood  on  the  deck  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth. 
On  all  the  ships  the  officers  and  crews,  manning  the  rails,  stood 
at  attention. 

The  "Star  Spangled  Banner"  came  rolling  from  the  British 
bands,  and  the  American  bands  played  "God  Save  the  King." 
This  was  according  to  custom,  but  it  was  a  real  surprise  to  our 
sailors  when  there  came  from  the  British  vessels  an  outburst 

151 


152  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

of  cheers  that  ran  clear  down  the  line.  That  seemed  like  home 
to  our  boys,  and  they  replied  with  Yankee  yells  until  Scapa 
i*esounded  with  such  a  roar  of  sound  as  it  never  heard  before. 

"This  is  the  most  enthusiastic  welcome  an  American  squad- 
ron ever  received  anywhere,"  Admiral  Rodman  remarked.  As 
soon  as  the  ships  anchored,  Admiral  Rodman  made  his  official 
call  on  Admiral  Beatty,  on  the  Queen  Elizabeth.  As  they  ex- 
changed greetings,  Admiral  Rodman  said : 

"We  are  here,  and  we  put  ourselves  entirely  at  your  com- 
mand. We  ask  no  favors  or  privileges.  We  only  want  to  be 
one  of  you.  In  a  sense  we  feel  that  we  are  no  longer  merely 
the  American  Navy.  We  are  now  rather  an  integral  part  of 
your  fleet  for  the  purpose  of  unified  prosecution  of  our  great 
common  aim.  We  have  not  come  merely  to  take  part  in  the  spec- 
tacular side  of  your  work.  We  want  to  do  our  fair  share  of 
everything,  duties  pleasant  and  unpleasant  alike.  We  do  not 
come  to  be  your  guests  but  to  be  co-workers.  We  do  not  want 
to  be  entertained;  we  want  to  work."  That  was  characteristic 
of  Rodman,  who  was  selected  to  command  our  greatest  ships 
overseas  because  of  his  outstanding  ability  as  a  great  officer. 

"Today  marks  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  England  and 
America,"  said  Admiral  Beatty,  expressing  the  pleasure  with 
which  he  had  looked  forward  to  the  coming. 

There  was  sealed  the  firm  friendship  of  those  "Comrades 
of  the  Mist,"  the  British  and  American  dreadnaughts  in  that 
Grand  Fleet,  which  formed  the  greatest  aggregation  of  naval 
power  the  world  ever  saw,  and  whose  very  existence  kept  the 
German  High  Seas  Fleet  contained  in  its  home  ports,  never 
again  to  venture  out  until  it  slunk  to  Scapa  Flow  in  surrender. 

The  American  dreadnaughts  which  served  with  the  Grand 
Fleet  were  the  New  York  (flagship),  Captain  C.  F.  Hughes, 
afterwards  commanded  by  Captain  E.  L.  Beach;  the  Texas, 
Captain  Victor  Blue ;  the  Wyoming,  Captain  H.  A.  Wiley,  after- 
ward Captain  H.  H.  Christy;  the  Arkansas,  Captain  W.  H.  G. 
Bullard,  afterward  Captain  L.  R.  de  Steiguer;  the  Florida, 
Captain  Thomas  Washington,  afterward  Captain  M.  M.  Taylor ; 
and  the  Delaware,  Captain  A.  H.  Scales. 

"It  is  a  matter  of  pride,"  said  Admiral  Rodman,  "that  we 
were  at  once  able  to  coordinate  and  cooperate  with  the  British 


COMRADES  OF  THE  MIST  153 

intelligently,  without  the  slightest  hesitancy,  friction  or  mis- 
understanding. We  adopted  and  could  use  their  signals,  radio, 
secret  codes  and  other  communication — and  that  is  one  of  the 
hardest  problems  we  have  in  the  Navy — and  could  efficiently 
execute  their  tactics  and  maneuvers  and  conform  to  their  war 
plans.  This  was  put  to  the  test  when  within  three  days  after 
our  arrival  a  signal  was  made  for  all  ships  to  be  ready  to  pro- 
ceed to  sea  for  active  service  and  we  reported  ready  when  the 
time  came. 

"From  that  day  to  the  end  of  the  war  we  took  part  in  every 
major  operation  in  the  North  Sea,  and  some  independent 
smaller  ones.  There  was  never  a  time  but  that  we  were  ready 
when  called  upon.  We  could  always  steam  full  speed,  maintain 
our  position,  and  we  received  nothing  but  the  highest  praise  not 
only  from  the  British  admirals,  officers  and  men,  but  from  those 
of  our  own  navy  who  visited  us. 

"Let  me  truthfully  add,  without  taking  the  slightest  credit 
to  myself  as  the  commanding  officer,  but  giving  it  to  the  officers 
and  men,  where  it  belongs,  and  to  the  years  of  preparedness  in 
the  American  Navy,  that,  put  it  as  modestly  as  I  can,  the  Ameri- 
can Squadron  was  fully  equal  to  any  of  the  Grand  Fleet." 

Our  ships  were,  in  fact,  in  such  a  high  state  of  efficiency  that 
the  British  Admiralty  made  specific  inquiries  as  to  our  methods 
with  a  view  to  adopting  them  for  their  own  ships. 

Soon  after  joining  the  Grand  Fleet,  the  American  dread- 
naughts  were  designated  as  the  Sixth  Battle  Squadron,  and 
assigned  to  one  of  the  two  places  of  honor  and  importance  in  the 
battle  line — one  of  the  two  "fast  wings"  which  would  take  sta- 
tion at  the  head  or  rear  of  the  battleship  force  when  going  into 
action.  On  one  occasion,  when  the  Grand  Fleet  came  within  a 
few  miles  of  the  German  fleet,  the  American  division  was  in  the 
van,  and  would  have  led  the  action,  but  the  Germans,  as  usual, 
took  refuge  behind  their  defenses  before  the  British  and  Ameri- 
cans could  run  them  down  and  force  an  engagement. 

Describing  the  activities  of  the  Grand  Fleet  and  of  our  battle- 
ships, Admiral  Rodman  said : 

It  was  our  policy  to  go  after  the  enemy  every  time  he  showed  his 
nose  outside  of  his  ports ;  no  matter  when  or  where,  whether  in  single 
ships,  by  divisions,  or  his  whole  fleet,  out  we  went,  day  or  night,  rain 


154  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

or  shine  (and  there  was  mighty  little  daylight  and  much  less  shine  in 
the  winter  months),  blow  high,  or  blow  low,  and  chase  him  back  in  his 
hole.  So  persistent  was  this  performance  on  our  part,  so  sure  were  we 
to  get  after  him,  that,  toward  the  end  he  rarely  ventured  more  than 
a  few  miles  from  his  base ;  and  immediately  we  would  start  after  him, 
back  he  would  go  in  his  hole,  and  haul  his  hole  in  after  him. 

Every  inducement  was  offered  him  to  come  out.  Inferior  forces  were 
sent  down  into  the  Heligoland  Bight  to  induce  him  to  attack;  valuable 
convoys  were  dispatched,  apparently  without  protection,  and  other 
devices  to  tempt  him  out ;  but  he  would  not  come.  It  is  needless  to  add 
that  such  expeditions,  on  every  occasion,  were  well  guarded,  and*  we 
were  ready  to  pounce  on  him  with  unseen  forces  had  he  attempted  to 
take  advantage  of  the  seeming  small  force  or  unprotected  vessels. 

In  our  operations  in  the  North  Sea  we  were  frequently  attacked  by 
submarines,  and  our  battleships  had  numerous  narrow  escapqs,  often 
only  by  prompt  and  skilful  handling.  On  one  occasion  a  submarine 
rammed  the  flagship  New  York,  dented  the  bottom,  and  demolished  the 
starboard  propeller.  But  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  blows 
from  the  propeller  sank  the  submarine.  En  route  to  drydock  to  make 
repairs  and  install  a  new  propeller,  three  torpedoes  in  rapid  succession 
were  fired  at  her  by  hostile  submarines.  But  again  she  avoided  them 
by  clever  maneuvering  and  escaped.  Once  when  guarding  or  supporting 
a  convoy  of  thirty  or  forty  vessels,  on  the  coast  of  Norway,  in  mid- 
winter, a  bunch  of  hostile  ' '  subs  ' '  fired  six  torpedoes  at  us.  Again  only 
our  vigilance  and  instantaneous  maneuvering  saved  us,  but  by  a  very 
narrow  margin.  There  were  still  other  attacks  by  submarines  which 
necessitated  quick  action  to  avoid  them. 

Our  dreadnaughts  were  attacked  six  times  by  submarines. 
On  February  8,  1918,  the  Florida  and  Delaware  were  off  the 
Norwegian  coast,  waiting  for  a  return  convoy,  when  a  submarine 
was  sighted.  The  U-boat  promptly  attacked,  firing  a  salvo  of 
torpedoes.  Four  were  aimed  at  the  Florida,  two  at  the  Dela- 
ware. Quick  action  was  required  to  avoid  the  deadly  cylinders. 
Both  vessels  turned  instantly,  swerving  so  rapidly  that  the 
torpedoes  swept  harmlessly  past,  neither  vessel  being  hit, 
Destroyers  dashed  at  the  enemy,  dropping  numerous  depth- 
bombs,  but  the  U-boat,  which  had  submerged  instantly,  ap- 
parently left  the  scene  undamaged. 

The  Texas  had  an  encounter  with  a  submarine  on  April  27th. 
At  12 :47  p.  m.  in  latitude  56°-56'  north,  longitude  0°-40'  west,  a 
periscope  was  sighted.  The  Texas  at  once  brought  her  guns  to 
bear,  firing  at  the  moving  feather.     The  "  sub  "  submerged, 


COMRADES  OF  THE  MIST  155 

leaving  only  its  tell-tale  wake.  Two  destroyers  which  were  near- 
by went  to  the  scene  and  dropped  depth-bombs  in  the  vicinity 
where  the  U-boat  went  down,  but  it  had  disappeared. 

The  New  York,  Texas,  Delaware,  Florida  and  Wyoming  were 
twice  attacked  on  June  30th.  The  division  was  steaming  in  line 
abreast,  in  open  order,  when  a  periscope  was  reported  by  the 
Wyoming,  and  was  also  seen  by  the  destroyer  Parker.  The 
Delaware,  Florida  and  Wyoming  opened  fire,  their  shells  fall- 
ing around  the  spot  where  the  "  scope  "  was  sighted.  The 
"  sub  "  had  immediately  submerged,  and  the  destroyers  Salmon, 
Parker,  and  Radstock  dashed  down  the  wake,  dropping  depth- 
bombs.  The  battleships  moving  on,  leaving  the  Radstock  to 
search  the  vicinity.  An  hour  later,  in  latitude  58° -44'  north, 
longitude  2°-34'  east,  the  second  attack  occurred,  the  Delaware 
opening  fire  on  a  submarine  reported  astern.  The  escorting 
destroyers  did  not  see  the  periscope,  but  three  of  them  scouted 
down  the  lines  and  dropped  ten  depth-bombs. 

At  9  p.  m.,  on  July  28th,  while  cruising  in  latitude  57° -55' 
north,  longitude  0°-05'  east,  the  Arkansas  sighted  a  periscope. 
Opening  fire  with  her  port  sky  gun,  she  went  to  emergency  full 
speed  using  her  rudder  to  bring  the  object  fired  at  ahead.  At 
this  moment  the  wake  of  a  torpedo  running  toward  the  ship  was 
sighted.  Swinging  to  the  left,  the  torpedo  was  avoided,  and  the 
battleship  escaped  unscathed. 

The  occasion  to  which  Admiral  Rodman  referred,  when  his 
flagship  was  rammed  by  a  submarine,  occurred  when  the  Neiv 
York  was  leading  the  division  into  Pentland  Firth.  While  turn- 
ing with  right  rudder,  her  stern  swinging  to  port,  a  heavy  under- 
water blow  was  felt  on  her  starboard  quarter,  followed 
immediately  by  another,  which  damaged  the  ship's  starboard 
propeller,  breaking  off  two  of  its  blades.  The  water  was  deep, 
the  channel  clear  of  obstructions.  No  ordinary  force  could  have 
delivered  a  blow  powerful  enough  to  smash  propeller  blades 
and  dent  the  big  ship 's  bottom.  After  weighing  all  the  evidence, 
and  examining  the  vessel's  hull  when  she  was  docked,  the  court 
of  inquiry  verified  the  conclusion  of  Admiral  Rodman,  that  the 
New  York  had  struck  a  submarine.  While  there  were  various 
theories,  the  one  which  seemed  most  tenable  was  that,  in  at- 
tempting to  dive  under  the  vessel,  to  get  in  position  to  attack, 


156  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  U-boat  had  struck  the  New  York's  propellers  and  been 
smashed  as  the  battleship  turned. 

The  New  York  was  attacked  again  on  October  16th,  at 
Rosyth,  while  en  route  from  a  northern  base.  At  one  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  three  torpedoes  were  fired,  all  passing  ahead 
of  her.  Owing  to  a  damaged  propeller,  the  ship  was  making 
only  twelve  knots.  Ordinarily,  she  would  have  been  going  at 
the  rate  of  sixteen  knots  or  more.  The  submarine  apparently 
misjudged  her  speed,  aiming  its  torpedoes  too  far  ahead.  A 
submarine  was  sighted  and  reported  by  a  patrol  in  the  vicinity, 
and  it  is  believed  this  was  the  same  one  which  attacked  the 
New  York. 

There  was  joy  among  the  Americans  on  April  24,  1918,  when 
they  sailed  with  the  Grand  Fleet  "for  active  service  against 
the  enemy."  A  large  German  force  was  reported  operating  in 
the  North  Sea,  probably  planning  to  attack  the  Norwegian  con- 
voys. Hoping  for  action,  the  British  and  American  vessels 
found  the  Germans  had  turned  back  to  their  home  bases.  They 
had  missed  the  enemy  by  only  four  hours.  A  British  flagship 
had  been  attacked  by  a  submarine,  two  torpedoes  being  fired  at 
her.  Destroyers  had  dropped  quantities  of  depth-charges. 
Some  floating  mines  had  been  destroyed  by  gunfire.  But  they 
had  missed  the  big  game  they  were  seeking. 

It  was  not  until  the  evening  of  October  12th  that  any  con- 
siderable German  force  was  reported.  Three  large  enemy 
men-of-war  were  said  to  have  been  sighted,  steering  northwest 
in  the  direction  of  a  convoy  off  the  Scotch  coast.  The  Ameri- 
can dreadnaughts,  a  battle-cruiser  squadron  and  light  cruisers, 
screened  by  destroyers,  sailed  soon  after  midnight.  They  were 
directed  to  take  position  to  the  north  and  west  of  the  Orkneys, 
and  to  patrol  the  passage  between  the  Orkney  and  Shetland 
islands,  in  the  hope  of  intercepting  the  Germans.  But  the  Ger- 
man ships  must  have  again  turned  back,  for,  though  that  whole 
region  was  scouted,  there  was  no  sign  of  an  enemy  vessel.  This 
was  only  another  of  the  many  disappointments  in  the  constant 
effort  to  engage  the  German  capital  ships. 

In  that  rigorous  climate,  a  latitude  as  far  north  as  Alaska 
or  Petrograd,  snow  and  ice  are  continuous  through  most  of  the 
year.    Cold  and  sleet  and  heavy  seas  made  navigation  arduous 


COMRADES  OF  THE  MIST  157 

and  dangerous.  There  was  continuous  cruising  in  close  forma- 
tion, without  lights,  at  high  speeds,  on  winter  nights  when  the 
darkness  lasted  for  eighteen  hours.  The  mine-fields,  our  own 
as  well  as  those  of  the  enemy,  were  an  ever-present  danger,  and 
battleships  had  to  be  always  on  the  alert  to  repel  attacks  by 
submarines. 

The  whole  fleet  had  to  be  ready  to  put  to  sea  on  almost  in- 
stant notice.  Officers  and  men  had  hardly  any  liberty  or  leave. 
No  one  was  allowed  away  from  the  ships  after  dark,  nor  for 
a  period  longer  than  four  hours,  and  then  only  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  ship,  in  signal  or  telephone  communication,  sub- 
ject to  recall.  All  ships  were  completely  closed  and  darkened 
from  sunset  to  sunrise,  as  a  precaution  against  air  and  other 
attacks.  In  winter  this  meant  from  fifteen  to  eighteen  hours 
per  day. 

Some  idea  of  the  immense  size  of  the  Grand  Fleet  may  be 
gained  from  the  statement  that,  entering  or  leaving  port,  the 
column  of  ships,  excluding  destroyers,  averaged  65  miles  long. 
On  one  occasion,  it  was  76  miles. 

Hard  duty  as  it  was  for  the  officers  in  that  wintry  clime,  it 
was  even  harder  for  the  enlisted  men.  Yet  our  boys  bore  it 
with  the  cheerfulness  that  distinguishes  the  American  sailor, 
who,  when  hardship  comes,  ''bears  it  with  a  grin," — not  only 
bears  it,  but  laughs  about  it.  For  a  year,  every  officer  and  man 
in  the  Grand  Fleet  had  been  waiting  and  hoping  for  a  chance 
to  get  at  the  Germans.  And,  at  last,  when  that  fleet  surrendered 
without  striking  a  blow,  their  disappointment  was  too  deep  for 
words. 

That  scene  has  been  graphically  described,  the  feeling  of 
officers  and  men  so  well  expressed  by  Admiral  Rodman,  that  I 
give  in  his  own  words  his  account  of  the  German  surrender : 

After  four  years  of  war  for  the  Grand  Fleet,  and  after  we  have  been 
a  part  of  it  for  the  last  year,  there  came  the  debacle,  the  last  scene 
of  the  great  drama.  Not  as  we  had  all  expected,  as  the  successful  ter- 
mination of  a  great  sea  battle,  but  as  an  ignominious  surrender  without 
firing  a  gun.  Surely,  no  more  complete  victory  was  ever  won,  nor  a 
more  disgraceful  and  humiliating  end  could  have  come  to  a  powerful 
and  much  vaunted  fleet  than  that  which  came  to  the  German  High  Seas 
Fleet.    Let  me  try  to  describe  it. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Grand  Fleet  demanded  and  received 


158  OUR  NAVY  AT  AVAR 

what  actually  amounted  to  an  unconditional  surrender  of  the  whole  Ger- 
man Navy.  Under  his  orders  the  enemy 's  ships  were  disarmed,  ammuni- 
tion landed,  torpedo  warheads  sent  ashore,  breech-blocks  and  fire-control 
instruments  removed,  and  every  offensive  utility  rendered  innocuous. 
Then,  with  reduced  crews,  under  the  command  of  a  German  admiral, 
in  one  lone  column,  the  heavy  battleships  leading,  the  Hun  fleet  sailed 
for  a  designated  rendezvous,  to  arrive  at  a  specified  time,  just  outside 
of  the  Firth  of  Forth  in  Scotland,  where  the  Grand  Fleet  lay  at  anchor. 

Before  daylight  the  Grand  Fleet  was  under  way  and  proceeded  to 
sea,  heading  east,  in  two  long  columns,  six  miles  apart,  our  American 
battleship  force  being  in  the  middle  of  the  northern  line.  A  light 
British  cruiser  was  directed  to  meet  the  Germans,  who  were  heading 
west,  and  conduct  them  in  between  our  two  columns. 

Let  me  diverge  for  a  moment  and  recall  to  any  one  who  has  been 
in  China  or  the  Philippines  the  viciousness  of  and  antipathy  which 
the  domesticated  carabao  has  for  a  white  man.  How  ready  they  are  to 
attack,  while  any  native  child  can,  with  perfect  safety  and  impunity, 
go  up  to  the  most  savage  of  them,  take  him  by  the  nose,  and  lead  him 
where  he  pleases.  I  was  reminded  of  this  when  a  little  British  cruiser 
rounded  to  ahead  of  the  much-vaunted  German  High  Seas  Fleet,  and 
hoisted  the  signal,  "Follow  me,"  and  led  them  down  between  our 
columns,  where  our  battle  flags  were  mast-headed,  turrets  trained 
toward  the  enemy,  crews  at  battle  stations,  and  all  in  readiness  for  any 
act  of  treachery  that  might  be  attempted. 

At  a  prearranged  signal  our  forces  swung  symmetrically  through  180 
degrees,  and,  still  paralleling  the  enveloped  Germans,  conducted  them 
into  a  designated  anchorage  in  the  entrance  of  the  Firth  of  Forth. 
Then  came  a  signal  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  the  surrendered 
fleet:  "At  sundown  lower  your  colors  and  do  not  hoist  them  again 
without  permission."  Surely  no  greater  humiliation  could  have  be- 
fallen them  after  their  frequent  and  taunting  boasts  and  threats. 

There  is  little  else  to  be  told.  After  an  inspection  by  British  and 
American  officers  to  gain  assurance  that  the  ships  were  disarmed,  they 
were  sent  in  groups,  under  guard,  to  Scapa  Flow,  in  the  cold,  dreary, 
bleak,  God-forsaken  harbor  in  the  Orkneys  where  the  Grand  Fleet  had 
spent  many  a  dreary  month  and  year,  waiting  like  ferocious  dogs  in 
leash,  watching  and  waiting,  to  pounce  on  the  German  Fleet,  should 
the  opportunity  ever  occur.  Here  the  Germans  lay  at  anchor  in  long, 
symmetrical  lines,  helpless,  innocuous,  harmless;  their  sting  and  bite 
removed,  their  national  colors  lowered  for  good  and  all  as  a  token  of 
submission  to  the  masters.  They  were  corralled  like  wild  and  cruel 
beasts  that  had  been  hobbled,  guarded  by  a  single  division  of  battleships. 

Our  mission  had  been  successfully  accomplished;  the  German  fleet 
is  a  thing  of  the  past ;  the  seas  are  safe  and  free  to  our  own  and  our 
Allies'  ships.  The  value  of  sea  power  could  have  no  better  demon- 
stration. 


COMRADES  OF  THE  MIST  159 

The  British  and  Americans  who  served  together  at  Scapa 
Flow  and  in  the  North  Sea  were  bound  together  by  the  strongest 
ties.  Admiral  Rodman  and  all  our  officers  and  men  felt  they 
were  serving  with  brothers,  and  our  British  allies  felt  the  same 
way  toward  our  own  forces. 

On  their  departure,  Admiral  Sir  David  Beatty,  the  British 
commander-in-chief,  in  an  address  on  board  the  flagship  New 
York,  paid  this  high  tribute  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Ameri- 
can battleships  which  served  with  the  Grand  Fleet : 

There  is  not  much  that  I  have  to  say,  but  what  I  do  say  I  hope  you 
will  understand  comes  from  the  heart,  not  only  my  heart,  but  the  hearts 
of  your  comrades  of  the  Grand  Fleet. 

I  want,  first  of  all,  to  thank  you,  Admiral  Rodman,  the  captains, 
officers,  and  the  ships'  companies  of  the  magnificent  squadron,  for  the 
wonderful  cooperation  and  the  loyalty  you  have  given  to  me  and  to 
my  admirals;  and  the  assistance  that  you  have  given  us  in  every  duty 
you  had  to  undertake.  The  support  which  you  have  shown  is  that  of 
true  comradeship ;  and  in  time  of  stress,  that  is  worth  a  very  great  deal. 
As  somebody  said  the  other  day,  "The  fighting  is  now  over,  the  talking 
is  now  going  to  begin ; ' '  therefore,  I  do  not  want  to  keep  you  here  any 
longer,  but  I  want  to  congratulate  you  for  having  been  present  upon 
a  day  which  is  unsurpassed  in  the  naval  annals  of  the  world. 

I  know  quite  well  that  you,  as  well  as  all  of  your  British  comrades, 
were  bitterly  disappointed  at  not  being  able  to  give  effect  to  that  effi- 
ciency that  you  have  so  well  maintained.  It  was  a  most  disappointing 
day.  It  was  a  pitiful  day  to  see  those  great  ships  coming  in  like  sheep 
being  herded  by  dogs  to  their  fold,  without  an  effort  on  anybody's  part; 
but  it  was  a  day  that  everybody  could  be  proud  of.  I  have  received 
messages  from  several  people,  offering  sympathy  to  the  Grand  Fleet, 
and  my  answer  was  that  we  do  not  want  sympathy ;  we  want  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  the  prestige  of  the  Grand  Fleet  stood  so  high  it 
was  sufficient  to  cause  the  enemy  to  surrender  without  striking  a  blow. 

I  had  always  certain  misgivings,  and  when  the  Sixth  Battle  Squad- 
ron became  a  part  of  the  Grand  Fleet  those  misgivings  were  doubly 
strengthened,  and  I  knew  then  that  they  would  throw  up  their  hands. 
Apparently  the  Sixth  Battle  Squadron  was  the  straw  that  broke  the 
camel's  back.  However,  the  disappointment  that  the  Grand  Fleet  was 
not  able  to  strike  their  blow  for  the  freedom  of  the  world  is  counteracted 
by  the  fact  that  it  was  their  prestige  alone  that  brought  about  this 
achievement. 

I  thank  you  again  and  again,  for  the  great  part  the  Sixth  Battle 
Squadron  played  in  bringing  about  the  greatest  naval  victory  in  history. 
I  hope  you  will  give  this  message  to  your  comrades:  "Come  back  soon. 
Good-bye  and  good  luck ! ' ' 


160  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Suppose  German  battle-cruisers  should  evade  the  vigilance 
of  Allied  capital  ships  and  escape  from  the  North  Sea  and  sud- 
denly attack  troop  carrying  transports!  That  suggestion 
phrased  in  some  such  terms  was  the  thought  uppermost  in  the 
mind  of  every  naval  official  when  troops  began  to  go  over  in 
1918  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands  each  month.  They  recalled 
the  damage  inflicted  by  German  raiders  in  the  early  days  of  the 
war.  To  be  ready  for  such  daring  incursion  a  division  of  dread- 
naughts  was  sent  over,  supplemented  by  submarines.  They  were 
kept  in  readiness  to  put  to  sea,  and  also  at  times  escorted  con- 
voys in  the  Channel  when  submarines  were  reported  in  that 
vicinity.  This  division  was  commanded  by  Admiral  Thomas  S. 
Rodgers,  and  was  composed  of  the  Utah  (Captain  F.  B.  Bas- 
sett) ;  the  Nevada  (Captain  W.  C.  Cole) ;  and  the  Oklahoma 
(Captain  C.  B.  McVay).  They  had  their  base  on  Bantry  Bay, 
Ireland,  ready  to  oppose  any  German  cruisers  which  might 
threaten  shipping  in  the  waters  to  the  south  of  Ireland  and 
England  or  on  the  routes  to  the  ports  of  Northern  France. 

Though  the  German  press,  sorely  disappointed  at  the  failure 
of  U-boats  to  sink  transports,  demanded  that  raiders  dare  every 
risk  and  sink  troop-ships,  they  never  ventured  away  from  the 
protection  of  home  ports.  But  the  dreadnaughts  of  Admiral 
Rodgers  kept  eyes  open  and  steam  up  ready,  if  they  should 
make  the  attempt.  Like  Rodman's  squadron,  they  did  faithful 
work  and  deserve  to  share  the  commendation  accorded  to  Ameri- 
can dreadnaughts  engaged  overseas. 

Three-fourths  of  our  first  line  dreadnaughts  saw  service  in 
European  waters.  All  the  rest,  first  and  second  line,  would 
have  been  taken  over  by  Admiral  Mayo  if  their  presence  had 
been  required. 


IS  *"• 

"so  - 


-  «H 


"en    P 

03     ft 


ft    ° 

ft  ™ 


,3   .£<      ft 


CHAPTER  XV 
"CINDERELLAS  OF  THE  FLEET" 

SUBMAKINE  CHASERS  BOEE  BRILLIANT  PART  IN  ATTACK  ON  DURAZZO — 
SANK    ONE    SUBMARINE,    DAMAGED    ANOTHER,   AND    "THOROUGHLY 

ENJOYED   THEMSELVES' ' QUEER    CODES   FOOLED    THE    GERMANS 

OVER      FOUR      HUNDRED      "  CHASERS "      BUILT STAUNCH      LITTLE 

WOODEN    CRAFT    DID    WONDERFULLY    GOOD    WORK    IN    EUROPE    AND 
AMERICA. 

CINDERELLA  was  not  the  guest  first  invited,  but  when 
she  arrived  she  became  the  belle  of  the  ball.  The  little 
submarine  chasers,  originally  designed  to  protect 
entrance  to  harbors,  to  patrol  coasts  and  keep  close 
to  shore,  won  fame  and  admiration  by  their  splendid  service  in 
Europe  and  America.  These  "Cinderellas  of  the  Fleet"  be- 
came eyes  and  ears  of  the  anti-submarine  forces,  hunters  rightly 
feared  by  the  U-boats,  whose  commanders  had  at  first  looked 
upon  them  with  ill-concealed  contempt. 

Sub-chasers  were  particularly  valuable  as  "listeners,"  the 
submarine  detection  devices  with  which  they  were  equipped 
being  vastly  superior  to  those  previously  in  use.  Organized  in 
"hunting  units" — three  to  the  unit,  the  commander  in  the 
center,  with  a  "wing  boat"  on  either  side — they  were  real 
"chasers"  of  submarines. 

I  am  most  grateful  for  the  valuable  service  rendered  by  twelve  sub- 
marine chasers  under  Captain  Nelson,  U.  S.  N.,  and  Lieutenant  Com- 
mander Bastedo,  U.  S.  N.,  which  I  took  the  liberty  of  employing  in  an 
operation  against  Durazzo  on  October  2.  They  screened  heavy  ships 
during  the  bombardment  under  enemy  fire;  also  apparently  destroyed 
definitely  one  submarine  which  torpedoed  H.  M.  S.  Weymouth,  and 
damaged  and  probably  destroyed  another  submarine. 

During  the  return  voyage  they  assisted  in  screening  H.  M.  S. 
Weymouth,  and  in  escorting  enemy  hospital  ship  which  was  being 
brought  in  for  examination.  Their  conduct  throughout  was  beyond 
praise.  They  all  returned  safely  without  casualties.  They  thoroughly 
enjoyed  themselves. 

161 


162  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

That  was  the  message  sent  by  the  British  Force  Commander 
regarding  the  attack  on  the  Austrian  naval  base  by  British, 
Italian  and  American  vessels  October  2,  1918.  And  the  Italians 
expressed  their  appreciation  in  this  dispatch  from  Rome : 

Italian  Naval  General  Staff  expresses  highest  appreciation  of  useful 
and  efficient  work  performed  by  United  States  chasers  in  protecting 
major  naval  vessels  during  action  against  Durazzo ;  also  vivid  admiration 
of  their  brilliant  and  clever  operations  which  resulted  in  sinking  two 
enemy  submarines. 

The  exploits  of  our  submarine  chasers  formed  a  notable 
feature  of  that  brilliant  and  successful  attack.  When,  on  Satur- 
day, September  28,  the  British  commodore  asked  Captain 
Charles  P.  Nelson,  in  command  at  Corfu,  if  he  could  have  twelve 
chasers,  with  four  days '  supplies,  ready  to  leave  in  twenty-four 
hours,  for  "special  service,"  Nelson's  reply  was  one  word: 
"Yes." 

Sailing  Sunday  evening,  the  next  morning  they  reached  Brin- 
disi,  where  the  Allied  forces  were  assembled  for  the  attack,  and 
received  their  instructions.  It  was  1 :30  a.  m.,  on  October  2nd, 
that  the  four  units,  under  command  of  Captain  Nelson,  got  under 
way  for  the  expedition.  The  chasers  and  their  commanders  were : 

Unit  B — Lieutenant  Commander  Paul  H.  Bastedo,  commanding  on 
S.  C.  215,  Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  "Wildon  A.  Ott;  S.  C.  128,  Ensign 
Hilary  R.  Chambers,  Jr. ;  S.  C.  129,  Ensign  Maclear  Jacoby. 

Unit  D — S.  C.  225,  Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  Elmer  J.  McCluen; 
S.  C.  327,  Ensign  Walter  P.  Grossmann. 

Unit  G — In  command,  Captain  Nelson,  on  board  S.  C.  95;  S.  C.  95, 
Ensign  George  J.  Leovy ;  S.  C.  179,  Ensign  Erskine  Hazard ;  S.  C.  338, 
Ensign  John  M.  Beverly. 

Unit  H— S.  C.  130,  Ensign  Henry  R.  Dann;  S.  C.  324,  Lieutenant 
(junior  grade)  Clifford  W.  Eshom;  S.  C.  337,  Ensign  Andrew  J.  Kelley. 

At  8 :40  they  arrived  off  Durazzo,  and  stood  by  six  miles  from 
shore  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  bombarding  force.  Its  smoke 
could  be  seen  on  the  horizon,  and  as  the  Italian  vessels  hove  in 
sight,  the  sub-chasers  moved  to  their  stations. 

Moving  along  on  the  flanks  of  the  bombing  squadrons,  the 
chasers  acted  as  a  screen  for  the  larger  vessels,  which  poured 
out  a  rain  of  shells  upon  the  Austrian  defenses.    Guarding  the 


"CINDERELLAS  OF  THE  FLEET"  163 

British  Light-Cruiser  Force,  the  three  boats  of  Unit  B  had  to 
run  in  close  to  shore,  only  800  yards  from  the  enemy  batteries. 
They  had  a  lively  experience  for  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  shells 
falling  around  them.  But,  going  at  full  speed  and  "  zigzagging 
to  beat  the  band,"  as  the  sailors  say,  they  managed  to  escape 
unscathed. 

Suddenly  came  the  cry,  "Submarine!"  Sub-chaser  129  had 
sighted  the  moving  feather  of  a.  U-boat  about  1,600  yards  off  her 
port  quarter.  Signaling  to  S.  C.  215,  S.  C.  129  altered  her  course 
to  the  left  to  deliver  an  attack  at  right  angles.  The  U-boat  was 
heading  south,  apparently  getting  in  position  to  attack  the  bom- 
barding forces.  In  a  moment  a  second  feather  was  sighted  a 
little  farther  to  westward.  As  S.  C.  129  reached  the  supposed 
path  of  the  undersea  boat,  a  depth-bomb  was  dropped.  When 
it  exploded,  the  enemy  submerged  for  almost  a  minute,  and  then 
reappeared,  showing  both  periscopes.  S.  C.  129  immediately 
began  laying  a  pattern  of  depth-charges  ahead  of  the  U-boat 
and  at  right  angles  to  his  course. 

When  the  seventh  bomb  exploded,  in  the  water  thrown  up 
objects  resembling  pieces  of  metal  appeared,  and  there  was 
another  explosion,  seemingly  in  the  submarine.  The  chaser 
crew  was  confident  that  submarine  was  destroyed. 

Sub-chaser  215,  sighting  another  periscope  750  yards  away, 
opened  fire  with  her  three-inch  gun  and  port  machine-gun, 
hoisting  signal  to  form  for  attack.  The  second  three-inch  shot 
dropped  within  two  feet  of  the  periscope,  the  commanding  officer 
reported,  and  shattered  it,  a  column  of  water  six  feet  high  rising 
into  the  air.  The  U-boat  seemed  to  be  turning  sharply  to  star- 
board in  the  direction  of  the  British  light  cruisers,  which  were 
then  entering  their  bombarding  sector.  S.  C.  215  and  S.  C.  128 
closed  in  on  the  submarine  and  laid  a  pattern  of  depth-charges. 
As  the  fourth  charge  exploded,  the  executive  officer  of  S.  C.  215 
sang  out,  ' '  That  got  him ! "  He  had  seen  what  appeared  to  be 
a  ship 's  plate  and  debris  rise  to  the  surface  and  then  disappear. 
Heavy  oil  rose,  covering  the  water  in  the  vicinity,  and  the  chaser 
crews  concluded  the  U-boat  had  been  sunk. 

S.  C.  215  and  S.  C.  128  then  turned  and  headed  for  S.  C.  129, 
which  had  first  reported  sighting  a  ' '  sub, ' '  but  which  was  lying 
to,  repairing  her  engines.    The  unit  stood  over  to  capture  the 


164  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Austrian  hospital  ship,  hoisting  the  international  flag,  "Stop 
instantly!"  The  British  cruisers  Nereide  and  Ruby  were,  at 
the  time,  astern  of  the  Austrian  vessel,  and  the  Nereide  sig- 
nalled that  she  would  stop  and  take  off  the  armed  guard  crew  if 
the  chasers  wished  to  take  over  the  hospital  ship.  The  chasers, 
which  were  north  of  the  Austrian  port,  replied  that  they  would 
take  her  over  when  clear  of  Durazzo. 

The  little  American  craft  took  charge  of  the  big  Austrian 
vessel,  the  British  cruisers  Tribune  and  Shark  signaling,  "Go 
to  Brindisi."  Reaching  Brindisi,  they  released  the  hospital 
ship,  which  had  been  taken  to  port  for  investigation.  Then,  with 
a  sense  of  duty  well  done,  the  chasers  dropped  anchor  in  the 
harbor,  and  "called  it  a  day." 

While  Unit  B  enjoyed  the  most  exciting  experience,  all  the 
other  units  were  busy  doing  their  full  share  of  the  work,  escort- 
ing the  bombing  vessels  and  playing  their  part  in  the  bombard- 
ment. When  the  British  cruiser  Weymouth  was  torpedoed, 
Units  D,  C,  and  H  went  to  her  assistance,  and  aided  in  warding 
off  further  attack.  Though  damaged,  the  cruiser  was  safely 
navigated  to  port.  The  boats  of  Unit  D  got  close  enough  to  fire 
at  the  houses  on  Cape  Laghi. 

The  attack  on  Durazzo  was  a  decided  success.  The  city  was 
practically  put  out  of  business  as  a  naval  base,  and  was  of  little 
further  use  to  the  Austrians  who,  defeated  on  land  and  sea, 
soon  sued  for  peace. 

The  United  States  naval  base  at  Corfu,  where  thirty-six  of 
our  sub-chasers  were  stationed,  was  established  May  24,  1918, 
by  Captain  R.  H.  Leigh,  Commander  of  Submarine  Chasers  for 
Distant  Service.  The  primary  duty  of  our  forces  there  was  to 
patrol  the  Straits  of  Otranto,  the  entrance  to  the  Adriatic.  That 
narrow  stretch  of  water,  forty  miles  wide,  from  Corfu  to  the 
"heel"  of  Italy,  was  the  only  route  by  which  Austrian  and 
German  vessels  from  Trieste,  Fiume,  Pola,  and  Durazzo  could 
make  their  way  into  the  Mediterranean. 

There  was  established  the  Otranto  Mobile  Barrage,  which, 
though  comprising  mines  and  nets,  depended  mainly  for  its 
effectiveness  on  patrol  vessels.  There  were  three  lines  of  these, 
at  some  distance  apart,  two  of  British  vessels,  destroyers  and 
trawlers,  and  the  third,  ten  miles  below,   of   our   submarine 


"CINDERELLAS  OF  THE  FLEET"  165 

chasers,  twelve  of  which  patrolled  this  line  day  and  night.  While 
this  barrage  was  by  no  means  "air-tight,"  and  occasionally 
U-boats  slipped  through,  it  proved  very  useful  and  after  its 
establishment  there  was  a  material  decrease  in  submarine  ac- 
tivity in  that  whole  region.  After  the  armistice  an  Austrian 
officer  said  that  six  U-boats  were  lost  in  that  area. 

Four  hundred  and  forty  sub-chasers  were  built,  340  manned 
by  the  United  States  Navy,  and  100  by  the  French.  They  op- 
erated in  the  Atlantic,  Pacific  and  Arctic  Oceans,  in  the  North 
Sea,  in  the  Adriatic,  the  Ionian  and  JEgean  Seas,  and  the  Sea  of 
Marmora.  After  the  armistice,  special  duties  carried  them  to 
Russia,  Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark,  to  Austria,  Dalmatia, 
Greece,  and  Turkey,  and  parts  of  Asia  Minor. 

"How  are  you  going  to  get  them  across  the  Atlantic?" 
foreign  naval  attaches  asked,  when  we  were  turning  out  chasers 
by  scores.  That  was  a  problem,  sending  small  boats  over  3,000 
miles  of  ocean  in  wintry  weather.  Pluck,  daring,  endurance  and 
good  navigation  were  required,  but  the  problem  was  solved  with 
surprising  success. 

Crossing  the  Atlantic  and  going  through  the  Mediterranean 
to  the  Adriatic  under  their  own  power,  they  weathered  storms 
that  distressed  many  a  big  steamship.  But  these  little  110- 
f  ooters  had  some  thrilling  experiences.  Disabled  in  a  terrific  gale 
Sub-chaser  28,  manned  by  the  French,  seemed  doomed.  The 
other  chasers  pulled  through,  but  this  one  was  missing,  and  after 
days  was  given  up  as  lost.  A  month  later  we  were  surprised 
and  delighted  when  the  news  came  that  it  had  reached  the 
Azores.  How  did  that  little  boat,  disabled  and  alone,  manage  to 
make  its  way  700  miles  to  port? 

It  was  a  thrilling  story  Alexis  Puluhen  and  his  men  had  to 
tell.  Storm  tossed,  their  engines  broke  down  and  the  boat  began 
leaking.  Salvoes  were  fired  and  distress  signals  hoisted,  but 
no  relief  came.  Lubricating  oil  was  exhausted,  and  all  the  salad 
oil  and  butter  aboard  were  used  in  an  effort  to  start  up  the 
engines.  All  motive  power  gone,  table-cloths,  sheets,  bed- 
spreads and  blankets  were  rigged  up  as  sails.  Rationing  the 
crew  to  the  smallest  amount  of  food  that  could  sustain  them, 
doling  out  the  drinking  water,  the  little  boat  headed  east.  With 
a  favoring  breeze,  she  could  sail  about  four  knots  an  hour. 


166  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

For  a  month  the  sub-chaser  kept  plodding  along,  laying  its 
course  for  the  Azores.  Occasionally  a  steamer  would  be  sighted 
far  away — four  in  all  were  seen — but  only  one  came  close  enough 
to  see  or  hear  the  S.  C.  28,  and  when  seven  guns,  the  distress  sig- 
nal, were  fired,  that  vessel  ran  away.  At  last,  after  a  struggle  of 
thirty-three  days,  Puluhen  sighted  land.  It  was  Fayal,  one  of 
the  Azores.  He  hoisted  the  signal ' '  YP ' ' — ' '  I  need  a  tug ' ' — and 
not  long  afterward  a  tug  steamed  out,  and  towed  him  into  Horta. 
The  sub-chaser  was  repaired,  continued  across  the  Atlantic,  and 
took  its  place  with  the  other  American-built  chasers  which  served 
on  the  French  coast. 

Three  days  at  sea  and  three  days  in  port,  many  chasers 
steamed  an  average  of  a  thousand  miles  a  month.  "You  people 
on  yachts  and  cruisers  don't  know  what  it  is  to  live  in  a  sub- 
chaser," one  seaman  remarked.  "Tossed  about  on  ocean  swells, 
swept  by  seas,  with  decks  leaking  and  things  below  wet;  gas 
fumes  from  the  engines  filling  the  interior,  sometimes  half  the 
crew  were  seasick.  The  destroyers,  I  know,  were  no  pleasure 
palaces,  and  they  had  no  easy  time,  but  none  of  you  had  a  harder 
job  than  we  fellows  on  the  110-footers."  But  they  took  things 
as  they  came,  with  unfailing  cheerfulness  and  good  humor. 

Some  of  the  sub-chaser  squadrons  developed  codes  of  their 
own  and  got  a  lot  of  fun  out  of  them.  1 1  Quack !  Quack !  Quack ! ' ' 
was  one  sub-chaser  signal.  The  first  time  that  queer  call  was 
heard  over  the  wireless  telephone  in  European  waters  it  mysti- 
fied our  English  friends  quite  as  much  as  it  did  the  Germans. 
And  when  the  call  was  answered  by  an  outbreak  of  strange  words 
and  phrases,  listeners  at  the  radio  phones  in  all  that  area  were 
plainly  puzzled. 

"Quack!  Red-white-blue, ' '  they  could  understand,  though 
what  it  might  mean  they  could  not  conceive.  But  when  it  came 
to  "Quack!  High-low-jack,"  the  thing  was  beyond  all  reason. 

This  was  something  new,  probably  a  German  trick.  The 
British  naval  officers  were  concerned  about  it,  and  were  de- 
cidedly relieved  when  they  found  it  was  no  enemy  concoction 
but  came  from  the  American  sub-chasers  which  had  lately  arrived 
from  across  the  Atlantic.  They  wanted  to  know  what  kind  of 
a  "quack"  game  the  Americans  were  playing.  And  they  were 
vastly  amused  when  told  that  it  was  a  new  code  they  had  de- 


"CINDERELLAS  OF  THE  FLEET"  167 

vised  that  could  be  easily  remembered  by  officers  and  men,  but 
could  not  be  deciphered  by  the  Germans. 

The  commander  of  one  group  named  his  boats  in  jingles  or 
phrases.  Three  boats,  as  I  have  stated,  constituted  a  submarine 
hunting  unit.  One  set  he  designated  as  " red-white-blue,"  an- 
other as  "corn-meal-mush,"  and  a  third  as  "high-low-jack." 
"Quack!  Quack!  Quack!"  meant  "operate  at  once." 

The  men  were  fond  of  making  parodies  on  "Mother  Goose" 
and  other  familiar  rhymes,  applicable  to  their  job  of  hunting 
the  U-boats.  One  of  these,  paraphrasing  "The  Spider  and  the 
Fly, ' '  went  this  way : 

"Won't  you  come  into  my  area?"  said  the  chaser  to  the  "sub"; 
"I'll  treat  you  just  as  kindly  as  I  would  a  tiger  cub; 
"I  will  listen  to  your  motors,  I  will  catch  you  without  fail, 
' '  And  then  I  promise  I  will  put  some  salt  upon  your  tail. ' ' 

What  do  you  suppose  the  Germans  thought  of  all  this  queer 
stuff  that  was  coming  over  the  radiophone?  I  should  have  liked 
to  have  seen  the  U-boat  captains  under  water,  and  code  experts 
in  Berlin  searching  the  books  and  racking  their  brains  to  find 
out  its  meaning,  for  no  boats  or  calls  or  orders  were  ever  phrased 
in  such  language  before. 

The  sub-chasers  put  the  Navy  flag  signals  into  words  instead 
of  letters.  "Able-Boy!"  was  the  code  to  "Take  hunt  forma- 
tion; distance  500  yards."  They  had  a  word  for  every  letter 
in  the  alphabet:  Able,  boy,  cast,  dog,  easy,  fox,  George,  have, 
item,  jig,  king,  love,  Mike,  Nan,  oboe,  pup,  quack,  rot,  sail,  tare, 
unit,  vice,  watch,  X-ray,  yoke,  zed. 

Almost  any  necessary  order  or  information  could  be  trans- 
mitted by  radiophone  by  means  of  this  code.  Here  is  a  typical 
instance  of  how  it  worked  when  a  submarine  was  heard : 

Listener  of  Boat  No.  1  reports:   "Submarine,  90  degrees." 
Executive  officer:    "Submarine,  123  degrees." 

Executive  reports:  "2  (number  of  wing-boat)  turbine  112  degrees." 
Executive  reports:   "3  (number  of  other  wing-boat)  submarine  130 
degrees. ' ' 

Captain  orders:    "Course  123  degrees." 
Executive  to  Radio  :   ' '  Fox-unit ;  dog-easy-cast ! ' ' 
Executive  to  Listener :   ' '  Up  tube. ' ' 


168  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

At  the  order  ' '  Up  tube, ' '  the  listening  tube  was  raised  from 
its  position  beneath  the  vessel;  the  signal-boy  beside  the  mast 
hoisted  the  cone,  the  position  of  which  showed  the  other  boats 
what  the  engine  of  this  sub-chaser  was  doing ;  the  steersman  put 
the  wheel  over,  and  the  vessel  headed  for  the  estimated  locality 
of  the  U-boat.    All  this  was  done  in  a  moment  or  two. 

If  the  submarine  was  not  located,  the  captain  ordered 
1 '  Stop ! ' '  the  executive  called,  ' '  Down  tube ! ' '  The  tube,  which 
extends  through  the  bottom  of  the  chaser,  was  lowered,  and  the 
listener  strove  again  to  hear  any  sound  of  the  U-boat. 

When  the  success  of  our  detection  devices  had  been  demon- 
strated, it  was  decided  that  sub-chasers  were  well  adapted  to 
this  duty,  and  were  to  be  used  mainly  for  this  purpose.  On 
May  12,  1918,  six  arrived  at  Portsmouth,  England,  and  with 
the  destroyer  Aylwin  began  training  tests  with  British  sub- 
marines, south  of  the  Isle  of  Wight.  Eighteen  chasers  soon  after 
reached  Plymouth,  and  this  under  command  of  Captain  Lyman 
A.  Cotten  was  made  the  chief  base,  having  eventually  a  force  of 
66  vessels.  On  August  20th,  30  of  these  chasers  were  or- 
dered to  Queenstown,  where  a  base  had  been  established  under 
command  of  Captain  A.  J.  Hepburn. 

The  Plymouth  sub-chasers  were  in  an  area  of  considerable 
submarine  activity,  and  reported  a  number  of  contacts.  The 
S.  C.  84,  85  and  86,  Ensigns  E.  F.  Williams,  A.  B.  Baker  and  G. 
H.  Lane,  respectively,  were  credited  with  attacking  and  damag- 
ing a  U-boat  on  July  10th.  Nine  chasers,  Units  6,  2,  and  10,  were 
on  hunt  off  the  English  coast  on  September  6th,  when  the  lis- 
teners heard  a  submarine.  Unit  2  attacked,  dropped  depth- 
charges,  but  its  flagship  was  damaged  by  an  explosion,  and  Unit 
6  took  up  the  pursuit.  Located  again,  the  U-boat  went  down, 
and  the  chasers  bombarded  her  with  depth-charges.  Her  ma- 
chinery was  evidently  badly  damaged.  Listeners  could  hear  the 
crew  at  work  on  the  motors  which  would  at  times  turn  a  few 
revolutions;  but  at  last  they  stopped  dead.  The  U-boat  was 
unable  to  move.  The  chasers  dropped  over  the  spot  all  the  depth- 
bombs  they  had,  and  at  6:15  two  boats  were  sent  to  Penzance 
to  get  a  fresh  supply. 

A  water  buoy,  with  50-fathom  wire  cable,  was  dropped  near 
the  spot,  lanterns  were  hung  on  it;  and  the  chasers  got  into 


3"   > 


I! 
s  I 

"         03 


m  53 

H  " 

pq  -3 

t>  On 

W 

ft  * 

M  o 

c  H 
h3 

ft 


"CINDERELLAS  OF  THE  FLEET"  169 

position  for  the  night.  At  times  the  listeners  reported  that  the 
U-boat  crew  made  attempts  to  start  their  motors.  The  next 
morning  a  few  faint  sounds  were  heard,  and  at  last  there  came 
a  noise  of  firing  as  if  from  revolvers  or  rifles,  first  three,  then 
22  shots.  After  this,  nothing  was  heard,  though  the  chasers 
remained  on  the  scene  all  afternoon.  They  had  been  there  thirty 
hours  from  the  time  the  attack  began.  The  chaser  crews  firmly 
believed  that  the  U-boat's  crew  perished  in  their  steel  tomb, 
which  sank  to  the  bottom,  never  to  rise  again. 

The  best  evidence  of  the  good  work  done  by  our  vessels  at 
Plymouth  is  the  fact,  shown  by  official  records,  that  from  June 
30th  to  the  end  of  August,  during  which  time  our  sub-chasers 
were  covering  the  area  between  Start  Point  and  Lizard  Head, 
not  a  single  Allied  or  merchant  ship  was  attacked  nor  were  any 
mines  laid  by  the  U-boats.  This  was  in  a  section  where  some 
months  before  sinkings  were  of  almost  daily  occurrence.  After 
August,  when  many  of  our  boats  were  withdrawn  for  duty  far- 
ther to  the  westward,  several  ships  were  attacked  and  sunk, 
and  mine-laying,  though  on  a  small  scale,  was  resumed.  This  is 
regarded  as  conclusive  proof  that  it  was  our  little  sub-chasers 
which  made  that  area  safe  for  Allied  shipping  in  that  important 
period. 

"While  at  Gibraltar,  on  their  way  to  Corfu,  the  thirty  chasers 
under  command  of  Captain  Nelson  engaged  in  several  hunts, 
on  May  17,  1918,  locating  and  chasing  a  U-boat  to  a  point 
12  miles  northeast  of  Gibraltar.  On  June  13th,  four  of  them 
formed  patrol  line  to  guard  the  commercial  anchorage  against 
a  submarine  which  had  been  sighted. 

Eighteen  sub-chasers  were  sent  to  the  Mediterranean  to 
patrol  the  Gibraltar  Barrage,  and  though  they  were  on  that 
duty  only  from  Nov.  6th  to  11th,  Admiral  Niblack  reported  that 
they  made  four  contacts  and  three  attacks,  and  that  one  was 
particularly  well  conducted  and  it  was  " highly  probable  sub- 
marine was  damaged,  and  possibly  destroyed." 

This  group  closed  its  war  service  with  two  exciting  experi- 
ences. On  November  10th  the  S.  C.  126,  190  and  353,  while  on 
patrol,  were  mistaken  for  enemy  submarines  and  were  fired  upon 
by  the  steamship  Bahia.  The  next  day,  about  the  time  the 
armistice  went  into  effect,  a  British  vessel,  without  waiting  for 


170  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

recognition  signals,  fired  on  the  S.  C.  214.    Luckily  the  shells 
missed  and  the  sturdy  little  boats  escaped  unscathed. 

The  organization  of  our  sub-chaser  service  in  European 
waters  was: 

At  U.  S.  Naval  Headquarters.  London — Captain  R.  H.  Leigh,  Com- 
mander Sub-chasers,  Distant  Service;  Lieutenant  Commander  W.  R. 
Carter,  detection  devices;  Lieutenant  Commander  E.  C.  Raguet,  com- 
munication officer;  Lieutenant  Commander  R.  M.  Griffin,  sub-chasers; 
C.  F.  Scott,  technical  expert,  devices ;  E.  L.  Nelson,  technical  expert,  radio. 

Sub-chaser  Detachment  1,  Plymouth — Captain  L.  A.  Cotten,  com- 
manding; Hannibal,  repair  ship;  Parker,  Aylwin,  destroyers;  36  to  66 
sub-chasers. 

Submarine  Detachment  2,  Corfu — Captain  C.  P.  Nelson,  command- 
ing; Hannibal,  repair  ship;  36  sub-chasers. 

Submarine  Detachment  3,  Queenstown — Captain  A.  J.  Hepburn,  com- 
manding; 30  sub-chasers. 

These  were  the  principal  bases,  though  our  chasers  also  did 
valuable  work  from  Brest,  Gibraltar  and  other  points  and  at 
the  Azores. 

Twenty-four  sub-chasers  assisted  in  sweeping  up  the  mines 
of  the  North  Sea  Barrage  from  April  to  the  end  of  September, 
1919,  and  four  were  damaged  by  exploding  mines. 

The  sub-chasers  played  an  important  part  in  operations 
against  the  German  U-boats  off  the  American  coast  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1918.  Scores  of  them  were  on  patrol  along  the  Atlantic, 
and  speeded  to  the  vicinity  whenever  a  submarine  was  reported. 
Immediately  after  the  U-151  appeared  off  the  New  Jersey  Coast, 
June  2,  a  special  hunting  group  was  formed  of  33  sub-chasers, 
headed  by  the  destroyers  Jouett,  Henley  and  Perkins,  and  later 
another  group,  headed  by  the  Patterson,  was  organized.  These 
hunters  kept  on  the  move,  pursuing  the  "subs"  for  months,  from 
the  Virginia  Capes  to  Nova  Scotia. 

Many  were  kept  busy  escorting  coastwise  convoys,  and  pa- 
trolling the  coast.  One  group  is  reported  to  have  escorted  from 
port,  with  other  naval  ships,  vessels  bearing  400,000  troops. 
Many  chasers  were  almost  constantly  at  sea.  The  Hampton 
Roads  Squadron,  in  command  of  Lieutenant  Herbert  L.  Stone, 
averaged  75  per  cent  of  the  time  on  duty.  Sub-chasers,  under 
Lieutenant  Le  Sauvage,  in  the  vicinity  of  Fire  Island,  when  the 
San  Diego  was  lost,  were  on  duty  28  days  out  of  30. 


"CINDERELLAS  OF  THE  FLEET"  171 

Patrolling  and  listening  was  dangerous  work,  for  the  little 
boats  lying  in  the  shipping  lines,  with  all  vessels  running  with- 
out lights,  might  be  run  down  or  mistaken  for  enemy  craft.  This 
was  the  fate  of  S.  C.  209.  Shelled  and  sunk  off  Fire  Island  by 
the  steamship  Felix  Taussig,  two  of  her  officers,  Lieutenant 
Henry  J.  Bowes  and  Ensign  E.  H.  Randolph,  and  fourteen 
enlisted  men  lost  their  lives. 

Keeping  open  the  shipping  lines  from  Mexican  and  Gulf  oil 
fields  was  an  important  duty;  it  was  considered  probable  that 
the  U-boats  would  extend  their  operations  to  Mexican  waters. 
Consequently  we  organized  a  special  hunting  squadron  of  12 
sub-chasers,  headed  by  the  U.  S.  S.  Salem  (Captain  S.  V.  Gra- 
ham), as  a  part  of  the  American  Patrol  Detachment  commanded 
by  Rear  Admiral  Anderson,  which  patrolled  the  waters  of  the 
Gulf  and  Caribbean. 

Twelve  sub-chasers  served  in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  eight 
being  stationed  at  the  Atlantic  entrance,  and  four  at  the  Pacific 
entrance  to  the  Canal,  which  it  was  their  mission  to  protect. 

Six  chasers  were  assigned  to  duty  in  Nova  Scotia,  three  based 
on  Halifax,  and  three  on  Sydney,  Cape  Breton.  Arriving  in 
May,  1918,  they  were  engaged  in  patrol,  convoy  and  guard  duty, 
and  conducted  a  number  of  submarine  hunts  when  the  U-boats 
were  active  in  that  region.  Two  were  sent  with  the  Explorer 
to  Alaska,  for  protection  against  alien  enemies  and  disturbing 
elements  which  threatened  the  fish  pack  and  other  industries  of 
that  region.  Sub-chaser  310,  to  which  was  assigned  the  section 
between  the  Canadian  boundary  and  Petersburg,  visited  112 
canneries  and  other  points,  covering  6,079  miles.  The  S.  C. 
309,  which  patrolled  the  remainder  of  southeast  Alaska,  visited 
132  points  and  covered  8,500  miles. 

Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  voyage  of  these  small  craft 
was  made  by  the  group  built  at  Puget  Sound  Navy  Yard,  near 
Seattle.  These  chasers,  under  command  of  a  reserve  officer, 
Lieutenant  Roscoe  Howard,  all  manned  by  reservists,  who  were 
trained  at  the  station  while  the  boats  were  building,  were 
brought  down  the  Pacific  Coast,  through  the  Panama  Canal  and 
up  to  New  London,  and  from  there  several  of  them  sailed  for 
Europe,  reaching  the  Azores,  arriving  just  as  hostilities  ended. 
Sailing  from  Bremerton  May  6,  1918,  this  group  was  joined  by 


172  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

others  at  San  Diego,  Magdalena  Bay  and  Pinchilinque  until 
there  were  fifteen  in  the  party.  August  4th,  at  8  p.  m.,  they  ar- 
rived at  New  London,  where  officers  and  men  began  their  train- 
ing in  listening  and  anti-submarine  tactics.  They  had  success- 
fully negotiated  a  voyage  of  7,470  miles ;  escorted  2,985  miles,  un- 
escorted 4,485.  Three  of  the  Pacific  coast  boats  were  in  the  con- 
voy of  10  American  and  19  French  chasers  which  left  New 
London,  October  24th,  for  Europe,  Captain  H.  G.  Sparrow,  in 
the  cruiser  Chicago,  commanding  the  convoy.  They  proceeded 
via  Bermuda,  and  were  only  a  day  off  the  Azores  when  the  news 
came  that  the  war  was  over. 

After  the  armistice,  sub-chasers  were  sent  on  various  mis- 
sions, to  Austria,  Turkey,  Norway,  Sweden,  Holland  and  Den- 
mark.    They  served  from  Northern  Russia  to  the  Black  Sea. 

When  the  work  abroad  was  ended  and  the  homeward  bound 
pennant  was  flying  over  these  glory-bedecked  Cinderellas,  the 
spirit  of  contest  and  mastery  of  the  sea  did  not  permit  them  to 
be  towed  back  to  the  United  States  or  to  come  quietly  and  de- 
liberately under  their  own  power.  Eternal  youth  and  love  of 
victory  was  in  their  blood,  and  ships  which  had  won  world 
applause  at  Durazzo  decided  upon  a  race  from  the  Bermudas. 

Six  which  had  rendered  conspicuous  service — the  S.  C.  90, 
129, 131,  217,  224  and  351— were  selected  for  the  contest.  Start- 
ing at  4 :21  p.  m.,  August  16th,  their  progress  was  followed  with 
general  interest,  being  reported  by  the  Ontario,  their  escort,  and 
bulletined  all  over  the  country. 

The  race  was  won  by  S.  C.  131  (Lieutenant  Joseph  L.  Day), 
which  arrived  at  Ambrose  Channel  lightship  at  1 :17  a.  m., 
August  19, 1919.  Her  running  time  was  56  hours,  56  minutes — 
8  hours  and  43  minutes  less  than  that  made  by  the  Dream,  which 
had  set  the  fastest  pace  in  1914.  Four  of  the  others  also  beat 
the  best  previous  record. 

The  sub-chasers,  after  long  and  wearing  service  in  the  war 
zone,  had  excelled  the  speedy  light  pleasure  craft. 

It  was  a  race  of  thoroughbreds,  and  when  the  winner  tied  up 
at  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard,  there  was  the  same  absence  of  self 
exploitation  that  had  signalled  the  services  of  the  Cinderellas 
from  the  first  day  they  began  writing  glowing  pages  of  new 
achievement  against  new  enemies. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
"DO  NOT  SURRENDER"— "NEVER!" 

SHIP  SHELLED,   MEN   WOUNDED,   NAVY  GUNNERS   ON   "j.   L.  LUCKEN- 

BACH ' '  FOUGHT  SUBMARINE  FOUR  HOURS ARMED  GUARDS  SAILING 

WAR    ZONE    BEFORE    WAR    WAS    DECLARED HAD    227    ENCOUNTERS 

WITH     SUBMARINES FIRST     IN     SERVICE,     THEY     WERE     FIRST     IN 

SACRIFICE "HAND  IT  TO    'EM,  JOe!" 

NAVY  gunners,  manning  Navy  guns  on  American  mer- 
chant ships,  were  sailing  the  war  zone  before  the  United 
States  declared  war.     First  to  get  into  action,  these 
armed  guards  had  more  than  two  hundred  encounters 
with  submarines,  many  of  them  long-fought  gunfire  battles. 
First  in  service,  they  were  first  in  sacrifice. 

The  night  President  Wilson  delivered  his  war  message  to 
Congress,  when  I  returned  from  the  Capitol  to  my  office  in  the 
Navy  Department,  I  was  greeted  by  this  dispatch  from  the 
American  Ambassador  to  France: 

Secretary  of  State,  Paris,  April  2. 

Washington. 

Urgent:  Foreign  Office  has  just  informed  me  that  the  American 
steamer  Aztec  was  torpedoed  at  nine  p.  m.  last  night  far  out  at  sea 
off  Island  of  Ushant;  that  one  boat  from  the  steamer  has  been  found 
with  nineteen  survivors  who  were  landed  this  afternoon  at  Brest. 
Twenty-eight  persons  are  still  missing  and  although  two  patrol  vessels 
are  searching  for  them,  the  stormy  condition  of  sea  and  weather  renders 
their  rescue  doubtful.  Foreign  Office  not  informed  of  names  of  sur- 
vivors.   Will  cable  further  details  as  soon  as  obtainable. 

Sharp. 

A  later  dispatch  stated  that  only  eleven  were  missing  and 
that  Lieutenant  William  F.  Gresham  and  the  boys  from  the 
Dolphin  were  safe.  This  possessed  a  personal  interest  for  me, 
for  the  Dolphin  was  the  vessel  assigned  to  the  Secretary  of  the 

173 


174  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Navy,  and  had  furnished  this  first  crew  for  an  armed  ship.  The 
news  that  night  was  reassuring,  but  we  were  saddened  to  learn, 
next  day,  that  one  of  our  seamen  had  gone  down — John  I. 
Eopolucci,  of  Washington,  the  first  man  of  the  American  armed 
forces  to  lose  his  life  in  service  against  Germany. 

The  first  officer  lost  was  Lieutenant  Clarence  C.  Thomas,  of 
Grass  Valley,  California,  commander  of  the  armed  guard  on  the 
Vacuum,  who,  with  four  of  his  men,  perished  after  the  sinking 
of  that  steamer  on  April  28th. 

The  Mongolia  was  first  to  report  a  "hit"  against  a  sub- 
marine, April  19th,  Lieutenant  Bruce  Ware  stating  that  a  shell 
from  his  guns  struck  the  U-boat's  conning-tower,  knocking  off 
part  of  the  shell-plating,  a  cloud  of  smoke  covering  the  spot 
where  the  "sub"  disappeared. 

Not  long  afterward  a  cablegram  was  received  from  Paris 
announcing  that  an  American  armed  vessel  had  sunk  a  sub- 
marine in  the  Mediterranean.  The  ship  was  the  Silver  Shell, 
and  the  encounter,  which  occurred  off  the  Balearic  Islands,  was 
thus  reported  by  Chief  Turret  Captain  William  J.  Clark: 

May  30,  at  5 :35  p.  m.,  a  submarine  was  sighted  off  starboard  beam, 
flying  no  flag  or  marks  of  identification.  Manned  and  loaded  both  guns. 
Hoisted  colors  and  waited  about  10  minutes.  Fired  after-gun  with 
sights  set  at  4,000  yards,  scale  49,  and  fired  purposely  short  to  see  what 
the  submarine  would  do,  as  she  was  closing  in  on  the  Silver  Shell.  At 
the  same  instant  of  our  flash,  the  submarine  fired  a  shot,  the  shell  drop- 
ping 100  yards  short  amidships.  The  ship  was  swung  to  port  to  bring 
the  submarine  astern. 

Twenty-five  rounds  were  fired  at  the  submarine,  the  last  two  of  which 
appeared  to  be  hits.  As  the  last  shot  landed  the  submarine's  bow  raised 
up  and  went  down  suddenly.  The  crew  of  the  submarine,  who  were 
on  deck,  did  not  have  time  to  get  inside,  so  it  is  believed  there  is  not 
much  doubt  about  her  being  hit.  The  submarine  fired  in  all  32  rounds, 
the  last  four  of  which  were  shrapnel  and  exploded  overhead. 

The  master  of  the  Silver  Shell,  John  Charlton,  was  con- 
vinced that  the  submarine  was  destroyed,  and  in  his  report  said : 
"One  shot  struck  the  submarine  flush,  hitting  the  ammunition 
on  the  deck.  There  was  a  flash  of  flame,  and  within  a  minute 
she  had  disappeared."  Captain  John  R.  Edie,  U.  S.  N.  (re- 
tired), the  naval  representative  who  investigated  the  matter  and 
heard  all  the  evidence,  made  a  report,  dated  Toulon,  June  3,  in 


"DO  NOT  SURRENDER"— "NEVER!"  175 

which  he  said:  "There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  but  that  the 
submarine  was  sunk." 

The  combats  of  the  Campana,  Luckenbach,  Nyanza,  Chincha, 
Borinquen,  Norlina,  Moreni  and  a  score  of  others  are  among 
the  thrilling  incidents  of  the  war.  These  armed  guards  of  16 
to  32  men,  usually  under  command  of  a  chief  petty  officer,  served 
on  practically  every  American  merchant  vessel  that  plied  the 
war  zone,  and  made  a  record  for  bravery  and  efficiency  which 
would  be  difficult  to  excel. 

One  of  the  longest  fights  on  record  was  that  of  the  J.  L. 
Luckenbach,  which  began  at  7 :30  o'clock,  the  morning  of  October 
19,  1917,  and  continued  four  hours.  The  submarine,  which  was 
disguised  as  a  steamer,  opened  fire  at  long  range.  The  Lucken- 
bach instantly  replied  with  both  her  guns.  Closing  in  to  2,000 
yards,  the  U-boat,  which  was  of  large  type,  with  heavy  ordnance, 
began  to  pour  forth  a  rain  of  shells.  One  shot  exploded  on  the 
deck,  partially  destroying  the  gun-crew's  quarters,  bursting  the 
fire-main,  and  setting  afire  that  part  of  the  ship.  Another  shot 
landed  near  the  stern,  putting  the  after-gun  out  of  commission. 

Pieces  of  shell  were  falling  all  around  the  deck.  Two  shots 
landed  on  the  port  side  forward,  striking  the  oilers'  room  and 
blowing  a  large  hole  in  the  ship's  side.  One  struck  on  the  port 
side  at  the  water-line,  hitting  the  fresh-water  tank,  the  water 
supply  pouring  out.  Another  burst  in  the  petty  officers'  mess- 
room,  wounding  two  men.  One  shot  passed  through  the  weather 
screen  on  the  bridge,  and  exploded  in  the  cargo.  Pieces  of  shell 
hit  V.  Louther,  of  the  armed  guard,  wounding  him  in  three 
places.  While  carrying  ammunition  forward,  a  sailor  was  hit 
and  severely  injured,  and  a  gunner  was  blinded  by  fumes.  Then 
a  shell  exploded  in  the  engine-room,  wounding  the  first  and  third 
engineers,  and  putting  the  engine  out  of  business. 

Struck  a  dozen  times,  with  exploding  shells  overhead  sending 
down  a  hail  of  steel,  nine  men  wounded  and  its  engine  disabled, 
the  Luckenbach  fought  on.  Its  armed  guard  was  under  com- 
mand of  J.  B.  Trautner,  chief  master-at-arms. 

Distress  signals  had  been  sent  out  soon  after  the  firing  be- 
gan, hours  before,  and  had  been  answered  by  the  Nicholson, 
82  miles  away.  The  destroyer  was  hurrying  to  the  steamer's 
assistance  at  high  speed ;  but  it  hardly  seemed  possible  for  her 


176  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

to  arrive  in  time.    There  was  a  constant  exchange  of  messages 
between  steamship  and  destroyer : 

"S.  0.  S. — J.  L.  Luckenbach  being  gunned  by  submarine." 

"We  are  coming,"  signalled  the  Nicholson. 

"Our  steam  is  cut  off.    How  soon  can  you  get  here?" 

1 '  Stick  to  it ;  will  be  with  you  in  three  hours. ' ' 

"Shell  burst  in  engine-room.     Engineer  crippled." 

"Fire  in  our  forehold.    They  are  now  shooting  at  our  antennae." 

"How  far  are  you  away?"  asked  the  Luckenbach.  "Code  books 
thrown  overboard.     How  soon  will  you  arrive?" 

"In  two  hours,"  answered  the  Nicholson. 

"Too  late,"  replied  the  Luckenbach.  "Look  out  for  boats.  They 
are  shelling  us. ' ' 

' '  Do  not  surrender ! ' '  radioed  the  Nicholson. 

' '  Never ! ' '  answered  the  Luckenbach. 

It  was  after  eleven  o'clock  when  smoke  was  seen  and  the 
ship  headed  towards  the  destroyer  to  lessen  the  distance.  Then 
that  shell  exploded  in  the  engine-room,  and  put  the  engine  out 
of  business.  As  the  Nicholson  approached,  her  guns  were  loaded 
and  pointed,  the  torpedo-tubes  made  ready,  and  the  crew  pre- 
pared for  action.  The  watch-officer  in  the  f oretop  reported  that 
he  could  see  the  ship,  smoke  coming  out  of  her  hull  and  shells 
splashing  around  her. 

Then  he  sighted  the  U-boat  far  away,  but  almost  dead  ahead. 
" Train  and  fire!"  ordered  the  captain.  "Boom!"  went  the 
gun.  The  U-boat  risked  another  shell  or  two  at  the  steamer. 
But  when  the  destroyer's  third  shot  landed  close  by,  the  "sub" 
quickly  submerged,  and  hurried  away.  The  U-boat  had  fired 
225  rounds,  the  Luckenbach  202.  When  the  destroyer  reached 
the  scene,  the  enemy  was  gone,  hidden  under  water,  leaving 
hardly  a  trace. 

The  Nicholson  sent  her  surgeon  and  senior  watch-officer  to 
the  damaged  steamer.  They  dressed  the  wounds  of  the  injured 
nine.  Two  armed  guardsmen  were  found  lying  under  a  gun, 
seriously  hurt.  The  third,  hit  in  three  places  by  shell  frag- 
ments, was  walking  around  the  deck,  his  cap  cocked  over  his 
ear,  proud  as  a  game  rooster.  Not  stopping  after  he  was  first 
hit,  he  was  carrying  ammunition  to  the  gun  when  he  was  struck 
again  in  the  shoulder.  As  he  laid  his  projectile  on  the  deck, 
another  fragment  of  flying  shell  hit  him.    Then  he  really  got 


"DO  NOT  SURRENDER"— "NEVER!"  177 

mad.  Shaking  his  fist  toward  the  "sub,"  he  shouted,  "No 
damned  German 's  going  to  hit  me  three  times  and  get  away  with 
it."  Grabbing  his  shell  off  the  deck,  he  slammed  it  into  the 
breech,  and  yelled  to  the  gun-pointer,  ' '  Hand  it  to  'em,  Joe ! ' ' 

The  ship 's  engineer  had  two  ribs  smashed,  a  piece  of  shrap- 
nel in  his  neck,  and  part  of  his  foot  shot  away.  He  was  lying 
down,  "cussing"  the  Germans.  "Put  me  on  my  feet,  men," 
he  asked,  and  two  oilers  set  him  up.  For  ten  minutes  more  he 
poured  out  a  steady  stream  of  denunciation  of  the  "blankety- 
blank"  U-boats.  After  he  had  expressed,  in  all  the  languages 
he  could  command,  his  full  and  free  opinion  of  the  whole  German 
nation,  he  went  to  work,  repaired  the  engine,  got  up  steam  and 
the  Luchenbach  began  to  move. 

Some  of  the  men  were  so  seriously  wounded  that  the  Nichol- 
son's doctor  was  left  on  the  steamer  to  care  for  them.  Soon 
afterward  he  found  he  was  the  senior  naval  officer  aboard,  and 
all  looked  to  him  for  orders.  He  was  a  doctor,  not  a  navigator. 
The  ship  was  bound  for  Havre,  going  alone  through  the  sub- 
marine-infested zone.  Running  without  lights  in  a  locality 
where  vessels  were  numerous  was  a  risky  business,  which  in- 
creased in  danger  as  they  neared  the  coast.  The  skipper  was 
not  sure  of  his  course.  He  had  never  made  a  port  in  France 
before,  and  knew  nothing  of  the  tides.  The  mates  were  equally 
uncertain. 

The  doctor  trusted  to  them  until  three  o  'clock  in  the  morning, 
when  he  found  the  ship  had  run  aground.  Then  he  took  a  hand 
in  navigation.  The  captain  and  the  mate  were  examining  a  chart 
on  deck  and  wondering  how  they  had  missed  the  shore  light. 
Studying  the  charts,  the  doctor  told  them  they  should  have  been 
twenty  miles  further  east,  and  said,  ' '  Now,  I  '11  take  charge. ' ' 

Fortunately,  it  was  low  tide  when  the  ship  went  on  the  beach, 
and  when  the  flood-tide  came  at  daylight,  the  vessel,  using  her 
engines,  was  backed  off.  By  eleven  o'clock  they  had  reached 
the  entrance  to  Havre. 

Seeing  her  coming,  with  the  marks  of  battle  upon  her,  the 
people  crowded  down  to  the  water-front.  They  cheered  the 
Navy  gun-crew,  the  sailors,  and  there  were  tears  for  the  wounded 
and  cheers  for  the  doctor  as  he  came  down  the  gang-plank  with 
them. 


178  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Attacked  by  a  submarine  off  the  Spanish  coast,  a  shell  ex- 
ploded in  the  gasoline  tank  of  the  Moreni  and  set  the  ship  afire. 
Chief  Boatswain's  Mate  Andrew  Copassaki  and  his  gun-crew 
had  begun  firing  as  soon  as  the  ''sub"  was  sighted,  but  the 
Moreni  was  slow  and  the  U-boat  had  a  decided  advantage.  Rain- 
ing shells  upon  the  ship,  the  enemy  shot  away  her  steering  gear, 
and  the  vessel,  beyond  control,  began  steaming  around  in  a  circle, 
but  the  naval  gunners  kept  shooting  away. 

Two  men  were  wounded ;  one  life-boat  upset  as  it  struck  the 
water  and  two  of  the  merchant  crew  were  drowned.  But  the 
armed  guard  kept  up  the  fight  until  the  entire  ship  was  in 
flames.  During  the  contest,  which  lasted  over  two  hours,  the 
Moreni  fired  150  shots,  the  submarine  200.  The  ship  was  hit  45 
times.  When  the  Spanish  steamship  Valbanera  came  up  to  res- 
cue the  survivors,  both  the  Spaniards  and  the  Germans  aboard 
the  submarine  cheered  the  Moreni's  naval  gun-crew  for  the 
brave  fight  they  had  made. 

After  his  return  to  this  country,  I  had  the  pleasure  of  con- 
gratulating Copassaki,  who  came  to  my  office.  Tall  and  bronzed, 
with  a  sweeping  black  moustache,  he  was  a  stalwart  figure, 
modest  as  he  was  brave. 

"That  must  have  been  a  thrilling  experience  you  had,"  I 
remarked  as  I  thanked  him.  "It  must  have  been  terrific  for 
those  men  at  the  guns,  with  the  flames  mounting  around  them." 
"It  was  pretty  hot,"  modestly  replied  Copassaki,  who  seemed 
to  think  that  about  covered  the  subject. 

The  first  Americans  taken  prisoner  by  the  Germans  were 
Chief  Gunner's  Mate  James  Delaney,  four  members  of  the 
armed  guard  and  the  master  of  the  Campana,  which  was  sunk 
about  150  miles  from  the  French  coast  on  August  6,  1917.  But 
they  were  captured  only  after  a  running  fight  of  more  than  four 
hours,  during  which  the  Campana  fired  170  shots  and  the  U-boat 
twice  as  many.  After  three  hours'  firing,  the  Campana' 's  captain 
wanted  to  stop  and  abandon  ship  to  avoid  casualties,  as  the 
vessel  was  clearly  outranged  by  the  more  powerful  guns  of  the 
submarine,  but  Delaney  protested,  and  kept  up  the  fight  for  an 
hour  and  ten  minutes  longer,  firing  until  his  ammunition  was 
exhausted. 

The  submarine,  the  U-61,  headed  for  the  life-boats,  keeping 


"DO  NOT  SURRENDER"— "NEVER!"  179 

its  6-inch  gun  and  revolvers  pointed  at  the  ^survivors.  They 
took  aboard  Delaney  and  four  of  his  gunners,  and  Captain 
Oliver,  the  ship's  master. 

Believing  Delaney  was  a  lieutenant,  the  U-boat  officers  grilled 
him  for  hours  with  questions,  but  could  get  nothing  out  of  him. 
The  German  captain  congratulated  him,  and  told  him  that  he 
had  put  up  the  longest  fight  any  merchantman  had  ever  made 
against  a  submarine.  The  U-boat  had  not  only  shot  away  most 
of  its  shells,  but  had  fired  two  torpedoes  at  the  Camp  an  a,  and 
its  captain  told  Delaney  he  would  have  to  carry  him  and  some 
of  his  gunners  to  Germany,  as  otherwise  they  could  hardly  make 
their  authorities  believe  they  had  had  to  expend  so  much  am- 
munition to  "get"  a  single  ship. 

That  evening  about  six  o  'clock,  the  U-61  encountered  a  decoy 
ship.  Coming  up  on  what  appeared  to  be  an  unarmed  vessel, 
they  fired  three  shots,  and  one  of  the  Germans  sitting  near 
Delaney  remarked,  "One  more  ship."  But  she  was  not  the 
easy  prey  they  thought  she  was,  and  the  U-boat  had  to  make  a 
quick  dive  to  escape.  "All  the  sailors  rushed  down  through  the 
hatch,  the  submarine  seemed  to  stand  on  her  bow  end,  and  every- 
thing capsized  as  she  submerged,"  Delaney  said.  "We  went 
down  62  meters.  Everybody  was  scared,  and  they  said  our 
Allies  were  trying  to  drown  us." 

After  seven  days '  cruising  the  U-boat  arrived  at  Heligoland, 
where  Delaney  and  his  men  were  landed,  and  then  sent  to 
Wilhelmshaven.  After  four  days  in  barracks,  they  were  taken 
to  the  prison  camp  at  Brandenburg,  where  there  were  10,000 
prisoners,  British,  French  and  Italian.  Conditions  in  the  camp, 
which  was  built  around  a  small  lake  which  served  as  a  sewage 
dump,  were  almost  intolerable,  and  many  prisoners  died.  When 
Delaney  protested  against  the  guards  stealing  parcels  sent  to 
prisoners,  he  was  hauled  up  and  "strafed"  by  the  officers.  He 
defied  them  and  a  sergeant  drew  his  sword,  and  threatened  to 
run  it  through  the  American  sailor.  But  the  others  held  him 
back.  The  six  Americans  had  many  trying  experiences,  and 
were  not  released  until  after  the  armistice;  yet  all  survived 
and,  leaving  Germany  December  8,  1918,  returned  safely  home. 

Dodging  a  torpedo,  which  missed  her  by  only  ten  feet,  facing 
a  storm  of  shells  and  shrapnel,  the  Nyanza  fought  until  the 


180  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

U-boat  keeled  over,  and  went  down.  This  engagement  occurred 
thirty  miles  west  of  Penmarch,  France,  on  a  Sunday  morning, 
January  13, 1918.  At  9 :30  a  periscope,  silver  plated,  was  sighted 
1,000  yards  away,  and  at  the  same  instant  a  torpedo  was  seen, 
heading  for  the  vessel.  The  helm  was  put  hard  aport,  and  the 
ship  swung  clear  in  time  to  avoid  the  torpedo. 

The  naval  gunners  opened  fire.  Falling  astern,  the  sub- 
marine came  to  the  surface  and  gave  chase,  zigzagging  and  firing 
both  her  guns,  using  shrapnel.  Chief  Gunner's  Mate  Benjamin 
H.  Groves,  in  reporting  the  encounter,  said : 

At  first  her  shots  fell  short,  but  eventually  he  got  our  range  and  hit 
us  five  times.  One  shot  passed  through  the  after-gun  platform,  through 
the  wood  shelter  house,  through  the  iron  deck,  breaking  a  deck  beam, 
exploding  in  the  hold,  and  passing  out  through  the  side  of  the  ship. 
One  shot  exploded  in  the  armed  guard's  mess  room,  wrecking  the  place 
completely.  Two  shots  exploded  in  a  steam  locomotive  on  deck,  doing 
some  damage.  One  shot  hit  the  stern  of  the  ship,  but  did  not  go 
through. 

About  11 :15  the  submarine  had  our  range  good  again.  The  ship 
zigzagged  a  little,  which  caused  his  shots  to  fall  a  little  to  the  right  or 
left  of  our  ship.  At  the  same  time,  I  had  his  range  and  fired  four  shells 
quick  at  7,800  yards,  causing  him  to  come  broadside  to  and  keel  over, 
then  suddenly  disappeared  just  as  he  had  our  own  range  good.  This 
leads  me  to  think  he  did  not  quit  from  choice,  but  from  necessity. 

The  engagement  lasted  two  hours  and  30  minutes.  I  fired  92  rounds, 
and  the  submarine  fired  approximately  200. 

Admiral  Wilson  highly  commended  the  Nyanza's  master,  her 
second  officer  and  the  armed  guard,  while  Admiral  Sims  wrote : 
1 '  The  Nyanza  was  undoubtedly  saved  by  the  prompt  work  of  the 
ship's  personnel  and  by  the  efficient  work  of  the  guns'  crew." 

The  Navajo  had  a  lively  encounter  with  a  submarine  in  the 
English  Channel  July  4,  1917,  and  the  court  at  Havre,  which 
investigated  the  matter,  reported  to  the  French  Ministry  of 
Marine  that  "the  fight  was  very  well  conducted,"  the  men  show- 
ing "a  very  fine  spirit,  doing  honor  to  the  American  Navy," 
and  "the  conclusion  may  be  drawn  that  the  submarine  was  hit 
and  probably  sunk."  Describing  the  engagement,  Chief  Boat- 
swain 's  Mate  H.  L.  Ham  reported : 

On  July  4,  at  9  :20  a.  m.,  heavy  gunfire  was  heard  to  starboard  and 
shortly  afterward  the  Navajo  ran  out  of  the  mist  and  sighted  a  sub- 


"DO  NOT  SURRENDER"— "NEVER!"  181 

marine  firing  on  a  British  topsail  schooner  about  two  miles  away.  The 
Navajo  changed  her  course,  the  fog  shut  down  again  and  the  "sub" 
was  lost  sight  of.  This  was  about  55  miles  northwest  of  Cape  La  Hague, 
France. 

About  2:55  p.  m.  the  same  day  the  fog  lifted  and  two  shots  were 
heard  from  a  point  1,500  yards  distant.  Upon  observation  a  submarine 
was  seen  firing  with  both  guns  at  the  Navajo.  The  first  shot  dropped 
50  yards  short  on  the  starboard  beam ;  the  second  one  went  over  the 
ship.  The  Navajo  was  swung,  bringing  the  submarine  about  three  points 
on  the  starboard  quarter,  and  opened  fire  with  her  after-gun. 

The  submarine  fired  about  40  shots  during  the  engagement,  which 
lasted  40  minutes,  one  of  which  hit  the  Navajo  underneath  the  port 
counter.  This  shell  exploded  before  hitting  the  ship  and  displaced  some 
of  the  plates,  causing  the  Navajo  to  leak. 

The  Navajo  in  return  fired  27  shots,  the  last  two  of  which  were  hits. 
The  twenty-seventh  shot  struck  the  submarine  just  forward  of  the 
conning  tower  where  the  ammunition  hoist  was  located,  causing  an  ex- 
plosion on  board  the  submarine  which  was  plainly  heard  on  the  Navajo. 
The  men  who  were  on  deck  at  the  guns  and  had  not  jumped  overboard 
ran  aft.  The  submarine  then  carted  forward  at  almost  40  degrees  and 
the  propeller  could  be  seen  lashing  the  air.  Nobody  was  seen  coming 
up  through  the  conning  tower  and  jumping  into  the  sea,  nor  were  any 
survivors  seen. 

The  armed  guard  commander  concluded:  "It  is  my  opinion 
that  the  submarine  was  sunk." 

The  men  of  the  Borinquen  were  also  convinced  that  they  sank 
a  U-boat  which  they  encountered  in  latitude  56°-32/  north,  longi- 
tude 10°-46'  west,  June  4, 1917.  Chief  Gunner's  Mate  T.  J.  Beer- 
man  reported: 

Submarine  was  laying  to  when  first  sighted.  We  think  she  was 
receiving  news  from  her  headquarters.  After-gun  could  not  bear  on 
her  then  and  while  the  trainer  was  training  gun  around  to  bear,  loader 
fired  pistol  to  wake  up  men  in  the  shelter  house,  at  the  same  time  hoisting 
our  colors.  Pointer  turned  on  lights  and  dropped  sights  from  500  yards 
to  100  yards.  As  soon  as  after-gun  could  bear  she  opened  fire.  I  did 
not  see  the  first  shot,  but  petty  officer  said  it  went  just  over  top  of 
submarine's  conning  tower.  I  saw  the  second  shot  hit,  exploding  and 
carrying  away  the  conning  tower.  She  was  about  three  points  abaft 
the  port  beam. 

The  ship  putting  stern  to  submarine,  the  third  shot  was  fired  about 
astern.  I  saw  it  hit  and  explode.  After  second  shot  the  submarine 
seemed  to  be  stopped  and  lay  in  trough  of  sea  at  the  mercy  of  the  gun. 
The  last  seen  of  her  she  was  going  down  on  swell,  listed  to  port,  with 


182  OUE  NAVY  AT  WAR 

her  bow  sticking  in  air  and  her  stern  down.    She  was  going  down  in  an 
upright  position. 

Struck  by  a  torpedo,  the  Norlina,  after  " abandon  ship"  was 
ordered  and  its  men  had  taken  to  the  boats,  manned  its  guns 
and  when  the  U-boat  reappeared,  put  the  enemy  out  of  business. 
This  engagement,  which  took  place  June  4,  1917,  in  latitude 
56°-32'  north,  longitude  10°-46'  west,  was  one  of  the  queerest 
of  war  incidents. 

At  6 :30  p.  m.,  a  man  on  the  forward  gun  platform  shouted, 
"Torpedo!"  As  the  ship  turned  the  torpedo  hit  just  abaft  the 
beam,  glanced  off  aft  around  the  stern,  and  sank.  The  first 
mate  sounded  the  "abandon  ship,"  signal  and  the  crew  made 
for  the  lifeboats.  Lieutenant  Commander  J.  Foster,  captain  of 
the  vessel,  three  of  his  mates  and  the  armed  guard  commander 
remained  aboard.  Inspecting  the  vessel,  they  found  it  in  no 
danger  of  sinking,  and  called  all  hands  to  return.  Chief  Boat- 
swain's Mate  0.  J.  Gullickson,  commanding  the  armed  guard, 
reported : 

As  boats  came  alongside,  a  periscope  was  sighted  off  the  starboard 
beam.  Guns  were  manned,  commenced  firing  from  forward  gun,  range 
2,000  yards.  In  the  meantime  the  captain  had  gotten  the  engineers 
below  and  we  got  under  way,  heading  toward  periscope.  Continued 
firing  from  both  guns,  all  shots  coming  very  close  to  the  periscope,  sub- 
marine changing  speed. 

Suddenly  shot  from  forward  gun  hit  just  in  front  of  periscope, 
making  it  submerge,  and  a  light  blue  smoke  came  up  from  astern  of 
the  submarine.  Periscope  appeared  again,  range  now  600  yards,  when 
a  shot  from  the  after-gun  hit  it  square  on  the  water  line,  making  small 
bits  of  steel  fly,  which  may  have  been  bursting  of  shell,  and  causing  a 
great  commotion  of  bubbles,  etc.,  in  the  water. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  captain,  seeing  the  submarine  getting  closer 
all  the  time  and  expecting  another  torpedo  any  second,  ordered  all 
engineers  on  deck,  causing  the  ship  to  be  absolutely  still  in  the  water 
during  most  of  the  firing.  Hoisted  in  all  boats,  laying  to  from  6:30 
until  9 :05  p.  m.,  seeing  no  more  of  submarine,  which  was  apparently 
either  sunk  or  badly  damaged. 

"It  seems  certain  that  the  submarine  was  either  sunk  or  dis- 
abled," Lieutenant  Commander  Foster  wrote  in  the  ship's  log, 
which  gave  every  detail  of  the  encounter. 

On  June  8,  1917,  when  the  steamship  W.  H.  Til  ford  was  off 


"DO  NOT  SURRENDER"— "NEVER!"  183 

Spezia  Bay,  Italy,  a  periscope  was  sighted,  1,500  yards  off  the 
starboard  beam.  Twenty  rounds  were  fired  rapidly  from  the 
ship's  gun,  the  armed  guard  commander  reported;  and  "the 
submarine  came  to  the  surface  and  made  for  the  beach, ' '  where 
an  Italian  torpedo  boat  took  charge  of  her. 

Off  the  Spanish  coast,  two  or  three  miles  from  Sabinal 
Point,  the  Chincha  at  7:25,  the  morning  of  January  18,  1918, 
sighted  an  object  like  an  enormous  whale.  Chief  Gunner's  Mate 
E.  E.  Nordquist,  commanding  the  armed  guard,  had  a  good  look 
at  it  and  decided  it  was  one  of  the  latest  type  submarines.  In 
his  report,  he  said : 

I  commenced  firing,  range  2,200  yards.  After  third  shot  all  shots 
fired  were  good.  Fired  10  shots,  when  submarine  disappeared.  At  8  :15 
submarine  again  showed  itself  about  2,000  yards  off  our  starboard  quar- 
ter. Commencing  firing  fifth  shot,  which  caused  an  explosion  and  a 
volume  of  black  smoke  was  seen.  Submarine  now  turned  around  and 
headed  away  from  us.  As  submarine  did  not  dive,  I  continued  the  fire. 
Although  nearly  all  shots  seemed  to  hit,  but  five  exploded.  The  fourth 
explosion  caused  another  volume  of  black  smoke.  The  submarine  did 
not  try  to  dive,  but  seemed  to  be  trying  to  come  up.  As  I  thought  she 
was  trying  to  come  up  for  shell  fire  at  us,  I  kept  on  firing. 

The  submarine  now  headed  for  the  beach  about  iy2  miles  away; 
29  shots  had  been  fired  at  her  the  second  time.  One  of  the  last  shots 
had  hit  and  exploded  close,  or  at,  where  her  propellers  were  churning. 
As  she  was  heading  for  the  beach  and  quite  a  ways  off,  I  ceased  firing. 
The  bow  swells  of  the  submarine  could  still  be  seen,  but  the  churn  of 
the  propellers  had  ceased.  Shortly  all  disappeared,  about  4,000  yards 
away. 

On  March  21,  the  Chincha,  whose  armed  guard  was  then  com- 
manded by  E.  D.  Arnold,  chief  boatswain's  mate,  encountered 
a  large  type  submarine,  which  was  driven  off.  But  one  of  its 
shots  struck  the  vessel,  killing  one  member  of  the  armed  guard, 
and  two  of  the  ship 's  crew. 

El  Occident e  had  an  exciting  fight  on  February  2,  the  armed 
guard  commander,  Chief  Boatswain's  Mate  Dow  Ripley,  report- 
ing that  the  ship  was  apparently  attacked  by  two  submarines. 
One  discharged  a  torpedo,  then  came  toward  the  vessel  with  a 
rush.  The  Navy  gunners  got  the  range,  Ripley  reported,  and 
"as  their  shots  were  hitting  on  top  of  her,  she  suddenly  disap- 
peared, acting  as  if  in  distress." 


184  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

When  the  Santa  Maria  was  torpedoed,  February  25,  Chief 
Boatswain 's  Mate  John  Weber  and  his  armed  guardsmen  stood 
at  the  guns  until  the  water  swept  around  them.  Chief  Gunner's 
Mate  Joseph  E.  Reiter  and  the  gunners  on  the  Paulsboro,  when 
that  vessel  was  attacked,  held  their  posts  while  shells  burst 
above  and  shrapnel  fell  all  around  them,  drove  off  the  U-boat 
and  saved  the  ship. 

Twenty-four  men — eight  of  the  armed  guard,  and  16  of 
the  merchant  crew — were  lost  in  the  sinking  of  the  Motano, 
which  was  torpedoed  the  night  of  July  31,  1917,  in  the  English 
Channel  off  Portland.  The  vessel  sank  in  less  than  a  minute 
after  she  was  struck.  There  was  no  time  to  launch  life-boats, 
and  the  men  on  deck  were  washed  into  the  sea. 

Survivors  of  merchant  vessels  sunk  far  from  land,  left  in 
open  boats  to  make  their  way  to  shore  as  best  they  could,  under- 
went terrible  hardships.  When  the  Rochester  was  sunk  Novem- 
ber 2,  1917,  300  miles  from  the  Irish  coast,  the  second  engineer 
and  an  oiler  were  killed  by  the  explosion  of  the  torpedo.  One 
of  the  three  life-boats  was  lost.  In  another  four  of  the  crew 
perished  before  reaching  land,  and  three  died  later  from  expo- 
sure. Five  men  of  the  armed  guard  were  lost  at  sea  and  one 
died  after  rescue. 

After  the  sinking  of  the  Actaeon  (the  ex-German  Adam- 
strum),  November  24,  1917,  a  boat  containing  19  of  the  armed 
guard  and  6  of  the  merchant  crew  became  separated  from  the 
other  boats,  lost  its  course,  and  rowed,  sailed  and  drifted  for 
eleven  days  before  it  reached  Cape  Villano,  near  Coruna,  Spain. 
Four  men  died  before  reaching  shore,  three  of  the  armed  guard 
and  one  of  the  merchant  crew. 

The  Armenia  seemed  to  afford  a  special  target  for  the 
U-boats.  She  was  torpedoed  on  two  occasions,  but,  though  badly 
damaged,  was,  in  each  instance,  safely  taken  to  port  and  re- 
paired. The  night  of  December  5,  1917,  about  20  miles  from 
Dartmouth  Light,  England,  a  torpedo  tore  a  hole  31  feet  long 
and  15  feet  wide  in  the  Armenia's  port  side.  Part  of  the  crew 
took  to  the  boats,  thinking  the  ship  would  sink  almost  imme- 
diately; but  the  ship's  captain  and  the  head  of  the  armed  guard, 
Stief  Homiak,  chief  boatswain's  mate,  remained  aboard. 
Prompt  measures  were  taken  to  keep  the  vessel  afloat,  the  armed 


"DO  NOT  SURRENDER"— " NEVER!"  185 

guard  working  with  the  crew.  The  hole  in  the  side  was  covered 
with  collision  mats  and  other  devices  to  keep  out  the  water,  and 
though  the  hold  was  flooded,  the  vessel  was  successfully  navi- 
gated into  Dartmouth.  Two  months  later,  after  repairs  were 
completed,  the  Armenia  left  Dartmouth,  February  8,  1918,  for 
West  Hartlepool.  Shortly  after  midnight,  when  about  nine 
miles  off  St.  Catherine's  Light,  Isle  of  Wight,  she  was  struck 
by  a  torpedo  which  opened  up  a  hole  40  by  30  feet,  carried  away 
the  stern-post  and  propeller  and  broke  the  tail-shaft.  Tugs 
came  from  shore  and  towed  the  vessel  to  Stokes  Bay,  and  she 
was  again  repaired. 

The  submarines,  particularly  in  the  early  months  of  the  war, 
seemed  especially  anxious  to  get  one  of  the  American  liners, 
St.  Louis,  St.  Paul,  New  York  and  Philadelphia.  Time  and 
again,  U-boats  were  sighted,  evidently  lying  in  wait  for  these 
fast  steamers.  The  Philadelphia,  on  one  occasion,  sighted  a 
periscope  only  a  few  hundred  yards  distant  and  saw  the  tor- 
pedo as  it  left  the  tube.  By  quick  maneuvering,  the  steamship 
turned  and  escaped  the  missile.  The  St.  Louis  had  several  ex- 
periences with  them.  Sighting  a  periscope  on  the  port  beam, 
she  opened  a  rapid  fire  and  drove  off  the  U-boat.  Another  time 
a  torpedo  was  seen  only  200  yards  away,  and  then  a  periscope 
popped  up,  but  by  speed  and  quick  maneuvering  the  liner 
escaped.  Again  a  submarine  was  sighted  three  miles  distant. 
The  St.  Louis  opened  fire  and  for  nearly  half  an  hour  there  was 
a  running  fight  between  "sub"  and  liner  until  at  last  the  St. 
Louis  sailed  out  of  range. 

There  were  many  instances  in  which  prompt  and  effective 
gunfire  repulsed  submarines,  and  in  most  cases  where  the 
U-boat's  guns  were  not  of  superior  range,  the  ship  escaped. 
Thus  on  July  10, 1917,  the  Gold  Shell  drove  off  a ' '  sub, ' '  as  did  the 
Dakotan  on  Sept.  6, 1917. 

The  Albert  Watts  and  Westoil,  oil  tankers,  had  a  thrilling 
encounter  Nov.  28,  1917,  with  two  submarines  which,  when  first 
observed,  were  within  300  yards.  Blazing  away  with  all  their 
guns,  the  ships  compelled  the  enemy  to  dive  to  escape  shelling. 
Then  ensued  a  running  fight  that  continued  for  four  hours. 
Every  now  and  then  a  periscope  would  bob  up,  in  an  effort  to 
get  in  position  to  launch  torpedoes.    But  the  ships  would  fire 


186  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

again,  and  the  periscopes  disappear.  At  10 :30  the  Watts  struck 
a  mine,  and  was  damaged,  but  remained  afloat.  The  rest  of  the 
convoy  got  to  port  that  afternoon,  and  a  few  hours  later  the 
Watts  arrived,  crippled  but  still  in  the  game. 

The  Westoil  had  another  brush  with  the  enemy  March  12, 
1918,  when  a  "sub"  appeared  some  distance  astern.  After  a  run- 
ning fight  the  submarine  gave  up  the  contest,  though  she  was 
of  big  type,  and  her  guns  were  apparently  heavier  than  those 
of  the  Westoil.  The  vessel's  fire  was  too  accurate  for  her;  for 
the  armed  guard  commander  was  a  "sure  shot,"  a  gun-pointer 
from  one  of  our  dreadnaughts  who  in  five  years  had  never 
missed  in  short-range  battle  practice.  They  were  "some  gun- 
ners," those  men  of  the  armed  guards ! 

I  could  fill  a  book  with  the  exploits  of  these  guards,  for  the 
Navy  furnished  guns  and  gunners  to  384  vessels,  and  this  serv- 
ice at  one  time  or  another  employed  30,000  men.  Begun  March 
12,  1917,  in  accordance  with  the  President's  order,  the  arming 
of  merchantmen  proceeded  until  nearly  every  American  ship 
crossing  the  Atlantic  was  provided  with  this  protection.  The 
Bureau  of  Ordnance  scoured  the  country  for  all  the  guns  of 
proper  calibers  that  were  available,  and  some  were  even  taken 
from  cruisers  and  older  battleships,  to  be  replaced  later  when 
more  could  be  manufactured.  But  crews  were  always  ready  and 
the  guns  were  secured  and  installed  in  record  time.  Statistics 
compiled  by  an  officer  of  the  Armed  Guard  Section  show  that: 

The  384  merchant  ships  armed  made  1832  trans- Atlantic  trips  while 
in  armed  guard  status. 

347  sightings  of  enemy  submarines  were  reported. 

227  attacks  by  submarines  were  classified  as  "actual." 

Only  29  ships  carrying  armed  guards  were  torpedoed  and  sunk. 

Two  ships  were  sunk  by  shell-fire,  both  after  long  engagements. 

193  attacks  were  successfully  repulsed. 

34  attacks  resulted  in  probable  damage  to  enemy  submarines. 

Of  the  2,738,026  tons  of  American  merchant  shipping  armed,  only 
166,428  tons  was  sunk  by  submarines.  As  a  result  of  attacks  repulsed, 
1,400,000  tons  of  American  shipping  were  saved. 

Could  there  be  better  evidence  of  the  success  of  this  under- 
taking, or  the  courage  and  efficiency  of  the  gunners  who  pro- 
tected our  merchant  ships  ? 


CHAPTEE  XVII 
WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA 

WAR  OFF  OUR  COASTS  FROM  MAY  TO  SEPTEMBER,  1918 GERMANS  SENT 

SUBMARINES  TO  INTERRUPT  TROOP  AND  SUPPLY  TRANSPORTATION, 
BUT    TRANSPORTS    WERE    SO    WELL    GUARDED    THAT    NOT    ONE    WAS 

ATTACKED     OR     EVEN     DELAYED MANY     SCHOONERS     AND      SOME 

STEAMERS  SUNK,  BARGES  AND  LIGHTSHIP  SHELLED,  BUT  GERMANS 
FAILED  IN  THEIR  MAIN  OBJECT. 

EUROPE  was  not  the  only  "war  zone."  There  was  war  off 
our  own  coasts  from  May  to  September,  1918,  and  the 
Navy  had  to  protect  transports  and  shipping,  to  escort 
convoys  and  hunt  submarines  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic 
as  well  as  off  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain  and  France. 

During  that  period  the  Navy  was  as  much  in  active  war 
service  in  home  waters  as  it  was  in  Europe.  And  our  methods 
were  quite  as  successful  here  as  there,  for  in  the  entire  four 
months  in  which  German  submarines  operated  off  our  coasts 
not  one  convoy  was  attacked,  and  not  one  trar  sport  was  delayed 
in  sailing. 

Will  you  ever  forget  that  Sunday,  June  2,  1918,  when  a  Ger- 
man submarine  suddenly  appeared  off  the  New  Jersey  coast  and 
sank  six  vessels,  ending  the  day  with  the  destruction  of  the 
passenger  steamer  Carolina? 

The  first  news  came  at  5:30  p.  m.,  from  the  Ward  Liner 
Mexico,  which  radioed  that  she  had  picked  up  three  life-boats 
containing  fifty  men  of  the  Isabel  B.  Wiley  and  other  schooners 
that  had  been  sunk.  This  message  was  immediately  broadcasted 
with  a  warning  to  all  ships  along  the  coast.  Naval  vessels  were 
at  once  ordered  to  the  vicinity  and  patrol  craft  in  that  region 
and  all  along  the  coast  were  notified  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  for 
the  submarine. 

The  passenger  steamer  Carolina,  en  route  to  New  York  from 

187 


188  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Porto  Rico,  was  13  miles  from  where  the  Wiley  was  sunk,  when 
she  received  the  warning  at  5:55  o'clock.  Darkening  her  lights, 
she  steered  due  west,  putting  on  full  speed.  The  captain  had 
just  got  his  vessel  steadied  on  the  new  course,  when  he  sighted 
the  submarine  two  miles  away.  In  a  moment  or  two  the  U-boat 
fired  three  shells,  which  landed  near  the  steamer.  At  the  second 
shot  the  captain  stopped  his  ship.  He  had  ordered  the  wireless 
operator  to  send  out  an  "SOS"  signal,  stating  that  the  vessel 
was  attacked  by  submarine.  But,  realizing,  he  said,  the  useless- 
ness  of  trying  to  escape,  and  fearing  if  he  sent  out  radio  mes- 
sages the  U-boat  might  shell  the  ship,  endangering  the  lives  of 
those  aboard,  the  captain  recalled  the  order.  The  radio  op- 
erator stated  that  the  submarine  had  wirelessed  to  him,  under 
low  power, ' '  If  you  don 't  use  wireless  I  won 't  shoot. ' '  That  was 
the  reason  we  were  so  long  in  getting  news  of  the  sinking  of 
the  Carolina.    She  sent  out  no  distress  signals. 

At  his  third  shot,  the  submarine  bore  down  on  the  vessel, 
which  was  flying  the  signal  "A.B." — abandon  ship — and  was 
lowering  its  lifeboats.  "Women  and  children  first,"  was  the 
rule,  and  after  they  had  been  placed  safely,  the  men  entered  the 
boats.  As  the  captain,  the  last  to  leave,  cleared  the  ship's  side, 
the  submarine  commander  ordered  him  to  make  for  shore.  The 
U-boat  fired  several  shells  into  the  vessel,  and  she  finally  sank 
at  7:55  p.  m.,  with  the  American  ensign  and  signals  flying. 
Clouds  of  fire  and  steam  arose  as  she  went  down. 

The  Carolina  carried  218  passengers,  and  a  crew  of  117.  All 
got  safely  into  the  lifeboats,  which  were  moored  head  and  stern, 
one  to  the  other,  except  the  motor  sailer  and  boat  No.  5,  and 
all  headed  for  shore,  on  a  westward  course.  They  had  smooth 
seas  until  midnight,  when  a  squall  came  on  with  heavy  rain  and 
lightning.  The  boats,  which  were  connected  by  lines,  were 
anchored  until  the  storm  passed.  At  daylight  they  began  to  pro- 
ceed singly,  to  make  rowing  easier. 

At  11  o'clock  the  storm-tossed  survivors  sighted  a  schooner, 
the  Eva  B.  Douglas,  which  took  aboard  all  that  were  in  sight, 
160  passengers  and  94  of  the  crew.  But  about  noon  one  boat, 
in  attempting  to  weather  the  rough  seas,  capsized,  drowning 
seven  passengers  and  six  of  the  crew.  There  were  still  three 
boats  to  be  accounted  for.     The  next  day,  19  survivors  were 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       189 

picked  up  and  carried  to  Vineyard  Haven,  and  18  were  rescued 
by  the  British  steamer  Appleby,  and  taken  to  Lewes,  Delaware. 
Lifeboat  No.  5  was  rowed  to  shore,  and  the  thousands  along  the 
Boardwalk  were  amazed  when  it  came  in  sight  and  was  landed 
through  the  surf  at  Atlantic  City. 

That  Monday,  June  3rd,  was  one  of  the  busiest  days  of  the 
war  in  the  Navy  Department,  as  it  was  at  naval  bases  all  along 
the  Atlantic.  The  fact  that  the  Germans  were  operating  off 
our  shores  stirred  up  not  only  Washington  but  the  entire 
country. 

Plans  for  submarine  defense  had  been  made  out  long  before, 
and  were  put  into  effect.  Our  patrol  force,  all  along  the  line, 
was  on  the  job.  But  hunting  a  U-boat  and  capturing  it  are 
two  very  different  things. 

News  and  rumors  were  pouring  in,  and  when  I  received  the 
newspaper  correspondents  I  faced  a  fire  of  questions  as  rapid 
as  that  of  a  machine-gun : 

"What  is  the  Navy  doing  to  protect  shipping?" 

"Why  did  it  let  the  submarine  sink  those  vessels?" 

"Have  you  sunk  the  U-boat?" 

"What  naval  vessels  have  you  sent  out?  What  methods  are 
they  using  to  get  the  'sub'?" 

"How  many  boats  have  the  Germans  sent  over?" 

"Have  you  got  enough  vessels  to  protect  our  coast  and 
commerce  ? ' ' 

"Will  you  recall  our  destroyers  from  Europe?" 

As  I  was  doing  my  best  to  answer  the  questions  of  the  gentle- 
men of  the  press,  who  had  a  right  to  know  everything  that  was 
not  of  advantage  to  the  enemy,  telegrams  were  pouring  into  the 
Department  by  the  hundred,  and  the  telephones  were  ringing 
without  cessation.  In  twenty-four  hours,  5,000  telegrams,  radio 
messages,  'phone  calls  and  other  inquiries  were  handled  by  the 
Navy.  The  halls  and  offices  of  the  Department  were  thronged 
with  anxious  people,  shippers  and  ship-owners,  friends  and  rela- 
tives of  captains  and  crews.  And  everybody  wanted  in- 
formation. 

There  was  alarm  along  the  coast,  from  Cape  Cod  to  Key 
West.  If  one  U-boat  was  over  here,  two  might  be  or  three  or 
more.    That  was  the  general  feeling. 


190  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

One  of  the  most  persistent  questions,  which  came  from  the 
country,  as  well  as  the  press,  was  whether  we  were  going  to 
recall  our  destroyers  from  Europe — and  in  many  cases  this  was 
put  not  as  an  inquiry  but  a  demand. 

We  could  not  tell  the  public  what  we  were  doing,  what  ships 
were  being  sent  out,  and  where.  That  was  just  what  the  Ger- 
mans wanted  to  know.  Most  of  our  destroyers  and  the  best  of 
our  patrol  craft  were  in  European  waters,  3,000  miles  away, 
performing  vital  duty  against  the  enemy  in  England,  Ireland, 
France  and  Italy.    We  had  no  idea  of  recalling  them. 

Thousands  of  vessels  would  have  been  required  to  patrol 
every  mile  of  our  long  coast-line,  and  guard  all  the  boats  off  our 
shores.  Our  duty  was  clear.  The  Germans  had  sent  their 
U-boats  across  the  sea  mainly  to  interrupt  the  transportation 
of  troops  and  supplies.  If  they  did  not  succeed  in  that,  their 
coming  would  have  no  real  military  effect. 

"Our  first  duty,"  I  said  to  the  newspaper  men  that  morn- 
ing, "is  to  keep  open  the  road  to  France,  to  protect  troop-ships 
and  Army  supply  vessels.  We  are  doing  all  we  can  to  protect 
all  shipping  and  commerce,  but  the  safety  of  troops  must  be  our 
first  thought." 

The  policy  was  so  well  carried  out  that  not  one  troop-ship 
or  cargo  transport  was  delayed  in  sailing,  and  the  months  in 
which  enemy  submarines  operated  almost  continuously  off  our 
coasts  were  the  very  months  in  which  we  broke  all  records  in 
troop  transportation. 

The  first  submarine  that  came  over  in  1918  was  the  U-151, 
and  the  first  craft  she  sank  were  three  small  schooners,  the 
Hattie  Dunn,  Rauppauge  and  Edna,  all  sent  down  by  bombs  the 
same  day,  May  25th.  To  prevent  disclosure  of  her  presence,  she 
kept  the  crews  of  all  three,  23  men,  imprisoned  aboard  her,  and 
sailed  well  out  at  sea,  submerging  whenever  a  large  vessel  was 
sighted,  until  June  2nd,  when  she  sank  three  other  schooners, 
the  Isabel  Wiley,  Jacob  M.  Haskell  and  Edward  H.  Cole;  a  small 
steamer,  the  Winneconne,  and  late  in  the  afternoon  attacked 
the  steamships  Texel  and  Carolina.  All  the  Texel's  crew  were 
saved,  but  they  rowed  to  shore  and  the  story  of  her  sinking  was 
not  told  until  they  reached  Atlantic  City  next  morning.  En 
route  from  Porto  Rico  to  New  York,  with  a  cargo  of  sugar,  the 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       191 

Texel  was  stopped  at  4:21  p.  m.  by  the  firing  of  shells,  one  of 
which  struck  the  vessel,  and  an  hour  later  was  sunk  by  bombs 
placed  aboard. 

By  sinking  only  small  boats  which  had  no  radio  apparatus, 
and  holding  their  crews  prisoners,  the  U-151  had  for  ten  days 
concealed  her  whereabouts.  But  the  Navy  had  warned  shipping 
to  be  on  the  lookout,  and  on  May  16th  had  sent  this  message 
to  all  section  bases : 

Most  Secret: — From  information  gained  by  contact  with  enemy  sub- 
marine, one  may  be  encountered  anywhere  west  of  40  degrees  west. 
No  lights  should  be  carried,  except  as  may  be  necessary  to  avoid  col- 
lision, and  paravanes  should  be  used  when  practicable  and  feasible. 
Acknowledge,  Commander-in-Chief  Atlantic  Fleet ;  Commander  Cruiser 
Force,  Commander  Patrol  Squadron,  Flag  San  Domingo,  Governor  Vir- 
gin Islands,  Commandants  1st  to  8th,  inclusive,  and  15th  Naval  Dis- 
tricts.   13016. 

Opnav. 

The  Department  had  been  notified  from  London  Headquar- 
ters early  in  May  that  a  large-type  submarine  had  left  Germany 
for  American  waters,  and  on  May  15th,  the  British  steamer 
Huntress  reported  that  she  had  escaped  a  torpedo  attack  in  lati- 
tude 34° -28'  north,  longitude  56° -09'  west,  about  1,000  miles  east 
of  Cape  Hatteras.  Four  days  later  the  Nyanza  was  attacked 
300  miles  from  our  coast;  the  Jonancy  was  gunned  about  150 
miles  at  sea,  and  on  May  21st  the  British  steamer  Crenelia  re- 
ported sighting  a  submarine. 

This  information  was  disseminated  to  all  section  bases, 
coast  defense  commanders  and  forces  afloat;  and  in  addition  to 
the  regular  patrols,  special  sub-chaser  detachments  were  organ- 
ized, and  ordered  to  proceed,  upon  the  receipt  of  any  "SOS" 
or  "Alio"  message,  to  the  vessel  attacked  or  in  distress. 

Comprehensive  plans  for  defense,  protection  of  shipping  and 
combating  the  U-boats  had  been  made  long  previously.  Before  we 
entered  the  war  a  general  scheme  had  been  adopted,  a  patrol 
force  and  naval  districts  organized.  From  that  time  on  we 
had  maintained  a  vigilant  lookout  for  the  German  craft.  A 
special  Planning  Board  had  been  created  in  February,  1918, 
to  study  the  situation  afresh  and  recommend  any  additional 
measures  that  might  be  adopted  for  coast  defense,  and  protec- 


192  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

tion  of  shipping.  These  plans,  approved  March  6,  placed  coast- 
wise shipping  under  the  control  of  district  commandants, 
district  boundaries  being,  for  this  purpose,  extended  seaward 
and  sharply  denned.  On  May  4  a  circular  letter  was  sent  to  all 
ship-owners  and  masters,  detailing  the  procedure  they  were  to 
follow.  Commandants  were  instructed  to  see  that  all  routing 
preliminaries  and  shipping  requirements  and  military  and  com- 
mercial arrangements  on  shore  were  made  and  thoroughly 
understood  by  all  the  interests  concerned. 

The  morning  of  June  3rd,  the  order  was  issued  to  com- 
mandants, "Assume  control  of  coastwise  shipping  and  handle 
traffic  in  accordance  therewith;"  and  the  following  warning 
was  sent  out : 

Unmistakable  evidence  enemy  submarine  immediately  off  coast  be- 
tween Cape  Hatteras  and  Block  Island.  Vessels  not  properly  convoyed 
advised  to  make  port  until  further  directed. 

A  Coastwise  Routing  Office  was  organized  in  the  Navy  De- 
partment as  a  part  of  Naval  Operations.  Every  naval  district 
had  its  arrangement  for  routing  and  convoying  traffic  in  and 
through  its  areas.  The  commandant  made  up  the  convoy,  out- 
lined its  route,  and  provided  escort  through  his  territory,  each 
district  in  succession  relieving  the  previous  escort.  Thus  naval 
protection  was  provided  for  shipping  all  along  the  coast. 

Routing  offices  were  also  established  at  Halifax,  Nova 
Scotia ;  at  Havana,  San  Juan  and  all  leading  West  Indian  ports ; 
and  Tampico,  Mexico — in  fact,  eventually  at  every  Atlantic  port 
where  coastwise  shipping  was  likely  to  originate. 

Through  the  Naval  Communication  Service  full  information 
as  to  convoys,  rendezvous  and  other  details  were  sent  in  code. 
Each  ship's  master,  before  sailing,  was  required  to  go  to  the 
routing  office  and  receive  written  instructions  as  to  the  route 
to  be  followed  and  areas  to  be  avoided.  He  was  given  all  the 
latest  submarine  information  and  was  told  of  the  signals  and 
the  location  of  each  "speaking  station." 

These  speaking  stations  were  established  at  various  points 
along  the  coast.  Manned  by  navy  personnel,  using  a  simple 
code  of  distance  signals,  they  could  communicate  with  ships  ,not 
equipped  with  radio,  call  vessels  into  harbor  if  necessary,  and 


From  the  painting  by  Frederick  J.   Waugh 

THE   GUN-CREW   OF   THE   LUCKENBACH   HAS   A  FOUR-HOUR   FIGHT 
WITH  A  SUBMARINE 


CHIEF  GUNNER'S  MATE  DELANEY,  OF  THE   CAMPANA,  DEFYING 

HIS  CAPTORS 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       193 

divert  them  from  dangerous  localities.  They  performed  a  valu- 
able function  in  expediting  the  flow  of  shipping  from  district 
to  district,  as  well  as,  by  prompt  action,  warning  craft  in  danger. 
Ships  at  sea  received  by  radio  all  war  warnings  and  orders,  and 
when  it  was  necessary  to  divert  convoys,  orders  to  change  course 
could  be  sent  at  a  moment's  notice.  Far  south  were  two  " re- 
porting" stations.  Vessels  passing  out  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
coastwise-bound  were  required  to  report  at  Sand  Key,  those 
northbound  through  the  Old  Bahama  passage,  to  report  at 
Jupiter. 

Thus  escort  was  provided  for  vessels  through  all  the  areas 
in  which  submarines  were  likely  to  operate,  and  a  system  pro- 
vided by  which  the  Navy  could  keep  track  of  and  in  touch  with 
them  from  the  time  they  sailed  until  they  reached  port.  Though 
this  necessitated  a  large  fleet  of  escorting  vessels,  of  which  our 
best  were  at  work  in  Europe,  by  utilizing  all  the  patrol  craft 
that  could  be  secured  and  our  sturdy  little  sub-chasers,  we  man- 
aged to  provide  sufficient  escorts. 

It  is  a  notable  fact  that,  while  the  submarines  sank  many 
schooners  and  fishing  craft  and  some  steamers  proceeding  inde- 
pendently, during  the  entire  four  months  in  which  the  U-boats 
operated  in  the  Western  Atlantic  not  one  convoy,  coastwise  or 
trans-Atlantic,  was  attacked  off  the  coast  of  the  United  States. 

The  alarm  which  occurred  when  the  U-boats  first  appeared 
quickly  subsided.  The  details  of  the  comprehensive  system  the 
Navy  had  put  into  effect  could  not  then  be  published.  But  the 
naval  committees  of  Congress  knew,  for  we  could  impart  this 
information,  in  confidence,  to  them.  To  find  out  for  themselves 
whether  the  Navy  was  doing  everything  possible  to  protect  ship- 
ping and  repel  the  Germans,  Senators  and  Representatives  came 
to  the  Navy  Department,  and  examined  all  our  plans  and 
arrangements. 

Senator  Lodge  well  expressed  their  convictions  in  his  speech 
in  the  Senate  on  June  6th,  1918,  when  he  said : 

The  Navy  and  the  Navy  Department  have  taken  every  precaution 
that  human  foresight  could  suggest,  so  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  and 
I  have  examined  their  preparations  with  such  intelligence  and  care 
as  I  could  give  to  the  matter.     *     *     * 

Mr.  President,  the  Navy  and  the  Navy  Department  have  necessarily 


194  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

anticipated  a  submarine  attack  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war. 
They  have  had  it  constantly  on  their  minds.  They  have  tried  to  make 
every  preparation  to  meet  it.  I  think  they  have.  It  would  be  most 
injurious  for  me  to  stand  here  and  follow  down  the  map  of  the  coast 
and  tell  the  Senate  and  the  public  exactly  what  those  preparations  are 
— tell  them  where  the  submarine  chasers  are,  where  the  destroyers  are, 
where  the  signal  stations  are,  what  arrangements  they  have  made  for 
meeting  the  danger  when  it  came,  as  they  were  sure  it  would  come. 
No  human  mind  can  possibly  tell  when  out  of  the  great  waste  of  waters 
of  the  Atlantic  Ocean  a  submarine,  which  travels  by  night  and  sub- 
merges by  day,  will  appear.  As  soon  as  the  Navy  had  any  authentic 
news  to  indicate  the  presence  of  submarines  on  this  coast  they  acted. 
They  will  do  everything  that  can  be  done.  They  have  the  means  to 
do  it.    That  is  all  that  I  feel  at  liberty  to  say  in  a  general  way. 

Mr.  President,  for  four  years  the  greatest  Navy  in  the  world  has 
been  devoting  its  strength  to  the  destruction  of  German  submarines. 
They  were  operating  in  what  are  known  as  the  narrow  seas,  where  the 
commerce  of  the  world,  we  may  say,  comes  together  in  a  closely  restricted 
area ;  and  even  there,  with  the  knowledge  for  years  of  the  presence  of 
the  German  submarines,  it  is  not  going  too  far  to  say  that  many  of  those 
submarines  escaped  them.  They  are  diminishing  now,  with  our 
assistance.  A  larger  control  is  being  established  over  the  narrow  seas, 
and  the  work  against  the  submarines  at  the  point  of  the  greatest  danger 
— what  we  may  call  the  naval  front  of  this  war — is  succeeding  more  than 
many  of  us  dared  to  hope.  It  is  done  by  the  multiplication  of  vessels 
and  the  multiplication  of  methods,  and  there  is  the  great  center  of  the 
fight. 

One  or  two  submarines  have  appeared  suddenly  on  our  coast,  as 
was  to  be  anticipated.  In  my  judgment,  we  are  doing  all  that  can  be 
done.  I  have  taken  the  pains  to  go  to  the  Department,  where  every- 
thing has  been  laid  before  the  members  of  the  Naval  Affairs  Committee 
who  cared  to  investigate  the  subject,  and  I  am  entirely  satisfied  that 
they  are  doing  everything  that  is  possible.  But  the  chase  of  the  sub- 
marine is  something  like  searching  for  the  needle  in  the  haystack.  You 
can  not  tell  in  which  particular  wisp  of  hay  it  will  come  to  the  surface ; 
but  that  the  defense  will  be  effective  I  have  no  sort  of  question.     *     *     * 

We  have  a  patrol  along  the  coast,  which  is  composed  chiefly  of  what 
is  known  as  the  Life-Saving  Service,  or  the  Coast  Guard,  as  it  is  now 
known.  "We  also  have  an  organized  system  for  procuring  information 
from  fishermen  and  others  on  the  coast,  extending  from  Maine  to  the 
Gulf.  Those  sources  of  information  were  organized  and  in  operation 
through  the  Navy  Department  at  least  two  years  before  we  entered  the 
war,  so  I  believe  that  so  far  as  our  own  coasts  are  concerned  the  chances 
of  a  base  there  are  almost  negligible.     *     *     * 

I  did  not  rise  to  go  into  the  details  to  describe  to  you  the  different 
naval  districts  of  the  country  and  what  has  been  done  in  each  one  of 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       195 

them,  but  simply  to  tell  you  what  my  own  opinion  is  after  having  exam- 
ined all  the  arrangements  with  the  utmost  care  of  which  I  was  capable 
and  with  the  most  intense  interest,  and  I  give  my  word  for  what  it  is 
worth,  that  in  my  judgment  the  Navy  and  the  Navy  Department,  the 
Secretary  and  Assistant  Secretary,  and  all  the  officers,  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  and  every  head  of  a  bureau  has  done  everything  that  human  fore- 
sight could  suggest.     *     *     * 

I  want  the  Senate  also  to  remember  that  when  newspaper  editorials 
ask  what  the  Navy  is  doing  I  should  like  to  have  them  consider  why 
it  is  that  we  have  sent  all  the  troops  we  have  sent — and  we  have  sent  a 
great  many  thousands — why  it  is  that  they  have  gone  to  Europe  with- 
out the  loss  of  a  transport,  thank  God,  as  I  do.  How  is  it  that  that  has 
happened?  It  has  happened  because  of  the  American  Navy,  which 
furnished  the  convoys,  and  no  other  cause. 

I  wish  I  could  go  on  and  tell  you  what  the  American  Navy  has  been 
doing  in  the  narrow  seas.  I  can  not.  The  Navy  has  remained  largely 
silent  about  its  work  and  its  preparation,  and  it  is  one  of  the  best  things 
about  it,  but  it  has  been  doing  the  greatest  possible  work  everywhere. 
It  has  not  failed  in  convoying  the  troops.  It  has  not  failed  in  its  work 
in  the  Baltic  and  the  Channel  and  the  coast  of  France  and  the  Medi- 
terranean, and  it  will  not  fail  here.  It  will  do  everything  that  courage 
and  intelligence  and  bravery  can  possibly  do. 

In  addition  to  the  elusive  U-boat,  mines  laid  by  the  "subs" 
also  proved  a  constant  danger,  quite  as  much  as  gunfire,  bombs 
and  torpedoes.  The  afternoon  of  June  3,  the  tanker  Herbert  L. 
Pratt  struck  a  mine  two  and  a  half  miles  off  Overfalls  lightship, 
and  sank.  But  she  was  not  in  deep  water,  and  was  quickly  sal- 
vaged and  towed  to  Philadelphia.  Late  that  evening  at  6 
o'clock,  the  U-151,  in  another  locality,  overhauled  and  sank  the 
Sam  C.  Mengel.  The  first  officer,  John  W.  Wilkins,  stated  that 
when  the  crew  were  leaving  the  schooner,  the  German  boarding- 
officer  shook  hands  with  them,  and  exclaimed : 

' '  Send  Wilson  out  here  and  we  will  finish  him  in  ten  minutes. 
Wilson  is  the  only  one  prolonging  the  war. ' ' 

Next  morning  an  "SOS"  call  came  from  the  French  tanker 
Radioleine,  "attacked  by  submarine."  The  coast  torpedo-boat 
Hull  (Lieutenant  R.  S.  Haggart),  rushed  to  her  assistance.  Zig- 
zagging and  firing  her  stern-gun,  the  steamer  was  putting  up 
a  good  defense,  though  shells  were  falling  around  her.  But 
before  the  Hull  could  get  within  firing  distance,  the  U-boat  dived 
and  scurried  off.  As  the  Radioleine,  relieved,  sailed  away,  the 
Hull  picked  up  the  crew  of  the  schooner  Edward  R.  Baird,  Jr., 


196  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

which  had  been  bombed  two  hours  before,  but  was  still  afloat, 
though  water-logged,  with  decks  awash. 

Moving  around  from  point  to  point,  in  the  next  week  the 
U-151  sank  six  steamships,  one  an  American  steamer,  the  Pinar 
Del  Rio,  and  then  headed  for  Germany. 

Naval  vessels  were  on  the  lookout  all  the  time.  But  when 
the  submarine  did  attack  any  craft  which  had  radio,  it  prevented 
them,  if  possible,  from  sending  out  signals  or  messages  of  dis- 
tress. This  was  a  great  handicap  to  the  naval  commanders,  as 
it  prevented  them  from  knowing  where  the  U-boat  was  operat- 
ing. The  moment  a  periscope  was  reported,  they  speeded  for 
the  scene. 

As  it  departed  for  home,  the  submarine  attacked  two  British 
steamers,  the  Llanstephan  Castle  and  Keemun,  both  of  which 
escaped,  and  later  sank  two  Norwegian  barks,  the  Samoa  and 
Kringsjaa,  150  miles  at  sea.  Though  sighted  several  times  by 
merchantmen,  the  U-151  made  no  further  attacks  until  June 
18th,  when  she  torpedoed  the  British  steamship  Dwinsk,  far  out 
in  the  Atlantic.  The  vessel  remained  afloat  and  two  hours  later 
was  sunk  by  gunfire. 

Soon  afterward  the  U.  S.  S.  Von  Steuben  arrived  on  the 
scene  and  bore  down  on  the  lifeboats.  The  submarine  fired  a 
torpedo  at  her,  but  the  cruiser  transport  avoided  the  deadly  mis- 
sile, and  blazed  away  at  the  "sub's"  periscope.  She  fired  19 
shots  and  dropped  numerous  depth-charges.  But  the  U-boat 
submerged  and  got  away  and  three  days  later,  about  200  miles 
further  east,  sank  the  Belgian  Chiller.  The  Norwegian  steamer 
Augvald  was  sunk  June  23.  This  was  the  last  vessel  sunk, 
though  the  submarine  made  several  unsuccessful  attacks  on 
British  and  American  ships. 

The  U-151  reached  Germany  August  1,  having  left  Kiel 
April  14.  In  a  cruise  of  nearly  three  months  she  had  sunk 
23  vessels,  of  59,000  gross  tons.  Some  submarines  in  European 
waters  had  destroyed  that  much  tonnage  in  a  week  or  two. 

But  this  was  only  the  beginning  of  submarine  operations. 
The  U-156,  commanded  by  Kapitan-Leutnant  von  Oldenburg, 
left  Germany  for  America  June  15,  and  on  July  5  attacked, 
almost  in  mid-Atlantic,  the  U.  S.  S.  Lake  Bridge,  which  after  a 
running  fight  outdistanced  her. 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       197 

Her  first  appearance  in  our  waters  was  on  July  21st,  when 
she  bobbed  up  near  Cape  Cod,  Mass.,  and  attacked  the  tug  Perth 
Amboy  and  four  barges  in  tow.  Three  torpedoes  were  fired 
at  the  tug,  it  was  stated.  A  shell  crashed  through  the  wheel- 
house,  and  cut  off  the  hand  of  a  sailor  as  he  grasped  the  spokes 
of  the  steering  wheel.  The  tug  on  fire,  the  German  turned  his 
attention  to  the  barges,  and  kept  firing  away  until  several  men 
were  wounded  and  the  helpless  craft  went  down.  Three  women 
and  five  children  were  aboard  the  barges.  They,  with  the  crews, 
were  reached  by  boats  from  Coast  Guard  Station  No.  40,  and 
landed  at  Nauset  Harbor. 

Seaplanes  from  the  Chatham  naval  air  station  flew  to  the 
scene  and  attacked  the  submarine,  dropping  aerial  bombs. 
Though  the  haze  obscured  the  view,  bombs  fell  very  near  the 
U-boat,  and  one  or  two,  it  was  reported,  actually  struck  her  but 
failed  to  explode.  Not  relishing  this  attack  from  the  air,  the 
German  submerged  and  started  for  Canadian  waters. 

Sinking  a  fishing  schooner  60  miles  southeast  of  Cape  Por- 
poise, and  burning  another  near  the  entrance  to  the  Bay  of 
Fundy,  the  raider  turned  her  attention  to  the  fishing  fleet  around 
Seal  Island,  Nova  Scotia,  sinking  four  American  schooners  and 
three  Canadians.  She  also  sank  the  Canadian  tanker  Luz 
Blanca  and  the  Swedish  steamer  Sydland.  On  August  11  the 
British  steamship  Penistone  was  torpedoed  and  sunk,  her  mas- 
ter, David  Evans,  taken  prisoner,  and  the  Herman  Winter,  an 
American  steamer,  was  attacked,  but  escaped  uninjured.  Sail- 
ing southward  the  U-boat,  a  week  later,  sank  the  San  Jose,  and 
Evans  was  released  and  allowed  to  get  into  a  lifeboat  with  the 
Norwegian  crew. 

The  U-156  then  went  northward  again,  and  on  August  20 
captured  the  Canadian  steam  trawler  Triumph,  and  armed  her 
as  a  raider,  placing  a  German  crew  aboard.  Operating  together, 
they  sank  a  dozen  schooners  in  Canadian  waters.  Sinking  the 
Canadian  schooner  Gloaming,  on  August  26,  the  U-156  started 
on  her  homeward  voyage.  The  only  attack  she  made  returning 
was  unsuccessful,  an  encounter  on  August  31  with  the  U.  S.  S. 
West  Haven,  which  drove  her  off. 

Beginning  by  attacking  barges  and  tugs,  devoting  most  of 
her  time  to  sinking  small  fishing  craft,  the  U-156  met  an  in- 


198  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

glorious  end  in  the  Northern  Mine  Barrage.  Attempting  to 
"run"  the  barrage,  she  struck  a  mine  and  sank  so  quickly  that, 
apparently,  many  of  her  men  did  not  have  time  to  escape. 
Twenty-one  survivors  were  landed  on  the  Norwegian  Coast ;  the 
fate  of  the  rest  of  the  crew  is  unknown.  It  seems  like  fate  that 
this  raider  which  destroyed  so  many  helpless  little  American 
vessels  should  have  been  sent  down  by  that  creation  which  was 
mainly  American,  the  great  barrage  which,  3,500  miles  from 
this  country,  stretched  across  the  North  Sea. 

At  the  same  time  the  U-156  was  slaying  fishing  craft  in  the 
north,  another  German  submarine,  commanded  by  Korvetten- 
Kapitan  Kophamel,  the  U-140,  was  operating  in  southern 
waters.  Leaving  Kiel  June  22,  only  a  week  after  the  U-156,  this 
big  undersea  boat  began  work  almost  in  mid-ocean  July  18,  gun- 
ning the  American  tanker  Joseph  Cudahy.  On  the  26th  she  fired 
on  two  British  vessels,  and  later  on  the  Kermanshah.  All  these 
attacks  were  unsuccessful,  but  she  succeeded  in  sinking  the  Por- 
tuguese bark  Porto,  and  on  August  1  the  Japanese  steamship 
Tokuyama  was  torpedoed  200  miles  southeast  of  New  York. 

The  U-140  had  a  long  and  hot  fight,  before  she  sank,  August 
4th,  her  first  American  vessel,  the  tanker  0.  B.  Jennings,  Cap- 
tain George  W.  Nordstrom,  master;  one  man  being  killed  and 
several  wounded,  before  the  ship  was  sent  down.  Then  the 
U-140,  sinking  a  schooner  on  the  way,  headed  for  Diamond 
Shoals,  on  the  North  Carolina  coast,  near  Cape  Hatteras. 

The  Merak,  a  Dutch  steamship  taken  over  by  the  Americans, 
was  sailing  along  at  eight  knots,  when,  at  1:40  p.  m.,  a  shot 
crossed  her  bow.  Putting  about,  the  Merak  made  for  shore, 
zigzagging,  the  submarine  pursuing,  firing  a  shell  a  minute. 
After  the  thirtieth  shot,  the  Merak  ran  aground  and  her  crew 
took  to  the  boats.  The  Germans  boarded  the  steamer,  bombed 
her,  and  then  turned  their  attention  to  other  vessels.  Three 
were  in  sight,  the  steamers  Beucleuch  and  Mariner's  Harbor, 
and  the  Diamond  Shoals  lightship. 

First  they  turned  their  guns  on  the  lightship.  Unarmed,  with 
no  means  of  defense,  this  vessel  of  590  tons  was  of  the  same 
type  as  the  other  ships  which  are  stationed  at  various  points 
along  the  coast  to  keep  their  lights  burning  and  warn  mariners 
off  dangerous  points.    To  destroy  one  of  these  coast  sentinels  is 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       199 

like  shooting  down  a  light-house.  But  the  Germans  evidently 
thought  its  destruction  would  cause  a  shock  and  arouse  indigna- 
tion, if  nothing  else.  So  they  shot  down  the  sentinel  of  Diamond 
Shoals,  while  the  lightships'  crew  took  to  the  boats  and  saved 
their  lives  by  rowing  to  shore.  Then  the  U-140  attacked  the 
Beucleuch,  but  the  British  steamer  was  too  fast  for  her,  and  in 
the  meantime  the  Mariner's  Harbor,  too,  had  escaped. 

No  more  was  heard  of  the  U-140  until  August  10,  when  she 
attacked  the  Brazilian  steamer  Uberaba.  The  destroyer  String- 
ham  went  at  once  to  the  steamship's  assistance  and  drove  off 
the  enemy.  The  Brazilians  later  presented  the  destroyer  with 
a  silk  American  flag  and  a  silver  loving-cup,  to  express  their 
thanks  for  the  timely  aid  given  by  the  Stringham  in  saving  the 
Uberaba  from  destruction. 

After  a  brush  with  the  U.  S.  S.  Pastores,  whose  gunfire 
proved  too  hot  to  face,  the  U-140  proceeded  several  hundred 
miles  north,  keeping  well  out  at  sea,  and  was  not  heard  from  for 
a  week.  Then  on  August  21,  after  a  gunfire  contest,  she  sank 
the  British  steamer  Diomed,  and  the  next  night  attacked  the 
Pleiades,  an  American  cargo  vessel,  whose  shots  fell  so  close 
around  the  submarine  that  it  was  glad  to  get  away. 

That  was  the  last  experience,  near  our  coast,  of  the  U-140, 
which  was  already  headed  for  Germany.  She  had  been  dam- 
aged, whether  by  our  shells  or  depth-bombs,  or  from  some  other 
cause  could  not  be  ascertained.  Her  passage  was  slow  until  she 
was  joined  by  the  U-117,  September  9.  They  proceeded  in  com- 
pany toward  Germany,  the  U-140  reaching  Kiel  October  25. 

The  U-117,  a  mine-layer  of  large  type,  commanded  by  Kapi- 
tan-Leutnant  Droscher,  had  left  Germany  early  in  July,  and 
her  first  exploit  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  was  a  raid  on  the 
fishing  fleet,  near  George's  Bank,  a  hundred  miles  or  more  east 
of  Cape  Cod.  In  one  day,  August  10th,  she  sank  nine  little 
schooners  of  18  to  54  tons.  Coming  nearer  shore,  she  torpedoed 
and  sank  the  Norwegian  steamer  Sommerstadt,  25  miles  south- 
east of  Fire  Island.  The  torpedo  made  a  circle  around  the  ves- 
sel and  returning,  exploded,  her  master,  Captain  George  Han- 
sen, declared,  saying : 

The  torpedo  went  about  1,300  fathoms  on  the  starboard  side;  then 
it  started  to  turn  to  the  left.    When  I  saw  the  torpedo  start  to  swerve 


200  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

around,  I  gave  orders  for  full  speed  ahead.  After  it  passed  the  bow  it 
made  two  turns,  making  a  complete  circle,  and  then  struck  our  vessel  aft 
on  the  port  side  exactly  between  the  third  and  fourth  holds,  right  at  the 
bulkhead. 

The  next  afternoon  the  Frederick  R.  Kellogg,  an  American 
tanker,  was  torpedoed  30  miles  south  of  Ambrose  Channel  light- 
ship. The  torpedo  struck  in  the  engine-room,  and  the  ship  went 
down  in  fifteen  seconds,  her  master,  Captain  C.  H.  White,  stated. 
Two  steel  decks  and  a  wooden  deck  were  blown  up,  and  a  lifeboat 
was  blown  in  the  air.  The  engineer,  his  third  assistant,  one  fire- 
man and  an  oiler  were  killed  or  drowned.  The  ship  sank  in 
shallow  water,  however,  and  was  later  raised,  towed  to  port  and 
repaired. 

The  submarine  sank  the  schooner  Dorothy  B.  Barrett  and  the 
motor-ship  Madrugada,  and  on  the  17th  sent  down,  120  miles 
southeast  of  Cape  Henry,  the  Nordhav,  a  Norwegian  bark, 
whose  survivors  were  rescued  by  the  battleship  Kearsarge. 
The  U-117  had  a  long  combat  on  August  20,  with  the  Italian 
steamer  Ansaldo  III,  the  steamer  escaping  after  a  gun  duel  that 
lasted  nearly  three  hours,  and  the  next  day  had  another  running 
fight  with  the  British  Thespis,  which  was  also  unsuccessful. 

The  final  exploit  of  the  U-117  on  this  side  of  the  ocean  was 
the  sinking  of  two  Canadian  schooners  on  August  30th.  She 
then  started  across  the  Atlantic,  ten  days  later  joining  the 
U-140. 

It  was  not  until  early  in  August  that  the  Deutschland,  which 
had  made  two  trips  to  the  United  States  as  a  commercial  sub- 
marine in  1916,  left  Germany  for  American  waters.  Her  opera- 
tions were  mainly  far  out  at  sea  or  in  Canadian  waters,  and 
she  never  came  within  200  or  300  miles  of  the  United  States 
coast. 

Renamed  the  U-155,  the  Deutschland  began  her  activities 
on  this  expedition  on  August  27,  1918,  when  she  attacked  the 
American  steamship  Montoso  almost  in  mid-Atlantic.  It  was 
at  night,  about  9  o'clock,  when  the  Montoso  and  the  Rondo  and 
Ticonderoga,  which  were  with  her,  opened  fire.  The  submarine 
fired  several  shots,  but  the  guns  of  our  vessels  drove  it  off. 

Five  days  later  the  Deutschland  attacked  the  U.  S.  S.  Frank 
H.  Buck,  opening  fire  with  two  six-inch  guns.    Firing  first  with 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       201 

its  3-inch  forward  gun,  then  putting  into  action  its  six-incher, 
the  Buck  made  a  vigorous  reply.  Her  shots  were  falling  close 
to  the  "sub,"  but  enemy  shrapnel  was  bursting  above  the  vessel 
and  falling  on  deck.  The  Buck  reported  that  one  of  her  shots 
apparently  hit  right  at  the  stern  of  the  U-boat  and  another  for- 
ward of  the  conning  tower,  under  the  water  line.  The  submarine 
then  disappeared.  She  seemed  to  have  been  damaged,  but  not 
enough  to  put  her  out  of  commission,  for  on  September  2nd  she 
sank  the  Norwegian  steamer  Shortind  and  on  the  7th  chased 
and  shelled  the  British  steamship  Monmouth.  Five  days  later 
she  torpedoed  the  Portuguese  steamer  Leixoes,  three  of  the  crew 
being  lost,  one  going  down  with  the  ship  and  two  dying  of  cold 
and  exposure  in  the  lifeboats. 

September  13th  was  an  unlucky  day  for  the  Deutschland,  for 
in  a  gunfire  contest  with  the  armed  British  merchantman  Newby 
Hall,  she  was  struck  by  a  shell  which  exploded  and  temporarily 
put  out  of  action  her  forward  gun.  For  the  next  week  she  seems 
to  have  devoted  her  attention  to  mine-laying,  off  Halifax  and 
the  Nova  Scotian  coast.  Then  she  sank  a  small  steam  trawler, 
the  Kingfisher,  and  on  Sept.  29th  unsuccessfully  attacked  the 
British  steamer  Reginolite.  On  October  3  and  4,  she  sank  the 
Italian  steamship  Alberto  Treves  and  the  British  schooner 
Industrial. 

At  10  a.  m.,  Oct.  12th,  the  Deutschland  attacked  the  Ameri- 
can steamship  Amphion,  formerly  the  German  Koln.  Her 
second  shot  carried  away  the  steamer's  wireless.  Then  ensued 
a  gunfire  contest  that  lasted  more  than  an  hour,  the  submarine 
firing  some  200  shots  and  the  Amphion  72.  The  Amphion  was 
hit  time  and  again,  her  lifeboats  were  riddled,  and  her  super- 
structure damaged,  but  she  gradually  drew  off  and  the  U-boat 
abandoned  the  chase. 

The  last  American  steamer  sunk  during  the  war  was  the 
Lucia,  known  as  the  "non-sinkable"  ship — and  the  reports  indi- 
cate that  it  was  the  Deutschland  that  sank  her.  The  Lucia,  a 
U.  S.  Shipping  Board  vessel  used  as  an  army  cargo  transport, 
had  been  fitted  up  with  buoyancy  boxes.  There  was  consider- 
able interest  in  this  experiment,  proposed  and  carried  out  by 
the  Naval  Consulting  Board,  accounts  of  which  had  been  widely 
published.     These  boxes  did  not  render  the  vessel  unsinkable, 


202  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

but  it  is  a  significant  fact  that  she  remained  afloat  twenty-two 
hours  after  she  was  torpedoed. 

It  was  5 :30  p.  m.,  October  17,  when  the  torpedo  struck  in  the 
engine-room,  killing  four  men.  Though  the  submarine  was  not 
seen,  the  naval  armed  guard  stood  at  their  guns,  which  were 
trained  in  the  direction  from  which  the  torpedo  came.  The 
civilian  crew  took  to  the  life-boats  as  the  vessel  settled  slowly. 
The  gunners  remained  aboard  until  1 :30  o  'clock  the  next  after- 
noon, when  the  seas  were  breaking  over  the  gun  platform.  The 
Lucia  did  not  finally  disappear  beneath  the  waves  until  3:20 
p.  m.,  October  18th. 

After  sinking  the  Lucia,  the  former  Deutschland  cruised 
towards  the  Azores,  and  did  not  reach  Kiel  until  November  15, 
four  days  after  the  armistice. 

There  was  one  other  submarine  assigned  to  operate  in 
American  waters,  and  which  started  out  from  Kiel,  late  in 
August,  for  this  purpose.  This  was  the  U-152,  a  large  craft  of 
the  Deutschland  type,  commanded  by  Kapitan-Leutnant  Franz. 
Though  she  never  got  within  hundreds  of  miles  of  our  coast,  on 
September  30th  she  sank  the  animal  transport  Ticonderoga, 
and  caused  the  largest  loss  of  life  any  of  our  ships  sustained  in 
action.  But  this  took  place  in  the  Eastern  Atlantic,  latitude 
43°-05'  north,  longitude  38°-43'  west,  nearer  Europe  than  Amer- 
ica. It  was  the  U-152  with  which  the  U.  S.  S.  George  G.  Henry 
had  a  two-hour  running  fight  on  September  29th,  in  which  the 
Henry  came  off  victor.  This  was  not  far  from  the  point  where 
the  Ticonderoga  went  down. 

The  nearest  point  she  came  to  the  United  States  was  on 
October  13th,  when  she  sank  the  Norwegian  bark  Stifinder,  in 
latitude  37° -22'  north,  longitude  53°  -30'  west,  600  miles  or  more 
from  our  coast. 

Next  to  attacking  vessels,  the  most  menacing  activity  of  the 
U-boats  was  mine-laying.  They  sowed  mines  at  various  points 
from  Cape  Hatteras  to  Nova  Scotia  and  mine-fields  were  dis- 
covered off  Fire  Island,  N.  Y. ;  Barnegat,  N.  J. ;  Five  Fathom 
Bank,  near  the  entrance  to  Delaware  River ;  Fenwick  Island,  off 
the  Delaware  Coast;  Winter  Quarter  Shoal  and  the  Virginia 
Capes,  and  Wimble  Shoals,  near  the  North  Carolina  coast. 
Single  mines  were  picked  up  at  other  points. 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       203 

Every  protective  measure  possible  was  employed  against 
them.  A  fleet  of  mine-sweepers  was  constantly  engaged  in 
sweeping  channels  and  entrances  to  harbors,  and  every  point 
where  there  was  reason  to  believe  mines  might  be  laid.  Fifty- 
nine  vessels  were  engaged  in  this  duty,  most  of  them  assigned 
to  the  districts  which  handled  the  largest  volume  of  shipping. 

Naval  vessels  and  the  larger  merchantmen  carried  paravanes, 
which  swept  up  mines  and  carried  them  off  from  the  vessel, 
where  they  could  be  destroyed.  But  even  the  paravanes  were 
not  always  effective. 

It  was  one  of  these  floating  mines  which  sank  the  cruiser 
San  Diego  July  19,  1918,  off  Fire  Island.  The  battleship  Min- 
nesota struck  one  of  them  at  night,  September  29th,  at  3:15 
a.  m.,  twenty  miles  from  Fenwick  Island  Shoals  lightship. 
Though  the  explosion,  under  her  starboard  bow,  seriously  dam- 
aged the  hull  and  flooded  the  forward  compartments,  the  Min- 
nesota proceeded  to  port  under  her  own  steam,  arriving  at  7 :45 
p.  m.  at  the  Philadelphia  Navy  Yard,  where  she  was  docked 
and  repaired. 

The  British  steamship  Mirlo  was  blown  up  off  Wimble  Shoal 
buoy,  near  Cape  Hatteras,  at  3 :30  p.  m.,  August  16th.  The  ship, 
which  was  loaded  with  gasoline,  took  fire,  and  one  explosion 
after  another  occurred,  breaking  the  vessel  in  two.  The  San 
Saba,  formerly  the  Colorado,  was  sunk  off  Barnegat,  October 
4th.  Struck  amidships,  the  vessel  practically  broke  in  two,  and 
sank  in  fire  minutes.  The  Chaparra,  a  Cuban  steamer,  was 
blown  up  ten  miles  from  Barnegat  Light,  October  27th. 

The  U.  S.  cargo  steamer  Saetia  (Lieutenant  Commander  W. 
S.  Lynch),  bound  for  Philadelphia  from  France,  was  sunk  by  a 
mine  on  November  9th,  two  days  before  the  armistice.  The  ship 
was  ten  miles  southeast  of  Fenwick  Island  Shoals  when  an  ex- 
plosion occurred  under  No.  2  hatch,  which  shattered  the  vessel 
and  sent  it  down.  Besides  the  crew  there  were  aboard  11  army 
officers  and  74  soldiers.    All  were  rescued. 

Enemy  mines,  scattered,  as  they  were,  over  a  thousand  miles, 
would  undoubtedly  have  taken  a  much  greater  toll  of  shipping 
if  the  Navy  had  not  been  so  energetic  in  sweeping  mines  and 
destroying  them  whenever  they  appeared. 

Summarizing  the  entire  operations  of  German  submarines 


204  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

which  were  assigned  to  American  waters,  79  vessels  were  sunk 
by  gunfire  or  bombs.  Of  these  17  were  steamers,  the  others 
being  sailing  vessels,  most  of  them  small  schooners  and  motor 
boats.  Of  the  14  steamers  torpedoed,  but  two  were  American, 
the  Ticonderoga  and  Lucia,  both  of  which  were  sunk  far  out  in 
the  Atlantic,  hundreds  of  miles  from  our  shores.  Of  the  seven 
vessels  mined,  one,  the  Minnesota,  got  to  port  under  her  own 
steam,  and  another,  the  tanker  Herbert  L.  Pratt,  was  salvaged, 
both  being  repaired  and  put  back  into  service.  Several  vessels 
sunk  or  bombed  by  submarine  were  later  recovered  and  repaired, 
including  the  big  steamer  Frederick  R.  Kellogg. 

Only  nine  American  steamers  were  lost  by  submarine  ac- 
tivities in  American  waters — the  Winneconne,  1,869  tons;  Texel, 
3,210;  Carolina,  5,093;  Pinar  del  Rio,  2,504;  0.  B.  Jennings, 
10,289;  Merak  (ex-Dutch),  3,024  tons,  all  destroyed  by  direct 
attack;  and  the  San  Diego,  13,680  tons  displacement;  the  San 
Saba,  2,458,  and  the  Saetia,  2,873  gross  tons,  sunk  by  mines — a 
total  tonnage  of  45,000. 

In  their  chief  mission  of  preventing  transportation  to 
Europe,  the  U-boats  failed  utterly.  The  flow  of  troops,  sup- 
plies and  munitions  to  France  and  England  was  not  for  a 
moment  interrupted.  In  fact,  it  was  precisely  this  period  in 
which  it  was  increased,  and  we  transported  to  Europe  over 
300,000  soldiers  per  month. 

Not  one  troop-convoy  was  even  attacked.  So  well  were  all 
convoys  protected  by  naval  escort  that  the  submarines  avoided 
them.  Furthermore,  they  avoided  all  naval  vessels  and  when 
one  was  sighted,  the  ''sub"  instantly  submerged,  usually  when 
the  man-of-war  was  miles  away.  This  made  it  difficult  for  our 
ships  even  to  get  a  shot  at  them. 

They  had  thousands  of  miles  of  water  to  cruise  in,  and  could 
choose  their  own  field  of  operations.  Driven  from  one  point, 
they  shifted  to  another,  often  disappearing  for  days,  then 
emerging  in  some  locality  hundreds  of  miles  from  where  they 
were  last  seen.  If  the  U-boats  were  generally  able  to  elude  for 
months  the  thousands  of  British,  French  and  American  patrol 
and  escort  craft  in  narrow  European  waters,  how  much  more 
difficult  it  was  to  run  down  the  few,  on  this  side  of  the  ocean, 
who  could  range  from  Nova  Scotia  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 


WHEN  THE  U-BOATS  CAME  TO  AMERICA       205 

Though  we  needed  the  best  and  all  the  patrol  craft  we  could 
get,  not  one  of  our  destroyers  or  any  other  vessel  was  recalled 
from  Europe.  In  fact,  more  were  sent  over  to  reinforce  them. 
Operating  for  .months  with  submarines  of  the  largest  type,  the 
Germans  failed  to  achieve  any  real  military  success,  and  while 
they  sank  many  small  craft  and  a  substantial  amount  of  ocean 
shipping,  and  cut  a  few  cables,  their  raids  on  the  American 
coast  had  no  effect  whatever  upon  the  trend  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
MARINES  STOPPED  DRIVE  ON  PARIS 

THROWN   INTO   THE   BREACH    WITH    OTHER   AMERICANS   IN    CHATEAU- 
THIERRY  SECTOR,  THEY  HALTED  GERMANS FIGHTING  DESPERATELY 

FOR  DAYS,  MARINES  CLEARED  BELLEAU  WOOD CAPTURE  OF  BLANC 

MONT  RIDGE,   THE   KEY   TO  RHEIMS CROSSED  THE   MEUSE   UNDER 

HEAVY  FIRE   THE   MORNING   OF  THE  ARMISTICE — IN   GERMANY  IN 
ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION. 

ENTER  the  Marines! 
It  was  the  evening  of  Memorial  Day,  May  30,  1918, 
that  they  were  ordered  to  the  most  critical  point  in  the 
battle  lines.  Paris  was  threatened  more  sorely  than  it 
had  been  since  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  The  Germans  were 
only  forty  miles  away.  Hurdling  the  Chemin-des-Dames,  taking 
Soissons,  they  had  overcome  the  strongest  French  defenses,  and 
were  moving  on  at  the  rate  of  five  or  six  miles  a  day.  Capture 
of  the  city  seemed  imminent.  Parisians  by  thousands  were 
trekking  to  safer  abodes.  Archives  were  packed ;  preparations 
made  to  move  government  offices  and  set  up  a  temporary  capital 
in  the  southwest. 

To  the  rescue  came  the  Americans — the  Second  Division, 
which  included  the  Marines;  and  elements  of  the  Third  and 
Twenty-eighth  Divisions.  "Move  at  10  p.  m.  by  bus  to  new 
area,"  was  the  order  received  by  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Marine 
Regiments,  and  the  Sixth  Machine-Gun  Battalion.  Seventy-five 
miles  from  the  field,  they  had  to  travel  in  camions,  not  even 
the  officers  knowing  their  ultimate  destination.  But  all  were  in 
happy  mood,  sure  they  were  bound  for  the  front. 

The  roads  were  crowded  with  French,  men,  women  and 
children  hurrying  away  from  the  battle  lines,  seeking  safety. 
Only  the  Americans  rode  ahead — always  forward.     They  had 

206 


MARINES  STOPPED  DRIVE  ON  PARIS  207 

no  tanks,  gas-shells,  or  flame  projectors.  They  were  untried  in 
open  warfare  and  they  had  to  go  up  against  Germany's  best 
troops.    The  French  hesitated  to  risk  all  to  them  in  the  crisis. 

"Let  us  fight  in  our  own  way,"  said  General  Harbord,  "and 
we  will  stop  them." 

Permission  was  granted.  In  their  own  way  they  fought  and 
won.  Colonel  (later  Brigadier  General)  A.  W.  Catlin,  who  com- 
manded the  Sixth  Regiment,  showed  his  officers  the  map,  in- 
dicating the  points  to  be  held,  and  the  maps  were  passed  around 
to  the  men  so  they  would  have  all  the  information  available. 
"I  hold,"  said  he,  "that  men  like  ours  fight  none  the  worse  for 
knowing  just  what  they  are  fighting  for. ' '  One  secret  of  Marine 
efficiency  in  combat  is  the  comradeship  between  officers  and  men. 
"Theirs  not  to  reason  why"  has  no  place  in  their  vocabulary. 

When  they  arrived,  June  1st,  the  Marines  were  told  to  "dig 
in."  As  tools  they  used  bayonets  and  the  lids  of  their  mess- 
gear.  "Say,  you'd  be  surprised  to  know  just  how  much  digging 
you  can  do  under  those  circumstances,"  remarked  Private 
Geiger  afterwards  as  he  lay  wounded  in  a  hospital.  "Bullets 
and  shrapnel  came  from  everywhere.  You'd  work  until  it 
seemed  you  couldn  't  budge  another  inch,  when  a  shell  would  hit 
right  close  and  then  you'd  start  digging  with  as  much  energy 
as  if  you  had  just  begun. ' ' 

At  ten  o'clock,  on  June  2nd,  they  were  ordered  to  back  up 
the  overtaxed  French.  It  was  the  second  battalion  of  the  Fifth 
Marines,  and  particularly  the  55th  Company,  which  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  assault  at  Les  Mares  Ferme,  the  point  where  the 
Germans  came  nearest  Paris. 

The  55th  Company  had  orders  to  take  position  one  and  a 
half  kilometers  northeast  of  Marigny.  The  French,  a  few  kil- 
ometers ahead,  were  reported  falling  back,  and  soon  began 
filtering  through.  The  enemy  attack  was  launched  at  5  p.  m. 
against  the  French  who  had  remained  in  front  of  Wise's  bat- 
talion at  Hill  165.  The  Germans  swept  down  the  wide  wheat 
fields.    The  French,  pressed  back,  fought  as  they  retreated. 

Neville's  Fifth  Marines  opened  up  with  a  slashing  barrage, 
mowing  down  the  Germans.  Trained  marksmen,  sharp- 
shooters, they  calmly  set  their  sights  and  aimed  with  the  same 
precision  they  had  shown  upon  the  rifle  ranges  at  Parris  Island 


208  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

and  Quantico.  The  French  said  they  had  never  seen  such  marks- 
manship in  the  heat  of  battle.  Incessantly  their  rifles  cracked, 
and  with  their  fire  came  the  support  of  the  artillery.  The  ma- 
chine-guns, pouring  forth  a  hail  of  bullets,  also  began  to  make 
inroads  in  the  advancing  lines.  Caught  in  a  seething  wave  of 
scattering  shrapnel,  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire,  the  Germans 
found  further  advance  would  be  suicide.  The  lines  hesitated, 
then  stopped.  The  enemy  broke  for  cover,  while  the  Marines 
raked  the  woods  and  ravines  in  which  they  had  taken  refuge. 

Above,  a  French  airplane  was  checking  up  on  the  artillery 
fire.  Surprised  at  seeing  men  set  their  sights,  adjust  their 
range,  and  fire  deliberately  at  an  advancing  foe,  each  man  pick- 
ing his  target,  not  firing  merely  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy, 
the  aviator  signaled  "Bravo!"  In  the  rear  that  word  was 
echoed  again  and  again.  The  German  drive  on  Paris  had  been 
stopped. 

The  next  few  days  were  devoted  to  pushing  forth  outposts 
and  testing  the  strength  of  the  enemy.  The  fighting  had 
changed.  Mystified  at  running  against  a  stone  wall  of  defense 
just  when  they  believed  that  their  advance  would  be  easiest,  the 
Germans  had  halted,  amazed.  Put  on  the  defensive,  they  strove 
desperately  to  hold  their  lines.  Belleau  Wood  had  been  planted 
thickly  with  nest  after  nest  of  machine-guns.  In  that  jungle  of 
trees,  matted  underbrush,  of  rocks,  of  vines  and  heavy  foliage, 
the  Germans  had  placed  themselves  in  positions  they  believed 
impregnable.  Unless  they  could  be  routed  and  thrown  back 
the  breaking  of  the  attack  of  June  2  would  mean  nothing.  There 
would  come  another  drive  and  another.  The  battle  of  Chateau- 
Thierry  was  not  won  and  could  not  be  won  until  Belleau  Wood 
had  been  cleared  of  the  enemy. 

On  June  6,  the  Americans  began  the  assault  on  that  wood 
and  the  strategic  positions  adjacent,  the  towns  of  Torcy  and 
Bouresches  being  the  objectives.  At  5  p.  m.  the  Marines  at- 
tacked. It  was  a  desperate  task.  Before  they  started,  their 
officers  cheered  them.  "Give  'em  hell!"  was  the  command 
Colonel  Catlin  is  said  to  have  given.  They  gave  it  to  them,  but 
paid  a  heavy  price  in  blood.  As  the  Marines  advanced,  the 
German  artillery  let  loose  a  storm  of  fire.  Men  on  every  hand 
were  killed  or  injured.    Brave  Berry  was  struck  in  the  arm,  but 


^3 


*  5 


rog 


OS 


OS  s 

3  * 

to    p> 

& 

ft)   |— i 

s. 

U  to" 

f1 

s 

H 

bd  cd 

>■ 

5. " 

O 

o    tf 

- 

-i  2- 

- 

~     OTQ 

CD 

►  g, 

O 

^ 

^ 

~  Q 

>-3 

p  ro 

a 

St  4 

H 

3  £L 

g 

^ 

> 

•-J       CT> 

1— 1 

CD 

3 

H 

fs 

QQ 

CD 

P  Q 

MARINES  STOPPED  DRIVE  ON  PARIS  209 

with  the  blood  streaming  from  his  sleeve,  he  kept  on  until  ex- 
hausted. Just  as  daring  Sibley's  men  reached  the  edge  of  the 
woods  a  sniper's  bullet  hit  Colonel  Catlin  in  the  chest.  Severely 
wounded,  he  was  relieved  in  command  by  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Harry  Lee. 

But  the  lines  never  halted  or  wavered.  Fighting  strictly 
according  to  American  methods,  a  rush,  a  halt,  a  rush  again, 
in  four-wave  formation,  the  rear  waves  taking  over  the  work 
of  those  who  had  fallen  before  them,  the  Marines  moved  ever 
forward.  Passing  over  the  bodies  of  their  dead  comrades,  they 
plunged  ahead.  They  might  be  torn  to  bits,  but  behind  them 
were  more  waves,  and  the  attack  went  on. 

"Men  fell  like  flies,"  reported  an  officer  writing  from  the 
field.  Companies  that  had  entered  the  battle  250  strong  dwindled 
to  fifty  and  sixty,  with  a  sergeant  in  command;  but  the  attack 
did  not  falter.  At  9 :45  o  'clock  that  night  Bouresches  was  taken 
by  Lieutenant  James  F.  Robertson  and  twenty-odd  men  of  his 
platoon.  They  were  soon  joined  by  reinforcements.  The  enemy 
made  counter  attacks,  but  the  Marines  held  the  town.  Leading 
his  men  through  the  machine-gun  fire,  Captain  Donald  Duncan, 
of  the  96th  Company,  was  killed. 

In  Belleau  "Wood  the  fighting  had  been  literally  from  tree  to 
tree,  stronghold  to  stronghold;  and  it  was  a  fight  which  must 
last  for  weeks  before  victory  was  complete.  Every  rocky  forma- 
tion was  a  German  machine-gun  nest,  almost  impossible  to  reach 
by  artillery  or  grenades.  There  was  only  one  way  to  wipe  out 
these  nests — by  the  bayonet.  And  by  this  method  were  they 
wiped  out,  for  United  States  Marines,  bare-chested,  shouting 
their  battle  cry  of  "E-e-e-e-e  y-a-a-h-h-h  yip!"  charged  straight 
into  the  murderous  fire  from  those  guns  and  won !  Out  of  those 
that  charged,  in  more  than  one  instance,  only  one  would  reach 
the  stronghold.  There,  with  his  bayonet  as  his  only  weapon, 
he  would  kill  or  capture  the  defenders  and  then,  swinging  the 
gun  about,  turn  it  against  remaining  German  positions. 

Fighting  in  that  forest  of  horror  for  eighteen  days,  the 
Marines  on  June  25  began  the  last,  rush  for  possession  of  the 
wood.  Following  a  tremendous  barrage,  the  struggle  started. 
The  barrage  literally  tore  the  woods  to  pieces,  but  could  not 
wipe  out  all  the  nests.    They  had  to  be  taken  by  the  bayonet. 


210  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

But  in  the  day  that  followed  every  foot  of  Belleau  Wood  was 
cleared  of  the  enemy.  On  June  26th  Major  Shearer  sent  the 
message:   "Woods  now  U.  S.  Marine  Corps  entirely." 

In  the  terrific  fighting  in  that  month,  the  Marine  Corps  lost 
1,062  men  killed,  and  3,615  wounded.  Hundreds  of  Germans 
were  captured.  In  the  final  assault,  Major  Shearer's  command 
alone  took  500  prisoners.  General  Pershing  sent  a  telegram  of 
commendation  on  June  9,  and,  visiting  division  headquarters, 
sent  his  personal  greetings  to  the  Marine  Brigade,  adding  that 
Marshal  Foch  had  especially  charged  him  to  give  the  Brigade 
his  love  and  congratulations  on  its  fine  work. 

Division  General  Degoutte,  commanding  the  Sixth  French 
Army,  on  June  30  issued  a  general  order  that,  henceforth,  in 
all  official  papers,  Belleau  Wood  should  be  named,  "Bois  de  la 
Brigade  de  Marine. "  It  was  thereafter  known  as  the  "Wood 
of  the  Marines." 

General  Pershing  in  his  final  report  said: 

The  Second  Division  then  in  reserve  northwest  of  Paris  and  pre- 
paring to  relieve  the  First  Division,  was  hastily  diverted  to  the  vicinity 
of  Meaux  on  May  31,  and,  early  on  the  morning  of  June  1st,  was  de- 
ployed across  the  Chateau-Thierry-Paris  road  near  Montreuil-aux-Lions 
in  a  gap  in  the  French  line,  where  it  stopped  the  German  advance. 

Praise  and  full  credit  are  due  the  other  troops  in  that  sector 
— the  Third  Division  whose  machine-gun  battalion  held  the 
bridge-head  at  the  Marne,  and  whose  Seventh  Regiment  fought 
for  several  days  in  Belleau  Wood;  the  artillery  and  engineers 
who  supported  every  advance ;  and  all  who  were  engaged  in  the 
Chateau-Thierry  sector.  Though  the  principal  honors  went  to 
the  Second  Division  and  the  Marines,  all  the  Americans  in  that 
region  fought  well  and  nobly. 

President  Wilson  said  they  "closed  the  gap  the  enemy  had 
succeeded  in  opening  for  their  advance  on  Paris,"  and,  driving 
back  the  Germans,  began  "the  rout  that  was  to  save  Europe 
and  the  world."  Mayors  of  the  Meaux  district,  who,  as  they 
stated,  were  eye-witnesses  of  the  American  Army's  deeds  in 
stopping  the  enemy  advance,  formally  expressed  their  admira- 
tion and  gratitude,  and  Mayor  Lugol,  in  transmitting  the  resolu- 
tion, June  26th,  wrote : 


MARINES  STOPPED  DRIVE  ON  PARIS  211 

The  civilian  population  of  this  part  of  the  country  will  never  forget 
that  the  beginning  of  this  month  of  June,  when  their  homes  were 
threatened  by  the  invader,  the  Second  American  Division  victoriously 
stepped  forth  and  succeeded  in  saving  them  from  impending  danger. 

After  personal  investigation,  and  study  of  the  area,  Melville 
E.  Stone,  manager  of  the  Associated  Press,  declared  that  in 
spite  of  heavy  losses,  the  Americans  engaged  in  the  operations 
at  and  around  Chateau-Thierry  did  three  things: 

1.  They  saved  Paris. 

2.  They  seriously  injured  the  morale  of  the  best  German  troops. 

3.  They  set  a  standard  for  American  troops  that  none  others  dared 
to  tarnish. 

General  Omar  Bundy,  commanding  the  Second  Division,  in 
General  Order  No.  41,  issued  July  10,  said : 

You  stood  like  a  stone  wall  against  the  enemy  advance  on  Paris. 

You  have  engaged  and  defeated  with  great  loss  three  German 

divisions,  and  have  occupied  the  important  strong-points  of  the  Belleau 
Woods,  Bouresches,  and  Vaux.  You  have  taken  about  1,400  prisoners, 
many  machine  guns  and  much  other  material. 

General  Petain,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French  Armies 
of  the  North  and  Northeast,  issued  a  general  order  citing  and 
commending  the  Marines,  mentioning  by  name  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral James  G.  Harbord,  commanding  the  Fourth  Brigade ;  Colo- 
nel Wendell  C.  Neville,  commanding  the  Fifth  Regiment ;  Colonel 
A.  W.  Catlin,  commanding  the  Sixth  Regiment,  and  Major  Ed- 
ward B.  Cole,  commanding  the  Sixth  Machine  Gun  Battalion. 
Colonel  Neville  commanded  the  Fifth  through  all  these  opera- 
tions, fighting  with  his  men  in  Belleau  Wood.  When  Colonel 
Catlin  was  wounded,  he  was,  as  I  have  stated,  succeeded  in  com- 
mand of  the  Sixth  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Harry  Lee,  who  con- 
tinued to  command  that  regiment  to  the  end  of  the  war.  When, 
leading  his  machine-gunners,  Major  Edward  B.  Cole  fell,  mor- 
tally wounded,  on  June  10th,  Captain  Harlan  E.  Major  took 
charge.  A  day  or  two  later  he  was  relieved  by  Captain  George 
H.  Osterhout,  and  on  June  21st  Major  Littleton  W.  T.  Waller, 
Jr.,  took  command  of  the  Sixth  Machine-Gun  Battalion. 

The  real  beginning  of  the  great  series  of  offensives  which 


212  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

finally  routed  the  German  armies  and  brought  complete  victory 
to  the  Allies,  was  when  Marshal  Foch,  on  July  18,  with  picked 
troops  made  a  vigorous  thrust  at  the  Germans  near  Soissons, 
with  overwhelming  success.  The  First  and  Second  U.  S.  Divi- 
sions and  the  French  Moroccan  Division  were  employed  as  the 
spearhead  of  the  main  attack. 

At  a  single  bound  they  broke  through  the  enemy's  infantry 
defenses,  overran  his  artillery,  and  cut  the  German  communica- 
tions. The  Second  Division  took  Beaurepaire  Farm  and  Vierzy 
in  a  rapid  advance,  and  at  the  end  of  the  second  day  was  in 
front  of  Tigny,  having  captured  3,000  prisoners  and  66  field- 
guns.  ' '  The  story  of  your  achievements, ' '  said  General  Harbord, 
"will  be  told  in  millions  of  homes  in  all  Allied  lands  tonight." 

"Due  to  the  magnificent  dash  and  power  displayed  by  our 
First  and  Second  Divisions,  the  tide  of  war  was  definitely  turned 
in  favor  of  the  Allies,"  said  General  Pershing.  Soissons  was 
relieved,  and  the  Germans  began  a  general  withdrawal  from  the 
Marne.  General  Harbord  was  in  command  of  the  Second  Divi- 
sion, Colonel  Neville  of  the  Marine  Brigade;  Colonel  Logan 
Feland  of  the  Fifth  Regiment,  Colonel  Lee  of  the  Sixth,  and 
Major  Waller  of  the  Machine-Gun  Battalion  in  this  operation, 
known  as  the  "Aisne-Marne  offensive." 

General  John  A.  Lejeune,  U.  S.  Marine  Corps,  on  July  29, 
assumed  command  of  the  Second  Division,  which  he  commanded 
with  marked  distinction  to  the  end  of  hostilities,  during  its  serv- 
ice with  the  Army  of  Occupation  in  Germany,  and  until  the 
Division,  on  its  return  to  America  in  August,  1919,  was 
demobilized. 

Of  the  six  Allied  offensives  designated  as  major  operations 
on  the  Western  Front  in  1918,  the  Marines,  with  the  other  units 
of  the  Second  Division,  took  part  in  three.  In  the  battle  for 
the  St.  Mihiel  salient,  the  division  on  September  11th  took  up 
a  line  running  from  Remenauville  to  Limey,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  12th  attacked.  Overcoming  the  enemy  resistance,  they 
romped  through  to  the  Rupt  de  Mad,  a  small  river,  crossed  it 
on  stone  bridges,  occupied  Thiaucourt,  scaled  the  heights  be- 
yond and  pushed  on  to  a  line  running  from  the  Xammes-Jaulny 
ridges  to  Bonvaux  Forest.  Then  they  rested,  having  occupied 
two  days'  objectives  before  3  p.  m.  of  the  first  day.    The  Divi- 


MARINES  STOPPED  DRIVE  ON  PARIS  213 

sion's  casualties  were  about  1,000  men,  134  killed.  It  had  cap- 
tured eighty  German  officers,  3,200  men,  120  cannon  and  a  vast 
amount  of  stores. 

The  taking  of  Blanc  Mont  Ridge,  the  key  to  Rheims,  was 
one  of  the  most  effective  blows  struck  by  the  Allies.  Determined 
to  break  through  the  powerful  German  defenses  in  the  Cham- 
pagne, Marshal  Foch  asked  for  an  American  division.  The 
Second  was  selected,  and  General  Lejeune,  on  September  27th, 
was  summoned  to  French  headquarters. 

Pointing  to  a  large  relief  map  of  the  battlefield,  General 
Gouraud,  who  directed  the  operations,  said  to  General  Lejeune : 
' '  General,  this  position  is  the  key  of  all  the  German  defenses  of 
this  sector  including  the  whole  Rheims  Massif.  If  this  ridge 
can  be  taken  the  Germans  will  be  obliged  to  retreat  along  the 
whole  front  30  kilometers  to  the  river  Aisne.  Do  you  think 
your  division  could  effect  its  capture?" 

Studying  the  map  closely,  General  Lejeune  said  with  quiet 
assurance  that  he  was  certain  the  Second  Division  could  take  it. 
He  was  directed  to  propose  a  plan  for  the  assault,  which  would 
be  begun  in  a  few  days.  He  did  so.  The  battle  of  Blanc  Mont 
Ridge  was  fought  and  won  by  the  Second  Division  as  a  part  of 
the  French  Fourth  Army,  and  that  signal  victory  was  due  largely 
to  the  military  genius  of  Lejeune. 

Setting  forth  on  October  1st,  the  Americans  that  night  re- 
lieved French  troops  in  the  front  line  near  Somme-Py.  Charg- 
ing over  desolated  white  chalky  ground,  scarred  and  shell- 
pocked  by  years  of  artillery  fire — a  maze  of  mine  craters,  deep 
trenches  and  concrete  fortifications,  the  Second  Division  cleaned 
up  Essen  Hook,  and  captured  Blanc  Mont  Ridge  and  St.  Etienne 
— all  in  the  days  from  October  3  to  9.  ''This  victory,"  the 
official  report  stated,  "freed  Rheims  and  forced  the  entire  Ger- 
man Army  between  that  city  and  the  Argonne  Forest  to  retreat 
to  the  Aisne." 

Writing  to  Marshal  Foch,  General  Gouraud  proposed  a 
special  citation  of  the  Division,  stating: 

The  Second  Infantry  Division,  United  States,  brilliantly  commanded 
by  General  Lejeune,  played  a  glorious  part  in  the  operations  of  the 
Fourth  Army  in  the  Champaigne  in  October,  1918.    On  the  3d  of  Octo- 


214  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

ber  this  Division  drove  forward  and  seized  in  a  single  assault  the  strongly 
entrenched  German  positions  between  Blanc  Mont  and  Medeah  Ferme, 
and  again  pressing  forward  to  the  outskirts  of  St.  Etienne-a-Arnes,  it 
made  in  the  course  of  the  day,  an  advance  of  about  six  kilometers. 

It  captured  several  thousand  prisoners,  many  cannon  and  machine- 
guns,  and  a  large  quantity  of  other  military  material.  This  attack, 
combined  with  that  of  the  French  divisions  on  its  left  and  right,  resulted 
in  the  evacuation  by  the  enemy  of  his  positions  on  both  sides  of  the 
River  Suippe  and  his  withdrawal  from  the  Massif  de  Notre  Dames  des 
Champs. 

Ordered  to  participate  in  the  Argonne-Meuse  operation,  the 
Second  Division  marched  ankle  deep  in  mud  more  than  a  hun- 
dred kilometers,  four  days  with  but  one  day  of  rest.  On  Novem- 
ber 1st,  following  a  day  of  terrific  barrage,  the  Division  ''jumped 
off"  for  its  final  operation  of  the  war,  which  did  not  end  until 
the  morning  of  the  armistice,  when  it  was  firmly  established  on 
the  east  bank  of  the  Meuse.  "It  was  so  placed  in  the  battle 
line,"  said  the  General  Headquarters  orders,  "that  its  known 
ability  might  be  used  to  overcome  the  critical  part  of  the  enemy 's 
defense."  The  salient  feature  of  the  plan  of  attack  was  to  drive 
a  wedge  through  Landres-et-St.  Georges  to  the  vicinity  of  Fosse. 
If  successful,  this  would  break  the  backbone  of  the  enemy  and 
compel  retreat  beyond  the  Meuse.  The  Second  Division  accom- 
plished the  desired  result  on  the  first  attack.  "This  decisive 
blow,"  said  the  official  report,  "broke  the  enemy's  defense  and 
opened  the  way  for  the  rapid  advance  of  the  Army. ' '  The  com- 
mander of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  wrote : 

The  Division's  brilliant  advance  of  more  than  nine  kilometers,  de- 
stroying the  last  stronghold  on  the  Hindenburg  line,  capturing  the 
Freya  Stellung,  and  going  more  than  nine  kilometers  against  not  only 
the  permanent  but  the  relieving  forces  in  their  front,  may  justly  be 
regarded  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable  achievements  made  by  any 
troops  in  this  war. 

During  the  night  of  November  3rd,  in  a  heavy  rain  the  divi- 
sion passed  forward  through  the  forest  eight  kilometers  in 
advance  of  adjoining  regiments,  and  within  two  days  again 
advanced  and  threw  the  enemy  in  its  front  across  the  Meuse. 
The  next  morning  at  6  o  'clock  it  attacked  and  seized  the  German 
defense  position  on  the  ridge  southeast  of  Vaux-en-Dieulet.    On 


MARINES  STOPPED  DRIVE  ON  PARIS  215 

the  night  of  November  10th  heroic  deeds  were  done  by  heroic 
men.  In  the  face  of  heavy  artillery  and  withering  machine-gnn 
fire,  the  Second  Engineers  threw  two  bridges  across  the  Meuse 
and  the  first  and  second  battalions  of  the  Fifth  Marines  crossed 
unflinchingly  to  the  east  bank  and  carried  out  their  mission. 
"In  the  last  battle  of  the  war,"  said  an  order  of  the  Second 
Division,  "as  in  all  others,  in  which  this  division  has  par- 
ticipated, it  enforced  its  will  on  the  enemy."  Of  this  achieve- 
ment the  commanding  general  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  said: 
"This  feat  will  stand  among  the  most  memorable  of  the 
campaign. ' ' 

"On  the  eleventh  hour,  the  eleventh  day  of  the  eleventh 
month  of  the  year  1918,"  Brigadier  General  Neville,  command- 
ing the  Marine  Brigade,  in  an  order  reviewing  its  great  record 
closed  with  these  words:  "Along  the  fronts  of  Verdun,  the 
Marne,  the  Aisne,  Lorraine,  Champagne,  and  the  Argonne,  the 
units  of  the  Fourth  Brigade  Marines  have  fought  valiantly, 
bravely,  decisively.    It  is  a  record  of  which  you  may  all  be  proud. ' ' 

Shortly  after  the  armistice,  General  Lejeune  was  ordered  to 
proceed  to  Germany.  Stationed  at  Coblenz,  for  months  his 
division  was  a  part  of  the  Army  of  Occupation.  I  had  the  honor 
of  reviewing  the  division  on  the  heights  of  Vallendar,  near  the 
junction  of  the  Moselle  and  Rhine  rivers,  and  to  note  that  its 
discharge  of  duty  in  Germany  was  in  keeping  with  the  glorious 
record  it  had  made  in  war.  "Your  brilliant  exploits  in  battle," 
said  General  Pershing  in  a  general  order  to  the  Second  Division, 
"are  paralleled  by  the  splendid  examples  of  soldierly  bearing 
and  discipline  set  by  your  officers  and  men  while  a  part  of  the 
Army  of  Occupation." 

The  Marines  and  their  comrades  of  the  Second  Division  were 
received  with  distinguished  honor  upon  their  return  to  the 
United  States,  President  Wilson  reviewing  the  men  as  they 
passed  the  White  House  to  receive  the  heart-felt  applause  of  a 
grateful  people.  The  Secretary  of  War  in  a  letter  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  upon  their  return,  wrote:  "The  whole  history 
of  the  Brigade  in  France  is  one  of  conspicuous  service.  Through- 
out the  long  contest  the  Marines,  both  by  their  valour  and  their 
tragic  losses,  heroically  sustained,  added  an  imperishable  chap- 
ter to  the  history  of  America's  participation  in  the  World  War." 


216  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

This  mere  outline  of  the  outstanding  fighting  history  of  the 
Marines  in  France,  tells  only  a  small  portion  of  what  was  done 
by  the  "Devil  Dogs,"  as  these  Soldiers  of  the  Sea  were  called 
by  the  Germans.  Overseas  the  largest  army  concentration 
camp  was  Pontanezen  at  Brest.  It  was  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  Brigadier  General  Smedley  D.  Butler,  who  organized, 
trained  and  carried  over  the  Thirteenth  Regiment  of  Marines. 
Approximately  1,600,000  men  passed  through  that  camp.  It 
was  one  of  the  biggest  jobs  in  France  and  General  Butler  per- 
formed the  difficult  duty  with  ability  and  satisfaction.  The 
citation  for  an  Army  Distinguished  Service  Medal  said  of  him : 
' 1  He  has  commanded  with  ability  and  energy  Pontanezen  Camp 
at  Brest  during  the  time  in  which  it  has  developed  into  the 
largest  embarkation  camp  in  the  world.  Confronted  with  prob- 
lems of  extraordinary  magnitude  in  supervision,  the  reception, 
entertainment,  and  departure  of  the  large  numbers  of  officers 
and  soldiers  passing  through  this  camp,  he  has  solved  all  with 
conspicuous  success,  performing  services  of  the  highest  char- 
acter for  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces."  After  his  re- 
turn to  America  General  Butler  was  made  commandant  of  the 
chief  Marine  training  camp  at  Quantico,  Va. 

Thirty  thousand  Marines  were  sent  overseas  to  join  the 
American  Expeditionary  Forces.  When,  in  May,  1917,  I  ten- 
dered the  Marines  for  service  with  the  land  forces  abroad,  there 
was  objection  on  the  part  of  some  high  ranking  officers  of  the 
Army.  But  Secretary  Baker,  with  the  breadth  that  character- 
ized him  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  accepted  the  tender,  and  the 
Fifth  Regiment,  under  command  of  Colonel  (afterwards  Briga- 
dier General)  Charles  A.  Doyen,  sailed  on  June  14  with  the  first 
expedition  sent  to  France.  The  Sixth  Regiment  and  Sixth 
Machine  Gun  Battalion  followed  later,  and  the  Fourth  Brigade 
of  Marines  was  organized  in  October,  as  a  part  of  the  Second 
Division,  which  General  Doyen  commanded  until  relieved  by 
Major  General  Omar  Bundy,  on  November  8.  General  Doyen 
continued  at  the  head  of  the  brigade  until  ill  health  compelled 
him  to  relinquish  his  command  on  May  9,  1918. 

The  fighting  ability  which  distinguished  the  Marines  in 
France  was  the  natural  result  of  training  and  experience,  the 
"spirit  of  the  corps"  with  which  they  were  instilled.     When 


MARINES  STOPPED  DRIVE  ON  PARIS  217 

war  was  declared  there  were  only  511  officers,  commissioned  and 
warrant,  and  13,214  enlisted  men  in  the  Marine  Corps,  which 
eventually  contained  2,174  commissioned  and  288  warrant  offi- 
cers, 65,666  enlisted  regulars,  6,704  reserves  and  269  female 
reservists — a  total  strength  of  75,101. 

Recruiting,  training,  equipment  and  supply  of  this  large 
force  was  a  task  without  parallel  in  the  history  of  the  Corps. 
It  was  conducted  with  an  energy  and  ability  that  reflected  the 
utmost  credit  upon  Marine  Corps  Headquarters — Major  Gen- 
eral George  Barnett,  Commandant;  the  Assistant  Command- 
ants, first  General  John  A.  Lejeune,  afterwards  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral Charles  G.  Long;  Brigadier  General  Charles  H.  Lauch- 
heimer,  Adjutant  and  Inspector;  Brigadier  General  George 
Richards,  Paymaster;  Brigadier  General  Charles  L.  McCawley, 
Quartermaster ;  and  others  on  duty  at  posts  and  in  the  field. 

What  they  did  in  France  was  only  one  phase  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  Marines.  They  were  employed  in  practically  every 
area  in  which  the  Navy  operated — on  battleships  in  the  North 
Sea,  on  cruisers  in  the  Asiatic;  in  Haiti,  Santo  Domingo  and 
Cuba,  and  the  isles  of  the  Pacific.  In  fact,  they  claim  the  honor 
of  firing  the  first  shot  of  the  war  in  the  far  distant  island  of 
Guam,  where  a  Marine  fired  on  a  motor-launch  which  was  trying 
to  get  to  the  German  ship  Cormoran  with  the  news  of  the 
declaration  of  war  before  an  American  naval  officer  could  reach 
that  vessel  and  demand  its  surrender.  That  was  the  only 
German  vessel  in  our  territorial  waters  which  we  did  not  get. 
Her  crew  blew  her  up,  and  a  number  of  her  officers  and  men 
went  down  with  the  vessel. 

Wherever  they  were,  these  Soldiers  of  the  Sea,  upon  whom 
Uncle  Sam  has  called  so  often  when  he  had  a  duty  to  perform 
anywhere  in  the  world — these  men  who,  in  many  conflicts,  have 
been  the  " first  to  land  and  first  to  fight" — served  well  and  added 
fresh  laurels  to  those  so  often  won  in  the  long  history  of  the 
Corps.  They  may  be  pardoned  for  singing  with  a  will  their 
marching  song: 

If  the  Army  and  the  Navy  ever  look  on  Heaven's  scenes, 
They  will  find  the  streets  are  guarded  by  United  States  Marines. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
THE  ANSWER  TO  THE  75-MILE  GUN 

GERMAN    LONG-DISTANCE    FREAK    STOPPED    BOMBARDING    PARIS    WHEN 

NAVAL    RAILWAY    BATTERIES    ARRIVED MANNED    BY    NAVY    CREWS, 

HUGE     14 -INCH    GUNS    OPERATED    WITH    FRENCH    AND    AMERICAN 

ARMIES ADMIRAL     PLUNKETT     IN     COMMAND MOST     POWERFUL 

ARTILLERY  USED  BY  ALLIES  ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT. 

4  4  J—N  ARIS  bombarded ! ' '  was  the  news  that   shocked   the 

I— -^    world  on  March  23,  1918.    Two  days  before  the  Ger- 

JL         mans  had  begun  their  great  drive  for  the  Channel 

ports.      Their    armies    to    the    north    were    breaking 

through  the  Allied  defenses,  taking  one  position  after  another. 

But  their  nearest  lines  were  nearly  seventy  miles  from  Paris. 

No  gun  known  would  shoot  half  that  distance.    How  could  they 

be  shelling  the  French  capital? 

That  was  what  mystified  the  Parisians.  Falling  out  of  a 
clear  sky,  the  missiles  fell,  bursting  in  the  streets.  Aeroplane 
bombs,  was  the  first  thought,  for  Paris  was  used  to  aerial  raids. 
But  these  were  undeniably  shells,  not  bombs,  and  there  were  no 
aeroplanes  in  sight.  And  they  continued  to  fall  with  painful 
regularity.  Arriving  at  15-minute  intervals,  it  was  found  that 
at  least  21  shells  had  fallen  that  day.  They  were  not  huge, 
weighing  about  260  pounds,  but  they  were  large  enough  to  do 
considerable  destruction,  and  to  kill  people  in  streets,  squares, 
and  markets. 

For  a  week  they  kept  falling,  and  then  occurred  a  tragedy 
that  shocked  not  only  Paris  but  the  whole  Christian  world.  It 
was  Good  Friday,  and  the  cathedrals  and  churches  were  crowded 
with  worshipers.  As  the  congregation — women  and  children, 
and  men  too  old  to  fight — prayed  in  the  Church  of  St.  Gervais, 
a  shell  crashed  through  the  roof  of  the  building,  and  exploded. 
Seventy -five  persons  were  killed,  of  whom  54  were  women — and 
five  of  these  were  Americans.    Ninety  others  were  injured. 

218 


THE  ANSWER  TO  THE  75-MILE  GUN  219 

In  all  Christian  lands  people  were  aghast  at  this  slaughter  of 
the  defenseless.  Indignation  was  stirred  all  the  more  by  the 
knowledge  that  this  bombardment  was  wholly  without  military 
value.  Its  entire  object  was  to  terrorize  the  civilian  population. 
It  was  only  another  example  of  German  frightfulness. 

After  long  search  by  aircraft  it  was  discovered  that  shells 
were  coming  from  the  forest  of  Gobain,  near  Laon,  nearly  75 
miles  from  Paris.  There,  inside  the  German  lines,  was  located 
this  new  instrument  of  warfare,  the  latest  surprise  sprung  by 
the  Germans  and  one  of  the  most  sensational  of  the  whole  war. 
Worst  of  all,  the  Allies  had  no  effective  reply.  Aeroplane  bomb- 
ing proved  ineffective,  and  the  Allies  had  no  guns  which  could 
reach  it. 

For  five  months  Paris  endured  this  menace.  No  one  knew 
where  the  shells  would  fall  next,  or  who  would  be  the  victim. 
The  city,  however,  went  about  its  business  and  kept  up  its  cour- 
age. But  here  in  America  there  was  being  prepared  the 
Nemesis  of  the  Teuton  terror. 

The  United  States  Navy  was  at  that  very  time  building  long- 
range  guns  that,  while  not  capable  of  firing  such  great  distances 
as  the  German  cannon,  were  far  more  powerful  and  effective  in 
action.  Germany's  gun  was  a  freak,  merely  able  to  hurl  com- 
paratively small  shells  seventy  miles  or  more.  Huge  projectiles 
weighing  1,400  pounds  were  fired  by  our  guns,  and  wherever 
they  hit,  everything  in  the  vicinity  was  smashed. 

Elaborate  emplacements  were  required  for  the  German  gun, 
taking  considerable  time  to  construct.  Their  cannon  could  be 
fired  from  only  one  point.  The  American  guns  were  on  railway 
mounts,  and  could  be  rapidly  moved  from  place  to  place, 
wherever  they  were  needed.  Only  a  few  hours  were  required 
to  get  them  into  position.  In  fact,  if  necessary,  they  could  fire 
from  the  rails. 

Five  of  these  immense  naval  railway  batteries  were  built 
and  sent  to  France.  When  the  first  battery  arrived,  on  its  way 
to  the  front,  the  Germans  stopped  shelling  Paris.  Their 
long-distance  gun  was  hastily  withdrawn,  and  it  never  fired 
another  shot. 

What  these  batteries  saved  us  from  can  be  judged  from  Ad- 
miral Sims '  statement  that,  encouraged  by  the  shelling  of  Paris, 


220  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  Germans  were  preparing  to  conduct  long-distance  bombard- 
ments at  various  points  along  the  front.  They  were  taking  large 
guns  from  battle  cruisers,  to  be  mounted  where  they  could  bom- 
bard Dunkirk,  Chalons-sur-Marne,  Nancy  and  other  cities. 
Sixteen  huge  rifles,  it  was  reported,  had  left  Kiel  for  this  pur- 
pose. But,  so  far  as  known,  they  never  got  into  action.  The 
Germans  never  carried  out  their  plan  to  scatter  that  terror  to 
the  cities  of  France. 

These  railway  batteries,  the  largest  ever  placed  on  mobile 
mounts,  proved  an  effective  answer  to  the  Germans.  They  were 
distinguished  not  only  by  what  they  prevented,  but  what  they 
accomplished  in  action.  Engaged  with  the  French  and  American 
armies  from  September  6th  until  hostilities  ceased,  this  was  the 
most  powerful  artillery  used  by  the  Allies  on  the  western  front. 

The  guns  were  of  the  largest  type  on  our  dreadnaughts — 
14-inch,  50  caliber,  capable  of  throwing  a  1,400-pound  projectile 
42,000  yards,  nearly  25  miles.  In  action,  the  firing  was  usually 
from  18  to  23  miles. 

Operating  at  various  points  along  the  lines  from  Laon  to 
Longuyon,  these  batteries  tore  up  enemy  railways,  cutting  im- 
portant lines  of  communication ;  blew  up  ammunition  dumps  and 
bases,  and  scattered  destruction  far  in  the  rear  of  the  German 
trenches.  Manned  entirely  by  Navy  personnel,  the  force  was 
under  command  of  Rear  Admiral  Charles  P.  Plunkett. 

Each  battery  comprised  an  entire  train  of  15  cars,  made  up 
as  follows : 


1  Locomotive 

1  Battery  kitchen  car 

1  Gun  car 

2  Ammunition  cars 

1  Construction  car 

3  Berthing  cars 

1  Construction  car  with  crane 

1  Battery  headquarters  car 

1  Sand  and  log  car 

1  Battery  headquarters  kitchen  car 

1  Fuel  car 

1  Workshop  car 

Thus  each  battery  was  self-sustaining,  carrying  not  only  its 
own  ammunition,  fuel  and  food,  but  also  machinery  and 
mechanics  for  making  repairs.  The  total  weight  of  the  gun-car 
was  about  535,000  pounds,  the  gun,  breech  mechanism,  and  yoke 
weighing  192,500  pounds.  The  five  batteries,  including  the  staff 
train  of  eight  cars,  comprised  6  consolidation  locomotives  and 


THE  ANSWER  TO  THE  75-MILE  GUN  221 

tenders  (tractive  power  35,600  pounds),  5  gun-cars  and  72  auxil- 
iary cars. 

The  first  mount,  complete  with  its  huge  gun,  rolled  out  of 
the  shops  on  April  25,  1918,  less  than  a  month  from  the  time  of 
the  Good  Friday  slaughter  in  the  Paris  church.  Tested  at 
Sandy  Hook,  N.  J.,  five  days  later,  it  proved  a  complete  success, 
hurling  its  immense  projectiles  more  than  twenty-five  miles. 

If  our  guns  had  been  built  in  Paris  we  could  have  had  them 
at  the  front  in  three  days.  They  were  made  to  move  by  rail, 
and  to  be  ready  for  almost  immediate  action.  But  they  had  to 
get  to  France  first,  and  the  difficulties  of  fighting  a  war  3,000 
miles  away  were  impressed  upon  us  by  this  necessity  for  trans- 
porting them.  No  ship  was  big  enough  to  carry  one  of  them 
set  up.  Each  had  to  be  taken  to  pieces  before  loading.  The 
last  of  the  mounts  was  completed  May  25 — a  new  record  for 
quick  construction.  But  getting  a  ship  to  take  them  over  was 
no  easy  task. 

The  first  ship  assigned  was  so  badly  battered  up  on  the  in- 
coming voyage  that  it  had  to  go  into  dock  for  repairs.  The 
second  ship,  the  Texel,  was  sunk  by  a  U-boat  near  our  coast. 
It  was  June  29  before  the  first  of  the  battery  transports,  the 
Newport  News,  heavily  laden  with  material,  sailed  for  France, 
arriving  at  St.  Nazaire  July  9th. 

Setting  up  these  immense  batteries  was  a  trying  job.  Facil- 
ities at  St.  Nazaire  were  very  limited  for  the  work  of  assembly. 
Lieutenant  Commander  D.  C.  Buell,  an  officer  of  railroad  experi- 
ence, who  as  inspector  had  watched  the  building  of  the  mounts, 
was  sent  to  France.  Admiral  Plunkett  and  his  force  were  on 
hand  when  the  major  part  of  the  material  arrived.  All  set  to 
work,  and  in  a  little  more  than  two  weeks  the  first  train  was 
assembled. 

Then  arose  another  complication.  When  the  French  saw 
the  size  of  these  mounts,  they  were  afraid  their  immense  weight 
would  crush  the  rails  and  probably  break  through  or  weaken 
bridges.  The  railroad  authorities  were  unwilling  for  them  to 
move  over  their  lines.  For  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  they  would 
never  get  to  the  front.  But  Admiral  Plunkett  and  his  aids  had 
more  confidence  than  did  the  French.  The  first  train,  which 
had  been  completed  a  week  before,  left  St.  Nazaire  August  17th. 


222  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

It  proceeded  slowly  and  all  doubts  were  removed  when  it  rode 
the  rails  and  passed  over  bridges  without  the  slightest  trouble. 

The  news  of  its  coming  had  somehow  spread  through  France 
and  its  progress  toward  Paris  was  like  a  triumphal  procession. 
All  along  the  route  crowds  assembled,  cheering  the  American 
naval  gunners  "going  to  land,"  and  girls  decorated  the  gun 
with  flowers.  A  second  battery  was  on  the  way  before  the  first 
arrived.  Camouflage  was  no  concealment.  Everybody  knew 
the  big  American  cannon  were  on  the  way.  And  the  Germans 
must  have  learned  it,  too.  For,  when  the  battery  got  near  the 
front,  the  German  long-distance  gun  was  hurried  away. 

These  two  batteries  were  to  proceed  to  Helles-Mouchy,  and 
from  there  search  out  the  hidden  enemy  in  Gobain.  But  when 
the  batteries  reached  this  position,  it  was  found  that  the  Ger- 
man terrifier  was  gone,  leaving  only  its  emplacement  to  mark 
the  spot  at  which  it  had  so  long  operated. 

Battery  No.  1  proceeded  to  the  French  proving  ground  at 
Nuisemont,  where  firing  tests  were  made  with  complete  success. 
Battery  No.  2  proceeded  to  Rethondes,  in  the  forest  of  Com- 
piegne,  to  fire  upon  an  ammunition  dump  at  Tergnier,  but  after 
one  shot,  fired  September  6,  ceased  firing,  as  the  French  captured 
the  village.  Battery  No.  1  was  taken  to  Soissons  where,  on 
September  11,  position  was  taken  near  St.  Christopher  Cem- 
etery.   No.  2  proceeded  to  Fontenoy-Ambleny. 

While  these  two  batteries  were  operating,  work  was  con- 
tinuing on  the  remaining  three.  Trains  No.  3  and  4  left  St. 
Nazaire  September  13,  followed  by  No.  5  on  the  14th.  They 
arrived  at  the  railroad  artillery  base,  Haussimont,  on  September 
23rd,  24th  and  26th,  respectively. 

Weather  conditions  preventing  observation  by  aeroplane  or 
balloon,  it  was  decided  to  proceed  without  observation,  so  on 
September  14th  Battery  No.  2  fired  ten  rounds  at  an  ammunition 
dump  in  Besny-Loisy,  just  west  of  Laon.  No.  1  on  September 
28th  fired  into  the  German  lines  at  Laon,  putting  over  47  rounds 
between  1  and  5 :30  p.  m.,  at  a  range  of  34,000  yards.  The  target 
was  the  railroad  yards.  One  hundred  and  twelve  rounds  were 
fired  against  this  objective  between  September  28th  and  October 
2nd.  Battery  No.  2  fired  twelve  rounds  into  Besny-Loisy  on 
September  15th. 


THE  ANSWER  TO  THE  75-MILE  GUN  223 

The  Germans  began  retreating  from  Laon  while  this  long- 
range  bombardment  was  in  progress,  leaving  these  targets  in  the 
hands  of  the  Allies.  It  was  found  that,  though  the  batteries  had 
only  maps  to  use  in  directing  the  firing  and  without  aeroplane 
observation,  the  shots  in  nearly  all  cases  were  effective  hits. 
One  14-inch  shell  wrecked  a  three-track  railroad  line,  making 
a  gap  of  100  feet,  tearing  up  rails,  shattering  ties  and  blowing 
a  crater  in  the  road-bed.  Another  projectile  struck  a  moving 
picture  theater  during  a  performance,  killing  40  men  outright 
and  severely  wounding  sixty.  Two  other  shells  struck  this 
theatre,  completely  demolishing  it  and  several  other  surrounding 
buildings.  A  freight  train  on  a  siding  had  been  struck,  and  one 
of  the  cars  was  lifted  from  the  tracks  and  thrown  a  distance  of 
thirty  feet. 

Time  and  again  enemy  aeroplanes  bombed  the  vicinity  of 
these  batteries.  Shells  were  continually  passing  overhead.  On 
October  5th,  at  4:30  p.  m.,  a  shell  burst  directly  over  Battery 
No.  1,  followed  by  three  other  high  bursts.  A  succession  of 
shells  followed.  One  struck  only  16  feet  from  the  gun,  fragments 
hitting  the  sideplates  and  breaking  the  casting  of  the  gas  engine 
support,  but  doing  no  further  damage. 

Battery  No.  2  was  taken  to  Flavy-le-Martel,  arriving  October 
8th.  No.  1  remained  at  Soissons  until  October  24th,  firing  in 
all  199  rounds  from  the  same  pit  foundation.  After  the  capture 
of  Laon,  the  target  was,  on  October  2,  shifted  to  a  point  north- 
east of  that  town,  where  87  rounds  were  fired  at  ranges  from 
28,000  to  36,660  yards. 

Having  performed  so  satisfactorily  in  the  vicinity  of  Soissons 
with  the  Tenth  French  Army,  Batteries  No.  1  and  No.  2  were 
ordered  to  join  the  First  American  Army.  They  arrived  at 
Nixeville,  just  south  of  Verdun,  October  28th.  Batteries  3,  4 
and  5,  already  in  that  region,  had  fired  several  rounds  at  open 
fields  in  the  German  lines  near  the  targets  selected,  in  order  to 
obtain  aviation  photographs  and  correct  the  range.  On  the 
30th  and  31st  six  rounds  per  gun  were  fired  each  day,  the  two 
guns  at  Thierville  firing  at  an  aviation  field  south  of  Longuyon 
and  the  two  batteries  at  Charny  firing  at  points  near  Montmedy. 
Battery  No.  2  bombarded  the  railroad  yards  at  Montmedy  with 
43  rounds  on  November  1st  and  2nd. 


224  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

As  General  Foch  was  preparing  for  a  big  offensive  east  of 
Metz,  the  French  requested  that  two  of  the  naval  batteries  be 
assigned  to  take  part  in  this  operation.  Accordingly  Nos.  1 
and  2  were  assigned  to  the  French,  while  the  remaining  three 
remained  at  Thierville  and  Charny  to  keep  up  the  bombard- 
ment of  Montmedy  and  Longuyon.  No.  1  proceeded  via  Cham- 
pigneulles,  arriving  at  its  firing  position,  in  the  forest  of  Velor, 
November  6th,  its  objective  being  Sarrebourg.  Leaving  Charny 
November  3rd,  Battery  No.  2  reached  Moncel-Luneville,  in  the 
forest  of  Mondon,  November  9th,  having  orders  to  fire  on  Bens- 
dorf.  Both  targets  were  important  German  railroad  centers. 
But  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  on  the  11th,  put  an  end  to  the 
French  offensive  for  which  huge  preparations  had  been  made. 

Battery  No.  3,  which  was  shifted  from  Thierville  to  No.  2  's 
position  at  Charny,  on  November  1,  fired  at  the  Longuyon. 
railway  yards.  No.  4  fired  23  rounds  into  Montmedy,  and  No. 
5,  44  rounds  at  the  transportation  centres  of  Longuyon.  The 
next  day  Nos.  3  and  5  each  fired  25  rounds  at  Longuyon  and 
No.  4,  20  rounds  at  the  Montmedy  railroad.  On  account  of  the 
enemy's  activities  at  Louppy  and  Remoiville,  No.  4  November 
3,  fired  25  rounds  at  a  large  ammunition  dump  and  at  the 
lower  railroad  dump  at  Montmedy.  On  November  4,  Battery  No. 
4  again  took  up  position  at  Thierville.  No.  3  opened  fire  on 
Louppy  and  Remoiville  on  the  morning  of  November  4,  firing 
44  rounds  at  the  two  targets.  Twelve  rounds  were  also  fired 
at  Montmedy. 

The  naval  guns  were  last  fired  on  November  11th,  batteries 
4  and  5  sending  five  shells  each  into  Longuyon.  The  last  shot 
was  fired  by  No.  4,  from  Charny,  at  10 :58 :30  a.  m.,  ninety  sec- 
onds before  hostilities  ceased. 

"While  direct  observations  could  not  be  obtained  in  the  Ver- 
dun sector,  there  was  evidence  from  the  enemy  of  the  effective- 
ness of  these  guns.  On  November  5,  the  southern  part  of  Mont- 
medy, which  was  under  bombardment,  was  reported  on  fire. 
Later  a  German  prisoner  stated  that  the  firing  on  Montmedy 
had  caused  a  great  deal  of  damage,  one  shell  which  landed  in 
the  railway  yards,  killing  all  the  Germans  in  two  coaches. 

The  batteries  at  Charny  and  Thierville  were  repeatedly 
shelled  and  bombed.     On  October  30th,  when  the  enemy  was 


THE  ANSWER  TO  THE  75-MILE  GUN  225 

shelling  crossroads  between  No.  2  gun  and  its  berthing  cars, 
three  American  engineers  working  on  the  track  near  by  were 
killed,  and  the  headquarters  car  and  one  berthing  car  derailed. 
On  the  same  day  five  soldiers  were  killed  and  others  wounded 
by  shells  which  fell  around  Battery  No.  4  at  Charny.  Three  men 
of  Battery  4  were  wounded  by  shell  fire  on  October  28th,  one 
of  these,  A.  P.  Sharpe,  seaman  first  class,  dying  the  next  day 
in  the  hospital  at  Glorieux. 

One  of  the  most  important  services  rendered  by  the  naval 
batteries  was  the  shelling  of  the  railroad  running  through  Lon- 
guyon  and  Montmedy,  the  only  line  (except  one  running  far  to 
the  north  through  Belgium),  by  which  the  Germans  could  bring 
troops  to  Sedan.  Though  some  shots  fell  several  hundred 
yards  beyond  the  ranges  calculated  from  the  range  table,  the 
railroad  line  and  yards  were  struck  frequently,  and  traffic 
stopped  completely,  not  only  during  the  actual  firing,  but  from 
six  to  ten  hours  each  day  after  the  firing  ceased. 

General  Pershing,  in  his  report  of  November  20,  1918,  said : 

Our  large  caliber  guns  were  advanced,  and  were  skilfully  brought 
into  position  to  fire  upon  the  important  lines  at  Montmedy,  Longuyon, 
and  Conflans.  On  the  6th  a  division  of  the  First  Corps  reached  a  point 
on  the  Meuse  opposite  Sedan,  25  miles  from  our  lines  of  departure. 
The  strategical  goal  which  was  our  highest  hope  was  gained.  We  had 
cut  the  enemy's  main  line  of  communications,  and  nothing  but  surren- 
der or  an  armistice  could  save  his  army  from  complete  disaster. 

Though  these  batteries  fired  a  total  of  782  rounds  and  were 
under  enemy  shell-fire  repeatedly,  there  was  no  material  dam- 
age to  guns,  mounts  or  equipment,  which  met  every  condition 
imposed.  The  total  rounds  fired  per  gun  were:  No.  1,  199; 
No.  2,  113;  No.  3,  236;  No.  4,  122;  No.  5,  112. 

In  France  the  naval  railway  batteries  operated  as  five  sep- 
arate and  independent  units,  all  under  command  of  Admiral 
Plunkett.  His  principal  assistants  were  Lieutenant  Com- 
manders G.  L.  Schuyler  and  J.  W.  Bunkley.  The  commanders 
of  the  batteries  were:  No.  1,  Lieutenant  J.  A.  Martin;  No.  2, 
Lieutenant  (junior  grade)  E.  D.  Duckett;  No.  3,  Lieutenant  W. 
G.  Smith;  No.  4,  Lieutenant  J.  R.  Hayden;  No.  5,  Lieutenant 
J.  L.  Rodgers. 

The  use  of  these  guns  at  the  front  was  first  proposed  in 


226  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

November,  1917.  Impressed  by  the  Allies'  lack  of  long-range 
artillery,  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  pointed  out  that 
a  number  of  14-inch  guns  at  the  Washington  Navy  Yard  were 
available  and  suggested  that  they  might  be  mounted  on  the 
Belgian  coast  to  reply  to  the  powerful  artillery  the  Germans 
were  using  against  Dunkirk.  Upon  consideration,  it  was  de- 
cided that  it  was  practicable  to  place  these  naval  guns  on  rail- 
way mounts,  though  they  were  heavier  than  any  mobile  artil- 
lery that  had  been  built  by  any  country.  On  November  26, 1917, 
I  instructed  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  to  proceed  with  the  build- 
ing of  five  of  these  mounts,  with  complete  train  equipment. 
Though  many  problems  had  to  be  solved,  the  naval  gun  fac- 
tory completed  the  designs  within  two  months,  and  the  136 
standard  drawings  and  36  sketches  required  were  ready  to  sub- 
mit to  bidders  on  January  26,  1918. 

With  the  numerous  other  war  requirements,  which  taxed 
steel  and  locomotive  plants  to  their  capacity,  it  seemed,  at  first, 
almost  impossible  to  secure  the  building  of  the  mounts,  locomo- 
tives and  cars  required.  But  bids  were  secured,  accepted  on 
February  13, 1918,  and  the  contractors  pushed  the  work  so  ener- 
getically that  the  first  mount  was  completed  72  days  from  the 
award  of  the  contract.  Scheduled  for  delivery  on  May  15,  it  was 
completed  April  25.  The  last  mount,  scheduled  for  June  15, 
was  completed  May  25.  The  first  gun  and  mount  complete 
arrived  April  27  at  Sandy  Hook,  N.  J.,  where  it  was  subjected 
to  severe  firing  tests.  The  locomotives  and  auxiliary  cars  were 
completed  June  1,  and  shipment  overseas  was  begun.  Credit 
for  this  speedy  construction  is  due  contractors  as  well  as  naval 
officers,  and  particularly  Mr.  Samuel  M.  Vauclain,  president  of 
the  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works,  who  took  an  intense  personal 
interest  in  the  whole  undertaking. 

While  construction  was  under  way,  the  Navy  had  been  select- 
ing and  training  the  personnel,  30  officers  and  500  men,  required 
to  man  and  operate  the  batteries.  Men  were  carefully  chosen — 
some  20,000  volunteered  for  this  detail — and  were  given  an  in- 
tensive course  of  training. 

The  approximate  cost  of  the  five  mounts,  locomotives,  cars, 
spare  parts  and  ammunition  was  $3,337,970. 

As  other  artillery  could  accomplish  with  less  expenditure  of 


THE  ANSWER  TO  THE  75-MILE  GUN  227 

ammunition  and  expense  the  results  desired  at  the  shorter 
ranges  the  naval  guns  were  used  entirely  for  strategical  pur- 
poses and  were  fired  at  ranges  between  30,000  and  40,000  yards, 
shelling  objectives  that  less  powerful  guns  could  not  reach.  The 
ammunition  supply  which  was  gauged  by  the  estimated  "life" 
of  the  gun — that  is,  the  number  of  times  it  could  fire  with  accur- 
acy— consisted  of  300  rounds  for  each  gun,  and  this  quantity 
proved  adequate.  Battery  No.  3  made  a  record  for  guns  of  this 
size  in  firing  236  rounds  without  serious  deterioration. 

From  beginning  to  end,  this  entire  enterprise  was  so  well 
planned  and  carried  out,  that  we  may  well  consider  it  one  of  the 
most  successful  operations  in  which  the  Navy  ever  engaged. 


CHAPTER  XX 
THE  NAVY  THAT  FLIES 

NAVAL    AVIATION"    WATCHED    OVER    SHIPS    AND    SEARCHED    THE    SEAS 

FIRST   OF   U.   S.   ARMED   FORCES   TO   LAND   IN    FRANCE — FOUGHT 

ENEMY  AIRCRAFT  FROM  HELIGOLAND  TO  POLA — ATTACKED  U-BOAT 

BASES  IN  BELGIUM NAVAL  AVIATORS,  IN   TRAINING  AND  SERVICE, 

FLEW  FIFTEEN  MILLION  MILES. 

THE  first  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  to  land 
in  France  were  naval  aviators — seven  officers  and  123 
men,  under  command  of  Lieutenant  Kenneth  W.  Whit- 
ing. One  group,  sailing  on  the  Neptune,  arrived  June  5, 
1917,  at  Pauillac,  the  port  from  which  Lafayette  sailed  for  Amer- 
ica to  join  the  struggling  colonists  in  their  war  for  independence. 
The  other,  on  the  Jupiter,  reached  St.  Nazaire  June  9,  sailing 
through  the  very  waters  in  which  John  Paul  Jones  operated  in 
the  Eevolution.  Eight  miles  up  the  river  Loire  lies  Paimboeuf , 
where  Jones  in  the  Ranger  arrived  November  30,  1777.  Fifteen 
miles  away  is  Quiberon  Bay,  where  the  French,  February  14, 
1778,  fired  the  first  foreign  salute  to  the  American  flag. 

Naval  aviation  stations  were  erected  at  both  Pauillac,  which 
is  on  the  Gironde  river  near  Bordeaux,  and  at  Paimboeuf,  so  the 
operations  of  America's  flying  navy  in  the  World  War  were 
over  the  very  waters  where  the  name  and  fame  of  the  first 
American  navy  were  established  140  years  before. 

We  had  stations  all  along  the  coast  of  France — at  Dunkirk, 
St.  Ingelvert  and  Autingues,  headquarters  of  the  Northern 
Bombing  Group;  L'Aber  Vrach,  Brest,  He  Tudy,  Le  Croisic, 
Fromentine,  St.  Trojan,  Treguier,  Arcachon,  La  Trinite,  La  Pal-, 
lice,  Le  Fresne,  Oye,  Guipavas,  Paimboeuf,  Pauillac,  Eochefort, 
St.  Ingelvert,  and  Gujan,  with  a  training  school  at  Moutchic. 

In  Ireland  we  had  stations  at  Queenstown,  Berehaven, 
Lough  Foyle,  Whiddy  Island  and  Wexford ;  in  England  at  East- 

228 


NAVAL  AVIATION  HANGARS  AT  GUIPAVAS 


P* 


A   NAVY   "BLIMP"   LEAVING   HANGAR   AT   GUIPAVAS,   FRANCE 


THE  NAVY  THAT  FLIES  229 

leigh  and  Killingholme.  We  aided  Italy  in  fighting  the  Aus- 
trians,  with  our  training  school  at  Lake  Bolsena  and  an  operat- 
ing station  at  Porto  Corsini,  on  the  Adriatic,  across  from  the 
Austrian  naval  base  at  Pola.  Our  aviators  flew  across  the  Alps 
and  the  Adriatic  sea ;  they  patrolled  the  waters  along  the  French 
coast,  protecting  the  vast  Allied  shipping  going  into  and  out 
of  the  French  ports,  and  guarding  the  convoys  of  American 
troops,  munitions  and  supplies.  Our  Northern  Bombing  Group 
bombed  the  German  submarine  bases  and  ammunition  and 
supply  depots  in  Belgium.  Operating  with  their  British  com- 
rades, our  aviators  flew  over  the  North  Sea  and  battled  with 
German  aircraft  over  Heligoland  Bight,  almost  within  sight  of 
the  home  bases  of  the  German  fleet.  They  took  part  in  the  North 
Sea  patrol  in  connection  with  the  movements  of  the  British 
Grand  Fleet,  and  those  assigned  to  the  British  stations  at  Felix- 
stowe and  Portsmouth  had  a  part  in  the  famous  Dover  Patrol 
that  kept  clear  the  road  from  England  to  France. 

The  United  States  Navy  had  44  aviation  stations  and  units 
in  Europe,  with  a  record  of  5,691  war  flights,  covering  a  distance 
of  791,398  miles.  This  does  not  include  18,000  flights  that  were 
made  in  training.  Forty-three  submarines  were  attacked  from 
the  air,  our  aircraft  being  credited,  according  to  the  records  of 
Naval  Aviation,  with  sinking  two  U-boats,  with  probably  send- 
ing down  two  more,  and  damaging  others.  An  even  more  strik- 
ing evidence  of  efficiency  was  the  fact  that  during  the  last  ten 
months  of  the  war  no  surface  craft  convoy  protected  by  Ameri- 
can naval  aircraft  in  the  war  zone  was  successfully  attacked  by 
an  enemy  submarine. 

Attacking  the  German  U-boat  bases,  Bruges,  Zeebrugge, 
Ostend,  and  the  airdromes  and  air  stations  and  other  enemy 
establishments  in  Flanders,  the  Northern  Bombing  Group,  which 
operated  in  connection  with  the  British  Royal  Air  Force, 
dropped  more  than  155,000  pounds  of  bombs,  destroying 
hangars  and  other  structures,  blowing  up  ammunition  dumps 
and  now  and  then  bringing  down  a  kite  balloon,  spreading  such 
havoc  that  it  shook  the  nerve  of  the  German  crews  that  handled 
the  Teuton  aircraft  in  western  Belgium. 

Our  first  naval  "ace,"  Lieutenant  David  S.  Ingalls,  was  at- 
tached to  this  Northern  Bombing  Group,  being  first  assigned  to 


230  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Royal  Air  Force  Squadron  No.  213.  His  spectacular  perform- 
ances began  on  August  11, 1918,  when,  in  company  with  a  British 
officer,  he  shot  down  a  two-seater  machine  in  a  running  flight 
over  the  German  lines.  The  night  of  the  13th,  flying  over  the  Ger- 
man airdrome  at  Varsenaere,  and  dropping  to  a  point  where  his 
plane  nearly  touched  the  ground,  he  sprayed  450  rounds  from 
his  machine-gun  into  the  wondering  Teutons,  who  were  making 
desperate  efforts  to  get  him  with  their  anti-aircraft  guns. 
Swinging  in  a  wide  circle,  he  again  swooped  down  on  the 
hangars  and  let  loose  four  bombs  in  the  midst  of  the  camp,  put- 
ting out  searchlights,  scattering  Germans  and  mussing  up  things 
generally.  At  the  Uytkerke  airdrome  he  repeated  the  stunt  he 
worked  at  Varsenaere,  firing  400  rounds  into  the  German 
hangars,  and  dropping  bombs  upon  the  Fokkers  grouped  on  the 
field  below. 

On  this  raid,  which  occurred  September  15,  Ingalls  led  a  for- 
mation of  five  in  a  wing  of  twenty  biplanes.  Returning  from 
Uytkerke,  he  sighted  an  enemy  two-seater  Rumpler  going  west 
from  Ostend.  With  Lieutenant  H.  C.  Smith,  of  the  British  Air 
Force,  Ingalls  turned  out  of  formation,  swung  in  over  the  shore, 
and  attacked.  The  Rumpler  turned  and  dived  toward  Ostend, 
the  Camels  following.  Firing  400  rounds  from  ranges  of  fifty  to 
200  yards,  they  chased  the  enemy  plane  to  the  Ostend  piers, 
when  the  Rumpler  went  down  out  of  control,  burst  into  flames 
and  crashed  just  off  the  beach. 

Three  days  later  Ingalls  made  one  of  the  most  spectacular 
flights  on  record.  In  company  with  two  English  pilots,  he 
sighted  a  kite  balloon  at  3,500  feet  elevation  near  La  Barriere. 
Crossing  the  coast  line,  they  attacked.  The  German  kite  reeled 
under  the  rapid  fire,  and  as  it  fell,  its  two  observers  opened  up 
their  white  parachutes  and  jumped.  Ingalls  gave  the  balloon 
another  spraying  with  bullets  and  it  burst  into  flames.  Falling, 
the  blazing  balloon  landed  on  a  hangar.  There  was  an  explo- 
sion, followed  by  a  fire  that  destroyed  the  entire  station.  The 
flames  were  visible  as  far  as  Nieuport. 

On  September  22,  in  company  with  four  other  machines, 
Ingalls  flew  all  over  Flanders,  committing  depredations  on 
German  hangars,  and  ammunition  trains.  Four  bombs  were 
dropped  on  the  ammunition  dump  at  Handezeame,  blowing  up  a 


THE  NAVY  THAT  FLIES  231 

string  of  wagons  loaded  with  shells.  Flying  over  Wercken, 
bombs  were  landed  on  a  hut  filled  with  explosives,  setting  it  on 
fire.  Swinging  around  over  the  railway  station  at  Thourout, 
where  the  Germans  had  an  enormous  supply  dump,  two  more 
hits  were  made.  On  the  way  back,  his  fourth  trip  for  the  day, 
he  bombed  a  horse  transport,  and  he  and  his  companions  by 
bombs  and  machine-gun  fire  killed  or  wounded  some  twenty- 
five  Germans  and  thirty-five  horses. 

With  three  other  machines,  Ingalls  was,  on  September  24,  fly- 
ing over  the  lines  at  16,000  feet  elevation,  when  twelve  Fokkers 
were  seen  approaching.  Though  outnumbered,  the  speedy 
Allied  planes  quickly  broke  up  the  German  formation.  The 
famous  British  Captain  Brown,  of  Squadron  No.  213,  swung 
into  and  gunned  a  Fokker  after  a  thrilling  high  bank,  and  the 
German  fell  to  earth  three  miles  below.  Another  Fokker  had 
got  on  the  tail  of  one  of  the  Allied  machines  and  by  a  well-aimed 
shot  punctured  its  gasoline  tanks.  Ingalls  came  to  the  rescue, 
fighting  off  the  enemy  and  in  a  few  minutes  shooting  him  down. 
The  fourth  plane  was  hard  at  it,  too,  succeeding  in  shooting 
down  another  Fokker,  after  following  it  down  to  within  a  few 
feet  of  the  ground.  Thus  three  Fokkers  were  accounted  for  in 
a  few  minutes. 

On  another  occasion,  Ingalls,  single  handed,  attacked  six 
biplanes,  driving  down  one  of  them  and  eluding  the  five  pur- 
suers. The  first  of  October  he  engaged  in  three  successive  raids 
in  one  day.  His  second  point  of  attack  was  a  large  farm  build- 
ing at  Cortemarck,  used  as  a  shelter  for  troops.  More  than  200 
Germans  were  gathered  there.  Crashing  through  the  roof,  a 
bomb  dropped  by  Ingalls  exploded  in  their  midst,  dealing  death 
and  destruction. 

I  wish  it  were  possible  to  recount  all  the  daring  deeds  per- 
formed by  our  Navy  and  Marine  Corps  aviators,  who  with  the 
British  and  on  their  own  engaged  in  constant  attacks  on  the 
German  bases  in  Belgium,  but  Ingalls'  exploits  are  enough  to 
give  an  idea  of  the  work  performed  by  this  Northern  Bombing 
Group.  And  all  this  was  "land  duty,"  a  task  seldom  assigned 
to  navies. 

The  Navy's  "regular  job,"  far  the  greater  part  of  its  work, 
was  patrolling  the  long  coast  lines,  watching  for  submarines, 


232  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

and  furnishing  aerial  escort  for  the  convoys  of  troop,  supply 
and  merchant  ships  that  moved  in  a  constant  stream  to  and  from 
European  ports.  Covering  vast  areas  of  water,  they  flew  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  miles,  and  they  were  always  on  the  job. 

Though  the  U-boats  usually  " ducked"  when  a  seaplane  or 
dirigible  balloon  was  sighted,  aircraft  often  managed  to  spot 
them,  and  took  part  in  some  exciting  encounters.  One  remark- 
able engagement,  a  gunfire  fight  between  seaplane  and  sub- 
marine, took  place  off  Dunkirk  on  August  13,  1918. 

Four  seaplanes  left  their  station  for  a  routine  flight  in  con- 
nection with  the  Dover  Patrol.  Eight  miles  off  the  coast,  be- 
tween Calais  and  Dunkirk,  Ensign  J.  F.  Carson,  one  of  the 
pilots,  sighted  a  large  submarine,  with  no  identification  marks, 
speeding  on  the  surface  in  the  direction  of  Holland.  Carson 
challenged  it  by  firing  a  recognition  signal.  The  U-boat  opened 
fire  on  the  seaplane  with  shrapnel  from  its  forward  gun,  firing- 
five  shots. 

Carson  nosed  his  plane  down,  his  machine-gunner  firing  on 
the  submarine.  As  it  came  into  bombing  position,  he  dropped 
a  bomb  which  hit  the  vessel,  and  as  it  exploded  two  of  the  gun 
crew  fell,  apparently  badly  wounded.  The  U-boat  cleared  its 
decks  and  dived.  Just  as  it  plunged  beneath  the  surface,  an- 
other seaplane  came  into  position  and  dropped  two  bombs.  One 
exploded  in  the  splash  where  the  submarine  plunged,  and  the 
second  slightly  forward  of  that  point  in  the  curving  line  of  the 
descending  boat.  Four  minutes  later  the  submarine  again  came 
to  the  surface.  But  before  Carson  could  get  his  plane  in  posi- 
tion for  bombing,  it  again  submerged,  sliding  beneath  the  waves 
stern  foremost. 

Carson  unloaded  his  bombs  on  the  moving  wake,  and  put 
back  to  the  station  for  more  ammunition.  When  he  returned 
oil  covered  the  water  and  a  lone  life  preserver  floated  near  the 
spot  where  the  submarine  went  down. 

The  value  of  cooperation  between  aircraft  and  vessels  was 
strikingly  demonstrated  in  the  sinking  of  the  U-boat  called 
"Penmarch  Pete,"  which  was,  according  to  reports  received, 
destroyed  by  American  seaplanes  from  the  He  Tudy  Station 
and  the  U.  S.  destroyer  Steivart,  on  April  28,  1918.  Two  planes 
left  He  Tudy  that  morning,  one  piloted  by  Ensign  K.  R.  Smith, 


THE  NAVY  THAT  FLIES  233 

the  other  by  Ensign  R.  H.  Harrell,  on  convoy  duty.  Zigzagging 
along  the  coast  nearly  due  west,  at  11:30  o'clock  they  picked 
up  a  convoy  of  twenty  ships  heading  south,  six  miles  northeast 
of  the  Pointe  de  Penmarch.  Heavy  fog  kept  the  planes  at  a  low 
altitude  and  in  the  course  of  maneuvers  about  the  convoy,  a 
stream  of  air  bubbles,  denoting  the  wake  of  a  submarine,  was 
sighted  by  both  planes.  Smith  descended  close  enough  to  the 
surface  to  distinguish  a  large  oil  patch.  He  dropped  two  bombs, 
the  first  being  apparently  a  direct  hit,  and  the  second  within  ten 
feet  of  it.  Dropping  a  phosphorus  buoy  to  mark  the  location, 
Harrell  sent  down  a  correspondence  buoy  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Steivart,  then  off  the  flank  of  the  convoy.  The  Stewart  speeded 
to  the  spot,  sighted  a  dark  object  in  the  water,  and  dropped  a 
succession  of  depth-bombs.  "These  bombs  were  dropped  so 
close  to  the  submarine,  one  on  each  side  and  within  fifty  feet 
of  it,  and  the  force  of  the  explosion  was  so  great,"  reported 
Lieutenant  Commander  Haislip,  her  commanding  officer,  "that  it 
seems  impossible  that  the  submarine  could  have  survived." 
For  days  there  rose  to  the  surface  quantities  of  oil,  which 
spread  for  miles  down  the  coast.  The  U-boat  was  later  identi- 
fied as  "Penmarch  Pete,"  which  had  operated  off  the  Pointe  for 
months,  and  had  destroyed  over  100,000  tons  of  shipping. 

Working  with  the  British  in  the  early  stages  of  participation, 
our  aviators  made  numerous  flights  over  the  North  Sea,  flying 
as  far  as  the  German  coast.  One  of  the  first  lost  in  action, 
Ensign  Albert  D.  Sturtevant,  of  Washington,  a  Yale  man,  was 
second  pilot  of  a  machine  that  was  attacked  by  ten  German 
planes.  Fighting  against  overwhelming  odds,  he  went  down  in 
flames. 

The  first  enemy  plane  destroyed  by  an  American  aviator 
was  shot  down  in  Heligoland  Bight,  almost  in  sight  of  the  great 
German  naval  base,  by  Ensign  Stephen  Potter,  of  Detroit, 
March  19,  1918.  His  machine  was  one  of  a  group  sent  out  on 
long-distance  reconnoissance.  Nearing  the  German  coast,  they 
were  attacked  by  Teuton  planes,  and  a  lively  combat  ensued. 
By  dashing  fighting,  Potter  succeeded  in  bringing  down  an 
enemy  plane,  which,  set  afire,  fell  to  the  water  and  burned  up. 
Putting  to  flight  other  German  machines,  the  force  returned. 
It  had  travelled  so  far  that  six  and  a  half  hours  steady  flying 


234  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

were  required  to  reach  the  base  on  the  British  Coast.  Six 
weeks  later,  April  25,  Potter  lost  his  life  in  a  thrilling  but  un- 
equal encounter  over  the  North  Sea. 

While  on  patrol  near  Hinder  Light,  Potter  and  his  compan- 
ion sighted  two  German  planes  and,  diving,  closed  in  on  them, 
firing  at  close  range.  Two  more  hostile  planes  appeared  over- 
head, attacking  vigorously.  Four  more  enemy  planes  now 
appeared  in  V  formation.  Of  seven  Germans  in  action,  four 
were  attacking  Potter,  whose  gun  had  jammed.  Handicapped 
as  he  was,  Potter  began  to  zigzag.  Again  and  again  he  dodged 
them,  but  at  last  the  enemy  machines  got  him  on  their  broad- 
side, and  poured  their  fire  into  him.  Bursting  into  flame  his 
machine  crashed  down.  Potter  was  last  seen  on  the  surface  of 
the  water  in  his  burning  plane,  from  which  arose  a  cloud  of 
smoke.  Two  of  the  enemy  circled  over,  then  joined  the  other 
five.  When  the  smoke  cleared  away,  there  was  not  even  a  splin- 
ter of  wreckage  to  show  where  this  brave  young  aviator  had 
gone  down. 

Lost  in  the  English  Channel,  given  up  as  drowned,  Ensign 
E.  A.  Stone,  of  Norfolk,  Va.,  was  rescued  after  such  an  experi- 
ence as  few  men  survive.  With  his  observer,  Sub-Lieutenant 
Eric  Moore,  of  the  British  Air  Force,  he  clung  for  eighty  hours, 
from  Saturday  morning  to  Tuesday  night,  without  food  or 
drink,  to  the  underside  of  a  seaplane  pontoon. 

Going  out  on  patrol  at  9  a.  m.,  at  11:30  the  engine  "went 
dead,"  and  the  plane  was  forced  to  descend  to  the  water  in  a 
heavy  sea.  At  2:30  the  plane  turned  over,  and  the  two  men 
climbed  up  to  the  capsized  pontoons.  With  no  food  or  water, 
soaked  and  lashed  by  the  waves,  there  they  hung  for  nearly  four 
days.  They  saw  convoys  in  the  distance,  but  none  came  to  their 
assistance.  Sunday  night  a  mast-head  light  was  sighted  and 
the  ship  headed  straight  for  the  crippled  plane.  But  when  it 
got  within  a  hundred  yards,  she  put  out  her  lights  and  turned 
away. 

"She  thinks  we  are  Huns,"  said  Moore. 

"I  hope  she  does,"  said  Stone,  "Then  they'll  send  patrol 
boats  out  to  get  us.  We  couldn't  be  worse  off  if  we  were  Ger- 
mans. ' ' 

A  seaplane  flew  near  them,  on  Monday  afternoon,  but,  after 


THE  NAVY  THAT  FLIES  235 

circling  around,  departed.  It  was  not  until  6  p.  m.,  Tuesday, 
that  they  were  rescued  by  a  trawler  which  had  been  chasing  a 
submarine. 

Every  machine  from  their  seaplane  base  and  those  from  a 
station  on  the  French  coast  had  searched  continuously  for  the 
lost  aviators  as  had  all  the  patrols  and  destroyers  in  the  area. 

Ensigns  K.  W.  Owen  and  J.  Phelan,  of  our  Killingholme 
station,  had  a  somewhat  similar  experience  May  16,  near  Flam- 
borough  Head.  Disabled  but  still  afloat,  by  both  getting  on  one 
wing  they  swung  the  tail  of  the  plane  into  the  wind  and  managed 
to  head  her  northwest,  and  coast  about  two  knots  an  hour.  Four 
days  they  kept  this  up,  and  then  were  drenched  by  a  thunder- 
storm which  damaged  the  wings  and  carried  away  their  rudder. 
It  was  not  until  one  o'clock  that  night  that  they  sighted  what 
seemed  to  be  a  boat  in  the  distance.  Using  up  their  last  cart- 
ridges, they  sent  a  stream  of  "fireworks"  from  a  Very  pistol, 
but  this  did  the  work  and  in  a  few  minutes  a  British  destroyer 
drew  alongside  and  took  them  aboard.  They  had  had  nothing 
to  eat  during  the  entire  time,  their  only  "provender"  being 
thirty  cigarettes.    They  had  drifted  180  miles. 

With  an  excellent  training  camp  at  Lake  Bolsena  and  an 
operating  station  at  Porto  Corsini,  on  the  Adriatic  Sea,  across 
from  the  Austrian  naval  base  at  Pola,  our  aviators  did  splendid 
service  in  Italy.  Patrolling  the  Adriatic  and  bombing  Austrian 
bases  was  their  "regular  job."  But  when,  in  the  later  months 
of  the  war,  we  began  scattering  over  Austria  American  and 
Allied  propaganda,  to  convince  the  Austrians  of  the  hopeless- 
ness of  their  position,  and  which  had  a  powerful  effect  in  induc- 
ing Austria  to  give  up  the  fight,  aeroplanes  were  utilized  to  drop 
these  thousands  of  leaflets  and  papers  over  cities.  It  was  while 
on  one  of  these  flights  that  our  aviators  had  an  exciting  experi- 
ence and  narrow  escape. 

On  August  24,  1918,  at  10:30  a.  m.  a  group  of  five  chasse 
and  bombing  machines  left  Porto  Corsini  for  Pola,  with  a  load 
of  "literature."  Formed  in  a  flying  wedge,  the  American 
machines  soon  came  in  sight  of  the  high  hills  back  of  the  Aus- 
trian coast,  and  a  few  moments  later  swept  over  Pola.  At 
11:20  the  planes,  at  an  altitude  of  12,000  feet,  unloaded  their 
propaganda  material  over  the  city  while  the  inhabitants,  in 


236  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

response  to  the  siren  and  bell  alarms,  sought  cover  from  the 
bombs  they  supposed  were  about  to  fall  upon  their  heads.  Anti- 
aircraft ordnance  filled  the  air  with  bursting  shrapnel  and  in- 
cendiary explosives,  but  the  aim  of  the  gunners  was  poor  and 
none  of  our  planes  was  hit. 

No  sooner  had  the  documents  been  dropped  than  Ensign  G. 
H.  Ludlow,  the  leading  pilot,  saw  five  Austrian  chasses  and  two 
seaplanes  rise  to  give  battle  to  the  five  Americans.  Giving  the 
signal  to  attack  the  Austrian  machines,  Ludlow  dived  toward 
them,  immediately  followed  by  Ensign  Austin  Parker  and  En- 
sign Charles  H.  Hammann. 

The  fight  started  at  an  elevation  of  7,500  feet  while  the 
American  planes  were  still  in  range  of  the  anti-aircraft  de- 
fenses. The  Austrian  planes  were  much  faster  than  the  bomber, 
which  was  in  the  direct  line  of  fire.  High  explosives,  shrapnel, 
pom-poms  and  incendiary  shells  burst  all  around  it,  and  as  the 
American  chasses  flew  down  to  give  aid,  they  in  turn  were  sub- 
jected to  the  heavy  rain  of  projectiles.  But  the  Austrian  planes 
were  also  in  the  range  and  the  anti-aircraft  gunners,  fearing 
they  would  bring  down  their  own  machines,  ceased  fire,  allow- 
ing the  American  bomber  to  make  good  its  escape. 

In  less  time  than  it  takes  to  tell,  Ludlow  singled  out  the  cen- 
ter machine  of  the  enemy  formation,  giving  it  bursts  from  his 
machine-gun,  while  handling  his  controls  with  his  knees.  He 
then  swung  to  the  left  after  the  second  Austrian,  Parker  con- 
tinuing the  fight  with  the  first.  Hammann,  in  the  meantime, 
engaged  two  other  Austrians  which  had  swung  into  action.  At 
this  juncture  Parker's  gun  jammed,  and  he  was  obliged  to  pull 
out  of  the  melee. 

Ludlow  had  riddled  one  of  the  enemy,  which  fell  to  the  har- 
bor in  a  sheet  of  flame,  but  his  own  machine  was  badly  damaged. 
The  right  magneto  was  shot  away ;  the  propeller  shattered ;  the 
engine  crank-case  punctured,  letting  out  the  oil,  which  was 
ignited  by  a  spark  from  the  exposed  magneto,  and  the  plane 
burst  into  flames.  Ludlow  immediately  slipped  into  a  tail-spin, 
and  the  rush  of  air  luckily  extinguished  the  fire.  One  pur- 
suer was  thrown  off  the  track,  but  the  other  followed  him  down 
to  1,500  feet  above  the  water,  the  last  burst  from  the  Austrian 
completing  the  wreck  of  Ludlow's   engine,  while  two  bullets 


THE  NAVY  THAT  FLIES  237 

passed  through  his  leather  helmet  and  grazed  his  scalp.  Lud- 
low then  went  into  another  spin  and,  straightening  out,  made 
a  safe  landing  Qn  the  water  three  miles  west  of  Pola. 

Then  occurred  a  daring  exploit.  Hammann,  by  generalship 
and  fighting  ability,  saved  the  whole  squadron  from  further  loss. 
With  terrific  bursts,  he  drove  at  the  enemy,  firing  first  on  their 
tails  and  then  on  their  flanks,  and  finally,  with  head-on  drives, 
forced  the  remaining  Austrian  planes  to  their  base.  This  gave 
the  slow-going  bomber  an  opportunity  to  make  its  final  escape, 
allowed  Parker  and  Voorhees  to  make  good  their  distance  and 
start  for  Porto  Corsini,  and  relieved  Ludlow  from  further  imme- 
diate attack. 

During  a  lull  in  the  fighting  Hammann  swooped  down  on  the 
surface  alongside  of  Ludlow  and  his  crippled  plane.  Austrian 
destroyers  were  on  their  way  from  the  harbor  to  gather  in  both 
planes,  and  another  squadron  of  Austrian  aircraft  was  taking 
off  for  pursuit.  Ludlow  opened  the  photographic  port  of  his 
machine,  allowing  the  boat  to  flood,  kicked  holes  in  the  wings 
to  destroy  buoyancy,  and  slipping  overboard,  swam  to  Ham- 
mann's  waiting  plane,  and  climbed  up  on  the  fuselage.  The 
machine,  a  single  seater,  was  so  small  that  he  had  to  sit  under 
the  motor,  grasping  the  struts  to  keep  himself  from  being  swept 
off  when  it  gathered  speed.  The  extra  load  forced  the  hull  into 
the  choppy  sea,  where  the  bow,  already  damaged  by  gunfire, 
was  broken  in  and  one  of  the  wing  pontoons  smashed. 

The  crippled  and  overloaded  little  plane  at  last  managed  to 
rise  from  the  water.  Hammann,  by  gunfire,  sank  the  wreck  of 
Ludlow's  machine  and,  putting  on  all  speed,  made  for  Porto 
Corsini  just  in  time  to  escape  the  leading  Austrian  destroyer 
and  a  squadron  of  seaplanes  coming  around  the  southern  end 
of  Brioni  Island  and  making  for  him. 

The  plane  made  the  sixty  mile  flight  without  mishap,  but 
in  landing  the  smashed-in  bow  took  in  enough  water  to  nose 
the  plane  over,  and,  catching  a  wing  tip  in  the  heavy  chop,  the 
machine  turned  over  on  its  back.  The  aviators  extricated  them- 
selves from  the  wreckage,  and  were  rescued  by  a  motor  boat 
from  the  station.  Ludlow  had  a  bad  gash  in  his  forehead,  in 
addition  to  the  scalp  wounds  received  in  the  fight,  and  Hammann 
was  badly  bruised  and  strained.    But  both  soon  recovered  and 


238  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

took  part  in  numerous  subsequent  actions,  including  raids  over 
the  front  during  the  drive  just  prior  to  the  Austrian  collapse. 

Before  hostilities  ended,  U.  S.  Naval  Aviation  had  18,736 
officers  and  men  in  service  in  Europe.  The  long  flights  along 
the  British,  French  and  Italian  coasts,  the  patrols  far  out  to 
sea,  the  combats  with  enemy  aircraft  and  submarines  form  one 
of  the  most  brilliant  chapters  of  the  war. 

On  this  side  of  the  water  24  naval  aviation  units  were  in 
operation,  patrolling  the  coast  from  Nova  Scotia  to  the  end  of 
Florida,  with  stations  on  the  Pacific  and  Gulf,  and  one  unit 
stationed  in  Panama  guarding  the  canal.  The  Azores,  that  half- 
way station  between  America  and  Europe,  was  guarded  by  a 
detachment  of  Marine  Corps  aviators.  In  America  our  fliers 
on  patrol  flew  2,455,920  nautical  miles;  and  advanced  training 
flights,  many  of  which  were  in  the  nature  of  patrols,  reached  the 
grand  total  of  10,949,340  nautical  miles.  The  total  flying  by 
our  naval  aviators  in  America,  the  Azores  and  Europe  was  more 
than  15,000,000  miles,  for  a  nautical  mile  is  longer  than  a  mile 
as  measured  on  land. 

Naval  Aviation  grew,  during  the  war,  to  a  force  of  approxi- 
mately 40,000,  as  follows : 

Officers — Qualified  aviators,  1,656 ;  student  aviators,  288 ;  ground  offi- 
cers, 891 ;  student  officers  under  training  for  commission,  3,881. 

Enlisted  men — Aviation  ratings,  21,951 ;  general  ratings  assigned  to 
aviation  duty,  8,742. 

Marine  Corps — Aviation  officers,  282 ;  Enlisted  men,  2,180. 

This  force  was  equipped  with  1,170  flying  boats,  695  sea- 
planes, 262  land  planes,  ten  free  balloons,  205  kite  balloons,  and 
15  dirigibles.  Of  this  equipment  570  aircraft  had  been  sent 
abroad,  before  the  armistice. 

Captain  N.  E.  Irwin  was  Director  of  Naval  Aviation,  with 
offices  in  the  Navy  Department.  Captain  H.  I.  Cone  was  in 
general  charge  of  our  aviation  activities  in  Europe.  Construc- 
tion and  operation  of  air  stations  in  France  were  under  his 
supervision  until  August  1,  1918,  when  he  moved  to  London,  as 
head  of  the  Aviation  Section  of  Admiral  Sims'  staff.  Then  all 
our  forces  in  France,  except  the  Northern  Bombing  Group, 
which  was  commanded  by  Captain  D.  C.  Hanrahan,  were  placed 


THE  NAVY  THAT  FLIES  239 

under  command  of  Admiral  Wilson,  Captain  T.  T.  Craven,  as 
aide  for  aviation,  on  his  staff,  being  charged  with  all  aviation 
matters. 

Building  more  than  forty  stations  in  Europe,  some  of  them 
of  huge  extent,  was  a  big  task  in  construction.  Its  accomplish- 
ment, under  many  handicaps  and  difficulties,  reflects  the  utmost 
credit  upon  all  concerned.  Constructors  and  aviators  displayed 
such  energy  and  resource,  that  it  was  a  current  saying  that, 
' '  Naval  Aviation  can  do  anything  that  comes  to  hand. ' ' 

They  created  in  a  few  months  stations  that,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  would  have  required  years  to  build.  Let  me  give 
one  example  illustrative  of  others.  At  the  big  air  station  at 
Killingholme,  England,  contracts  for  the  buildings  had  been 
made,  but  it  became  evident  soon  after  the  arrival  of  our  avia- 
tion personnel  that  unless  we  did  the  work  ourselves  that  station 
would  never  be  built  in  time  to  permit  active  operations  or  house 
the  men  in  comfort.  But  Lieutenant  M.  E.  Kelly,  with  a  detail  of 
200  American  blue- jackets,  built  in  thirty  days  twenty-eight  bar- 
rack buildings  of  brick  and  concrete,  each  twenty  feet  wide  and 
sixty  feet  long.  That  is  only  one  instance  of  hundreds  of  things 
done  by  this  force  in  Europe. 

The  Navy  erected  its  own  aircraft  factory  at  the  Philadel- 
phia Navy  Yard,  which  was  producing  and  shipping  planes  to 
Europe  in  the  spring  of  1918.  This  immense  plant  was  of  in- 
estimable value  in  carrying  out  the  program  of  aviation  con- 
struction, which  was  pushed  all  along  the  line. 

Though  there  was  no  specific  appropriation  for  erecting  an 
aircraft  factory,  this  was  considered  so  essential  that  an  allot- 
ment of  $1,000,000  was  made  for  the  purpose.  I  signed  the  order 
authorizing  the  erection  of  the  plant  July  27,  1917.  Within  ten 
days  the  contract  was  let.  Naval  Constructor  F.  G.  Coburn  was 
detailed  as  manager.  Under  his  energetic  direction,  construc- 
tion was  pushed  so  rapidly  that  by  October  17  the  first  buildings 
were  up,  considerable  machinery  installed  and  on  November  2 
the  keel  of  the  first  flying  boat  was  laid.  The  building  was  pro- 
nounced complete  on  November  20,  only  110  days  after  the  con- 
tract was  awarded.  That  factory  was  enlarged  until  it  covered 
forty  acres,  with  buildings  having  888,935  square  feet  of  floor 
space.    At  the  time  of  the  armistice,  there  were  3,642  employees 


240  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

engaged  in  constructing  aircraft  of  the  latest  type.  The  value 
of  its  war-time  output  was  more  than  $5,000,000. 

Not  only  did  the  Navy  build  and  put  into  operation  hundreds 
of  seaplanes,  flying  boats  and  other  aircraft,  but  it  originated 
and  built  the  largest  seaplanes  in  existence,  the  "NC"  type,  the 
first  of  which  was  completed  before  the  armistice. 

Few  people  seem  to  realize  that  these  huge  "NC"  planes — 
the  "Nancys'*  they  were  called — which  became  famous  in  the 
first  flight  across  the  Atlantic  in  May,  1919,  were  built  for  war 
use,  and  that  the  work  of  developing  this  new  type  was  begun 
only  five  months  after  we  entered  the  war.  It  takes  a  long  time 
to  develop  a  new  type  of  such  magnitude. 

All  nations  recognized  the  need  of  larger  seaplanes,  able  to 
cruise  hundreds  of  miles  and  return  without  refueling.  Ship- 
ping space  was  so  valuable  that  taking  to  Europe  the  large 
numbers  of  planes  the  Army  and  Navy  had  contracted  for  was 
a  serious  problem. 

The  Chief  Constructor  of  the  Navy,  Admiral  Taylor,  had 
often  discussed  these  problems  with  me.  One  day  in  Septem- 
ber, he  sent  for  Naval  Constructors  (x.  C.  Westervelt  and  J.  C. 
Hunsacker.  "I  want  a  plane  designed  that  will  fly  across  the 
Atlantic,"  was  the  surprising  task  he  assigned  them.  Admiral 
Taylor's  daring  idea  aroused  my  warmest  enthusiasm.  He  and 
his  force  began  work  at  once.  No  flying  boat  of  anything  like 
that  size  and  power  had  ever  before  been  produced.  There  were 
all  kinds  of  problems  to  be  solved;  numerous  experiments  had 
to  be  made  concerning  every  detail.  By  the  end  of  1917  all  the 
main  elements  of  the  design  had  been  formulated,  and  early 
in  1918  the  work  of  construction  was  begun.  The  NC-1  was  com- 
pleted by  the  first  of  October,  and  the  first  test  flight  made  three 
days  later.  This  was  so  successful  that,  on  November  7,  just 
before  the  armistice,  she  flew  to  Washington,  where  she  was  in- 
spected, going  thence  to  Hampton  Roads  and  back  to  Rockaway. 

Our  dream  of  building  a  plane  that  would  fly  across  the 
Atlantic  had  been  translated  into  reality.  Six  months  later  the 
NC-4  made  the  first  flight  from  America  to  Europe,  from  Rocka- 
way, Long  Island,  to  Nova  Scotia,  the  Azores,  Portugal  and  Eng- 
land, landing  at  Plymouth,  the  port  from  which,  three  centuries 
before,  the  Pilgrims  had  set  sail  for  America. 


CHAPTER  XXI 
THE  FERRY  TO  FRANCE 

"iST.  O.  T.   S.,"  THE  WORLD'S  LARGEST  CARGO  FLEET — OPERATING    450 
STEAMERS,  NAVY  HAULED  MILLIONS  OF  TONS  OF  MUNITIONS,  FOOD, 

FUEL   AND    SUPPLIES    TO    FORCES    ABROAD ONLY    EIGHT    SUNK    BY 

U-BOATS  OR  MINES "tICONDEROGA"  TORPEDOED DISAPPEARANCE 

OF  " CYCLOPS"  MYSTERY  OF  THE  WAR. 

"  ^   T     0.  T.  S."    You  may  not  recognize  those  initials,  but 

\        every  sailor  on  the  Atlantic  was  familiar  enough 

4  k    1  ,  with  them  in  1918,  for  they  stood  for  the  largest  cargo 

fleet  on  earth,  under  a  single  management — the  Naval 

Overseas  Transportation  Service.    No  one  had  ever  heard  of  it 

a  year  before.     But  before  the  end  of  hostilities  490  vessels, 

3,800,000  deadweight  tons,  had  been  assigned  to  this  service, 

and  378  were  in  actual  operation,  the  remainder  being  under 

construction  or  preparing  to  go  into  commission. 

If  the  war  had  continued  through  1919  we  would  have  needed, 
according  to  the  estimates,  at  least  20,000  officers  and  200,000 
men  for  this  service  alone.  The  number  might  have  gone  well 
over  a  quarter-million.  The  Shipping  Board  and  American 
yards  were  building  ships  at  a  rate  never  before  approached. 
The  schedule  for  1918-19  contemplated  the  delivery  of  1,924 
vessels,  the  large  majority  of  which  were  to  be  put  into  war 
service  and  manned  by  the  Navy.  Officers  and  men  had  to  be 
recruited  and  trained  months  in  advance,  and  this  we  were  do- 
ing, to  have  the  crews  ready  to  get  to  sea  as  vessels  were 
completed.    They  manned,  in  all,  450  cargo  ships. 

"N.  O.  T.  S."  was  "The  Ferry  to  France,"  carrying  mil- 
lions of  tons  of  munitions,  guns,  food,  fuel,  supplies,  materials 
to  our  army  and  naval  forces  abroad.  Remaining  in  port  only 
long  enough  to  discharge  their  cargoes,  make  necessary  repairs, 
and  fill  their  bunkers  with  coal,  its  vessels  plied  steadily  across 

241 


242  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  Atlantic,  to  and  from  Europe,  with  the  regularity  of  freight 
trains.  Five  tons  of  supplies  a  year  were  required  for  each 
soldier.  Vast  quantities  of  munitions,  mountains  of  coal,  mil- 
lions of  gallons  of  fuel  oil ;  enormous  quantities  of  steel,  timber, 
concrete  and  other  materials;  food  for  civilian  populations; 
locomotives,  guns, — all  these  and  a  thousand  other  things  were 
required,  and  it  was  "up  to"  the  N.  0.  T.  S.  to  get  them  to 
Europe.    And  that  is  what  it  did. 

Sailing  from  New  York,  Boston,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore, 
Norfolk,  Newport  News,  Charleston  and  other  ports,  they  took 
their  cargoes  to  Bordeaux,  to  Pauillac  and  Bassens,  to  St.  Na- 
zaire  and  Nantes,  to  Havre,  Cherbourg,  Brest,  La  Pallice,  La 
Rochelle  and  Marseilles.  Docking  and  unloading  facilities  in 
French  ports  were  very  inadequate.  Americans  had  to  build 
vast  piers  and  wharves  and  warehouses.  Channels  were  tor- 
tuous, and  nearly  every  harbor  overcrowded.  In  spite  of  these 
drawbacks,  notable  records  were  made  in  quick  turn-arounds. 

Incomparably  greater  were  the  difficulties  and  dangers  faced 
at  sea.  Suppose  some  vessel  owner  had  stepped  into  a  group 
of  his  ship  captains  and  told  them  that  they  were  expected  to 
navigate  their  vessels  3,000  to  4,000  miles,  not  singly,  where 
they  could  give  other  craft  a  wide  berth,  but  in  formation  with 
a  score  of  other  vessels,  hugging  them  as  closely  as  possible. 
Furthermore,  that  at  night  they  would  have  no  lights  to  guide 
them  or  indicate  the  position  of  other  ships  in  the  convoy,  but 
must  sail  at  full  speed,  changing  course  every  fifteen  minutes. 
And  finally,  warned  the  ships '  masters  that  at  any  moment  they 
might  be  attacked  by  submarines,  torpedoed  and  sent  to  the  bot- 
tom. Wouldn't  that  have  been  enough  to  make  the  most  hard- 
ened seadog  throw  up  his  hands  and  resign  his  job? 

Yet  that  was  what  every  captain  and  crew  of  the  N.  O.  T.  S. 
had  to  face.  They  did  not  fear  the  submarine  half  as  much 
as  they  did  the  perils  of  war  navigation,  the  possibilities  of  col- 
lision. One  was  problematical;  they  were  willing  to  take 
chances  and  eager  to  get  a  shot  at  a  "  sub. ' '  The  other  danger 
was  constant  and  might  mean  the  loss  of  other  vessels  as  well 
as  their  own.  Under  the  circumstances,  it  is  remarkable  that 
collisions  were  so  infrequent,  and  so  few  vessels  were  lost  or 
damaged. 


THE  FERRY  TO  FRANCE  243 

Consider  the  record  of  the  steamship  George  G.  Henry.  That 
will  give  some  idea  of  the  work  these  ships  did,  and  the  perils 
they  faced.  Having  made  seven  round  trips  to  Europe,  aver- 
aging 76  days — a  splendid  record  for  a  cargo  steamer — the 
Henry  sailed  from  France  for  New  York.  When  she  was  far 
out  at  sea,  alone,  footing  her  way  under  full  speed,  a  submarine 
was  sighted  5,000  yards  away.  This  was  at  6 :50  a.  m.,  Septem- 
ber 29,  1918.  "Full  left  wheel"  was  ordered,  general  quarters 
rung  in,  and  the  guns  went  into  action. 

The  "sub"  opened  fire,  some  of  his  shells  falling  a  little 
short,  others  going  over  the  vessel.  Twenty-one  shots  from  the 
after-gun  made  the  U-boat  keep  his  distance  and  get  out  of 
range,  but  he  still  kept  up  the  chase.  After  two  hours  the 
"sub,"  which  had  guns  of  considerable  power,  was  still  pur- 
suing and  now  and  then  firing.  At  last,  at  nine  o'clock,  the 
Germans  scored  a  hit.  A  six-inch  shell  struck  the  Henry,  pierc- 
ing the  after-deck,  plunging  diagonally  downward,  breaking  the 
exhaust  pipe  of  the  steering  gear  and  exploding  against  a  maga- 
zine filled  with  powder  and  shells. 

The  ammunition  exploded,  spreading  destruction,  and  start- 
ing such  a  blaze  that  the  whole  after-part  of  the  ship  was  soon 
in  flames.  Its  powder  destroyed,  fire  raging  around  it,  the  after- 
gun,  the  one  bearing  on  the  enemy,  was  useless.  The  crew 
turned  to  fighting  the  fire.  Smoke  bombs  were  exploded,  and  a 
dense  smoke-screen  overhung  the  stern.  Thinking  he  had 
crippled  the  ship,  the  U-boat  sailed  past  the  weather  end  of  the 
smoke-screen,  redoubling  his  fire,  using  shrapnel  and  solid  shot. 
Though  the  vessel  was  not  hit  again,  the  shrapnel  exploding 
over  it  descended  in  a  rain  on  the  decks  and  fourteen  men  of 
the  crew  were  struck  by  flying  fragments. 

By  steering  obliquely,  the  Henry  brought  its  forward  gun 
to  bear,  but  the  ' '  sub ' '  ran  out  of  range.  At  10 :15  the  fire  hav- 
ing been  got  under  control,  two  shells  were  fired  from  the  after- 
gun,  both  striking  extremely  close  to,  if  not  hitting  the  U-boat. 
Clouds  of  yellowish  smoke  rose  from  the  submarine,  which  ten 
minutes  later  ceased  firing  and  submerged.  It  had  given  up  the 
fight. 

The  enemy  disposed  of,  the  N.  0.  T.  S.  ship  proceeded  on 
its  way.    Plunging  along,  with  all  lights  out,  five  days  after  its 


244  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

encounter  with  the  submarine,  the  Henry  was  nearing  the 
American  coast.  An  outbound  convoy,  shrouded  in  darkness, 
was  proceeding  from  New  York.  It  was  midnight,  pitch  dark, 
and  before  either  the  group  going  east  or  the  single  ship  sailing 
west,  knew  of  each  other's  presence,  the  Henry  ran  into  the  con- 
voy. In  a  moment,  before  there  was  time  even  to  switch  on  run- 
ning lights  to  keep  clear  of  the  convoy  vessels,  the  Henry  crashed 
into  the  Herman  Frasch,  cutting  into  her  well  below  the  water 
line.  The  Frasch  had  received  a  mortal  wound,  and  sank  in  a 
few  minutes  right  under  the  bow  of  the  Henry. 

Three  days  afterwards,  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean,  the 
steamship  American  collided  with  the  Westgate,  sending  the 
Westgate  to  the  bottom. 

Sailors  have  a  superstition  that  "luck  runs  in  streaks,"  and 
it  does  seem  so,  for,  with  the  hundreds  of  N.  0.  T.  S.  vessels 
running  back  and  forth,  only  four  were  sunk  by  collision,  and 
two  of  these  accidents  occurred  within  three  days.  Of  the  450 
vessels  actually  sailing  for  the  N.  0.  T.  S.,  only  18  were  lost — 
eight  were  victims  of  torpedoes  or  German  mines,  four  were 
sunk  as  the  result  of  collisions,  and  six  were  lost  from  other  acci- 
dents, such  as  fire  or  stranding. 

One  of  these  cases  was  the  most  mysterious  thing  that  hap- 
pened during  the  war — the  disappearance  of  the  Cyclops. 

Sailing  from  Bahia,  Brazil,  the  Cyclops,  carrying  a  cargo  of 
manganese,  was  bound  for  Baltimore.  She  was  proceeding 
steadily,  with  no  indication  of  any  doubt  as  to  her  seaworthiness. 
Though  she  reported  having  some  trouble  with  one  of  her  en- 
gines, her  captain  felt  confident  that  he  could  easily  reach  port, 
even  if  using  only  one  engine  might  somewhat  reduce  his  speed. 
On  March  4th  the  collier  put  into  Barbados,  British  West  Indies, 
to  take  aboard  coal  for  the  rest  of  the  voyage.  While  in  that 
port,  there  was  no  indication  of  anything  unusual.  Among  offi- 
cers, crew  and  passengers  there  seemed  to  be  no  apprehension 
or  foreboding  of  trouble  or  disaster.  After  coaling,  she  sailed 
away.  Many  persons  saw  her  sail,  other  vessels  hailed  her  as 
she  passed  out  to  sea. 

After  that  no  one  ever  saw  the  Cyclops  again,  or  heard  one 
word,  or  ever  found  any  trace  of  her.  Almost  invariably,  when 
a  vessel  is  sunk,  bodies  of  the  drowned  are  found,  and  a  mass 


THE  FERRY  TO  FRANCE  245 

of  floating  wreckage.  But  never  a  soul  of  all  those  on  the  big 
19,000-ton  collier,  never  a  stick  of  wreckage  or  one  thing  from 
the  lost  ship  was  ever  discovered. 

The  whole  area  was  searched  for  weeks,  scores  of  vessels 
joined  in  the  hunt,  rewards  were  offered  for  the  discovery  of 
anything  concerning  the  missing  collier.  Nothing  was  ever 
found.    She  had  disappeared  completely,  leaving  not  a  trace. 

In  this  connection  this  last  message,  the  last  word  received 
from  the  Cyclops  is  of  melancholy  interest : 

From :   U.  S.  S.  Cyclops,  Barbados. 
To:   Opnav. 

Arrived   Barbados,  West   Indies,   17303   for   bunker   coal.     Arrive 

Baltimore,  Md.,  12013.  Notify  Office  Director  Naval  Auxiliaries,  Comdr. 
Train   (Atl),  07004. 

Class  3  U.  S.  S.  CYCLOPS. 

DNAS  1145  AM                                            3-4-18. 

Three  hundred  and  nine  men  perished  when  the  Cyclops 
went  down.  In  addition  to  her  officers  and  crew,  she  was  bring- 
ing north  some  72  naval  personnel  who  had  been  serving  on 
United  States  vessels  in  South  American  waters,  as  well  as  a 
few  civilians  returning  from  Brazil,  among  them  Mr.  Maurice 
Gottschalk,  United  States  consul  at  Rio  de  Janeiro. 

What  happened  to  her?  There  were  many  theories,  most  of 
them  wild  and  untenable ;  none  that  seemed  to  fit  the  case  thor- 
oughly. Many  people  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  she  was 
sunk  by  a  submarine,  but,  so  far  as  known,  there  was  no  sub- 
marine anywhere  near  that  region.  Others,  seizing  upon  the  fact 
that  her  captain,  Lieutenant  Commander  G.  W.  Worley,  was  a 
native  of  Germany,  and  that  a  number  of  the  crew  had  German 
names,  thought  captain  and  crew  had  turned  traitors  and  taken 
the  ship  to  Germany.  Her  captain  had  come  to  America  as  a 
boy.  He  had  been  employed  in  the  Naval  Auxiliary  Service  for 
nearly  twenty  years  with  no  evidence  of  disloyalty.  But  this 
belief  among  some  outside  the  Navy,  that  the  ship  had  been 
taken  to  Germany,  persisted  until  the  armistice,  when  there  was 
undeniable  proof  that  no  such  vessel  had  been  captured,  turned 
over  or  sighted,  and  the  Germans  knew  no  more  about  her  fate 
than  we  did. 


246  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  only  theory  that  seems  tenable  is  that  the  Cyclops  was 
caught  in  a  sudden  West  Indian  hurricane;  that  her  cargo 
shifted,  listing  the  vessel,  which  turned  turtle  and  went  down. 
This  is  the  only  way  in  which  seamen  account  for  the  absence 
of  wreckage.  Our  colliers  of  that  type  have  high  steel  beams 
like  cranes,  with  chains  of  buckets  to  load  and  unload  coal.  If 
she  went  down  bottom-side  up,  these  huge  steel  fingers  may  have 
pinned  down  everything  on  deck,  allowing  nothing  to  float  to 
the  surface.  But,  like  everything  else  connected  with  the  case, 
that  is  all  conjecture. 

"Fate  unknown,"  is  the  inscription  beside  the  name  of  the 
Cyclops  on  the  Navy  list.  The  waves  that  sweep  over  the  spot 
where  she  lies  conceal  the  secret.  Her  fate  will  probably  remain 
a  mystery  until  that  Last  Day  when  the  waters  are  rolled  back 
and  the  sea  gives  up  its  dead. 

The  most  serious  loss  of  life,  next  to  the  Cyclops,  sustained 
by  the  N.  0.  T.  S.,  was  in  the  sinking  of  the  Ticonderoga.  This 
animal  transport,  manned  by  Navy  personnel  but  with  soldiers 
aboard  to  care  for  the  cargo,  was  almost  in  mid-Atlantic,  though 
nearer  Europe  than  America,  the  night  of  September  29,  when 
her  engines  broke  down  and  she  fell  behind  her  convoy.  At 
5 :30  the  next  morning  she  was  attacked  by  the  U-152.  Though 
the  steamer  was  riddled  by  shells,  and  most  of  her  men  were 
killed  or  wounded,  she  fought  on  for  two  hours  until  both  her 
guns  were  disabled.  Lifeboats  had  been  smashed  by  shell-fire, 
and  there  were  not  even  enough  rafts  left  to  accommodate  all 
the  men.  They  were  hundreds  of  miles  from  the  nearest  land, 
the  Azores,  with  little  hope  of  getting  to  shore. 

The  wounded  were  given  the  preference  in  getting  into  the 
boats.  Of  the  237  men  aboard  only  24  were  saved,  the  majority 
of  them  wounded.  Two  of  the  officers,  both  junior-grade  lieu- 
tenants, F.  L.  Muller  and  J.  H.  Fulcher,  were  taken  prisoners 
and  carried  to  Germany  by  the  submarine. 

One  of  the  few  survivors,  Ensign  Gustav  Ringelman,  officer 
of  the  deck,  said  the  submarine  was  sighted  only  200  yards  off 
the  port  bow;  the  captain  put  his  helm  hard  to  starboard  and 
came  within  25  feet  of  ramming  the  U-boat.  The  submarine 
fired  an  incendiary  shell  which  struck  the  ships'  bridge,  killing 
the  helmsman,  crippling  the  steering  gear  and  setting  the  amid- 


THE  FERRY  TO  FRANCE  247 

ships  section  ablaze.  Lieutenant  Commander  J.  J.  Madison,  cap- 
tain of  the  Ticonderoga,  was  severely  wounded  by  a  piece  of  this 
shell.  But,  wounded  as  he  was,  he  had  himself  placed  in  a  chair 
on  the  bridge,  and  continued  to  direct  the  fire  and  maneuver  the 
ship  until  the  vessel  had  to  be  abandoned. 

Six  shots  were  fired  at  the  Ticonderoga' s  3-inch  forward 
gun,  killing  the  gun  crew  and  putting  the  gun  out  of  commission. 
Then  the  U-boat  drew  away  some  distance,  both  ship  and  sub- 
marine keeping  up  the  firing.  "  During  this  time  most  every- 
body on  board  our  ship  was  either  killed  or  wounded  to  such 
an  extent  that  they  were  practically  helpless  from  shrapnel," 
said  Ringelman.  ''The  lifeboats  hanging  on  the  davits  were 
shelled  and  full  of  holes,  others  carried  away.  However,  we 
kept  the  submarine  off  until  our  fire  was  put  out  and  our  boats 
swung  on  the  davits,  ready  to  abandon  the  ship  with  the  few 
men  left  on  board.  Possibly  fifty  were  left  by  that  time — the 
rest  were  dead." 

The  submarine  still  continued  to  shell  the  ship  and  then 
came  alongside  and  fired  a  torpedo,  which  struck  amidships  in 
the  engine  room.    The  ship  slowly  settled. 

There  was  one  life-raft  left  on  top  of  the  deck  house.  The 
wounded  men  were  gathered  together  and  lashed  to  the  raft, 
which  was  then  shoved  off  from  the  ship.  Three  or  four  min- 
utes after  that  the  Ticonderoga  took  the  final  plunge.  The  sub- 
marine picked  up  the  executive  officer  out  of  the  water  and  took 
the  first  assistant  engineer,  Fulcher,  off  the  life  raft.  As  Muller, 
whom  Captain  Franz,  of  the  submarine,  supposed  to  be  the  cap- 
tain of  the  Ticonderoga,  was  picked  up,  Franz's  first  questions 
were: 

"Where's  the  chief  gunner?  Where's  the  chief  gunner's 
mate?" 

"Dead,"  replied  Muller. 

Alicke,  a  machinist 's  mate  of  German  descent,  already  hauled 
aboard  the  submarine,  interpreted  for  Fulcher.  Franz  was  or- 
dering him  to  the  raft  alongside.  He  pleaded  to  be  kept  on 
board.  "Speak  for  me,"  he  begged  his  officer,  but  the  German 
captain  replied:  "Get  back  on  the  raft.  What  do  you  mean  by 
fighting  against  us,  against  your  country?  Only  God  can  save 
such  as  you  now!" 


248  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Wounded  men  on  the  raft  pleaded:  "Won't  you  please  take, 
us?  We  have  no  food  or  water;  no  chance."  But  Franz  an- 
swered, "We  have  room  for  no  more,"  and  cast  them  adrift. 

All  on  board  that  raft  were  lost.  The  lifeboat,  containing 
mainly  wounded  soldiers,  was  threatened  by  the  Germans,  who 
went  aboard  it  in  their  search  for  the  ship's  commander.  They 
failed  to  discover  Captain  Madison,  who  lay,  badly  wounded, 
almost  under  their  feet.  The  Captain  and  21  men  were  in  that 
boat  for  four  days  before  they  were  rescued  by  the  British 
steamer  Moorish  Prince. 

The  two  officers  made  prisoners  found  that  the  submarine 
was  the  U-152,  which  had  left  Kiel  September  5,  ordered  to 
operate  in  American  waters.  The  submarine,  Muller  and  Ful- 
cher  said,  received  on  October  11  the  order  from  Berlin, 
"Engage  men  of  war  only;  merchant  war  has  ended,"  and  on 
October  20  the  radio,  "All  submarines  return  to  Kiel." 

The  U-152  arrived  at  Kiel  November  15,  four  days  after 
the  armistice.  The  two  Ticonderoga  officers  stated  that  the 
executive  officer  of  the  Kronprinz  Heinrich,  the  mother  ship  of 
the  submarines,  formally  released  them  as  prisoners,  saying, 
' '  Naval  officers  have  no  more  power  over  you. ' '  He  blamed  the 
collapse  of  Germany  upon  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
the  war.  "You  have  ruined  our  country,"  he  added.  "See 
what  you  have  done  I" 

He  told  them  that  they  were  free  to  go  ashore  and  the  next 
day  the  lieutenants  left  for  Copenhagen,  from  which  they  made 
their  way  to  America. 

Only  eight  N.  0.  T.  S.  vessels  were  lost  by  enemy  action,  and 
six  from  other  causes  during  the  war  period.  Though  the  Naval 
Overseas  Transportation  Service  was  not  formally  organized 
under  that  name  until  January  9,  1918,  naval  vessels  had  been 
performing  such  service  from  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Com- 
mander Charles  Belknap  was  the  director  of  this  service  from 
its  inception  until  January  17,  1919,  when  he  was  succeeded  by 
Rear  Admiral  Hilary  P.  Jones.  Six  million  tons  of  cargo  were 
carried  by  Navy  vessels  from  May,  1917,  to  December,  1918,  fol- 
lowing being  the  principal  items : 

For  the  Army  in  France 3,102,462  tons 

For  the  Navy  (exclusive  of  coal) 1,090,724  tons 


THE  FERRY  TO  FRANCE  249 

Coal  shipped  from  Norfolk 1,348,177  tons 

Coal  from  Cardiff  to  France  for  Army 96,000  tons 

Food  for  the  Allies 359,627  tons 

5,996,990  tons 

Five  hundred  million  pounds  of  meats,  butter,  etc,  were  car- 
ried to  our  forces  overseas,  only  4,000  pounds  being  lost  on 
voyage. 

In  addition  to  1,500,000  tons  of  coal  carried  overseas  or  from 
England  to  France,  700,000  tons  of  fuel  oil  and  gasoline  were 
taken  to  Brest,  Queenstown,  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  Ad- 
riatic. The  N.  O.  T.  S.  also  operated  the  mine-transports,  which 
carried  across  the  Atlantic  82,000  complete  mine-units  for  the 
North  Sea  Barrage. 

When  rail  transportation  broke  down  in  the  cruel  winter  of 
1917-18,  threatening  to  close  down  New  England's  industries 
and  cause  widespread  suffering,  the  Navy  released  large  quan- 
tities of  coal  stored  at  supply  bases,  and  naval  vessels  hauled 
to  Boston  and  other  ports  the  fuel  which  brought  relief  to  that 
section. 

During  the  war,  when  there  was  not  enough  merchant  ship- 
ping for  commerce  in  the  western  hemisphere,  N.  O.  T.  S.  ships 
carried  American  goods,  manufactures  and  other  cargoes  to  and 
from  the  West  Indies,  Mexico,  and  the  ports  of  Central  and 
South  America. 

The  activities  of  the  N.  O.  T.  S.  did  not  end  with  the  armistice. 
For  many  months  the  Navy  continued  to  haul  supplies  and  fuel 
to  our  forces  abroad,  took  commercial  cargoes  wherever  needed, 
and  carried  food  to  the  distressed  regions  of  Europe.  Its  ves- 
sels plied  to  nearly  every  quarter  of  the  globe — to  Russia,  Ger- 
many, Holland,  England,  France,  Portugal,  Spain,  Italy, 
Austria,  Greece,  Turkey  and  Arabia;  to  South  America;  to 
Hawaii,  the  Philippines  and  China,  going  as  far  as  Burma,  Cey- 
lon, and  the  Dutch  East  Indies. 


CHAPTEE  XXII 
RADIO  GIRDLED  THE  GLOBE 

IF  GERMANS   HAD   CUT  EVERY   CABLE,   WE   COULD   STILL  HAVE   TALKED 

TO    EUROPE FROM    ONE    ROOM    IN     NAVY    DEPARTMENT    FLASHED 

DESPATCHES    TO   ENGLAND,   FRANCE   AND   ITALY CAUGHT   GERMAN 

AS   WELL  AS   ALLIED   WIRELESS QUEER   "NEWS"    FROM   BERLIN 

U.  S.  NAVY  BUILT  IN  FRANCE  RADIO  STATION  WHOSE  MESSAGES  ARE 
HEARD  AROUND  THE  WORLD. 

IF  the  Germans  had  cut  every  cable — and  their  U-boats  did 
cut  some  of  them — we  would  still  have  been  able  to  keep  in 
touch  with  Pershing  and  the  Army  in  France,  with  Sims  in 
London,  Rodman  and  Strauss  in  the  North  Sea,  Wilson  at 
Brest,  Niblack  at  Gibraltar,  Dunn  in  the  Azores,  with  all  our 
forces  and  Allies. 

A  spark,  flashing  its  wave  through  the  air,  would  in  an 
instant  cross  the  Atlantic.  Caught  by  the  Eiffel  tower  in  Paris 
or  the  Lyons  station,  by  the  British  at  Carnarvon,  by  the  tall 
Italian  towers  in  Rome,  it  could  be  quickly  transmitted  to  any 
commander  or  chancellory  in  Europe.  That  was  the  marvel 
wrought  by  radio. 

President  Wilson  and  Secretary  Baker  in  Washington  were, 
so  far  as  time  was  concerned,  in  closer  touch  with  Pershing  and 
his  forces  than  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary  of  War  Stanton 
were  with  the  battle-fields  a  few  miles  away  in  Virginia,  during 
the  Civil  War.  It  was  infinitely  easier  for  me  to  send  a  message 
or  hear  from  our  vessels  3,000  or  4,000  miles  distant  than  it 
was  for  Gideon  Welles,  when  he  was  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to 
communicate  with  the  Federal  ships  at  Charleston  or  with 
Farragut  at  Mobile. 

Vessels  at  sea  could  be  reached  almost  as  easily  as  if  they 
had  been  at  their  docks.  Submarine  warnings,  routings,  all 
kinds  of  information  and  orders  were  sent  to  them,  fifty  or  sixty 

250 


RADIO  GIRDLED  THE  GLOBE  251 

messages  being  transmitted  simultaneously.  At  the  same  time 
radio  operators  were  intercepting  every  word  or  signal  sent 
out  by  ships.  Sometimes,  as  the  operators  remarked,  "the  air 
was  full  of  them. ' ' 

1 '  ALLO !  ALLO ! SOS ! "  When  that  call  came  naval  vessels 
went  hurrying  to  the  scene,  for  it  meant  that  a  ship  was  attacked 
by  submarines.  Sometimes  in  the  war  zone  the  air  seemed  full 
of  " Alios,"  for  ships  approaching  the  European  coast  could 
catch  the  wireless  for  hundreds  of  miles,  hearing  signals  one 
moment  from  a  vessel  off  Ireland  and  the  next  from  some  craft 
being  attacked  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay. 

From  one  room  of  the  Navy  Department — the  ' '  Trans-Ocean 
Room,"  we  called  it — we  communicated  with  all  western 
Europe.  Messages  went  direct  to  the  high-power  sending  sta- 
tions at  Annapolis,  Sayville,  Long  Island ;  New  Brunswick  and 
Tuckerton,  N.  J.,  which  flashed  them  overseas.  At  the  same 
time  dispatches  were  pouring  in  at  receiving  stations,  coming 
into  Washington  from  abroad  without  interfering  with  the 
volume  going  out. 

Stations  at  San  Francisco,  San  Diego,  Pearl  Harbor,  and 
Cavite  spanned  the  Pacific,  keeping  us  in  touch  with  the  Far 
East,  with  China,  Japan,  the  Philippines,  and  Eastern  Russia. 
North  and  south  from  Panama  to  Alaska  were  wireless  stations, 
from  Darien,  on  the  Isthmus,  to  far  up  into  the  Arctic.  These 
were  the  "high-powers."  At  various  points  along  the  coast 
were  shore-to-ship  stations  that  communicated  with  shipping- 
several  hundred  miles  from  shore.  And  there  were  radio  com- 
pass stations,  which  could  determine  a  ship's  position  at  sea. 

The  United  States  Navy  not  only  built  up  this  vast  system 
in  our  own  territory,  but  it  erected  in  France  the  most  powerful 
radio  station  in  existence.  Located  near  Bordeaux,  at  Croix 
d'  Hins,  it  is  named  the  Lafayette,  and  a  tablet  on  the  main 
building  bears  the  inscription : 

Conceived  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  adequate  and  uninterrupted 
trans-Atlantic  communication  facilities  between  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  engaged  in  the  World  War  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

Erected  by  the  United  States  Navy  in  conjunction  with  and  for  the 
Government  of  France. 


252  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Planned  in  1917,  in  response  to  the  earnest  desire  of  our 
military  authorities  that  steps  be  taken  to  insure  ample  wireless 
communication,  in  case  cables  should  be  cut  or  otherwise  inter- 
rupted, and  to  supplement  the  inadequate  cable  service,  this 
immense  plant  was  fast  approaching  completion  when  the  armis- 
tice was  signed.  Then  work  was  suspended  for  a  time,  but  on 
agreement  with  the  French  government  was  resumed,  and 
pushed  to  completion. 

"When,  after  elaborate  tests,  the  plant  was  put  into  opera- 
tion, on  August  21,  1920,  I  received  this  radiogram: 

This  is  the  first  wireless  message  to  be  heard  around  the  world,  and 
marks  a  milestone  on  the  road  of  scientific  achievement. 

Lafayette  Radio  Station. 

The  Navy  takes  a  just  pride  in  having  brought  into  being 
that  great  plant  with  its  eight  towers,  each  832  feet  high,  nearly 
300  feet  higher  than  the  Washington  Monument — the  first  sta- 
tion to  girdle  the  globe  by  wireless. 

During  the  war  the  Navy  controlled  all  radio  in  the  United 
States  and  its  possessions,  taking  over  and  operating  59  com- 
mercial stations.  These  fitted  easily  into  the  extensive  system 
which  the  Navy  itself  had  developed,  for  on  January  1,  1917, 
it  owned  and  operated  55  stations  at  various  points  from 
Panama  to  Alaska,  and  from  our  Atlantic  coast  across  the  con- 
tinent and  the  Pacific  to  the  Philippines.  This  had  been  the 
work  of  years. 

In  August,  1914,  immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  war, 
Commander  S.  C.  Hooper  was  sent  to  Europe  to  study  the  latest 
developments  in  radio  and  war  communications,  and  spent  six 
months  in  England,  France,  Ireland,  Holland  and  Belgium.  His 
report  proved  of  decided  value.  A  special  board,  headed  by 
Captain  Bullard,  was  appointed,  and  this  led  to  the  expansion 
of  Navy  Radio  and  the  creation,  in  1916,  of  the  Naval  Communi- 
cation Service. 

Nearly  a  year  before  we  entered  the  war,  May  6th  to  8th, 
1916,  naval  communications,  wire  and  wireless,  of  the  entire 
country  were  mobilized,  under  the  supervision  of  Captain  (later 
Rear  Admiral)  W.  H.  G.  Bullard,  Superintendent  of  Radio  Serv- 
ice.   All  the  apparatus  necessary  for  country-wide  communica- 


EADIO  GIRDLED  THE  GLOBE  253 

tion  by  radio  or  telephone  was  provided,  by  the  Bureau  of  Engi- 
neering, specially  marked,  and  placed  in  readiness  for  operation 
on  twenty-four  hours'  notice. 

Inaugurating  war  service  was,  therefore,  comparatively 
simple,  and,  under  the  supervision  of  Captain  D.  W.  Todd, 
Director  of  Naval  Communications,  was  easily  accomplished. 
Trans-ocean  service  with  Europe  was  improved  by  increasing 
the  power  of  Tuckerton,  N.  J.,  and  Sayville,  L.  I.,  the  German- 
built  stations  we  had  taken  over,  and  placing  improved  ap- 
paratus at  New  Brunswick,  N.  J.  Work  was  pushed  on  the  big 
new  station  at  Annapolis,  Md. 

At  Otter  Cliffs,  near  Bar  Harbor,  Maine,  a  receiving  station 
was  built  that  more  than  doubled  the  capacity  of  the  existing 
ones  at  Chatham,  Mass.,  and  Belmar,  N.  J.  Sending  and  receiv- 
ing stations  were  connected  by  wire  with  the  Navy  Department, 
and  use  of  high  speed  apparatus,  automatic  senders  and  re- 
ceivers enabled  us  to  handle  an  immense  amount  of  traffic. 
Speed  in  transmission  increased  from  30  to  100  words  a  minute 
in  actual  practice,  and  300  words  in  pre-arranged  tests,  and 
there  was  almost  as  marked  progress  in  receiving. 

In  1916,  experts  considered  it  a  very  creditable  record  when 
125,000  dispatches  were  transmitted  or  received.  In  the  twelve 
months  following  April  6,  1918,  when  traffic  was  at  its  height, 
a  million  dispatches,  averaging  30  words  each,  were  handled 
from  the  Navy  Department  alone.  The  Naval  Communication 
Service  in  a  single  year  handled,  by  wire  and  wireless,  71,347,860 
words. 

American  merchant  ships,  as  well  as  naval  vessels,  were 
equipped  with  modern  apparatus  and  furnished  competent 
operators.  Thousands  of  radio  operators  were  required,  and 
7,000  were  enlisted  and  trained.  At  Harvard  University  we 
established  the  largest  radio  school  that  ever  existed.  Beginning 
with  350  students  in  1917,  the  number  grew  to  3,400  and  op- 
erators were  graduated  at  the  rate  of  200  a  week. 

Air,  surface  and  undersea  craft  were  linked  by  radio,  easily 
communicating  with  each  other  at  long  distances.  Battleships 
received  four  messages  and  transmitted  three  simultaneously. 

During  the  flight  of  the  Navy  planes  across  the  Atlantic,  in 
May,  1919,  a  message  was  sent  from  the  Navy  Department  to 


254  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  NC-4  far  out  at  sea.  An  immediate  reply  was  received  from 
the  plane,  and  this  was  transmitted  to  London,  Paris,  San  Fran- 
cisco and  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  and  its  receipt  acknowledged 
by  these  stations,  thousands  of  miles  apart,  all  in  three  minutes 
after  the  original  message  left  Washington. 

When  President  Wilson  went  to  France  on  the  George  Wash- 
ington to  attend  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris,  we  kept  in  touch 
with  the  ship  by  wireless  all  the  way  across  the  Atlantic.  On 
the  return  voyage  we  made  a  test  with  the  wireless  telephone 
and  from  an  instrument  much  like  the  'phone  in  your  home  or 
office,  I  talked  with  the  President  when  he  was  1,700  miles  at  sea. 

The  radio  compass,  used  first  for  locating  enemy  submarines, 
became  a  most  important  aid  to  navigation.  Any  ship  out  of 
its  course  or  uncertain  of  its  reckoning  has  only  to  transmit  the 
signal,  "Give  me  my  position."  The  operator  at  the  radio 
compass  station  turns  the  wheel  now  this  way,  then  that,  until 
he  finds  from  what  point  the  wireless  comes  strongest.  At  the 
same  time  other  stations  along  the  coast  are  doing  the  same 
thing.  Triangulating  the  directions  reported,  the  master  out  at 
sea  is  told  the  position  of  his  vessel,  the  latitude  and  longitude 
and,  if  in  danger,  is  told  what  course  to  steer  to  get  out  of  his 
predicament. 

The  saving  in  life  and  property  has  more  than  compensated 
for  the  cost  of  this  system.  Beginning  with  a  few  on  the 
Atlantic,  there  are  now  some  75  of  these  compass  stations  all 
along  our  coasts. 

The  necessity  of  a  single  control  of  wireless  was  shown  by 
an  instance  that  occurred  one  night  in  the  Navy  Department. 
A  message  was  being  received  from  Darien,  in  the  Panama 
Canal  Zone,  when  some  one  broke  in  on  its  wave-length  and 
mixed  up  words  and  letters  in  a  hopeless  jumble.  The  operator 
had  to  stop  Darien  until  he  could  find  out  where  the  trouble 
was.  At  last  they  found  it  was  a  station  in  Nova  Scotia,  that 
was  testing  its  apparatus.  It  had  unintentionally  "broken" 
into  the  wave-length  our  operators  were  using,  and  caused  inter- 
ference clear  to  Panama. 

American  news  was  spread  throughout  the  world  by  Navy 
radio.  Every  night  the  "Navy  Press"  was  broadcasted,  and 
received  by  ships  far  out  at  sea.    Our  boys  in  the  army  were 


RADIO  GIRDLED  THE  GLOBE  255 

quite  as  eager  to  hear  the  news  from  home,  and  a  complete 
service,  compiled  by  the  Committee  on  Public  Information,  was 
sent  to  Europe  each  night,  and  distributed  through  the  Allied 
countries,  including  Russia.  Regular  reports  were  sent  to 
South  America  and  the  Orient,  the  latter  being  distributed 
throughout  China,  Japan  and  Siberia. 

Germany  had  a  big  Cryptographic  Bureau  in  Berlin,  with 
experts  in  deciphering  languages  and  codes,  which  often  secured 
valuable  information  from  intercepted  radio  messages.  With 
the  assistance  of  able  civilians,  we  built  up  a  corps  of  code  and 
cipher  experts  who  compared  well  with  those  of  any  country. 
Frequent  changes  in  codes  kept  Germany  guessing,  and  afforded 
a  high  degree  of  secrecy  to  our  official  communications. 

"Listening  in"  on  Nauen,  the  largest  of  German  stations, 
Navy  operators  in  America  took  down  nightly  the  latest  news 
from  Berlin.  And  the  "news"  the  Germans  sent  out  for  home 
consumption  and  foreign  effect  was  weird  and  startling.  One 
night  in  July,  1918,  the  Germans  announced: 

Vaterland  sunk !  Largest  German  vessel  used  by  Americans  as  troop 
transport,  named  by  them  "Leviathan,"  was  torpedoed  and  sent  down 
today  by  German  submarines! 

By  wireless,  telegraph,  bulletins  and  newspapers,  the  report 
was  spread  all  over  Germany,  and  there  was  general  rejoicing 
throughout  the  empire. 

I  did  not  believe  the  report  and  felt  it  could  hardly  be  true, 
but  I  must  confess  that  the  dispatch  gave  me  a  start.  Our 
latest  reports  showed  that  the  big  transport  had  sailed  from 
Brest  three  days  previous  and  was  nearly  half  way  home.  My 
anxiety  was  not  relieved  until  we  got  positive  assurance  of  her 
safety.  The  British  radio  next  day  broadcasted  the  following 
statement : 

The  German  wireless  and  German  newspapers  have  asserted  that 
the  former  German  liner  the  Vaterland,  now  in  use  as  an  American 
transport,  had  been  torpedoed  and  sunk.  The  statement  is  false.  The 
Vaterland  has  not  been  sunk.  The  Vossische-Zeitung  says  that  the 
Americans  had  intended  to  bring  over  a  dozen  divisions  in  the  course  of 
a  year  in  this  ship.  If  so  the  intention  may  be  carried  out,  for  the 
Vaterland  is  afloat  and  is  in  the  finest  possible  condition. 


256  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

There  was  bitter  disappointment  in  the  ''Fatherland"  when 
the  German  Government  gradually  broke  the  news  that  it  was 
not  the  Vaterland,  but  another  steamer,  "almost  as  big,"  which 
had  been  sunk.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  Justicia,  a  British  vessel 
which  had  been  carrying  troops,  but  was  returning  empty — and 
she  was  nothing  like  so  large  as  the  Leviathan,  not  by  20,000 
tons. 

That  report  was  only  one  of  the  thousand  queer  things  we 
heard  from  Germany. 

There  was  laid  on  my  desk  every  morning  a  daily  newspaper 
— I  suppose  it  was  the  only  "secret"  daily  ever  gotten  out  in 
America — which,  compiled  and  mimeographed  by  the  Naval 
Communication  Service  and  marked  ' '  confidential, ' '  was  sent  in 
sealed  envelopes  to  officers  and  officials  whose  duties  compelled 
them  to  keep  in  touch  with  all  that  was  going  on  abroad.  This 
contained  not  only  all  that  Germany  was  sending  out,  but  a 
digest  of  all  that  was  sent  out  by  the  British,  French  and 
Italians. 

We  certainly  heard  some  strange  "news"  from  Berlin — 
things  that  were  news  to  us.  One  report,  received  July  25,  1918, 
when  our  troops  were  proving  their  valor  in  Foch  's  great  drive, 
informed  us : 

The  American  army  is  lacking  in  the  one  essential,  the  will  to  fight. 
In  any  case,  it  will  not  be  numerous  enough  to  play  any  important  part 
until  1920,  and  then  only  provided  the  transport  difficulty  is  got  over 
and  the  munition  industry  developed  from  its  present  nursery  stage. 
Our  submarines  will  see  to  the  transports,  and  America  will  find  it 
impossible  to  create  a  gigantic  industry  and  a  gigantic  army  at  the 
same  time.  Ammunition  perhaps,  but  guns  cannot  be  cast  in  sewing- 
machine  factories.  At  present  the  American  soldiers  are  without  either 
rifles  or  artillery. 

At  that  moment  there  were  a  million  American  soldiers  in 
France  and  we  were  turning  out  munitions  at  a  rate  the  Ger- 
mans could  not  believe  was  possible. 

The  more  evident  it  was  that  U-boat  warfare  had  failed,  the 
more  vehement  were  the  German  naval  authorities  in  asserting 
its  success.  Admiral  Holtzendorff,  head  of  the  Admiralty, 
announced  on  July  29,  that  they  were  taking  into  consideration 
the    counter   measures — (that   meant   the   mine   barrage,   the 


STATION  RADIOTELEGRAPWQLjE 

LA  FAYETTE 

EN  L  HONNEUR  DU  GENERAL 

LA   FAYETTE 

CONCUE  DANS  LE  BUT 

D 'ASSURER  A  TRAVERS 

L'ATLANTIQUE  DES 

COMMUNICATIONS  SURES 

ET  INflNTERROMPUES 

ENTRE  LES   FORCES 

EXPED1TIONNAFRES 

AMERICAINES  ENGAGEES 

DANS  LA  GRANDE  GUERRE 

ET  LE  GOtA  ERNEMENT 

DES    ETATS-UNIS 

D'AMERIQUE 

ER1&EE  PAR  LA  MARINE 

DES  ETATS-UNIS  AVEC 

LE  CONCOURS  ET  A 

L'  INTENTION  DU 

GOUVERNEMENT 

1  FRANCOIS 

COMMENCEE,  IE   7    MARS  1918 
ACHEVFK,  LE    SI    AOIT    19«0 


LA  FAYETTE 

RADIO    STATION 

IN  HONOR  OF  GENERAL' 
LA  FAYETTE 

CONCEIVED  FOR  THE 

PURPOSE  OF  INSURING 

ADEQUATE    AND 

UNINTERRUPTED 

TRANSATLANTIC 

COMMUNICATION  FACILITIES 

BETWEEN  THE  AMERICAN 

EXPEDITIONARY   FORCES 

ENGAGED   IN  THE 
WORLD  WAR  AND  THE 
GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITE))  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

ERECTED   BY  THE 

UNITED  STATES  NAVY 

IN   CONJUNCTION 

WITH  AND  FOR 

THE    GOVERNMENT 

OF    FRANCE 

WORK  STARTED.  28  MAY  1918 
COMPLETED.  21    AUCIST    1920 


REMISE   AU    GOUVERNEMENT    KRANC  AIS.  I  f 


THE  TABLET  ON  THE  MAIN  BUILDING  OF  THE  LAFAYETTE 
EADIO  STATION 


RADIO  GIRDLED  THE  GLOBE  257 

destroyers,  patrol  boats  and  all  the  things  we  were  using  to 
defeat  them) ;  that  the  Germans  were  building  many  more  sub- 
marines, and  that  "final  success  is  guaranteed." 

After  submarine  crews  had  mutinied  and  U-boat  warfare 
had  ended  with  the  recall  of  their  submarines  in  October,  the 
German  chiefs  were  still  bluffing  their  own  people.  As  late  as 
November  5,  less  than  a  week  before  the  armistice,  we  caught 
this  bulletin  from  Berlin: 

English  wireless  service  reported,  and  this  report  was  circulated 
also  in  neutral  newspapers,  that  German  submarines  had  passed  Nor- 
wegian coast  on  their  way  home  with  a  white  flag  at  the  masthead.  This 
is  a  pure  invention.    English  wireless  has  thus  again  circulated  a  lie. 

At  that  very  time  the  U-boats  were  all  hurrying  home,  some 
of  them  passing  so  close  to  the  Norwegian  coast,  to  avoid  mines 
and  destroyers,  that  they  could  be  plainly  seen  from  shore. 

When  the  French  and  Americans  by  terrific  attacks  drove 
the  Germans  across  the  Marne,  Berlin  announced : 

The  excellent  execution  of  the  movement  for  changing  to  the  oppo- 
site bank  of  the  wide  River  Marne,  which  took  place  unnoticed  by  the 
enemy,  demonstrates  today  the  splendid  ability  of  the  German  command 
and  troops. 

When  the  Americans  won  their  notable  victory  at  St.  Mihiel 
we  heard  from  Berlin  that  the  Germans  had  only  "evacuated" 
the  "bend"  there  to  improve  lines,  and  that  on  the  whole,  the 
French  and  American  attacks  had  failed.  And  General  Wris- 
berg  assured  the  trusting  Teutons  back  in  the  fatherland : 

The  American  army  also  can  not  terrify  us,  as  we  shall  settle  accounts 
with  them. 

Even  in  November,  with  total  collapse  only  a  few  days  away, 
they  were  still  talking  of  the  failure  of  the  Americans  and  the 
"victorious  repulse"  of  the  French. 

After  the  mutiny  at  Kiel  and  other  ports,  where  sailors  took 
possession  of  the  ships  and  started  the  revolution,  they  sent  out 
this  bulletin,  on  November  7 : 

Concerning  situation  in  Kiel  and  uprisings  in  other  harbor  towns; 
military  protection  of  Baltic  has  been  carried  out  without  a  break  by 


258  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

navy.     All  warships  leaving  harbor  fly  war  flags.     Movements  among 
sailors  and  workmen  have  been  brought  back  to  peaceful  ways. 

The  surrender  of  the  German  High  Seas  Fleet  was  gently 
termed,  the  "carrying  out  of  armistice  conditions  at  sea!" 

But  through  the  secret  service  of  the  Allies,  we  were  kept 
well  informed  of  all  that  was  going  on  in  the  German  navy. 

The  denials  of  mutinies  and  revolts  were  merely  amusing  to 
us.  We  knew  the  facts.  We  knew  their  morale  was  shattered, 
that  the  Allies  had  ' '  got  their  nerve. ' ' 

I  do  not  know  any  dispatch  that  amused  me  more  than  the 
one  we  picked  up  from  Berlin  November  16.  This  showed  that 
the  U-boat  crews  had  to  be  reassured  that  their  lives  were  safe, 
even  after  the  armistice ;  that  they  had  to  be  coaxed  and  bribed 
before  they  would  venture  out  to  take  the  submarines  to  Eng- 
land for  surrender.    Here  it  is : 

Pr.  143.     W522 — Transocean  Press.     Berlin,  November  16. 

German  armistice  commission  has  directed  to  Chancellor  Ebert  for 
immediate  communication  to  all  submarine  crews  letter  in  which  it  states 
that  English  Admiral  Sir  Roslyn  Wemyss  has  given  unreserved  and 
absolute  assurance  that  all  crews  of  submarines  to  be  handed  over  will 
be  sent  back  to  Germany  as  soon  as  possible  after  their  arrival  in  the 
harbor  appointed  by  England.  Commission  therefore  requests  crews 
to  hand  over  in  good  time  the  submarines. 

In  connection  with  this,  workmen  and  soldiers'  council  of  Wilh elms- 
haven  states  that  all  men  of  ships  which  are  brought  into  an  enemy  port 
are  insured  for  10,000  marks  in  case  of  death.  A  corresponding  special 
pension  has  been  provided  for  accidents.  Besides,  the  married  men  who 
are  concerned  in  bringing  the  submarines  receive  a  premium  of  500 
marks,  and  finally  are  to  be  immediately  discharged  after  their  return 
home. 


CHAPTER  XXni 
A  SURPRISE  FOR  COUNT  VON  LUXBURG 

"HERR  DOCTOR  BRECHT,"  SPEAKER  AT  HIS  BANQUET  IN  BUENOS  AIRES, 

WAS  U.  S.  NAVAL  AGENT NAVAL  INTELLIGENCE  FRUSTRATED  PLOTS 

OF  GERMANS FRENCH  EXECUTED  TWO  WOMEN  SPIES  CAUGHT  NEAR 

ST.    NAZAIRE,    GIVING    GERMANS    INFORMATION    REGARDING    AMERI- 
CAN TROOPS. 

EVERYONE  recalls  the  Count  von  Lnxburg,  German  Min- 
ister to  Argentina,  and  his  famous  ''spurlos  versenkt" 
dispatch     advising     his     Government     that     Argentine 
steamers,  if  not  spared  by  the  U-boats,  be  sunk  without 
leaving  a  trace.    But  there  is  one  incident  in  connection  with 
that  worthy  which  may,  even  yet,  be  news  to  the  Teutons. 

One  of  the  speakers  at  the  last  big  banquet  by  the  Germans 
in  Buenos  Aires,  over  which  Luxburg  presided — one  of  the  ora- 
tors they  applauded  vociferously  and  patted  on  the  back  as 
the  cries  of  "Hoch  der  Kaiser!"  rang  round  the  festive  board, 
was  an  agent  of  the  United  States  Government.  And  thereby 
hangs  a  tale. 

When  this  country  broke  relations  with  Germany,  German 
activities  in  South  America  were  redoubled.  The  large  German 
population  in  Brazil  not  only  planned  to  keep  that  country  from 
joining  the  Allies,  but  talked  boldly  of  "uprisings,"  and  join- 
ing in  action  with  the  Germans  in  neighbor  countries.  We 
needed  to  find  out  more  about  Teuton  activities  in  that  region. 
An  American  of  varied  accomplishments,  who  spoke  Portuguese 
and  Spanish,  as  well  as  German,  offered  his  services  to  the  Navy. 
He  had  spent  years  in  Germany,  and  though  of  a  Colonial 
American  family,  was  a  doctor  of  philosophy  of  Leipzig  Univer- 
sity, and  intimately  acquainted  with  German  conditions  and 
German  character.  He  had  volunteered  to  act  as  a  secret  agent, 
in  which  capacity  he  had  served  the  Navy  in  Spain  itself  during 
the  Spanish  War. 

259 


260  OUE  NAVY  AT  WAR 

In  February,  1917,  he  was  accepted  by  Naval  Intelligence, 
and  on  March  3,  a  month  before  we  declared  war,  sailed  for 
Brazil.  He  was  no  amateur  in  securing  information,  and  he  wel- 
comed the  chance  of  going  to  Brazil  and  Argentina,  the  danger 
to  him  rather  adding  zest  to  the  task. 

When  he  reached  southern  Brazil  as  a  German  emissary 
coming  from  Switzerland,  he  was  taken  into  their  clubs  and 
councils,  and  told  what  they  planned  and  plotted.  He  was  with 
the  optimistic  Teuton  singers  as  they  roared  out  "Die  Wacht 
am  Rhein"  and  * '  Deutschland  iiber  Alles,"  and  toasted  "Der 
Tag" — the  day  when  Germany  would  gather  in  its  spoils  in 
South  America.  He  attended  the  secret  meetings  of  German 
intriguers  and  learned  their  secrets.  But,  suspected  at  last, 
he  was  attacked  by  burly  Teutons  and  emerged  with  a  broken 
head  and  a  badly  hurt  arm. 

Departing  for  Argentina,  he  appeared  there  as  "Dr.  Ernst 
Brecht, ' '  bearing  tidings  from  the  Germans  in  Brazil,  which  had 
just  declared  war.  He  was  taken  into  their  inner  circles,  their 
plots  and  purposes  were  poured  into  his  ears.  Not  once  did 
they  have  the  faintest  suspicion  that  he  was  an  American,  much 
less  a  Government  agent. 

Members  of  the  German  legation  staff  conferred  with  him. 
Plotting  and  intriguing  there,  as  they  did  in  the  United  States, 
they  were  pretending  the  greatest  friendship  for  Argentina, 
giving  officials  and  people  to  understand  that,  while  the  U-boats 
might  be  sinking  vessels  of  other  nations  without  warning,  Ar- 
gentinian shipping  was  exempt.  If  any  of  its  ships  were  sunk, 
it  was  only  a  regrettable  mistake.  And  at  the  very  time  Lux- 
burg  was  talking  this  dear  friendliness,  he  was  sending  ' '  spurlos 
versenkt"  messages  to  the  German  Government. 

"Doctor  Brecht"  had  many  adventures,  but  the  most  pic- 
turesque was  the  role  he  played  in  Buenos  Aires.  Joining  at 
once  the  German  "Bund,"  which  had  branches  all  over  the 
Argentine,  the  "Doctor"  formed  one  of  the  group  of  well-known 
Austrians  and  Germans  which  gathered  at  the  famous  round- 
table  in  the  Bismarck  restaurant. 

At  the  annual  banquet  of  the  Deutscher  Bund,  the  German 
event  of  the  year,  Count  von  Luxburg  presided.  "Herr  Doctor 
Ernst  Brecht"  was  called  upon  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Ger- 


A  SURPRISE  FOR  COUNT  VON  LUXBURG   261 

mans  of  Brazil.  Giving  a  touching  account  of  the  situation  of 
the  Brazilian  Teutons  and  their  determination  and  devotion  to 
the  cause  of  the  "Vaterland,"  he  ended  by  quoting  a  bellicose 
poem  written  by  a  well-known  German  poetess  who  lived  at 
Blumenau,  the  hotbed  of  Teutonism  in  Brazil. 

He  was  cheered  and  applauded  enthusiastically,  and  Count 
von  Luxburg  himself  unbent  far  enough  to  thank  the  speaker 
for  his  inspiring  words  and  express  the  hope  that  his  sojourn 
in  the  hospitable  Argentine  would  prove  pleasant  and  profitable. 
It  certainly  did — but  in  a  way  that  the  Count  never  suspected. 

There  was  general  regret  when  "Doctor  Brecht"  announced 
that  he  felt  compelled  within  a  few  weeks  to  return  to  Europe. 
He  had  found  that  the  German  officials  were  planning  to  send 
important  dispatches  they  would  not  entrust  to  the  mails,  and 
they  planned  at  first  to  make  him  their  messenger.  But  before 
this  was  arranged,  Luxburg 's  code  messages  regarding  the 
U-boat  warfare  were  published  by  the  United  States.  The  Count 
was  amazed. 

Sent  in  a  complicated  code  known  only  to  himself  and  the 
Berlin  Foreign  Office,  five  thousand  miles  away;  cabled  by  the 
minister  of  another  country  among  his  own  private  dispatches, 
he  could  not  understand  how  those  messages  could  be  captured 
and  deciphered  by  the  Americans.  It  was  evident  that  they  were 
not  so  stupid  as  he  and  Captain  von  Papen  thought  they  were. 

Luxburg 's  dispatches,  when  made  public,  led  to  uprisings 
against  the  Germans,  makiug  it  impossible  for  him  to  remain  in 
Argentina.  The  day  the  Count  got  his  passports,  September 
12,  1917,  "Doctor  Brecht"  had  left  the  Bismarck  restaurant 
and  was  on  his  way  home  with  a  German  acquaintance  when 
they  saw  a  fire  in  the  distance,  and  found  the  German  Club  was 
burning.  It  had  been  mobbed  and  set  on  fire  by  pro-Ally  stu- 
dents and  others.  Seeing  the  club  half  destroyed,  the  Doctor 
and  his  companion  returned  to  the  Bismarck  to  inform  their 
confreres.  But  they  found  that  the  restaurant  had  been  com- 
pletely gutted  by  a  mob,  the  tables  and  dishes  smashed,  and 
every  portrait  of  the  Kaiser,  Hindenburg,  and  other  "heroes" 
slashed  to  pieces. 

Germany  had  been  astonished  a  few  months  before  by  the 
publication  of  Foreign  Minister  Zimmerman's  note  to  the  Ger- 


262  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

man  Minister  in  Mexico,  proposing  an  alliance  of  Germany  and 
Mexico  to  make  war  against  the  United  States.  There  was  noth- 
ing the  Germans  guarded  more  closely  than  that. 

Yet  before  Bernstorff  reached  Europe,  that  secret  dispatch 
was  published,  and  the  first  thing  the  German  Ambassador  to 
Sweden  demanded  to  know  when  the  Count  reached  Christiania, 
was  how  the  Americans  ever  managed  to  get  hold  of  it.  The 
Foreign  Office  was  stunned.  Not  only  had  its  plot  been  exposed, 
but  the  exposure  had  shown  that  the  Allies  could  decipher  the 
most  secret  and  puzzling  code  they  could  devise. 

Captain  von  Papen,  who  once  called  us  "those  idiotic  Yan- 
kees," might  have  told  them  that  we  were  more  alert  than  he 
had  supposed,  for  the  exposure  of  his  dealings  in  every  detail ; 
of  the  activities  of  Wolf  von  Igel,  his  aide;  of  Doctor  Albert, 
of  Fritz  von  Rintelen ;  of  the  ship-bomb  plots ;  the  plan  to  blow 
up  the  Welland  Canal  locks,  and  various  other  German  in- 
trigues, must  have  by  that  time  convinced  him  that  the  Ameri- 
cans had  some  secret  service  of  their  own.  When,  on  December 
4,  1915,  our  Government  demanded  the  recall  of  Papen,  who 
was  military  attache  of  the  German  embassy,  and  Captain 
Boy-Ed,  the  naval  attache,  it  was  merely  stated  that  the  cause 
was  "improper  activity  in  military  matters."  Both  protested, 
declaring  that  they  had  done  nothing  illegal.  But  later  we  pub- 
lished a  full  account  of  Papen 's  activities,  with  photographs  of 
his  checks,  the  exact  amounts  paid  to  his  tools  who  did  the  dirty 
work,  to  whom  they  were  paid  and  for  what  purpose.  It  was 
shown  that  Boy-Ed  had  transactions  amounting  to  millions  with 
German  steamship  lines  whose  officials  were,  through  false  mani- 
fests, sending  out  ships  laden  with  coal  and  other  supplies  for 
German  raiders. 

Boy-Ed,  at  that,  did  not  seem  to  be  so  deeply  involved  as 
Papen  was.  He  protested  that  he  had  no  part  in  conspiring  with 
Huerta,  and  had  never  seen  the  Mexican  "ex-President."  But 
it  was  known  that  Rintelen  had  had  dealings  with  Huerta,  and 
that  Rintelen  had  received  from  Boy-Ed  at  least  half  a  million 
dollars.  The  dealings  of  Captain  von  Papen  with  Huerta  were 
too  thoroughly  disclosed  to  admit  of  denial. 

Germany,  beginning  years  before,  had  built  up  in  this  coun- 
try an  extensive  spy  system,  which  kept  it  informed  not  only  of 


A  SURPRISE  FOR  COUNT  VON  LUXBURG   263 

military  developments,  but  of  what  was  done  in  every  branch 
of  industry.  When  the  European  war  began  they  used  every 
possible  means  of  preventing  the  manufacture  of  munitions  or 
supplies  for  the  Allies.  Nearly  every  large  factory  or  plant 
had  in  its  employ  workmen  who  were  paid  agents  of  the  German 
Government.  That  they  could  secure  information  of  what  was 
going  on  was  not  so  menacing  as  what  they  might  do,  for  one 
or  two  men  could  damage  machinery  so  as  to  retard  work  for 
months.  There  were  explosions  in  munition  plants,  machinery 
was  at  times  mysteriously  wrecked,  shells  were  damaged;  and 
while  the  cause  seldom  could  be  definitely  determined,  it  was  the 
general  belief  that  many  of  these  "accidents"  were  the  work 
of  German  agents. 

The  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence,  whose  function  in  peace 
times  is  to  gather  naval  information  from  all  parts  of  the  world, 
had  a  more  difficult  task  to  perform  when  war  came.  An  Investi- 
gation Section  was  formed  to  seek  out  and  take  into  custody 
persons  who  were,  by  sabotage,  explosion,  fomenting  strikes 
or  other  means,  seeking  to  prevent  or  retard  the  manufacture 
of  munitions;  to  discover  and  thwart  any  attempt  to  damage 
vessels,  shipyards,  bases  or  factories;  to  counteract  German 
propaganda  and,  in  general,  restrain  the  activities  of  Germans 
and  German  sympathizers. 

In  each  naval  district  there  was  an  Aide  for  Information, 
reporting  to  Rear  Admiral  Roger  Welles,  Director  of  Naval 
Intelligence,  at  Washington.  Each  district  was  further  sub- 
divided into  sections  with  representatives  working  under  the 
district  aid.  The  activity  of  these  aides  was  tremendous,  espe- 
cially in  our  large  ports  of  entry,  New  York,  Boston,  Philadel- 
phia, Baltimore,  and  Norfolk.  Arrests  of  suspects  sent  fear 
into  the  hearts  of  any  who  might  be  plotting  sabotage.  In  one 
day  I  ordered  the  arrest  of  more  than  a  score  in  one  plant. 

Ships  from  countries  near  Germany  were  examined  from 
truck  to  keel  for  contraband,  or  papers  or  literature  that  might 
convey  secret  messages.  Passengers  and  crews  were  carefully 
scrutinized.  Close  inspection  and  censorship  of  mails  and 
cables  prevented  Germany  from  communicating  with  its  agents 
in  this  country,  and  also  prevented  them  from  sending  out  mili- 
tary information. 


264  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Outgoing  ships  were  carefully  inspected  to  prevent  them 
from  taking  supplies  or  materials  to  Germany.  Some  neutral 
vessels  had  been  carrying  from  America  quantities  of  spare 
machinery  and  electrical  parts,  especially  those  composed  of 
copper,  brass  and  zinc.  There  was  reason  to  believe  much  of 
this  was  smuggled  to  Germany  and  used  in  the  manufacture  of 
parts  for  U-boats.  Radio  apparatus  was  purchased  in  quanti- 
ties. Ships  leaving  for  Holland  or  Sweden  sometimes  sailed 
with  enough  lubricating  oil  to  take  them  around  the  world. 
Much  of  it  must  have  ''leaked"  into  Germany.  This  traffic  was 
greatly  reduced,  and  that  in  contraband  practically  ended. 

Military  guards  were  placed  around  piers,  no  enemy  or  sus- 
pected aliens  were  allowed  to  work  around  shipping,  and  all 
dock  workers  were  required  to  carry  identification  cards.  Ves- 
sels were  under  government  supervision  during  their  entire  stay 
in  port. 

Not  only  navy  yards  and  shipyards  were  kept  under  surveil- 
lance, but  all  plants  engaged  on  naval  work  were  constantly  in- 
spected. Thus  all  sources  of  production  were  protected  from 
enemy  activity.  For  this  purpose  a  Plant  Division  was  created, 
which  also  reported  any  undesirable  working  conditions  or  lack 
of  fire  protection.  This  led  later  to  the  creation  of  the  Fire  Pre- 
vention Section  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 

Admiral  Welles  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  Director  of  Mili- 
tary Intelligence,  the  State  and  Labor  Departments,  and  the 
Department  of  Justice.  Naval  attaches  abroad  obtained  a  large 
amount  of  information  regarding  "trading  with  the  enemy"  as 
well  as  military  activities,  and  this  was  transmitted  to  the  War 
Industries  Board,  the  State  and  War  Departments.  The  Bureau 
of  War  Trade  Intelligence  cooperated  with  the  Navy  in  holding 
up  undesirable  imports  and  exports. 

Information  regarding  foreign  navies  and  ships  and  war 
developments  was  compiled  and  disseminated,  in  confidential 
publications,  to  all  our  forces  afloat.  Fleet,  Force  and  Division 
commanders  were  kept  informed  of  the  activities  of  all  fleets, 
Allied  and  enemy,  of  ships  sunk,  and  tonnage  destruction;  of 
the  number  and  tracks  of  submarines  in  the  Atlantic  and  Medi- 
terranean ;  and  of  all  efforts  made  by  the  Allied  and  associated 
powers. 


A  SURPRISE  FOR  COUNT  VON  LUXBURG   265 

The  British  had  a  remarkably  complete  system  which  con- 
stantly improved,  so  that,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  it  was 
said  that  they  were  informed  of  the  sailing  of  every  submarine 
sent  out  from  Germany,  and  its  probable  destination.  We  had 
the  advantage  of  this,  as  well  as  the  information  obtained  by 
France  and  Italy.  We  had  our  own  agents  in  most  foreign  coun- 
tries, and  maintained  quite  a  force  in  France. 

The  most  important  of  these  activities  was  along  the  coast 
around  Brest  and  St.  Nazaire,  the  centers  of  troop  and  supply 
traffic.  German  agents,  it  was  reported,  were  using  Belle  He 
as  a  signal  station  to  advise  their  submarines. 

Convoys  reported  suspicious  lights,  and  it  was  believed  that 
these  were  informers  on  shore  signalling  to  U-boats.  The  sub- 
marines used  various  disguises.  One,  submerged  with  its  peri- 
scope showing,  lay  hidden  for  hours  in  the  midst  of  a  fishing 
fleet.  Yet  the  fishermen  paid  so  little  attention  to  it  that  the 
French  semaphore  station,  only  a  few  kilometers  away,  was  not 
notified.  A  Greek  merchantman  hove  in  sight,  the  U-boat  fired  a 
torpedo  and  the  steamship  was  sunk. 

The  French  authorities  welcomed  our  intelligence  officers, 
and  together  they  set  about  developing  an  efficient  service  all 
along  the  coast.  A  U.  S.  Naval  Reserve  officer  who  spoke 
French  fluently  was  attached  to  the  staff  of  the  French  com- 
mander-in-chief in  Brittany.  That  coast  is  rugged  and  bold, 
with  groups  of  small  islands.  The  most  important  is  Belle-Ile- 
en-Mer,  twelve  kilometers  from  shore,  the  first  land  sighted  by 
convoys  going  to  St.  Nazaire,  and  the  last  seen  on  their  way 
home.  At  the  northern  end  is  the  famous  "Passage  de  la 
Tenouse,"  leading  to  the  bay  of  Quiberon.  Once  through  this 
passage  and  in  the  bay,  ships  were  considered  safe  from  sub- 
marines. One  group  of  our  first  troop  convoys  was  attacked 
three  miles  west  of  the  Point  des  Poulin,  the  entrance  to  this 
passage,  and  several  shells  fired  by  the  transports  ricocheted 
and  exploded  on  the  rocky  bluffs  of  the  island.  West-bound  con- 
voys were  assembled  in  Quiberon  Bay.  Every  effort  was  made 
to  conceal  their  departure,  but  the  information  that  enemy  sub- 
marines seemed  to  obtain  at  times  was  startling.  When  the 
merchant  convoy  system  was  inaugurated,  ships  were  instructed 
to  anchor  off  Le  Palais,  in  the  lee  of  Belle  He.    Two  days  later 


266  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

a  submarine  laid  mines  in  the  roadstead.  The  next  night  ships 
were  anchored  two  miles  to  the  north,  but  within  twelve  hours 
mines  were  laid  there. 

Lights  and  signals  were  not  the  only  means  of  enemy  com- 
munication. Some  fisherman,  seeing  the  transports  in  the  bay, 
might  go  out  at  night  and  inform  a  submarine,  which  could  radio 
the  news  to  all  the  U-boats  in  the  vicinity. 

These  were  the  conditions  that  had  to  be  met.  Every  report 
of  suspicious  happenings  had  to  be  investigated,  and  the  French 
were  quite  willing  that  the  American  Navy  assume  this  task, 
as  it  was  responsible  for  most  of  the  convoy  work  through  these 
waters. 

With  the  greatest  care  and  secrecy,  forty -five  of  the  most 
intelligent  fishermen  who  had  boats  of  their  own  were  selected, 
and  formed  into  a  patrol  service.  Proceeding  with  their  fishing, 
they  were  instructed  to  watch  for  any  sign  of  submarines  or 
mines  and  report  it  immediately.  Furthermore,  they  were  to 
report  any  mysterious  behavior  of  fishermen  or  strangers  in 
boats,  and  any  lights  or  suspicious  happenings  along  the  coast. 
Experienced  detectives  were  employed,  with  headquarters  at 
Nantes,  to  investigate  all  reports.  A  flood  of  them  came  in 
from  the  population  who,  like  the  French  officers,  seemed  anxious 
to  aid  the  Americans. 

Hundreds  of  investigations  were  made,  fishermen  and  resi- 
dents ashore  were  aroused  to  the  necessity  of  reporting  every- 
thing that  seemed  likely  to  aid  the  enemy,  and  an  intelligence 
system  was  built  up  that  was  no  small  factor  in  making  safe 
the  coast  of  France. 

Women  spies  were  found,  now  and  then ;  quite  as  dangerous 
as  the  men  in  enemy  pay.  The  most  remarkable  and  pathetic 
instance,  perhaps,  was  the  "Alvarez  Case,"  handled  by  the 
French  from  its  beginning  to  its  tragic  end. 

In  the  spring  of  1917,  French  agents  in  Barcelona,  Spain, 
reported  that  two  women  known  as  the  Alvarez  sisters,  were 
associating  with  a  man  strongly  suspected  of  being  in  the  Ger- 
man secret  service.  Soon  afterward  they  disappeared,  and  for 
two  months  their  whereabouts  was  unknown.  The  Paris  author- 
ities directed  that  all  regions  in  France,  particularly  the  Amer- 
ican zone,  be  searched  for  them.    They  were  at  last  discovered 


A  SURPRISE  FOR  COUNT  VON  LUXBURG   267 

in  the  seacoast  town  of  Sables  d*  Olonne,  thirty  miles  south  of 
St.  Nazaire,  where  our  troop  convoys  landed.  They  were  closely 
watched  and  when  they  boarded  a  train  for  Bordeaux,  evidently 
attempting  to  get  back  to  Spain,  they  were  arrested.  Upon  trial 
it  proved  that  they  had  come  under  the  influence  of  German 
agents  in  Spain  and  had  been  induced  by  an  offer  of  50,000 
francs  to  obtain  information,  among  other  things,  concerning 
the  American  troops  disembarking  in  Brittany. 

By  this  trial  the  mystery  of  the  blowing  up  of  the  French 
destroyer  Enseigne  Roux  was  cleared  up.  It  turned  out  that 
the  condemned  sisters  had  been  closely  associated  with  a  French 
sailor  named  Gaitton,  and  evidence  pointed  to  him  as  having 
mixed  dynamite  with  the  bunker  coal  on  the  destroyer.  This 
was  not  conclusively  proved,  but  Gaitton  had  enough  counts 
against  him  to  be  sentenced  to  twenty  years  in  a  naval  prison. 

The  Alvarez  sisters  were  convicted,  and  were  sentenced  to 
be  shot.  The  execution  took  place  at  daybreak  in  the  courtyard 
of  the  ancient  Chateau  of  Anne  de  Bretagne,  at  Nantes.  In  the 
courtyard  were  assembled  the  officers  in  charge  of  the  execution, 
government  officials  and  witnesses. 

The  women  were  led  to  two  posts  near  the  wall  of  the  chateau, 
and  the  last  words  were  spoken  to  them  by  the  priest.  At  their 
trial  they  had  confessed  all,  so  there  was  little  left  to  say.  One 
was  in  a  fainting  condition,  but  the  elder  of  the  two  proved 
unusually  courageous.  She  refused  to  be  blindfolded,  and  stood 
her  ground. 

An  army  officer  read  the  sentence.  There  was  a  volley  of 
musketry,  and  the  blindfolded  woman  dropped  to  the  ground. 
But  the  sister  who  had  shown  such  courage,  though  mortally 
wounded,  remained  erect,  and  had  to  be  despatched  by  a  shot 
from  a  revolver. 

The  Naval  Intelligence  officer  who  gave  Admiral  Welles  the 
account  of  this  pathetic  case,  from  which  are  taken  the  par- 
ticulars recited  above,  wrote : 

' '  For  years  to  come,  when  the  American  tourists  visit  the  now  historic 
ports  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces,  they  will  see,  if  they  look 
carefully,  a  few  scars  on  the  thick  wall  of  the  Chateau  courtyard  at 
Nantes.  These  are  the  marks  of  bullets  which  ended  the  careers  of  two 
poor  deluded  women  who  attempted  to  betray  the  Allies.     *     *     *" 


CHAPTER  XXIV 
AMERICAN  ADMIRAL  SAVED  KOLCHAK 

HEAD   OF   EUSSIAN    FLEET   RELEASED   FKOM    PRISON    AFTER   GLENNON  's 

ADDRESS  TO  MUTINOUS  SAILORS AFTER  MISSION   TO  WASHINGTON, 

BECAME   HEAD   OF    OMSK    GOVERNMENT KILLED   BY   BOLSHEVIKI 

UNITED    STATES    VESSELS    IN    NORTHERN    AND    WESTERN    RUSSIA 

KNIGHT       AT       VLADIVOSTOK MC  CULLY       AT       MURMANSK       AND 

ARCHANGEL. 

WHEN  revolution  swept  Eussia  in  1917,  the  sailors  of 
the  Baltic  Fleet  mutinied,  assassinated  their  com- 
mander-in-chief, and  murdered  a  hundred  officers. 
The  Black  Sea  Fleet  for  the  time  remained  loyal,  but 
in  June  revolted  and  deposed  its  commander. 

The  American  mission  headed  by  Elihu  Eoot,  of  which  Ad- 
miral James  H.  Glennon  was  the  naval  representative,  had  just 
arrived  in  Petrograd.  The  sailors  at  Sebastopol  on  June  20th 
voted  to  remove  Admiral  Kolchak,  send  him  to  prison  and  elect 
a  commander-in-chief  from  their  own  ranks.  When  the  Admiral 
was  notified,  he  appeared  on  the  quarter-deck  of  his  flagship  and 
addressed  his  men.  Appealing  in  the  name  of  Russia  and  the 
cause  for  which  she  was  fighting  with  the  Allies,  he  urged  them 
to  remain  loyal.  But  the  sailors  refused.  They  were  bent  on 
taking  control.  There  was  nothing  for  the  Admiral  to  do  but 
to  give  up  his  command,  and  leave  the  fleet  to  be  managed  by  a 
committee. 

They  demanded  his  sword,  but  he  would  not  give  it.  Draw- 
ing it  from  its  scabbard,  he  saluted  the  Russian  flag,  and  threw 
the  shimmering  blade  into  the  sea.  Turning  upon  his  heel 
sharply,  the  former  commander-in-chief  came  down  from  the 
quarter-deck,  climbed  over  the  side  of  the  flagship  into  a  waiting 
boat,  and  was  taken  to  Sebastopol,  where  he  was  put  in  prison 
along  with  Smirnoff  and  other  officers.  Kolchak  might  have  met 
the  same  fate  as  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Baltic  Fleet. 

268 


AMERICAN  ADMIRAL  SAVED  KOLCHAK        269 

" Execution  by  order  of  the  Sailors'  Soviet"  is  quite  as  deadly 
as  assassination. 

Unaware  of  the  serious  situation  that  had  developed,  Ad- 
miral Glennon  set  out  for  Sebastopol  to  visit  Kolchak  and  the 
Black  Sea  Fleet.  With  him  went  Admiral  Newton  A.  McCully, 
naval  attache,  a  master  of  the  Russian  tongue  and  a  great  ad- 
mirer of  the  Russian  people,  whose  affection  and  confidence  he 
has  held  through  all  events. 

The  first  intimation  the  American  admirals  had  that  they 
were  about  to  face  unusual  circumstances  was  when,  on  reach- 
ing the  station  in  Sebastopol,  they  found  a  reception  committee 
awaiting  them  composed  wholly  of  workmen  and  sailors.  There 
were  no  officers.  Kolchak  was  not  there,  nor  had  he  sent  any 
members  of  his  staff  to  greet  them.  Glennon  and  McCully  were 
quick  enough  to  catch  the  significance  of  this  unexpected  wel- 
come, and  to  accommodate  themselves  to  its  peculiar  character. 

"They  wore  no  swords,"  said  Admiral  Glennon,  "so  the 
.American  officers  left  their  swords  in  the  train." 

The  American  officers  were  taken  to  the  flagship,  from  which 
Kolchak  had  been  deposed  the  day  before.  Standing  on  the 
quarter-deck,  where  Kolchak  had  stood  in  his  final  appeal,  Ad- 
miral Glennon  spoke  to  the  sailors  on  the  meaning  of  democracy. 
He  paid  a  generous  tribute  to  their  ships.  He  spoke  of  Russia's 
bravery,  and  urged  the  sailors  to  stand  by  the  cause  for  which 
the  Allies  were  fighting.  Referring  feelingly  to  the  cordial  re- 
lations which  had  always  existed  between  Russia  and  the  United 
States,  he  made  much  of  the  argument  for  the  continued  friend- 
ship and  cooperation  of  these  nations,  now  the  two  biggest 
republics  in  the  world.  But  not  a  word  did  he  say  of  the  deposed 
officers. 

Admiral  Glennon  is  a  big  man,  of  commanding  appearance, 
but  with  a  kindly  and  genial  bearing.  His  speech  made  a  deep 
impression  on  the  sailors.  Evidently  they  talked  over  the  things 
he  had  said  and  decided  to  show  their  appreciation  in  some  way. 
When  the  American  admirals  and  other  officers  were  boarding 
their  train  to  return  to  Petrograd,  representatives  of  the  sailors 
came  on  board  and  told  Admiral  Glennon  that  they  had  voted 
to  restore  the  arms  to  all  the  deposed  officers  except  Kolchak 
and  Smirnoff.    These  two,  they  said,  they  would  probably  keep 


270  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

in  prison  and  bring  to  trial.  Admiral  Glennon  saw  his  chance. 
Manifestly  these  sailors  wanted  to  please  the  Americans.  They 
were  a  little  afraid  of  Kolchak  and  Smirnoff,  so  they  felt  obliged 
to  keep  them  in  prison,  but  probably,  if  the  Russian  admirals 
were  to  leave  Sebastopol  and  the  region  of  the  Black  Sea,  the 
sailors  would  be  satisfied.  So  Admiral  Glennon,  smiling  down 
from  his  towering  height  upon  the  shorter  Russians,  made  a 
proposal.  In  effect  he  said:  " Release  Smirnoff  and  Kolchak, 
and  we  will  take  them  to  Petrograd  with  us."  Petrograd  was 
far  away.  Moreover  the  authority  of  Petrograd  was  still  recog- 
nized, so  the  sailors  agreed.  Kolchak  and  Smirnoff  were  taken 
from  prison  and  put  on  board  the  train  with  the  Americans.  For 
them  it  was  deliverance  from  almost  certain  death.  It  is  little 
wonder  that  Kolchak  regarded  Glennon  with  the  greatest  affec- 
tion and  gratitude.  A  few  weeks  later  he  came  to  the  United 
States  at  the  head  of  a  Russian  naval  mission,  and  his  renewal 
of  acquaintance  with  Admiral  Glennon  was  like  the  meeting  of 
brothers. 

I  had  a  chance  to  see  a  good  deal  of  Kolchak  while  the  mis- 
sion was  here.  He  was  said  to  be  of  Tartar  descent.  Of  medium 
height  and  very  dark  complexion,  he  had  piercing  eyes  and  a 
determined  expression.  He  admired  Farragut  greatly,  and 
made  a  special  trip  to  his  tomb  to  place  a  wreath  upon  it.  He 
was  also  a  great  admirer  of  our  Arctic  explorers,  probably  be- 
cause of  his  own  Polar  service.  I  remember  the  dinner  Admiral 
Kolchak  gave  at  a  Washington  hotel  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  and  prominent  naval  officers  just  before  he  took  his  de- 
parture in  1917.  It  was  about  the  gloomiest,  most  funereal 
occasion  I  experienced  in  all  my  eight  years  in  Washington. 
News  had  just  arrived  of  a  German  victory  over  the  Russians 
in  the  Baltic.  The  Kerensky  government  was  in  a  perilous 
position.  The  depressing  situation  was  reflected  in  the  solemn 
faces  of  the  banqueters.  I  did  my  best  to  cheer  Kolchak,  pre- 
dicting a  wonderful  future  for  a  democratic  Russia  when  the 
Allies  and  America  had  won  the  war. 

''Do  you  really  believe  Russia  can  again  have  peace I"  he 
asked  me,  and  the  tone  of  his  question  spoke  his  own  despair. 
The  premonition  of  tragedy  must  have  been  in  his  soul.  At  the 
end  of  October  he  sailed  from  San  Francisco,  intending  to  re- 


AMERICAN  ADMIRAL  SAVED  KOLCHAK        271 

turn  to  European  Russia  by  Siberia.  When  be  reached  Japan 
he  found  the  Bolsheviki  had  seized  power  and  Kerensky  was  a 
fugitive.  The  Bolshevik  government  offered  him  and  his  officers 
safe  journey  to  Petrograd,  if  they  would  recognize  its  authority 
and  swear  allegiance.    Kolchak  refused. 

Gathering  together  the  forces  opposing  Lenine,  he  became 
leader  of  the  anti-Bolshevik  movement  in  Siberia.  In  the  spring 
of  1919,  when  the  Admiral  was  head  of  the  Omsk  government, 
the  world  thought  he  was  going  to  succeed  in  his  great  effort 
to  overthrow  Lenine  and  Trotzky.  Then  the  tide  turned. 
He  was  driven  back.  His  retreat  became  a  rout.  When  he 
reached  the  region  of  Lake  Baikal,  his  forces  disintegrated  and 
fled,  leaving  him  alone.  One  day  in  January,  1920,  a  revolu- 
tionary group  raided  the  village  of  Innokentieskaya,  near 
Irkutsk,  and  found  Kolchak.  They  took  him  prisoner,  and 
turned  him  over  to  the  Bolshevik  commissairs.  There  was  a 
perfunctory  court-martial,  which  passed  the  predetermined  sen- 
tence of  death. 

In  the  early  dawn  of  February  7,  he  was  led  from  his  cell 
to  the  courtyard  of  a  building  in  Irkutsk,  where  he  was  stood 
with  his  back  to  the  wall.  It  was  too  dark  to  see  his  face  dis- 
tinctly, the  stories  that  came  to  us  stated;  so  a  soldier  held  a 
lighted  lamp  near  it  to  guide  the  firing  squad.  When  the  com- 
mand to  fire  was  given,  the  squad  failed  to  obey.  Angered  at 
their  soft-hearted  reluctance,  the  Bolshevik  commissair  who 
was  supervising  the  execution  pushed  the  squad  aside,  strode 
up  to  Kolchak,  and  shot  him  down. 

Thus  the  famous  Russian  admiral  met  his  fate. 

The  debacle  in  Russia  profoundly  disturbed  America.  It 
was  due  primarily  to  the  failure  of  communication  and  trans- 
portation. Russia  was  shut  off  at  the  Dardanelles  by  the  Turks 
and  at  the  Danish  Sound  in  the  Baltic  by  the  Germans.  When 
the  Kerensky  government  was  organized  there  was  hope  by  the 
oldest  republic  in  the  New  World  for  the  success  of  the  newest 
republic  in  the  Old  World.  The  coup  d'etat  of  the  Bolshevists, 
who  soon  made  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  with  the  Germans, 
gave  pause  to  the  Allied  forces,  who  felt  it  necessary  to  take 
steps  on  what  had  been  the  ''Eastern  front"  to  prevent  the  use 
of  Russian  manpower  against  them.     Fifty  million  dollars  of 


272  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

their  supplies  were  piled  up  at  Archangel,  which  the  Bolshevists 
were  undertaking  to  confiscate  and  move  into  the  interior.  The 
Germans  were  seeking  a  submarine  base  on  the  Murman  coast 
in  order  to  gain  access  to  the  sea  which  they  had  been  so  long 
denied. 

These  dangers  drew  Allied  forces  into  Northern  Russia.  In 
May,  1918,  the  U.  S.  S.  Olympia,  which  won  fame  as  Dewey's 
flagship  at  Manila  Bay,  arrived  at  Murmansk  with  Lieutenant 
General  Poole,  of  the  British  army,  and  a  small  detachment  of 
troops.  They  drove  off  an  attack  at  Pechenga.  A  small  group  of 
Russian  naval  officers,  who  could  not  reconcile  themselves  to  Bol- 
shevik rule,  spent  the  winter  on  a  sealing  trip.  They  believed 
themselves  safe  when  in  sight  of  the  Murman  coast  with  their 
cargo  of  skins  worth  $35,000.  Without  warning  a  German  sub- 
marine came  up  alongside  and  sank  their  vessel,  few  of  the 
crew  escaping. 

The  Murmansk  Soviet  could  not  retaliate  because,  by  the 
treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk,  the  Russian  navy  could  take  no  further 
part  in  the  war.  So  they  turned  over  their  navy,  consisting  of 
three  destroyers,  one  to  the  British,  one  to  the  French,  and  one 
to  the  Olympia  when  she  arrived.  I  dare  say  few  people,  even 
in  the  Navy,  knew  that  we  possessed  a  destroyer  named  the 
Karitan  Yurasovsky.  Its  crew  was  half  Russian  and  half  Amer- 
ican. It  was  a  queer  sort  of  arrangement,  but  Admiral  Mc- 
Cully,  in  command  of  Naval  Forces  in  Northern  Russian  Waters, 
said  "It  worked  remarkably  well,  there  never  being  the  least 
sign  of  friction,  and  the  destroyer  always  ready  for  duty." 

Not  much  has  been  heard  of  the  U.  S.  flotilla  on  Lake  Onega. 
When  the  Allied  forces,  including  a  small  detachment  from  the 
Yankton,  were  on  the  line  of  march  within  300  miles  of  Petro- 
grad,  there  was  need  of  water  transportation.  Our  small  naval 
contingent  was  equal  to  the  emergency.  Two  motor  boats,  each 
with  a  short  one-pounder  in  the  bow  and  a  machine-gun  on  the 
beam,  were  transported  by  rail  down  to  near  Lake  Onega,  then 
hauled  miles  through  the  woods,  and  launched  in  the  lake  on 
May  27,  1919.  Three  times  they  were  engaged  with  Bolshevik 
gun-boats  at  long  ranges. 

In  June,  1918,  the  Olympia  sent  a  detachment  150  strong  to 
Kandalaska  to  assist  in  guarding  that  point.    When  the  Mur- 


AMERICAN  ADMIRAL  SAVED  KOLCHAK        273 

mansk  government  broke  with  the  Bolsheviki,  Allied  troops 
landed  in  Murmansk.  In  August  a  detachment  from  the  Olympia 
under  Captain  Bierer  took  part  in  the  successful  expedition 
against  Archangel.  This  same  detachment  under  Lieutenant 
Hicks  bore  their  share  in  the  pursuit  of  the  retreating  Bolshe- 
vists to  the  interior,  having  some  hard  fighting.  Under  Colonel 
G.  W.  Stewart,  the  339th  Infantry  Regiment  and  310th  En- 
gineers, about  5,600  men,  having  just  completed  their  training  at 
Aldershot,  reached  Northern  Russia  September  4th,  and  they 
remained  all  winter.  They  were  immediately  put  in  the  front 
line,  doing  practically  all  the  fighting  that  was  done,  and  during 
this  time  losing  more  men  in  action  than  all  the  other  Allies 
combined.  The  small  detachment  of  Navy  men  privileged  to 
fight  with  their  army  brethren  in  Northern  Russia,  regard  them 
as  among  the  noblest  of  all  fighting  forces. 

The  Asiatic  Fleet,  under  command  of  Admiral  Austin  M. 
Knight,  cooperated  with  the  Japanese  and  other  Allied  forces 
in  the  Far  East,  and  the  flagship  Brooklyn  or  some  other  ves- 
sels were  almost  constantly  at  Vladivostok,  where  Admiral 
Knight  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  conferences  and  operations 
to  check  enemy  and  hostile  activities. 

In  June,  1918,  Vladivostok  and  nearly  all  of  Siberia  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Bolsheviki.  Assisted  by  German  and 
Austrian  prisoners  of  war,  they  were  resisting  the  advance  of 
the  Czecho-Slovaks  who,  fighting  their  way  for  thousands  of 
miles  through  Russia,  were  endeavoring  to  reach  the  eastern 
coast,  where  Allied  vessels  might  take  them  home.  Vladivostok 
was  their  destination,  but  they  had  hard  fighting  before  they 
could  enter.  On  June  29  they  took  the  city  after  a  three-hour 
battle  with  the  Bolsheviki.  There  were  12,000  of  the  Czecho- 
slovaks, but  only  2,500  of  them  were  armed  and  equipped.  The 
city  was  still  in  an  uproar,  with  desultory  firing  at  various  points. 
In  the  afternoon  Admiral  Knight  ordered  ashore  Marines  and 
sailors  to  guard  the  American  consulate,  and  to  act  as  part  of  a 
patrol  force  composed  of  British,  Japanese,  Chinese  and  Czecho- 
slovaks who  patrolled  the  city,  preventing  destruction  and  pre- 
serving order. 

Marines  from  the  Brooklyn  in  July  guarded  the  German  and 
Austrian  prisoners  of  war  on  Russian  Island,  five  miles  from 


274  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Vladivostok.  Our  Navy  had  a  radio  station  there.  Men  from 
our  ships  formed  a  part  of  the  force  of  British  marines,  Japanese 
land  Chinese  bluejackets  and  Czecho-Slovak  soldiers  organized 
to  guard  the  Russian  navy  yard  at  Vladivostok,  and  prevent 
disorder  in  the  city. 

The  United  States  Asiatic  Fleet  performed  a  valuable  func- 
tion in  the  Far  East.  Guarding  American  interests  and  co- 
operating with  the  Allied  forces,  its  vessels  operated  from  the 
Philippines  to  the  Russian  coast.  They  exerted,  as  always,  de- 
cided influence  in  China,  supporting  the  Chinese  Government 
in  its  stand  with  the  .Allies.  Though  the  Japanese  had  long 
before  taken  Kiao-Chau,  the  German  stronghold,  and  the  Teuton 
strength  was  broken,  constant  efforts  were  required  to  prevent 
the  German  propaganda  and  agitation  from  causing  trouble.  A 
sharp  lookout  was  maintained  for  German  raiders.  One,  the 
famous  Seeadler,  sank  two  American  vessels  in  the  Pacific.  But 
after  it  was  run  down  and  disposed  of,  no  more  raiders  appeared. 

Our  vessels  in  the  Pacific  were  of  material  assistance  to  the 
Army  when  American  troops  were  sent  to  Russia  to  protect  the 
Siberian  railway,  and  again  when  they  were  being  returned  from 
Russia.  Admiral  William  L.  Rodgers  succeeded  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  in  the  latter  part  of  1918  and  con- 
tinued until  late  in  1919,  when  he  was  succeeded  by  Admiral 
Gleaves.  Some  of  our  vessels  were  at  Vladivostok  practically 
all  the  time.  One  of  the  first  suggestions  made  by  the  British 
when  we  entered  the  war  was  that  we  maintain  our  force  in 
Asiatic  waters,  and  while  the  vessels  were  few  in  number,  they 
performed  excellent  and  necessary  service. 


?    > 

5  Q 

CD        fH 

W 

w  o 

6  > 


S3     > 


DO  W 

•  3 

2  h 

o 

3  i— i 
Q 

3  hrj 

"k!  ^ 

s  H 

1"  3 

&  w 

3  32 


CHAPTER  XXV 
THE  HALF-WAY  HOUSE 

AZORES  VITAL  IN  NAVAL  OPERATIONS "  ORION* '  CELEBRATED  FOURTH 

OF  JULY  BY  DRIVING  OFF  U-BOAT  THAT  WAS  SHELLING  PONTA  DEL- 

GADA HUNDREDS    OF    AMERICAN    SHIPS    STOPPED    THERE    ON    THE 

WAY    ACROSS DUNN    IN    COMMAND    OF    BASE MARINES    MANNED 

GUNS,      MAINTAINED      AERIAL      PATROL SUBMARINES      KEPT      OFF 

SUBMARINES. 

THE  Fourth  of  July,  1917,  was  ushered  in  by  the  booming 
of  American  guns,  not  in  the  United  States,  but  in  the 
far-away  Azores. 

Bright  and  early,  at  4:45  a.  m.  (not  long  after  mid- 
night in  this  country),  a  German  submarine  began  bombarding 
Ponta  Delgada,  the  principal  city  in  the  islands.  The  U-boat 
was  one  of  the  largest  type,  with  powerful  guns,  and  she  poured 
a  rain  of  shells  that  crashed  into  stores  and  residences,  and 
exploded  in  the  streets.  People  were  panic  stricken.  The  an- 
tiquated forts  were  no  defense.  Their  guns  were  not  of  suffi- 
cient caliber  to  cope  with  the  enemy.  Knowing  this,  the  Ger- 
mans thought  they  would  have  a  picnic,  without  any  risk  or 
interruption,  shelling  an  undefended  city  and  terrorizing  its 
helpless  inhabitants. 

But  relief  came  from  an  unexpected  source.  The  United 
States  naval  collier  Orion  was  in  port,  and  three  minutes  after 
the  enemy  began  operations,  her  guns  were  in  action.  This  was  a 
surprise  for  the  submarine.  When  the  shells  began  to  fall 
around  her,  the  Germans  could  not  imagine  where  they  came 
from.  The  Orion  was  at  a  dock  2,000  yards  away  on  the  other 
side  of  a  point  of  land  that  juts  out  into  the  harbor.  She  could 
not  sail  out  immediately,  as  her  stern  had  been  hoisted  to  make 
repairs.  But  she  promptly  turned  her  guns  on  the  intruder, 
and  in  a  few  moments  the  enemy  found  he  was  faced  by  a 
formidable  foe. 

275 


276  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  Orion's  fire  was  too  hot  for  the  Germans.  Its  shells  were 
falling  uncomfortably  close;  its  gunners  rapidly  getting  the 
range.  Not  many  minutes  later  the  U-boat,  baffled  and  dis- 
appointed, disappeared.  The  submarine,  it  was  discovered 
later,  was  the  famous  Deiitschland,  the  U-155. 

Proclaiming  that  the  American  collier  had  saved  the  city, 
the  whole  town  joined  in  a  spontaneous  celebration.  The  cap- 
tain of  the  Orion,  Lieutenant  Commander  J.  H.  Boesch,  was 
cheered  and  feted,  as  was  his  whole  crew.  Officials  tendered 
him  their  formal  thanks,  and  he  became  a  hero  in  the  Azores. 
All  kinds  of  honors  were  paid  him,  and  later  he  was  presented 
with  a  handsome  gift,  expressing  the  gratitude  of  the  Del- 
gadans.  They  even  named  brands  of  cigars  for  him,  with  his 
picture  on  the  boxes — and  I  know  no  more  conclusive  evidence 
of  popular  favor  than  that. 

These  islands — the  "half-way  point  between  America  and 
Europe" — were  vitally  important  in  our  naval  operations,  and 
soon  after  war  was  declared,  we  began  negotiations  with  Por- 
tugal for  permission  to  establish  an  American  naval  base  at 
that  strategic  point.  U-boats  of  large  type  were  already  operat- 
ing in  that  region.  Had  the  Germans  succeeded  in  establishing 
a  base  there  or  in  utilizing  the  islands  for  supplying  or  refueling 
submarines,  they  could  have  seriously  menaced  our  troop  and 
cargo  transportation,  and  trans-Atlantic  lines  of  communication. 

The  necessity  of  protecting  this  locality  was  emphasized  in 
a  dispatch  from  our  London  headquarters  on  July  13,  and  let- 
ters of  July  30,  1917,  in  which  we  were  informed  that  England 
had  sent  a  mystery  ship  and  two  submarines  to  the  Azores,  and 
the  hope  was  expressed  that  the  United  States  would  do  the 
same.  "The  advisability,"  said  the  report,  "of  the  United 
States  sending  one  of  the  older  battleships  with  perhaps  two 
or  three  auxiliary  craft  to  the  Azores  to  prevent  the  use  of  these 
islands  as  a  base  during  the  coming  winter  should  be  con- 
sidered." The  Germans  had,  about  that  time,  sent  out  the  former 
Deiitschland  to  cruise  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Azores. 

Early  in  August,  1917,  the  U.  S.  S.  Panther  and  five  coal- 
burning  destroyers  arrived  at  Ponta  Delgada  "to  operate 
against  enemy  vessels,  to  assist  torpedoed  vessels  and  rescue 
survivors,  and  to  deny  the  island  to  enemy  submarines  which 


THE  HALF-WAY  HOUSE  '  277 

might  try  to  use  them  as  a  base"  In  September  the  Wheeling, 
with  two  destroyers,  arrived,  relieving  the  Panther  and  destroy- 
ers, which  had  been  ordered  to  French  waters.  The  Wheeling's 
captain  was  acting  base  commander. 

On  October  28,  a  division  of  U.  S.  submarines,  the  K-l,  K-2, 
K-5  and  K-6,  arrived,  and  later  the  E-l.  These  submarines  and 
our  destroyers  patrolled  the  waters  around  the  Azores,  and  from 
the  time  operations  began  there  was  practically  no  enemy  sub- 
marine activity  around  the  islands,  although  the  German  Gov- 
ernment had  declared  this  a  "barred  zone." 

As  a  result  of  the  Allied  Naval  Conference  at  London,  in 
September,  1917,  it  was  decided  to  establish  a  British  naval  in- 
telligence center  in  the  Azores  and  to  build  a  radio  station  eight 
miles  west  of  Ponta  Delgada.  Our  Navy  mounted  a  seven- 
inch  gun  on  a  high  bluff  for  its  protection.  This  radio  station 
was  of  great  value,  for  prior  to  its  construction  communication 
from  the  Azores  was  by  cable  to  the  United  States  and  thence  to 
Europe.  By  arrangement,  all  British  naval  units  served  under 
the  general  direction  of  the  United  States  senior  naval  officer. 

As  soon  as  the  diplomatic  negotiations  with  Portugal  were 
completed,  I  directed  Admiral  H.  0.  Dunn  to  proceed  to  Ponta 
Delgada  and  establish  a  regular  naval  base.  He  embarked  on 
the  Hancock,  with  a  complete  advance  base  outfit,  and  a  detach- 
ment of  Marine  aviators  with  aircraft.  Guns  were  mounted  at 
Ponta  Delgada  to  defend  the  harbor,  and  nets  and  other  torpedo 
defenses  were  stretched  across  the  entrance. 

The  First  Marine  Aeronautic  Company,  12  officers  and  133 
men,  operated  an  anti-submarine  patrol  of  ten  R-6  and  two  N-9 
seaplanes,  and  six  HS-2-L  flying  boats.  Major  Francis  T. 
Evans  was  in  command  to  July  18,  1918,  when  he  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Major  David  L.  S.  Brewster,  who  was  in  command 
of  these  Marines  until  they  were  ordered  home  January  20, 
1919.  Submarines  and  destroyers  as  well  as  aircraft,  operated 
from  Ponta  Delgada.  The  establishment  of  a  hospital  afforded 
treatment  and  comfort  not  only  to  the  personnel  on  duty  there, 
but  alike  to  men  and  officers  passing  through,  and  to  the  people 
on  the  islands,  who  suffered  greatly  during  the  influenza 
epidemic.  Large  warehouses,  filled  with  stores,  furnished  sup- 
plies to  ships  stopping  at  Ponta  Delgada. 


2?8  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

In  addition  to  the  value  of  this  base  to  our  own  operations, 
its  potential  value  is  seen  from  the  fact  that  never  after  its 
establishment  did  German  submarines  appear  off  the  island. 
Several  operated  in  that  region  but  were  careful  not  to  approach 
within  reach  of  our  guns. 

"The  occupation  of  the  Azores,"  said  Admiral  Dunn,  "was 
of  great  strategic  value  from  the  mere  fact  that  had  it  been  in 
possession  of  the  enemy,  it  would  have  formed  an  ideal  base  for 
submarines,  and  as  our  convoy  routes  passed  north  and  south 
of  the  islands  an  enemy  base  would  have  been  a  very  serious 
obstacle  for  the  successful  transport  across  the  ocean  of  troops 
and  supplies." 

All  our  submarine  chasers,  tugs  and  small  craft  sent  to 
Europe  stopped  at  the  Azores  for  fuel,  provisions  and  repairs. 
Our  repair  ship  and  station  were  found  invaluable,  particularly 
during  the  stormy  winter  when  many  merchant  vessels  broke 
down  in  the  vicinity.  Tugs  were  sent  out  to  tow  them  in,  repairs 
were  promptly  made,  and  they  were  sent  on  their  way.  In  sev- 
eral instances,  merchant  vessels  were  rescued  at  distances  of 
400  to  500  miles  from  the  islands.  The  relations  between  the 
American  naval  officers  and  Portuguese  authorities  in  the  Azores 
were  most  cordial,  and  this  cooperation  strengthened  the  ties 
between  the  United  States  and  Portugal. 

If  Portugal  had  not  been  in  the  war  as  an  ally,  it  would  have 
been  a  tremendously  difficult  problem  to  have  gotten  across  any 
of  the  yachts  and  sub-chasers,  and  a  large  portion  of  our  de- 
stroyers, because  they  did  not  have  the  steaming  radius  to  cover 
the  more  than  3,000  miles  of  ocean  between  us  and  the  coast  of 
Europe.  But  for  the  base  in  the  Azores  and  Portugal's  co- 
operation, we  would  have  lacked  a  place  to  re-fuel  in  mid-ocean. 
Before  the  Azores  was  open  to  us  we  were  forced  to  establish 
a  mobile  oil  base  at  sea,  moving  the  oilers  secretly  to  fuel  our 
destroyers  as  they  went  across.  Discovery  of  such  an  oil  base 
by  the  Germans  would  have  been  fatal  to  us,  as  sinking  tankers 
and  oilers  was  a  task  at  which  their  U-boats  were  most  proficient. 

On  May  20,  1919,  the  people  of  Ponta  Delgada  again  did 
honor  to  men  of  the  American  Navy.  On  that  day  ships  in  the 
harbor  were  dressed,  the  town  decked  in  flags,  and  there  was 
general  rejoicing  at  the  arrival  of  the  aviators  on  the  first  trans- 


THE  HALF-WAY  HOUSE  279 

Atlantic  flight.  A  salute  of  twenty-one  guns  was  fired  by  the 
Portuguese  battery,  and  the  Governor  of  the  Azores  and  the 
Mayor  of  Ponta  Delgada  gave  official  welcome  to  Commander 
J.  H.  Towers  and  the  officers  and  crews  of  the  "Nancys,"  as 
those  famous  planes  were  called. 

The  Azores  formed  the  central  point  in  the  flight  from  the 
United  States  to  Europe.  It  was  the  evening  of  May  16,  1919, 
when  the  three  giant  planes  swung  out  from  Trepassy,  New- 
foundland, on  the  long  "jump"  to  the  Azores,  a  distance  of 
1,380  miles.  When  the  goal  appeared  to  be  near,  the  worst  foe 
of  navigation  appeared.  A  dense  fog  all  but  blinded  the  pilotst 
endangering  the  success  of  the  flight  and  putting  the  lives  of 
the  flyers  in  peril.  The  NC-4  managed  to  ascend  above  the  fog, 
and  15  hours  and  13  minutes  after  leaving  Newfoundland  ar- 
rived at  Horta,  the  emergency  stop  in  the  Azores,  and  after  a 
delay  of  three  days,  due  to  bad  weather,  flew  to  Ponta  Delgada. 
The  NC-1  was  forced  to  descend  to  the  water  45  miles  from  the 
island  of  Flores,  and  half  an  hour  later  the  NC-3  also  descended 
not  far  from  Fayal.  Disabled  by  heavy  seas,  the  NC-1  sank. 
Nothing  was  heard  from  the  NC-3  for  more  than  two  days.  Many 
people  feared  that  she  was  lost,  and  there  was  general  rejoicing 
when,  after  fifty-three  hours  on  the  water,  drifting  and  taxiing 
209  miles,  she  reached  Ponta  Delgada. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  May  26th,  Commander  Albert  C. 
Read  and  his  crew  departed  on  the  NC-4  for  the  891-miles  flight 
for  Lisbon,  carrying  the  good  wishes  of  the  people  of  the  islands. 
Lisbon  did  honor  to  the  fliers,  who  had  made  a  new  world  record. 
Bells  rang,  whistles  blew,  and  the  guns  of  the  shore  batteries 
boomed  as  the  thousands  lined  the  water  front  to  welcome  the 
aerial  voyagers.  Portuguese  in  Lisbon  as  well  as  in  the  Azores 
took  the  deepest  pride  in  the  achievement  of  the  great  adventure. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 
TO  VICTORY  ON  A  SEA  OF  OIL 

ABILITY  TO  SECUEE  OIL  AND  TRANSPORT  IT  TO  EUROPE  WAS  ESSENTIAL 

TO  SUCCESS OUR  NAVY  PATROLLED  CARIBBEAN  AND  GULP  COASTS 

TRANSPORTED  MATERIAL  AND  FURNISHED  PERSONNEL  TO  LAY  PIPE 

LINE   ACROSS   SCOTLAND AMERICA   FURNISHED   EIGHTY   PER   CENT 

OF  OIL  FOR  ALLIED  FORCES. 

^r  |  a  HE  Allies  floated  to  victory  on  a  sea  of  oil,"  was  the 

epigrammatic  way  in  which  Lord  Curzon  expressed 

X        the  truth  that  oil  was  essential  for  success  in  the 

World  War.    This  was  true  particularly  of  the  Navy's 

part  in  the  war,  for  most  of  the  naval  force  and  the  Shipping 

Board's  ships  were  oil  burners.     That  oil  was  necessary  also 

for  the  army  was  emphasized  when  General  Foch  warned  that 

"interruption  of  the  petroleum  supply  would  necessitate  an 

entire  change  of  campaign  and  if  long  continued  might  result 

in  the  loss  of  the  war." 

Long  before  1914,  Great  Britain  had  felt  dependence  upon 
Mexican  oil  for  its  increasing  oil-burning  navy,  and  had  made 
provision  for  securing  it  through  acquisition  of  Mexican  oil 
fields.  American  captains  of  industry  had  likewise  large  oil 
fields  in  Mexico.  From  the  minute  war  was  declared  in  1914, 
Allied  dependence  was  upon  Mexican  and  American  oil.  Tam- 
pico  and  Port  Arthur  were  strategic  points  in  all  Allied  plans 
of  campaign  on  sea  or  land.  If  this  supply  of  oil  had  been  in- 
terrupted, the  war  might  have  gone  on  much  longer. 

From  the  day  the  first  German  raider  sank  a  British  ship 
or  a  submarine  fired  at  an  Allied  vessel,  the  British  and  French 
were  zealous  to  protect  the  oil  supplies  in  Mexico.  They  main- 
tained patrol  vessels  in  that  region  and  kept  ceaseless  vigil  of 
sea  routes  to  protect  this  priceless  agency  of  war.  However 
great  their  need  of  ships  on  their  own  coast,  they  knew  that  if 
the  oil  supply  failed  at  Tampico  they  would  lose  the  only  ade- 
quate available  source  of  oil  for  all  their  operations. 

280 


TO  VICTORY  ON  A  SEA  OF  OIL  281 

The  question  has  sometimes  been  raised  why  the  Navy  De- 
partment did  not  immediately  upon  the  declaration  of  war  send 
every  patrol  ship  into  European  waters.    One  answer  is  Oil. 

Before  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  sensing,  as  the 
authorities  did  then,  that  oil  might  determine  the  outcome,  a 
naval  squadron,  first  under  Admiral  Wilson  and  afterwards 
under  Admiral  Edwin  A.  Anderson,  was  organized  for  patrol 
service  in  the  Gulf  and  Caribbean  as  well  as  in  the  North  At- 
lantic. Why?  Again  the  answer  was  Oil,  with  a  big  O.  The 
United  States  was  importing  millions  of  barrels  of  oil  from 
Mexico  for  its  own  ships  and  industries.  It  could  not  permit 
any  danger  of  cessation  of  this  supply.  Our  dependence  would 
be  heightened  when  we  entered  the  war.  Gasless  Sundays  and 
other  methods  of  conservation  were  practiced  later  in  order  that 
the  Army  and  Navy  in  Europe  might  be  well  supplied. 

At  one  time  the  sinking  of  the  tankers  was  serious  enough  to 
alarm  the  Allied  navies.  The  maintenance  of  fleets  of  Great 
Britain  and  America  in  the  North  Sea  was  dependent  upon  oil 
supplies,  and  always  the  U-boats  were  on  the  watch  to  torpedo 
oilers.  They  were  so  successful  and  the  number  of  tankers  was 
so  small,  compared  to  the  need,  that  the  American  and  British 
naval  administrations  decided  to  construct  a  pipe  line  across 
Scotland  as  the  best  new  way  to  lessen  the  danger  of  losing 
tankers  and  to  hasten  the  delivery  of  oil  to  the  Allied  fleet  in 
the  North  Sea. 

The  Bureau  of  Navigation  will  enroll  a  force  to  lay  the  pipe  line 
(Glasgow,  Scotland)  to  consist  of  seven  officers  and  one  hundred  men 
experienced  in  pipe  line  work.  All  material  expense  to  be  borne  by 
British  Government  and  personnel  expense  by  United  States  Govern- 
ment. 

That  was  the  order  I  signed,  April  5,  1918,  in  pursuance  of 
which  the  Navy  undertook  to  furnish  the  personnel,  and,  coop- 
erating with  the  British,  lay  a  pipe  line  across  Scotland,  thirty- 
six  miles  in  length,  following  the  course  of  the  Clyde  and  Forth 
Canal,  extending  from  Old  Kilpatrick  (St.  Patrick's  birth- 
place), to  Grangemouth,  Firth  of  Forth.  Directions  were  also 
given  that  pipe  and  other  material  should  be  transported  in 
American  naval  vessels.    Priority  orders  were  given  by  me  for 


282  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  material  in  order  to  expedite  shipment  and  construction,  and 
as  soon  as  the  necessary  material  was  ready  the  naval  force 
embarked  and  carried  out  the  work  under  Commander  W.  A. 
Barstow.  The  pipe  line  was  laid  out  by  Mr.  Forrest  Towl,  presi- 
dent of  the  Eureka  Pipe  Line  Company,  New  York,  and  the 
naval  personnel  was  able  to  complete  the  work  in  four  months. 

There  were  two  intermediate  pumping  stations,  and  fuel  oil 
could  be  pumped  in  a  cold  state  at  the  rate  of  100  tons  per  hour. 
At  the  Old  Kilpatrick  terminal  sixteen  large  tanks  were  con- 
structed, each  with  a  holding  capacity  of  8,000  tons.  At  the 
opposite  end  the  oil  was  pumped  into  large  reservoirs,  easily 
accessible  to  oil-burning  ships  at  Grangemouth  and  Forth  ports. 

The  U-boats  seemed,  as  I  have  stated,  to  have  some  uncanny 
way  of  finding  and  sinking  tankers  carrying  oil  to  Europe. 
When  unable  to  hit  transports  and  cargo  ships,  their  aim  at 
tankers  seemed  unerring,  particularly  when  the  ships  were  go- 
ing around  the  north  of  Scotland  to  carry  oil  to  the  fleet  in  the 
North  Sea.  And  oil  was  more  valuable  to  the  fleet  than  radium. 
In  fact  it  was  the  prime  essential.  The  construction  of  the  pipe 
line  became  a  pressing  war  need  for  three  reasons : 

1.  To  reduce  the  sinkings  of  tankers  proceeding  around  the 
north  of  Scotland  or  up  the  English  channel. 

2.  To  secure  quicker  trans- Atlantic  voyages  by  eliminating 
the  necessity  of  the  tankers  going  into  the  North  Sea. 

3.  To  increase  the  flexibility  in  the  distribution  of  reserve 
stocks  between  the  west  and  east  coasts,  and  vice  versa. 

Its  completion  secured  a  continuous  and  adequate  supply  of 
fuel  oil  for  the  naval  vessels  operating  in  the  area  it  served. 
The  building  of  this  pipe  line  appealed  to  the  Navy  Department. 
As  soon  as  the  plans  were  ready,  the  order,  "Push  it!",  was 
sent  to  every  bureau  which  could  assist  in  hastening  construc- 
tion and  furnishing  the  officers  and  men.    The  order  was  obeyed. 

When  the  formal  opening  of  the  line  was  celebrated  a  tele- 
gram of  thanks  was  sent  to  American  Naval  Headquarters  at 
London.  Admiral  Tothill,  the  British  Fourth  Sea  Lord,  who 
turned  on  the  steam  that  started  the  pumps  going,  in  his  speech 
stated  that  this  line,  the  longest  in  Great  Britain,  had 
been  completed  in  about  six  months  time  from  placing  of  order 
in  the  States,  and  that  the  U.  S.  Navy  had  in  that  time  enrolled 


TO  VICTORY  ON  A  SEA  OF  OIL  283 

a  special  unit  to  lay  the  pipe,  and  completed  the  work  in  a  much 
shorter  time  than  had  been  expected. 

In  his  report  Commander  Barstow  said  that  "during  the 
past  year  the  Allied  governments'  requirements  amounted  to 
2,900,000,000  gallons,  of  which  large  total  the  United  States  has 
furnished  80  per  cent,  or  about  2,320,000,000  gallons. "  The  fact 
that  eighty  per  cent,  of  the  oil  required  had  to  be  transported 
across  the  Atlantic  shows  the  importance  of  the  pipe  line  across 
Scotland  which  our  Navy  had  a  large  part  in  constructing,  and 
equally  proves  the  value  of  the  patrol  of  the  Caribbean  and  Gulf 
Coast  by  our  squadron  in  those  waters. 

In  March,  1913,  in  answer  to  a  letter  from  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment as  to  whether  the  Navy  would  be  justified  in  constructing 
all  its  ships  as  oil  burners,  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  advised 
that  the  Geological  Survey's  estimates  of  the  available  source 
of  oil  showed  that  it  was  ample.  The  policy  of  "all  oil-burners" 
was  adopted  by  the  Navy  in  1913  and,  when  it  was  organized, 
the  Shipping  Board  adopted  the  same  policy.  It  was  found  that 
four  ships  burning  oil  will  do  the  work  of  five  ships  burning 
coal.  From  the  coal  mine  to  the  fire-room  the  use  of  oil  saves 
fifty  men  per  ship.  Oil  is  the  super-fuel.  It  does  effectively  and 
economically  all  that  coal  can  do,  and  more.  Its  use  makes  pos- 
sible the  highest  service  of  the  two  hundred  and  seventy-five 
destroyers  built  or  contracted  for  during  the  war. 

Foreseeing  the  larger  use  of  oil  for  naval  purposes,  in  the 
latter  part  of  1912,  President  Taft  withdrew  certain  lands  in 
California  from  public  exploitation  and  set  this  land  aside  as 
Naval  Reserves,  No.  1  and  No.  2.  On  April  30,  1915,  President 
Wilson  issued  an  order  setting  aside  Naval  Petroleum  Reserve 
No.  3,  in  Wyoming.  The  preservation  of  these  reserves  intact 
for  naval  use  is  of  such  importance  that  the  Government  has 
fought  the  many  adverse  claims  and  refused  the  persistent  ap- 
plications of  claimants  and  others  to  open  wells  on  these 
reserves.  It  will  soon  be  recognized  that  the  nation  which  con- 
trols the  oil  supply  of  the  world  has  an  advantage  in  naval 
operations  and  in  the  carrying  of  water-borne  commerce  which 
will  give  it  supremacy.  The  Navy  Department  appreciated  this 
fact  in  1913.  After  the  war  it  recommended  that  this  Govern- 
ment take  steps  not  only  to  keep  a  large  reserve  of  American 


284  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

oil  stored  in  the  ground  but  also  to  acquire  wells  in  every  part 
of  the  world  where  oil  is  produced. 

The  contest  for  oil  is  a  contest  for  supremacy  of  the  sea  traffic 
and  naval  superiority.  Naval  need  of  oil  and  the  need  for  a 
large  merchant  marine,  demand  that  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment shall  adopt  a  new  policy  touching  oil  and  other  national 
resources.  We  have  been  so  wasteful  of  resources  as  to  endan- 
ger national  strength.  It  required  the  World  War  to  teach  us 
the  importance  of  large  production  of  oil,  and  of  tankers  and 
storage  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 
EDISON— AND  100,000  MORE 

FLOOD  OF  SUGGESTIONS  AND  INVENTIONS  OFFERED,  MOST  OF  THEM  TO 

DOWN  THE  U-BOATS "FIND  THE  SUBMARINE' '  WAS  THE  PROBLEM 

BEST   DETECTION   DEVICES   DEVELOPED  IN    AMERICA NEW   WEAP- 
ONS   OF    WAR THE    NAVAL    CONSULTING    BOARD    AND    ITS    GREAT 

WORK SOME  AMUSING  SUGGESTIONS. 

ONE  hundred  thousand  suggestions  and  inventions  were 
offered  the  Navy  for  winning  the  war.  Four-fifths  of 
them  were  designed  to  down  the  submarine.  They 
poured  in  upon  the  Department  in  floods,  evidence  that 
American  genius  was  mobilized  along  with  man-power.  Letters 
came  in  by  the  thousand,  plans  and  models  by  the  hundred.  All 
were  examined,  and  those  that  gave  promise  were  tested. 

The  creation  of  the  Naval  Consulting  Board,  headed  by 
Thomas  A.  Edison,  in  1915,  made  the  Navy  the  natural  center 
for  war  inventions.  While  many  did  not  prove  practical  and 
others  were  in  process,  a  considerable  number  of  important  in- 
ventions were  completed  and  proved  of  the  highest  value.  A 
notable  instance  was  the  development  of  means  for  detecting 
submarines.    In  this  America  led  the  world. 

"When  these  devices  had  been  perfected  and  thoroughly  tested 
out  on  this  side  of  the  water,  Captain  R.  H.  Leigh  was  sent  to 
England  with  a  staff  of  naval  officers  and  civilian  experts ;  and 
ten  tons  of  apparatus,  to  be  tried  out  in  British  waters.  Three 
trawlers,  the  Andrew  King,  Kunishi,  and  James  Bentole,  were 
equipped  at  the  Portsmouth  dock  yard,  and  on  December  30, 
1917,  accompanied  by  a  speedy  "P"  boat,  they  steamed  out  for 
" listening  patrol"  in  the  English  channel.  Mr.  C.  F.  Scott,  one 
of  the  civilian  engineers  who  accompanied  Captain  Leigh,  said : 

The  day  after  New  Year's  we  received  a  wireless  from  an  airship 
that  a  submarine  had  been  sighted.  We  steamed  over,  got  our  devices 
out,  but'couldn't  hear  a  thing.     Another  message  from  the  airship 

285 


286  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

changed  the  "sub's"  position,  so  we  altered  our  course  and  obtained  a 
clear  indication  from  the  listening  devices.  The  Hun  was  moving  slowly 
up  the  Channel,  submerged. 

We  gave  the  "P"  boat  a  "fix"  (cross  bearing)  on  the  spot  where 
our  indication  showed  the  submarine  to  be.  She  ran  over  the  place, 
dropping  a  "pattern"  of  depth  charges,  and  soon  we  began  to  see  tre- 
mendous amounts  of  oil  rising  to  the  surface.  Evidently  our  first 
experience  was  to  be  successful.  How  successful  we  did  not  learn  until 
afterward. 

A  trawling  device  had  been  developed  which  indicated  whether  con- 
tact with  a  submarine  had  been  made.  After  the  oil  came  up,  we  got 
out  our  trawling  device  and  ran  over  the  area  for  about  an  hour  and 
finally  got  an  indication. 

"We  threw  over  a  buoy  to  indicate  the  spot  and  anchored  for  the 
night,  as  it  was  getting  dark.  Next  morning  we  trawled  again  and  got 
another  contact  within  a  hundred  yards  of  the  buoy.  We  had  destroyed 
a  submarine  in  our  first  test,  and  the  "sub"  was  given  out  by  the 
Admiralty  as  a  "probable."     [That  is,  probably  sunk.] 

Many  detection  devices  had  been  tried  out  and  proved  fail- 
ures, but  the  American  apparatus  was  so  successful  that  the 
British  ordered  them  for  their  own  vessels.  Thousands  were 
manufactured,  and  our  sub-chasers  sent  abroad  were  equipped 
with  them.  In  December,  1917,  it  was  estimated  that  at  times 
two  to  five  U-boats  had  passed  through  the  English  Channel  in 
a  day.  After  July  1,  1918,  when  patrol  ships  were  equipped 
with  the  improved  listening  devices,  only  one  enemy  submarine 
is  known  to  have  passed  through  the  Channel.  Blocking  the 
entrances  to  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend,  the  Dover  patrol  and  the 
better  mine  defenses  are  to  be  credited  with  the  larger  part 
of  this.  But  considerable  credit  is  due  to  these  " listeners,' ' 
whose  ability  to  locate  under-water  craft  greatly  increased  the 
hazards  of  U-boats,  especially  in  narrow  waters. 

The  listeners  also  proved  decidedly  effective  in  high  waters, 
off  the  French  coast,  in  the  Adriatic,  the  Mediterranean,  and 
wherever  they  were  used.  They  compelled  the  U-boats  to 
change  their  tactics,  and  remain  motionless  for  hours,  fearing 
that  the  slightest  movement  of  their  propellers  would  disclose 
their  presence. 

Our  submarine  force  began  listening  tests  off  Pensacola, 
Fla.,  in  January,  1917,  using  privately-invented  apparatus 
which  gave  such  promise  that  an  experimental  station  was  estab- 


EDISON— AND  100,000  MORE  287 

lished  at  Nahant,  Mass.,  the  General  Electric,  Submarine  Signal, 
and  Western  Electric  companies  cooperating  with  the  Navy 
Department  and  Naval  Consulting  Board. 

The  Consulting  Board  had  created  a  special  Experimental 
Committee  headed  by  Mr.  Lawrence  Addicks,  and  on  March  3 
held  a  "Submarine  Defense  Conference"  at  New  York,  which 
was  addressed  by  Admiral  Sims,  then  president  of  the  Naval 
War  College ;  Captain  J.  K.  Robison,  of  the  Newport  Torpedo 
Station,  and  Commander  Yates  Stirling,  Jr.,  in  charge  of  our 
submarine  base  at  New  London,  Conn. 

Scientists  and  naval  officers  engaged  in  this  work  held  a  con- 
ference in  my  office  in  the  Navy  Department  on  May  9,  and  two 
days  later  I  created  a  Special  Board  on  Anti-submarine  Devices, 
with  Rear  Admiral  A.  W.  Grant  as  chairman,  and  representa- 
tives of  the  electrical  and  signal  companies,  and  the  National 
Research  Council  as  advisory  members.  Extensive  experiments 
were  carried  on  at  our  submarine  station  at  New  London,  as 
well  as  at  Nahant. 

Magnetic,  electrical  and  other  apparatus  having  proved  im- 
practicable, attention  was  concentrated  on  listening  devices. 
The  British  had  been  experimenting  with  various  inventions  of 
this  nature,  but  none  had  proved  very  effective.  The  first  suc- 
cessful listening  device  produced  in  America  was  the  "  C  "  tube, 
an  application  of  the  binaural  principle — that  is,  hearing 
through  both  ears — which  was  developed  by  Dr.  William  D. 
Coolidge.  Next  was  the  "K"  tube,  developed  at  Nahant,  an 
adaptation  of  the  rotary  compensator  devised  by  Prof.  Max 
Mason  at  New  London,  with  microphones,  enabling  the  device 
to  be  towed  several  hundred  feet  astern  of  the  listening  vessel. 
Subsequently  the  combined  work  at  Nahant  and  New  London  re- 
sulted in  production  of  the  "Y"  tube,  "Delta,"  "O  S,"  and 
"OK"  tubes,  all  modified  forms  of  the  "K"  tube,  for  installa- 
tion on  vessels  of  different  types. 

Submarine  chasers  were  equipped  with  these  tubes,  the  first 
of  which  was  developed  by  August,  1917,  and  a  thorough  test 
was  made  with  American  submarines,  which  were  easily  located. 
But  much  depended  on  the  acuteness  of  the  operator,  and  a 
school  to  train  "listeners"  was  established  at  New  London. 
Phonograph  records  of  the  sound  made  by  various  craft  were 


288  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

prepared,  and  used  in  the  school  for  listeners,  who  soon  became 
experts  in  determining  direction,  distance,  type  of  vessel  and 
speed  at  which  it  was  moving. 

"Find  the  submarine,"  was  the  problem  when  we  entered 
the  war,  and  this  was  the  purpose  of  the  listening  devices.  Once 
located,  the  ' '  sub ' '  could  be  destroyed  or  damaged  by  the  depth- 
bomb.  Before  its  advent  there  was  no  way  of  reaching  the 
U-boat,  once  it  submerged.  The  story  is  told  that  a  British 
vessel  chased  down  a  "sub,"  which  dived  and  remained  station- 
ary right  under  its  pursuer.  Down  below  them  in  the  clear 
water,  the  Britishers  could  see  the  enemy  plainly.  "If  we  only 
had  some  sort  of  bomb  that  we  could  shoot  down  into  the  water, 
we  could  blow  that  Fritzie  to  Kingdom-come,"  an  officer  re- 
marked. The  general  idea  of  the  depth-bomb  had  long  been 
known,  and  was  then  given  its  practical  application. 

The  first  ones,  designed  by  an  officer  in  the  Admiralty,  were 
crude  affairs,  metal  cylinders  like  ash-cans.  They  were,  at  first, 
not  very  reliable,  but  by  development  they  became  the  most 
effective  weapons  used  against  under-water  craft. 

The  United  States  Navy  developed  depth-bomb  tactics  vastly 
superior  to  any  before  in  use.  Instead  of  half  a  dozen  bombs, 
our  destroyers  carried  fifty.  The  old  method  of  releasing  from 
the  stern  was  superseded  by  the  "Y"  gun,  which  hurled  the  huge 
charges  with  greater  accuracy  and  less  risk  to  the  vessel  firing. 
Instead  of  dropping  one  or  two,  the  depth-charge  barrage  was 
devised,  bombs  being  fired  in  "patterns"  all  around  the  vicinity 
of  the  submerged  boat,  as  well  as  over  the  spot  where  it  was 
believed  to  be.  That  was  one  reason  the  destroyers  proved  such 
a  terror  to  the  ' '  subs, ' '  which,  as  a  rule,  on  sighting  one  of  these 
swift  warships  ducked  or  ran  away. 

Gunfire,  tellingly  effective  against  submarines  as  long  as 
they  were  on  the  surface,  was  ineffective  the  moment  they  sub- 
merged, as  the  ordinary  sharp-nose  shells  were  deflected  and 
ricocheted  as  they  struck  the  water.  Our  ordnance  experts 
had  already  devised  a  non-ricochet  shell,  a  "flat  nose"  pro- 
jectile  which  could  be  fired  with  considerable  accuracy  at  a  tar- 
get under  water.  The  first  contract  for  this  type  of  projectile 
was  placed  June  19,  1917,  and  deliveries  began  the  next  month. 
Rapidity  in  firing  was  increased  by  a  twin-gun  produced  for 


SECRETARY  DANIELS  AND  THOMAS  A.  EDISON 

Inset,  Secretary  Daniels  and  Mr.  Edison  with  Mr.  William  L.  Saunders  and 
Professor  Max  Mason,  inventor  of  a  submarine  detection  device,  at  a  test  experi- 
ment at  New  London. 


EDISON— AND  100,000  MORE  289 

destroyers,  two  barrels  on  a  single  mount,  both  aimed  at  one  time 
and  firing  alternately. 

Thus  we  had  bombs  and  projectiles  and  quick-firing  guns 
which  would  "get"  the  under-sea  enemy,  once  it  was  located. 

The  paravane,  an  English  invention,  proved  of  great  value 
in  protecting  ships  from  mines.  Its  ' '  wings, ' '  spread  out  in  the 
water,  picked  up  mines ;  and  its  wires  bore  them  away  from  the 
ships,  where  they  could  be  exploded  without  danger  to  the  vessel. 

Mines  played  a  big  part  in  naval  warfare.  The  Germans 
sowed  the  seas  with  them,  and  if  the  Allied  mine-sweepers  had 
not  been  so  energetic  and  skillful,  they  might  have  been  as 
destructive  to  shipping  as  the  U-boats  were.  Our  Bureau  of 
Ordnance  led  in  mine  development,  and  the  new  mine,  called 
"Mark  VI,"  which  it  produced  in  1917,  was  decidedly  superior 
to  any  of  its  predecessors,  and  was  the  type  used  by  us  in  the 
North  Sea  Barrage. 

Better  guns  for  aeroplanes  was  a  vital  need.  Machine-guns 
were  made  more  effective ;  but  for  anti-submarine  warfare  there 
was  needed  something  of  larger  caliber,  with  sufficient  power  to 
penetrate  the  hull  plating  of  the  U-boat.  An  aeroplane  "can- 
non," the  Davis  non-recoil  gun,  was  produced. 

A  37-millimeter  automatic  cannon  was  being  developed,  as 
well  as  a  three-inch  gun  for  the  larger  type  of  dirigibles.  Aerial 
bombs  were  improved  and  enlarged  until  they  reached  a  weight 
of  550  pounds,  with  190  pounds  of  explosive,  the  largest  type 
being  15  inches  in  diameter  and  over  62  inches  in  height.  Vari- 
ous experiments  were  made  in  launching  torpedoes  from  planes, 
and  torpedo  planes  were  designed  to  accompany  the  fleet. 

Night  firing,  naval  experts  realized,  could  be  made  much 
more  effective  by  some  method  of  illuminating  the  area  around 
enemy  ships  without  disclosing  the  position  of  our  own.  This 
was  solved  by  "star"  shells.  Fired  at  long  distances  and  ex- 
ploding high  in  the  air,  these  shells  light  up  a  considerable  area, 
bringing  out  in  bold  relief  the  vessels  beneath. 

Range-finding  and  fire-control  devices  were  improved,  in- 
creasing the  efficiency  of  large  and  medium  caliber  guns. 
"Smoke  boxes"  were  manufactured  by  the  thousand  and  placed 
aboard  merchant  as  well  as  naval  vessels,  so  that  in  case  of 
attack  they  could  make  smoke  screens. 


290  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

So  many  new  devices  were  developed  that  it  would  take  vol- 
umes to  tell  of  them  all.  Though  thousands  of  the  suggestions 
made  were  impracticable,  not  a  few  were  of  decided  value,  and 
the  result  as  a  whole  was  fresh  proof  of  the  never-failing  inven- 
tiveness and  genius  of  Americans. 

When  the  Navy  Department,  in  1915,  was  planning  its  large 
program  of  construction,  and  seeking  for  new  weapons  and  new 
strategy  to  combat  the  submarine,  I  was  convinced  that  it  would 
be  of  great  assistance  if  civilian  scientists  and  inventors  could 
be  induced  to  give  the  Navy  the  benefit  of  their  experience  and 
ability.  This  resulted  in  the  creation  of  the  Naval  Consulting 
Board.  On  July  7,  I  wrote  Mr.  Edison  inviting  him  to  become 
the  head  of  the  Board,  saying: 

One  of  the  imperative  needs  of  the  Navy,  in  my  judgment,  is  machin- 
ery and  facilities  for  utilizing  the  natural  inventive  genius  of  Americans 
to  meet  the  new  conditions  of  warfare  as  shown  abroad,  and  it  is  my 
intention,  if  a  practical  way  can  be  worked  out,  as  I  think  it  can  be, 
to  establish,  at  the  earliest  moment,  a  department  of  invention  and  devel- 
opment to  which  all  ideas  and  suggestions,  either  from  the  service  or 
from  civilian  inventors,  can  be  referred  for  determination  as  to  whether 
they  contain  practical  suggestions  for  us  to  take  up  and  perfect. 

We  are  confronted  with  a  new  and  terrible  engine  of  warfare  in  the 
submarine,  to  consider  only  one  of  the  big  things  which  I  have  in  mind ; 
and  I  feel  sure  that  with  the  practical  knowledge  of  the  officers  of  the 
Navy,  with  a  department  composed  of  the  keenest  and  most  inventive 
minds  that  we  can  gather  together,  and  with  your  own  wonderful  brain 
to  aid  us,  the  United  States  will  be  able,  as  in  the  past,  to  meet  this  new 
danger  with  new  devices  that  will  assure  peace  to  our  country  by  their 
effectiveness. 

Upon  Mr.  Edison's  acceptance — he  was  the  first  American 
chosen  by  selective  draft — each  of  twelve  leading  scientific 
societies  was  asked  to  name  two  representatives  to  compose  the 
membership  of  the  Board.  Most  of  them  were  eminent  in  scien- 
tific research  or  the  development  of  useful  apparatus.  This  was 
the  first  civilian  organization  of  a  war  character  which  was 
created.  Because  of  the  personnel  of  its  members,  it  aroused 
wide  interest. 

The  Board  was  composed  of  Thomas  A.  Edison,  president ; 
William  L.  Saunders,  chairman;  Benjamin  B.  Thayer,  vice- 
chairman;  Thomas  Robins,  secretary;  Lawrence  Addicks,  Bion 


EDISON— AND  100,000  MORE  291 

J.  Arnold,  Dr.  L.  H.  Baekeland,  D.  W.  Brunton,  Howard  E. 
Coffin,  Alfred  Craven,  W.  L.  R.  Emmett,  Peter  Cooper  Hewitt, 
A.  M.  Hunt,  M.  R.  Hutchison,  B.  G.  Lamme,  Hudson  Maxim, 
Spencer  Miller,  J.  W.  Richards,  A.  L.  Riker,  M.  B.  Sellers, 
Elmer  A.  Sperry,  Frank  J.  Sprague,  A.  G.  Webster,  W.  R. 
Whitney,  and  R.  S.  Woodward.  Admiral  William  Strother 
Smith  was  named  as  special  representative  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment. All  bureau  chiefs  and  other  naval  experts  worked  in 
cooperation  with  the  Board. 

With  its  technical  talent,  the  Board  began  at  once  a  survey 
of  the  industries  of  the  country,  having  effected  an  organization 
in  every  state,  with  five  technical  men  in  each  as  advisory  mem- 
bers. These  field  aids,  giving  their  services  free,  went  into 
industrial  plants  throughout  the  country,  listing  all  machin- 
ery and  machine  tools  suitable  for  war  service,  and  the  men 
competent  to  serve  in  shops.  That  gridiron  organization 
functioned  perfectly.  This  information  of  the  manufacturing 
resources  of  the  country  for  public  service  in  case  of  emergency 
was  the  first  that  had  been  collected.  The  Navy  had  taken  a 
census  of  the  ships  and  the  Army  knew  of  munition  plants,  but 
it  was  this  survey  of  industrial  material  and  services  which  later 
formed  the  basis  for  the  big  production  work  of  the  two  military 
departments  and  the  War  Industries  Board.  This  was  real  pre- 
paredness— and  it  was  begun  in  1915.  Before  England  went 
into  the  war,  it  had  prepared  no  record  of  skilled  labor  suitable 
for  war  work.  The  result  was  that  many  men  hastened  to  the 
front  whose  services  were  far  more  valuable  in  munition  plants. 
The  inventory  taken  by  the  Naval  Consulting  Board,  completed 
in  five  months,  enabled  our  country  to  avoid  that  mistake.  It 
made  it  comparatively  easy,  when  war  came,  to  retain  skilled 
men  where  they  counted  most,  and  enabled  factories  to  swing 
from  their  regular  line  of  production  to  Army  and  Navy  work. 

The  card  indexes,  prepared  with  thoroughness,  showed  the 
concerns  that  were  working  on  military  orders  for  foreign  gov- 
ernments. It  was  ascertained  that  35,000  concerns  in  the  United 
States  could  manufacture  war  material,  and  the  names,  location 
and  facilities  of  these  plants  were  docketed.  The  Board  pointed 
out,  what  afterwards  became  generally  recognized,  that  the 
manufacture  of  munitions  was  a  parts-making  business.    Parts 


292  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

made  in  Toledo,  Ohio,  must  fit  those  made  in  Portland,  Oregon, 
or  Augusta,  Georgia,  and  all  these  parts  must  fit  each  other  to 
the  hundredth  part  of  an  inch.  Over  500  concerns  manufactured 
parts  of  the  Mark  VI  mine.  When  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  was  established,  it  took  over  the  data  and  organization, 
and  requested  the  Naval  Consulting  Board  to  act  as  the  official 
Board  of  Inventions  for  the  country. 

After  the  experiments  at  Nahant,  which  followed  the  March 
meeting,  in  1917,  in  company  with  Mr.  Edison,  Mr.  William  L. 
Saunders  and  others  of  the  Consulting  Board,  I  visited  New 
London.  We  took  a  sea  trip  on  a  submarine-chaser  equipped 
with  listening  devices.  It  was  a  matter  of  gratification  to  both 
civilians  and  naval  men  to  witness  personally  the  success  of 
submarine  detection,  and  to  feel  that  their  faith  and  experiments 
had  been  rewarded. 

Ship  protection  was  the  subject  of  constant  study,  and 
various  methods — camouflage,  armament,  smoke-boxes,  sub- 
marine and  torpedo  detection,  plans  to  prevent  and  withstand 
attack  and  increase  buoyancy — were  studied  by  the  Consulting 
Board.  It  was  through  that  board  that  the  naval  research  and 
experimental  laboratory,  now  under  way  on  the  Potomac,  below 
Washington,  was  established  and  the  money  provided  through 
Congressional  appropriation. 

Mr.  Edison  spent  most  of  his  time  during  the  war — prac- 
tically all  of  it — either  on  board  the  Sachem,  which  had  been 
fitted  up  for  his  special  use,  or  in  his  office  in  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment at  Washington.  I  was  in  intimate  touch  with  him.  It 
was  a  revelation  to  go  into  his  chart-room  and  talk  to  him  about 
his  study  of  the  lanes  of  the  sea ;  to  see  his  maps  studded  with 
pins  pointing  out  where  sinkings  were  most  frequent,  and  to 
obtain  his  advice  as  to  the  routing  of  ships  to  lessen  the  proba- 
bility of  attack.  An  authority  on  many  other  subjects,  he 
learned  much  about  troop  transportation,  the  routing  of  mer- 
chant ships  and  their  quick  turn-around,  and  avoiding  U-boats 
by  changing  routes. 

One  of  his  most  successful  and  yet  least  known  of  his  experi- 
ments was  in  the  detection  of  torpedoes.  The  Wizard  of  Menlo 
Park  was  most  modest  in  his  claims.  To  a  lady,  enthusiastic 
over  what  she  called  his  inspiration,  Mr.  Edison  is  reported  to 


EDISON— AND  100,000  MORE  293 

have  said,  "Madam,  it  is  not  inspiration,  but  perspiration."  In 
a  letter  to  a  sub-committee  of  the  Senate,  when  some  one  had 
attributed  the  success  in  detecting  submarines  to  Mr.  Edison, 
he  wrote : 

I  never  worked  or  pretended  to  work  on  the  detection  of  submarines. 
All  of  my  work  in  this  general  direction  was  confined  to  the  detection 
of  torpedoes  and  to  the  quick  turning  of  cargo  boats  ninety  degrees  in 
order  to  save  the  boat  from  being  torpedoed. 

I  was  successful  in  both.  With  my  listening  apparatus,  and  while 
my  boat  was  in  full  speed,  I  could  hear  a  torpedo  the  instant  it  was 
fired  nearly  two  miles  away,  and  with  my  turning  device,  a  5,000-ton 
cargo  boat,  fully  loaded  going  at  full  speed,  was  turned  at  right  angles 
to  her  original  course  in  an  advance  of  200  feet. 

Along  with  the  hundred  thousand  suggestions  of  how  to  win 
the  war,  there  were  not  wanting  incidents  out  of  the  ordinary. 
One  day  as  I  was  discussing  department  business  with  a  bureau 
chief  the  telephone  rang,  and  a  clerk  said  "long  distance"  was 
calling.  He  did  not  catch  the  name  clearly,  but  thought  it  was 
Mr.  Ford.  I  found  in  a  moment  that  it  was  not  the  famous 
Detroit  automobile  maker,  for  the  man  at  the  other  end  of  the 
line  began  talking  a  blue  streak,  starting  out  with  the  declara- 
tion: "I've  invented  a  thing  that  will  wipe  out  the  submarines; 
I  Ve  got  something  that  positively  will  end  the  war. ' '  He  seemed 
quite  excited  about  it.  I  asked  him  what  it  was.  He  said  he 
could  not  tell  me  over  the  phone,  or  entrust  the  secret  to  mails 
or  telegraph. 

"Send  it  to  our  Inventions  Board,"  I  suggested. 

"Not  on  your  life,"  he  replied.  "They  might  steal  it,  and 
I'd  never  get  the  credit  for  it.    It's  worth  millions,  millions !" 

He  would  never  show  it  to  but  three  people,  he  said,  the 
President,  Mr.  Edison  and  myself,  and  all  three  must  give  the 
pledge  of  secrecy. 

"There's  not  a  moment  to  be  lost,  and  I  want  to  bring  it  to 
Washington  myself, ' '  he  exclaimed.  ' '  But  I  must  be  careful.  If 
the  Germans  knew  I  had  this,  their  spies  would  murder  me." 

"All  right,  bring  it  on,"  I  remarked,  hoping  to  end  the  con- 
versation before  he  had  bankrupted  himself  with  telephone 
charges. 

' '  Send  me  $5,000  by  telegraph  this  afternoon,  and  I  '11  start 


294  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

tomorrow,"  he  demanded.  Used  as  I  was  to  queer  propositions, 
this  did  rather  startle  me.  "No,  no,"  I  replied  emphatically; 
"I  cannot  do  that." 

1  'Do  you  mean  to  say," — he  seemed  to  be  surprised — "that 
you  won't  send  me  a  measly  little  $5,000  when  the  thing  I  have 
is  worth  millions,  and  will  end  the  war  f ' ' 

"That's  correct,"  I  said,  rather  sharply,  I  fear.  "We  will 
not  send  anybody  a  dollar  of  Government  money  until  we  know 
what  it  is  for." 

"Well,  that's  the  smallest  piece  of  business  I  ever  heard  of," 
he  snapped.  "I  thought  you  were  some  Secretary,  and  now  I 
believe  all  the  mean  things  some  newspapers  have  said  about 
you. ' ' 

One  of  my  office  aids  figured  out  that  this  irate  citizen  had 
spent  about  $20  in  telephone  tolls.  We  never  heard  from  him 
again,  and  the  invention  that  would  end  the  war  was  lost  to  the 
world. 

The  sturdy  police  that  guarded  the  portals  of  the  State,  War 
and  Navy  building  stopped  at  the  entrance  a  tall,  lean  man  who 
was  lugging  a  box  about  as  big  as  two  suitcases.  They  ordered 
him  to  open  it,  and  found  inside  a  concern  that  looked  as  if  it 
•might  go  off  at  any  moment.  He  wanted  to  see  somebody  in  the 
Navy  Department,  and  one  of  my  aids  went  down  to  investigate. 
The  fellow  did  not  look  like  a  spy  or  plotter,  and  the  Navy  man 
asked  him  what  his  contraption  was. 

"It's  a  porcupine  boat,"  he  said,  "a  boat  that'll  keep  off 
them  torpedoes  that  the  submarines  are  firin '. ' ' 

It  was  a  model  of  a  boat,  its  wooden  sides  thickly  studded 
with  long  spikes. 

"What's  the  idea?"  he  was  asked. 

"Well,  you  see,  the  torpedoes  can't  sink  a  ship  unless  they 
hit  her,"  he  explained;  "and  if  you  put  these  long  spikes  all 
along  the  side,  they  can't  get  to  her.  The  spikes  will  stop  'em; 
the  torpedoes  are  stuck  before  they  hit  the  boat — there  you  are." 

It  was  a  great  idea ;  certainly  no  one  else  had  thought  of  it. 
But  as  the  spikes  would  have  to  be  about  forty  or  fifty  feet  long 
to  hold  off  the  torpedoes,  and  each  ship  would  have  to  have  a 
thousand  or  two  of  them,  we  could  not  very  well  adopt  the 
invention. 


EDISON— AND  100,000  MORE  295 

A  Southern  inventor  brought  forth  a  plan  that  would  have 
brought  joy  to  the  Sunny  South,  if  it  could  have  been  adopted. 
This  was  to  sheathe  all  ships  with  an  armor  of  thick  cotton  bat- 
ting. He  evidently  got  his  inspiration  from  the  battle  of  New 
Orleans,  where  doughty  old  Andrew  Jackson  erected  a  barricade 
of  cotton  bales  which  the  British  shells  could  not  penetrate.  So 
a  century  later  this  Jacksonian  figured  that  a  ship  swathed  in 
cotton  would  be  immune  from  shell  or  torpedoes.  The  Germans 
could  fire  away,  and  do  no  more  harm  than  if  they  were  throw- 
ing rocks  at  a  mattress.  But  unfortunately  the  naval  experts 
seemed  to  have  their  doubts  about  the  efficacy  of  cotton-batting 
armor,  preferring  to  stick  to  steel. 

"Lick  the  enemy  before  he  lands!"  was  the  slogan  of  an 
earnest  soul  who  was  designing  a  submarine  that  would  carry 
from  200  to  400  torpedoes.  If  necessary,  in  the  midst  of  a  for- 
eign fleet,  he  told  us,  they  could  "unload  the  whole  400  in  from 
four  to  eight  minutes,  according  to  the  number  of  men  on  duty 
to  let  them  loose." 

He  also  had  "some  very  good  ideas  for  warships,"  one  of 
which  was  to  turn  our  old  battleships  into  floating  forts  with 
16-inch  disappearing  guns.  Attached  to  each  vessel  would  be 
a  sloping  steel  shelving  running  into  the  water,  a  great  plough 
that  would  turn  the  other  fellow's  shells  and  scoop  up  torpedoes 
as  if  they  were  watermelons.  "You  could  just  sit  up  on  deck," 
he  said, ' '  and  laugh  at  a  hundred  of  them  sending  torpedoes. ' ' 

An  airship  that  would  sail  from  here  to  Germany,  blow  up 
Berlin,  and  keep  right  on  around  the  world,  manufacturing  its 
own  fuel  as  it  went  along,  was  another  suggestion. 

One  citizen  had  a  remarkable  mine-catcher  which,  he  said, 
"misses  none;  it  sees  and  feels  for  you  and  catches  all,  if  the 
sea  is  strewed  with  mines."  He  offered  to  sell  his  model  for 
only  $250,000. 

We  were  offered  an  automatic  field-gun  that,  placed  in  Wash- 
ington, could  be  operated  by  electricity  from  Texas.  One  man 
could  operate  a  thousand  of  them,  the  inventor  claimed.  Placing 
these  guns  all  along  the  German  lines  in  France,  the  operator, 
seated  at  his  switch-board  in  Paris,  could  play  on  the  keys  like 
a  typewriter,  spraying  the  Teuton  lines  with  deadly  missiles 
from  Ypres  to  Verdun. 


296  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Another  scheme  was  to  put  guns  on  top  of  all  the  skyscrapers 
in  New  York  to  ward  off  aerial  attack;  and  to  build  a  machine 
that  would  gather  all  the  electricity  in  the  metropolis,  and  pro- 
ject it  by  wireless  far  to  sea,  sinking  hostile  vessels  as  if  they 
had  been  struck  by  lightning. 

Mobilizing  the  dogs  of  America,  sending  them  to  France  and 
"sicking"  them  on  the  Germans  was  a  proposition  that  might 
not  have  appealed  to  dog-lovers  so  much  as  to  the  ferocious 
fighting  men  who  wanted  to  bite  the  Germans  and  ' '  eat  'em  up. ' ' 

Mechanical  soldiers  capable  of  marching,  fighting  and  cap- 
turing man  soldiers  were  proposed.  You  would  only  have  to  fill 
them  with  ammunition,  wind  them  up  and  let  them  go. 

The  German  fleet  at  Kiel  could  have  been  easily  destroyed, 
if  the  floating  torpedo  suggested  had  been  a  success.  Its  origina- 
tor proposed  to  launch  them  in  channels  when  the  tide  was  going 
in,  let  them  float  into  the  German  harbors  and  blow  up  every- 
thing afloat. 

These  absurdities  gave  a  touch  of  humor  to  the  arduous  task 
of  developing  new  methods  and  inventions — a  task  well  per- 
formed by  the  naval  experts,  civilian  scientists  and  inventors 
who  so  patriotically  devoted  their  time  and  talents  to  the  win- 
ning of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 
BUILDING  A  THOUSAND  SHIPS 

SIX  HUNDRED  MILLION  DOLLARS  FOR  DESTROYERS — "  WARD*'  LAUNCHED 

173^   DAYS  AFTER  KEEL  WAS  LAID "REID"  COMPLETED  IN  45   DAYS 

GREAT    DESTROYER    PLANT    BUILT    AT    SQUANTUM — PATRIOTS    IN 

OVERALLS WHY  WERE  NOT  MORE  DESTROYERS  BUILT  BEFORE  THE 

WAR? NEW    NAVY    WILL    SURPASS    ALL    OTHERS REDUCTION    OF 

ARMAMENT. 

/  /  | — v  ESTROYER  Ward  launched  seventeen  and  a  half 
|  days  after  laying  of  keel,"  was  the  message  from 

I  J  Mare  Island  Navy  Yard  that  announced  a  new 
world's  record  in  ship  construction. 

In  pre-war  days  from  twenty  months  to  two  years  had  been 
required  to  build  a  destroyer.  Now  they  were  being  completed 
in  a  fraction  of  that  time.  All  the  yards  were  working  at  top 
speed,  far  excelling  any  previous  accomplishments,  but  Mare 
Island  had  set  a  new  pace  hard  to  equal. 

''Liberty  Destroyer,"  the  Ward  was  designated,  and  the  way 
in  which  she  was  put  through  was  like  a  continuous  Liberty  Loan 
rally.  "This  destroyer  is  needed  to  sink  Hun  submarines;  let 
all  hands  help  sink  them,"  was  one  of  the  numerous  placards 
posted  around  her.  Each  day's  progress  was  marked  on  the 
big  canvas  banner  stretched  above  the  bow.  In  twenty-four 
hours  she  began  to  assume  shape.  In  two  weeks  they  were  put- 
ting the  finishing  touches  to  the  hull,  and  the  banner  read : 


LIBERTY  DESTROYER  No.   139 

Keel  Laid  May  15th        j        A  DAYS 

Will  be  Launched  ZL         0LD    „ 

June  1st  11  TODAY 

SHE'S  SOME  BABY 


Three  and  a  half  days  later,  she  was  sent  down  the  ways.  As 
she  slid  into  the  water,  officers  and  workmen  cheered  as  they 
had  never  cheered  before. 

297 


298  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

This  was  the  quickest  time  in  which  a  vessel  had  ever  been 
launched.  But  the  record  for  completion — the  Ward  was  com- 
missioned in  70  days — was  later  bettered  at  the  great  Victory- 
Plant  at  Squantum,  Mass.,  where  the  Reid  was  finished  and  made 
ready  for  her  trials  in  4by2  working  days. 

Before  war  began  we  ordered  scores  of  destroyers,  and  soon 
afterwards  contracted  for  all  that  American  yards  could  build. 
But  we  wanted  more.  The  question  was  how  to  get  them.  The 
Navy  Department,  after  conferring  with  one  of  the  leading  ship- 
builders, determined  on  a  bold  stroke.  All  the  contractors,  those 
building  engines  and  machinery  as  well  as  hulls,  were  summoned 
to  Washington,  and  met  with  the  Chief  Constructor  and  Engi- 
neer-in-Chief  of  the  Navy  in  my  office.  ' '  One  hundred  and  fifty 
more  destroyers  must  be  built,' '  they  were  told.  That  proposi- 
tion was  a  "stunner."  They  had  already  contracted  to  build 
every  one  for  which  they  had  facilities.  And  here  was  a  demand 
that  more  than  as  many  again  be  constructed.  Some  shipyards 
would  have  to  be  enlarged,  some  new  ones  built.  The  same  was 
the  case  with  engine  manufacturers,  and  producers  of  f orgings ; 
for  producing  enough  engines  was  quite  as  difficult  as  building 
hulls.  Where  companies  could  not  finance  additions,  we  agreed 
that  the  Government  would  build  them,  as  well  as  the  new  fac- 
tories or  yards.  Even  at  that,  it  was  a  staggering  proposition. 
But  the  contractors  were  game  and  patriotic.  They  promised 
every  cooperation  and  with  the  Navy  experts  began  working  out 
the  thousand  details  involved. 

Congress  was  asked  to  appropriate  $350,000,000  more  for 
destroyers,  to  build  new  plants  required,  as  well  as  for  ship  con- 
struction. When  the  bill  was  passed,  October  6,  1917,  the  plans 
were  ready,  contracts  were  signed,  and  the  enlarged  program 
was  under  way.  Ground  was  broken  at  Squantum  the  next  day, 
October  7.  Thousands  of  laborers  were  at  work,  dredging, 
draining,  making  roads,  driving  piles,  erecting  buildings,  trans- 
forming that  marsh  into  a  fit  habitation  and  working-place  for 
10,000  men.  Buildings  sprang  up  like  magic.  One  concrete,  steel 
and  glass  structure  three  stories  high  and  200  feet  long  was 
finished  in  two  weeks.  When  winter  came  on,  the  laborers  had 
to  use  picks  and  shovels  to  dig  through  the  frozen  clay  to  lay 
foundations,  and  all  the  workmen  were  handicapped  by  the 


BUILDING  A  THOUSAND  SHIPS  299 

bitter  cold.  Concrete  poured  hot — and  thousands  of  tons  were 
used — had  to  be  protected  by  masses  of  hay  and  sheets  of  can- 
vas, with  heated  air  circulating  inside  to  keep  it  from  freezing. 
But  the  work  never  halted,  and  in  spite  of  all  handicaps,  was 
completed  in  record  time. 

There  were  eighteen  acres  of  shipyards  covered  by  one  con- 
tinuous roof;  the  arrangements  being  so  complete  that  raw 
material  went  in  at  one  end  and  destroyers  slid  out  at  the  other. 
There  were  hundreds  of  buildings,  not  a  few  of  them  covering 
one  to  three  acres.  There  were  enough  ways  for  ten  destroyers, 
and  a  score  could  have  been  under  construction  at  the  same  time. 

Six  months  after  ground  was  broken  I  had  the  privilege  of 
witnessing  there  the  laying  of  the  keels  of  five  destroyers  in 
one  day. 

The  building  of  Squantum  was  rivaled  by  the  erection  of  the 
big  plants  at  Erie,  Pa.,  to  make  forgings  for  destroyer  shafts 
and  turbines;  the  plant  at  Buffalo  and  by  other  feats  of  con- 
struction that  would  be  difficult  to  excel.  All  were  erected  and 
in  operation  in  half  the  time  they  could  have  been  completed 
under  ordinary  conditions. 

Our  construction  program  embraced  practically  a  thousand 
vessels — 275  destroyers,  447  submarine-chasers,  99  submarines, 
100  eagle  boats,  54  mine-sweepers,  and  a  number  of  gunboats 
and  ships  of  other  types.  All  these  in  addition  to  the  capital 
ships  and  scout  cruisers  authorized  in  the  three-year  program. 
Though  some  contracts  were  cancelled  after  the  armistice,  all 
but  100  or  so  of  these  vessels  were  built,  nearly  500  completed 
before  the  end  of  hostilities.  In  addition  1,597  privately-owned 
vessels,  ranging  from  small  patrol  craft  to  huge  transports,  were 
converted  by  the  Navy  for  war  purposes. 

Over  2,000  vessels  were  in  naval  service  before  hostilities 
ended — six  times  as  many  as  were  on  the  Navy  list  when  war 
was  declared.  How  was  it  possible,  in  a  country  where  ship- 
building had  declined  until  it  was  "a  craft  and  not  a  trade," 
to  build  and  alter  and  repair  all  these  ships,  and  also  to  provide 
munitions  and  build  great  establishments  ashore  on  both  sides 
of  the  sea? 

It  was  made  possible  by  the  foresight  of  Admirals  Griffin 
and  Taylor  and  their  associates,  who  before  the  war  had  made 


300  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

designs  for  building  various  types  of  ships  and  for  converting 
the  ex-German  vessels  and  privately-owned  craft  suitable  for 
war  service.  I  wish  the  whole  country  could  know  the  true  value 
of  the  work  of  these  able  officers  and  their  naval  and  civilian 
assistants.  But  for  their  forehandedness  and  ability,  our  Navy 
would  not  have  been  able  to  have  rendered  such  prompt  and 
valuable  service.  Great  credit  is  due,  alike,  to  the  shipbuilders 
who  carried  their  plans  into  effect,  devoting  their  talents  and 
untiring  efforts  to  further  warship  construction. 

It  was  also  because  the  100,000  mechanics  and  workers  in 
navy  yards  and  naval  plants,  and  the  many  more  in  private 
plants,  who,  with  patriotic  naval  and  civilian  experts,  worked 
as  never  before.  Many  of  these  "patriots  in  overalls"  sacrificed 
their  desire  to  enlist  when  told  that  they  could  do  more  to  win 
the  war  by  driving  rivets,  fashioning  guns  or  making  munitions. 
Labor  was  whole-heartedly  in  the  war,  and  would  not  tolerate 
slackers  in  production  or  in  service.  In  the  heat  of  summer 
and  the  cold  of  winter,  they  rushed  construction  and  astonished 
the  world  by  the  celerity  with  which  American  skill  and  industry 
turned  out  ships,  weapons  and  supplies.  On  every  war  board 
labor  had  its  representative — in  the  Cabinet  as  well — and  its 
patriotism  and  unity  made  for  a  united  and  efficient  America. 
The  Navy  and  other  war  agencies  found  the  militant  spirit  and 
wise  counsel  of  Samuel  Gompers  worth  a  regiment  of  fighting 
men. 

The  Navy  did  not  wait  for  war  to  begin  building  ships. 
When  the  program  for  156  vessels  was  proposed  in  1915,  with- 
out awaiting  congressional  action,  work  was  begun  on  plans  so 
that  on  the  very  day  that  the  bill  became  a  law  the  plans  and 
specifications  were  issued  for  20  destroyers,  27  submarines,  4 
dreadnaughts  and  4  scout-cruisers.  Contracts  were  placed 
for  their  construction  as  soon  as  the  bids  were  received.  "Such 
speed,"  said  Admiral  Taylor,  "was  without  precedent  in  the 
history  of  the  Navy  Department.  It  was  the  result  of  the  per- 
sistent insistence  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  work  should 
be  pushed  and  his  loyal  support  in  this  respect  by  bureaus  con- 
cerned. There  was  no  procrastination  or  dilatoriness  in  the 
largest  undertaking  ever  entered  into  by  the  United  States 
Navy,  and  the  most  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  prepara- 


BUILDING  A  THOUSAND  SHIPS  301 

tion  for  any  eventuality.  While  the  large  vessels  of  the  program 
had  to  be  suspended  during  the  war,  the  destroyers  were 
pressed." 

Completion  of  the  destroyer  program  gives  the  United  States 
Navy  267  destroyers  of  the  latest  pattern,  in  addition  to  those 
of  older  type,  which,  in  the  emergency  of  war,  rendered  such 
good  service.  These  destroyers  have  an  aggregate  of  7,400,000 
horse-power,  and  they  cost  approximately  $600,000,000,  counting 
$40,000,000  spent  for  new  plants  and  building  ways.  This  sum  is 
greater  than  the  cost  of  all  the  ships  of  the  Navy  available  for 
service  when  we  entered  the  war.  The  record  of  our  destroyers 
overseas  won  the  admiration  of  Allied  navies,  and  reflected 
credit  upon  Congress,  the  naval  administration  and  the  country. 

But,  in  view  of  the  need  of  thousands  to  patrol  the  seas  in 
1917-18,  where  we  only  had  scores,  it  has  been  asked,  "Why  did 
not  the  Navy  Department  build  hundreds  of  destroyers  in  1915 
and  1916  and  have  them  ready  in  1917?"  Looking  backward, 
all  of  us  admit  that  was  the  thing  that  should  have  been  done. 
No  naval  experts,  however,  either  in  Europe  or  America,  recom- 
mended in  pre-war  days  such  a  building  program. 

All  European  admiralties,  as  well  as  our  own,  regretted  that 
they  had  not  built  more  destroyers  against  the  day  when  they 
were  so  much  needed.  In  reply  to  an  inquiry  made  by  a  United 
States  senator,  Admiral  Sims  said: 

If  we  could  have  imagined  that  the  Germans  would  do  what  they 
did  do  we  could  have  prepared  for  it  and  built  destroyers  galore,  if 
we  could  have  persuaded  Congress  to  give  us  the  money.  Nobody  had 
any  experience  with  this  kind  of  war  at  all,  and  nobody  could  be  savage 
enough  in  his  disposition  to  know  what  the  Germans  would  do,  and  there- 
fore to  prepare  for  it;  so  that  I  would  advise  you  to  be  a  little  gentle 
in  criticisms  of  naval  officers  in  general,  because  they  were  not  prepared 
for  this  war,  because  we  are  a  more  or  less  civilized  people. 

After  ruthless  submarine  warfare  began,  we  contracted,  as 
we  have  shown,  for  275  destroyers,  many  more  than  any  nation 
had  ever  attempted  to  build  in  anything  like  so  short  a  time. 

But  destroyers  were  by  no  means  the  only  anti-submarine 
craft  we  built.  Realizing  the  usefulness  of  small  craft,  the  Navy 
Department,  in  1916,  turned  its  attention  to  the  utilization  of 
motor  yachts  and  other  small  power-driven  vessels.    Assistant 


302  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Secretary  Roosevelt  conferred  with  owners  and  builders,  and 
an  inventory  of  such  craft  was  taken.  He  started  a  campaign 
to  interest  owners  of  yachts  and  motor  boats  and  induce  them 
to  design  their  boats  so  that  they  could  readily  be  converted  to 
war  uses.  Naval  architects  and  their  clients  were  encouraged 
to  submit  their  designs  to  the  Navy  Department.  To  give  fur- 
ther impetus  to  the  movement,  two  small  boats  were  constructed 
as  models. 

Early  in  1917,  before  war  was  declared,  the  Department's 
construction  experts,  under  the  leadership  of  Captain  J.  A. 
Furer,  naval  constructor,  in  cooperation  with  Mr.  A.  Loring 
Swazey,  who  later  enrolled  as  lieutenant  commander  in  the 
Naval  Reserve,  submitted  to  the  General  Board,  in  February,  a 
design  for  those  wonderful  boats  which  became  known  as  sub- 
marine-chasers. They  were  to  be  110  feet  long,  with  a  speed  of 
14  knots  and  a  cruising  radius  of  800  miles,  armed  with  3-inch 
guns,  Y-guns  for  firing  depth-charges,  machine-guns  and  depth- 
bombs.  The  shortage  of  structural  steel  and  of  labor  required 
for  steel  construction,  necessitated  building  them  of  wood. 

On  March  19,  1917,  orders  were  issued  for  building  sixty 
chasers  at  the  New  York  navy  yard  and  four  at  the  New  Or- 
leans yard.  On  March  21st  orders  were  placed  with  private 
firms  for  41  boats.  Ten  days  later  contracts  were  placed  with 
private  builders  for  179  additional  boats,  and  orders  given  for 
71  more  to  be  constructed  at  the  navy  yards  at  Norfolk,  Charles- 
ton, Mare  Island  and  Puget  Sound,  a  total  of  355,  all  ordered 
before  war  was  declared.  Fifty  of  these  were,  after  completion, 
turned  over  to  the  French  government.  The  French  were  so 
pleased  with  them  that  they  ordered  fifty  more.  A  total  of  447 
chasers  were  ordered,  and  441  were  completed.  Their  serv- 
ice far  surpassed  expectations  of  designers  and  builders. 
Originally  constructed  for  use  in  rivers  and  harbors  and  near 
home  coasts,  they  crossed  the  ocean  and  became  a  reliance  not 
only  for  patrol  work  but  for  offensive  against  the  U-boats — 
chasing  submarines. 

In  the  three-year  program,  there  was  provision  for  58  coast 
submarines,  of  which  appropriations  were  made  for  thirty.  On 
March  4,  1917,  20  additional  submarines  were  provided  for, 
and  their  construction  was  begun.     The  Portsmouth   (N.  H.) 


BUILDING  A  THOUSAND  SHIPS  303 

navy  yard  had  been  made  a  submarine  construction  yard  and 
the  orders  were  divided  between  that  yard  and  private  contrac- 
tors. Forty  were  completed  before  the  armistice.  We  sent  sev- 
eral submarines  to  the  Azores  and  a  number  to  British  waters, 
where  they  operated  from  Bantry  Bay.  They  gave  an  excellent 
account  of  themselves,  one,  the  AL-2  being  credited  with  caus- 
ing the  destruction  of  the  German  UB-65. 

Having  ordered  all  the  destroyers  and  sub-chasers  that  could 
be  built,  other  sources  were  sought  to  produce  more  anti-sub- 
marine craft.  On  December  24,  1917,  I  received  a  letter  from 
Mr.  Henry  Ford  proposing  quantity  production  of  fabricated 
boats,  suggesting  that  at  least  500  could  be  built,  and  saying: 
"We  will  undertake  the  construction  of  these  boats  with  all 
possible  speed,  and  deliver  them  to  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment without  profit  to  us. ' '  I  telegraphed  him,  suggesting  that 
he  send  his  engineers  and  construction  men  to  confer  with  our 
designers.  Captain  Robert  Stocker  and  his  associates  in  the 
Design  Division  completed  the  plans  and  specifications  in  a  few 
days,  and  they  were  submitted  to  Mr.  Ford.  On  January  15 
he  made  a  definite  proposal  to  build  100  to  500  of  these  vessels. 
I  consulted  with  the  General  Board,  and  two  days  later  tele- 
graphed him  to  proceed  with  construction  of  100.  Later  twelve 
additional  were  ordered  for  the  Italian  Government.  They  were 
to  be  of  500  tons  displacement,  200  feet  long,  speed  18  knots, 
with  a  cruising  radius  of  3,500  miles.  They  were  to  be  armed 
with  two  4-inch  50  caliber  guns,  discharge  projectors,  anti-air- 
craft and  machine  guns. 

These  "eagle  boats,"  as  they  were  named,  were  built  speci- 
fically to  hunt  submarines.  For  their  construction  Mr.  Ford 
erected  a  special  plant  on  the  River  Rouge  near  Detroit.  Though 
only  a  few  were  in  service  before  the  armistice,  sixty  in  all  were 
built.  The  completion  of  23  in  one  month  in  1919  indicated  that 
Mr.  Ford  was  not  far  wrong  in  his  original  estimate  that  it 
was  possible,  when  his  plant  got  into  quantity  production,  to 
turn  out  25  per  month. 

"Eagles"  went  from  New  York  to  Inverness,  Scotland,  over 
a  4,500-mile  course,  and  after  they  had  steamed  11,500  miles 
officers  confirmed  their  seaworthiness  and  their  fitness  for  the 
task  for  which  they  were  built.    Several  sailed  to  Arctic  waters, 


304  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

through  fields  of  ice.  They  were  used  to  maintain  dispatch 
service  between  ports  in  Northern  Russia,  in  which  duty  Ad- 
miral McCully  reported  they  were  very  successful. 

Orders  for  many  mine-sweepers  were  placed  early  in  1917, 
their  design  permitting  their  construction  by  certain  companies 
without  interfering  with  the  building  of  naval  or  merchant  craft. 
Some  were  built  at  the  Puget  Sound  and  Philadelphia  navy 
yards.  The  new  mine-sweepers  proved  exceptionally  seaworthy. 
Thirty-six  were  employed  in  sweeping  the  mines  in  the  North 
Sea.  In  addition  to  the  vessels  designed  and  built  for  this  pur- 
pose, we  employed  a  fleet  of  privately-owned  ships  of  all  sorts 
and  sizes,  which  were  fitted  out  and  used  first  as  patrol  and 
then  as  mine-sweepers. 

While  war  was  on,  construction  had  to  concentrate  on  de- 
stroyers and  other  anti-submarine  craft.  However,  we  com- 
pleted two  battleships,  the  Mississippi  and  New  Mexico,  and 
practically  finished  the  Idaho;  but  work  was  suspended  on 
capital  ships  that  were  not  already  far  advanced. 

Hostilities  ended,  attention  was  turned  to  the  completion  of 
the  program  authorized  in  1916.  Should  we  proceed  with  the 
dreadnaughts  and  battle-cruisers  on  the  pre-war  plans;  or 
modify  the  plans,  but  still  build  two  distinct  types ;  or  abandon 
the  plans  altogether  and  build  a  single  type  to  do  the  work  of 
both  battleship  and  battle-cruiser!  These  were  questions  that 
addressed  themselves  to  naval  administration.  Officers  were 
debating  them.  From  London  came  the  information  that  the 
British  Admiralty  had  built  a  capital  ship,  the  Hood,  a  com- 
posite of  the  dreadnaught  and  the  cruiser,  which  was  said  to 
combine  the  advantages  of  both. 

After  consultation  with  leading  members  of  the  Naval  Affairs 
Committee,  and  upon  their  advice,  accompanied  by  Admirals 
Griffin,  Taylor  and  Earle,  heads  of  the  Bureaus  of  Engineering, 
Construction  and  Ordnance,  I  went  to  Europe  to  learn,  at  first 
hand,  what  changes,  if  any,  war  experience  taught  should  be 
incorporated  into  the  new  ships  to  be  constructed.  An  ex- 
amination of  the  Hood  by  our  expert  officers  disclosed  that  this 
new  ship  had  more  speed  than  earlier  battle-cruisers,  though 
less  than  that  of  our  design ;  a  heavier  battery,  though  of  only 
about  half  the  power  of  that   of  our  projected  battleships; 


% 


HANGING  UP  A  RECOED 

The  launching  of  the  destroyer  Ward  at  the  Mare  Island  Navy  Yard  17%  days 
after  her  keel  was  laid  established  a  new  record. 


BUILDING  A  THOUSAND  SHIPS  305 

and  had  protection  much  greater  than  that  of  earlier  battle- 
cruisers. 

Upon  our  return  from  Europe  all  the  information  gathered 
was  laid  before  the  General  Board.  Admirals  Mayo  and  Rod- 
man, who  had  recently  returned  from  Europe,  where  they  had 
been  interested  in  the  question,  were  invited  to  act  with  them. 
The  General  Board  made  a  unanimous  recommendation  that  the 
twelve  battleships  should  be  "completed  as  expeditiously  as 
possible  on  present  lines  of  development  in  battleship  construc- 
tion." In  view  of  the  importance  of  protection  as  indicated  by 
experience  at  the  Battle  of  Jutland,  where  thinly  protected 
battle-cruisers  were  unable  to  stand  up  under  heavy  fire,  the 
Board  recommended  that  "the  six  battle-cruisers  now  author- 
ized be  completed  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  but  with  addi- 
tional protection,  particularly  to  turrets,  conning  towers, 
magazines  and  communications,  at  the  expense  of  a  small  re- 
duction in  speed."  The  recommendations  were  approved,  and 
directions  given  to  press  their  construction. 

The  new  battleships  under  construction  will  be  660  feet  long, 
with  displacement  of  43,200  tons,  with  an  extreme  breadth  of 
105  feet  and  a  mean  draft  of  33  feet.  Engines  developing  60,000 
horse-power  will  drive  them  at  a  speed  of  23  knots.  Their 
twelve  16-inch  guns  will  be  mounted  in  four  turrets,  which  re- 
volve so  that  all  can  be  fired  simultaneously  to  either  side  of  the 
vessel.  In  a  single  salvo  these  guns  will  throw  25,000  pounds 
of  projectiles.  In  every  way  they  outclass  any  ships  of  the 
line  ever  built. 

The  six  battle-cruisers  will  be  larger  than  any  war-ships 
heretofore  constructed.  Each  will  have  43,500  tons  displace- 
ment, practically  the  same  as  the  battleships,  but  will  be  longer 
by  over  200  feet,  their  length  being  874  feet,  and  they  will  be  ten 
knots  faster,  making  3314  knots,  38'  miles  an  hour.  No  less 
than  180,000  horse-power  is  required  to  drive  these  immense 
vessels  through  the  water.  Their  engines  will  develop  as  much 
electric  power  as  is  required  to  supply  a  good-sized  city.  The 
six  battle-cruisers  will  have  a  total  of  1,080,000  horse-power. 
Each  will  be  armed  with  eight  16-inch  guns,  firing  16,800  pounds 
of  projectiles.  The  weight  of  metal  is  not,  however,  nearly 
as  important  in  gunfire  as  is  the  range.    The  guns  of  our  battle- 


306  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

cruisers  will  easily  outrange  those  of  any  ships  now  afloat. 
Both  battleships  and  battle-cruisers  will  be  propelled  by  electric 
drive,  the  new  method  which,  first  installed  on  the  New  Mexico, 
proved  its  superiority,  and  was  adopted  for  all  our  later  major 
vessels. 

With  the  completion  of  these  eighteen  capital  ships,  together 
with  the  scout  cruisers  and  other  types  under  construction,  the 
Navy  of  the  United  States  will  be  at  least  "  equal  to  the  most 
powerful  maintained  by  any  other  nation  of  the  world. ' '  That 
was  the  goal  in  view  when  the  big  three-year  program  proposed 
in  1915  was  adopted  by  Congress  in  the  act  of  August  29,  1916, 
to  which,  when  this  program  is  completed,  the  Navy  will  owe 
its  supremacy. 

It  is  a  matter  of  gratification  that  the  United  States,  which 
brought  forth  the  steamship,  the  ironclad  monitor,  the  torpedo 
boat,  the  aeroplane,  the  flying  boat,  has  again  taken  the  lead  in 
naval  construction  and  will  soon  have  the  most  powerful  of  all 
armadas. 

This  country  should  keep  that  position  for  all  time  until — 
and  unless — with  a  powerful  navy  and  great  national  wealth, 
the  United  States  succeeds  in  securing  an  international  agree- 
ment to  reduce  armament.  The  very  act  making  possible  our 
supremacy  on  the  seas,  declared  it  to  be  the  "policy  of  the 
United  States  to  adjust  and  settle  its  international  disputes 
through  mediation  and  arbitration";  authorized  the  President 
to  invite  a  conference  of  all  the  great  governments  to  formulate 
a  plan  of  arbitration  and  "consider  the  question  of  disarma- 
ment"; and  declared  that  the  ships  authorized  but  not  already 
under  contract  were  not  to  be  built  if  international  reduction 
of  armament  could  be  secured. 

That  statement  of  policy  in  the  naval  appropriation  act  of 
1916 — "a  most  unusual  place,"  said  the  President  in  an  address 
at  Seattle — was  in  line  with  the  policy  of  the  Government  from 
the  day  of  Wilson's  inauguration.  It  was  the  authorization  for 
the  international  agreement  looking  to  a  reduction  of  armament 
contained  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  The  Bryan  treaties,  rati- 
fied by  every  European  country  except  Germany,  which  insured 
cooling  time  and  opportunity  for  discussion  in  a  world  forum, 
were  a  long  step  toward  settling  international  differences  by 


BUILDING  A  THOUSAND  SHIPS  307 

reason  rather  than  by  resort  to  war.  It  was  about  the  time 
those  treaties  were  proposed  that  Winston  Churchill,  First  Lord 
of  the  British  Admiralty,  suggested  a  "naval  holiday."  In  my 
first  report  in  1913,  reiterated  in  every  subsequent  report,  I 
declared :  "It  is  not  a  vacation  we  need,  but  a  permanent  policy 
to  guard  against  extravagant  and  needless  expansion."  I 
recommended  then  that  "the  war  and  navy  officials,  and  other 
representatives  of  all  nations,  be  invited  to  hold  a  conference 
to  discuss  whether  they  cannot  agree  upon  a  plan  for  lessening 
the  cost  of  preparation  for  war"  and  added  this  observation: 

It  is  recognized  that  the  desired  end  of  competitive  building,  carried 
on  under  whip  and  spur,  could  not  be  effective  without  agreement  be- 
tween great  nations.  It  ought  not  to  be  difficult  to  secure  an  agreement 
by  which  navies  will  be  adequate  without  being  overgrown  and  without 
imposing  over-heavy  taxes  upon  the  industries  of  a  nation. 

Long  before  the  match  was  struck  by  the  assassination  of 
the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  President  Wilson,  Ambassador  Page 
and  Colonel  House  were  taking  steps  which,  if  Germany  had 
been  willing  and  Great  Britain  and  France  had  sensed  the 
coming  conflict,  might  have  averted  the  World  War.  To  that 
end  in  the  early  part  of  1914,  President  Wilson  sent  Colonel 
House  abroad  with  letters  to  the  Kaiser  and  the  heads  of  the 
British  and  French  governments,  with  whom  earnest  confer- 
ences were  held.  President  Wilson  and  his  associates  in  1913- 
14,  as  this  shows,  had  the  vision  of  world  agreement  for  peace 
to  secure  which  he  and  the  representatives  of  other  free  nations 
signed  the  treaty  in  Paris  in  1919. 

"The  last  thing  Germany  wants  is  war,"  said  the  Kaiser  to 
Colonel  House,  just  three  months  before  he  precipitated  the  con- 
flict. The  Kaiser  was  obsessed  at  that  time,  so  Colonel  House 
reported,  with  the  thought  of  what  he  called  "the  Yellow  Peril." 
The  Kaiser  said:  "The  white  nations  should  join  hands  to  op- 
pose Japan  and  the  other  yellow  nations,  or  some  day  they  will 
destroy  us."  That  fear,  or  simulated  fear,  and  his  statement 
that  Germany  could  not  hastily  join  a  peace  pact  so  long  as 
175,000,000  Slavs  threatened  his  empire,  furnished  the  excuse 
for  brushing  aside  the  suggested  agreement  to  prevent  war. 


308  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Did  he  fear  that  President  Wilson's  tentative  move  early  in 
1914  toward  a  League  of  Nations  for  world  peace  would  be 
successful?  Was  the  Kaiser  convinced  that  he  must  strike  in 
that  year,  or  surrender  his  mad  ambition  for  world  domination  1 

As  these  lines  are  written  a  conference  of  five  nations,  called 
by  President  Harding,  is  in  session  at  Washington,  where  the 
discussion  of  reduction  of  naval  armament  was  given  first  place 
in  a  proposal  to  scrap  all  pre-dreadnaughts  and  also  the  incom- 
pleted great  dreadnaughts,  and  not  to  build  or  complete  the 
battle-cruisers  under  construction.  The  plan  presented  by  the 
American  representatives  is  to  adopt  the  ratio  of  capital  ships 
for  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  Japan  at  five  for  the 
United  States,  five  for  Great  Britain,  and  three  for  Japan. 
Such  a  program,  if  followed  by  scrapping  all  submarines  and 
placing  them  in  the  category  of  outlaws,  would,  with  reduction  of 
land  armament  and  regulation  of  aircraft,  carry  out  the  hopes 
of  those  responsible  for  the  naval  program  authorized  in  1916. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 
MAKING  SAILORS  OUT  OF  LANDSMEN 

HALF  A   MILLION    RECRUITED   AND    TRAINED   IN   EIGHTEEN    MONTHS — 
"ONE  OP  THE  MOST  STRIKING  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  OF  THE  WAR," 

SIR  ERIC  GEDDES  DECLARED NAVY'S  EDUCATIONAL  SYSTEM  PAVED 

THE  WAY EVERY  OFFICER  A  TEACHER — NAVAL  ACADEMY  GREATLY 

ENLARGED NO  SHIP  KEPT  WAITING  FOR  OFFICERS  OR  MEN. 

HALF  a  million  men  and  thirty  thousand  officers  were 
enlisted  and  trained  by  the  United  States  Navy  in 
eighteen  months.    No  navy  in  the  world  ever  had  as 
large  a  personnel,  or  ever  attempted  to  raise  and  train 
as  large  a  sea-force  in  so  brief  a  time.    Sir  Eric  Geddes,  First 
Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty,  said: 

The  dauntless  determination  which  the  United  States  lias  displayed 
in  creating  a  large,  trained  body  of  seamen  out  of  landsmen  is  one  of 
the  most  striking  accomplishments  of  the  war.  Had  it  not  been  so 
effectively  done,  one  would  have  thought  it  impossible. 

When  the  Archbishop  of  York,  Honorary  Chaplain-in-Chief 
of  the  British  Navy,  visited  Great  Lakes,  111.,  he  was  amazed 
quite  as  much  by  the  spirit  of  the  personnel  as  he  was  by  the 
vast  extent  of  the  establishment,  the  largest  naval  training  sta- 
tion in  the  world.  The  Archbishop  reviewed  the  cadets  in  the 
administration  drill  hall,  a  structure  large  enough  for  three 
entire  regiments  to  maneuver.  Thirty  thousand  blue-jackets 
were  assembled  in  the  hall,  with  three  full  regiments,  nine  thou- 
sand men,  and  a  band  of  three  hundred  pieces  in  light  marching 
order.  After  the  preliminary  ceremony  "to  the  colors,"  they 
passed  in  review  before  the  Archbishop,  playing  and  singing 
"Over  There."  The  thousands  massed  in  the  center  of  the  hall, 
sang  "Columbia,  the  Gem  of  the  Ocean."  Profoundly  moved, 
the  Archbishop  turned  and  said  to  Captain  W.  A.  Moffett,  the 
commandant,  "Captain,  now  I  know  that  we  are  going  to  win 
the  war." 

309 


310  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

When,  a  few  days  later,  he  visited  Washington,  the  Arch- 
bishop told  me  that  the  outstanding  thing  he  had  seen  in  America 
was  the  Great  Lakes  Training  Station.  "If  I  had  not  seen  it," 
he  said, ' '  I  could  not  have  believed  it  possible  that  such  a  train- 
ing camp  for  seamen  could  be  conducted  a  thousand  miles  from 
the  ocean." 

Like  expressions  came  from  members  of  the  various  mis- 
sions and  naval  officers  who  came  to  the  United  States.  That 
station,  situated  in  the  heart  of  the  country,  far  from  the 
ocean,  trained  and  sent  into  the  navy  during  the  war  over 
one  hundred  thousand  men.  It  was  the  vitalizing  spirit  of  the 
Navy  in  the  Middle  West;  a  center  of  the  patriotic  inspiration 
which  swept  like  a  prairie  fire  and  brought  young  men  into  the 
Navy  more  rapidly  than  we  could  house  them.  Two  thousand 
five  hundred  enlisted  men  were  under  training  there  when  war 
was  declared  and  in  that  month  9,027  recruits  were  received. 
But  Great  Lakes  never  was  swamped.  No  matter  what  strain 
was  put  upon  it,  the  authorities  were  equal  to  any  emergency. 

Between  April  6, 1917,  and  March  11, 1919, 125,000  men  were 
received ;  96,779  trained  and  sent  to  sea  duty,  and  17,356  gradu- 
ated at  its  special  schools.  The  camp  grew  to  1,200  acres,  with 
775  buildings.  Nine  great  drill  halls  were  built  in  which  thou- 
sands could  maneuver  in  regimental  formation.  But  bigger  than 
the  number  of  men  enrolled  or  the  buildings  erected  or  the  great 
schools  conducted  was  the  spirit  of  the  place.  From  the  in- 
spiring leadership  of  Captain  Moffett,  who  was  a  genius  at 
organization,  to  the  youngest  boy  fitted  out  in  naval  uniform, 
pride  in  the  station  and  the  naval  service  was  so  contagious  that 
it  reached  back  into  the  homes  from  which  the  youths  had  come 
and  stirred  the  whole  Middle  West  with  enthusiasm  for  the 
Navy. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  war,  Captain  Moffett,  who  had  come 
to  Washington  to  discuss  plans  for  enlarging  the  station,  said 
to  me:  "Mr.  Secretary,  I  have  here  a  requisition  for  $40,000 
for  instruments  for  the  Great  Lakes  band." 

It  had  not  been  very  long  since  $40,000  was  the  entire  ap- 
propriation for  the  station.  The  captain's  request  seemed  to 
me  like  extravagance. 

"Do  you  expect  to  win  the  war,  as  the  Israelites  did?"  I 


MAKING  SAILORS  OUT  OF  LANDSMEN         311 

asked,  "by  surrounding  Berlin  and  expecting  the  walls  to  fall 
as  every  man  in  your  band  blows  his  trumpet?" 

I  demurred  at  first,  but  he  pleaded  for  it  with  such  eloquence 
that  I  signed  the  requisition.  This  enabled  John  Philip  Sousa, 
enrolled  as  a  lieutenant  in  the  Reserve  Force,  to  train  fifteen 
hundred  musicians,  the  largest  band  in  the  world.  Bands  were 
not  only  sent  to  ships  and  stations  overseas,  but  toured  the 
■  country,  giving  the  greatest  impetus  to  the  Liberty  Loan  cam- 
paigns. These  bands  were  an  inspiration  to  the  entire  service. 
I  found  later  that  a  British  commission  had  reported  that  only 
three  things  were  more  important  than  music.  These  were  food, 
clothing  and  shelter. 

The  three  other  great  permanent  training  stations,  Hampton 
Roads,  Va.,  Newport,  R.  I.,  and  San  Francisco,  were  animated 
by  the  same  spirit  as  Great  Lakes.  Their  officers  and  men  vied 
with  each  other  in  efficient  training  of  recruits.  The  same  was 
true  of  the  temporary  stations  along  the  coast  which  came  into 
being  to  give  quarters  and  instruction  to  youths  who  enlisted 
so  rapidly  that  provision  had  to  be  made  for  them  at  every 
available  point. 

Approximately  500,000  men  and  33,000  officers  were  in  the 
Navy  when  hostilities  ended,  and  nearly  nine-tenths  of  them  had 
been  trained  after  war  was  declared.  Naval  administration  did 
not  wait  until  hostilities  began  to  increase  its  force.  Recruiting 
was  pressed  in  the  closing  months  of  1916,  immediately  after 
Congress  authorized  a  substantial  increase,  and  8,000  men  were 
enlisted.  In  January  1917,  enlistments  went  up  to  3,512,  and 
there  was  a  larger  increase  the  next  month.  In  March,  when 
the  President  signed  the  order  raising  the  Navy  to  emergency 
strength — 87,000  regulars,  plus  10,000  apprentice  seamen,  and 
hospital  attendants  and  others,  a  total  of  97,000 — we  began  a 
vigorous  campaign  that  covered  the  entire  country.  When  war 
was  declared  there  were  in  the  Navy  64,680  enlisted  men  and 
4,376  officers,  commissioned  and  warrant.  Some  12,000  reserves 
had  been  enrolled,  the  10,000  Naval  Militia  were  mustered  into 
service  and  590  officers  and  3,478  men  of  the  Coast  Guard  were 
placed  under  the  Navy.  This  gave  us  a  total  force  of  approxi- 
mately 95,000. 

Within  little  more  than  a  month  after  war  was  declared 


312  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

there  were  100,000  regulars,  and  by  June  1st  the  total  force  had 
grown  to  170,000.  By  January  1, 1918,  there  were  300,000  officers 
and  men  on  the  rolls,  including  reserves  and  the  Coast  Guard. 
By  August  we  had  passed  the  half -million  mark,  and  when  the 
armistice  was  signed  there  was  a  naval  personnel  of  approxi- 
mately 533,000.  The  actual  figures  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation 
for  November  11,  1918,  were  531,198,  and  for  December  1, 
532,931.  But  practically  all  those  shown  in  the  latter  report 
had  been  enlisted  before  hostilities  had  ended.  Figures  of  va- 
rious branches  varied  slightly  before  and  after  the  armistice, 
but  there  were  in  the  naval  service  at  its  maximum : 

Officers  Men 

Regulars    10,590  218,251 

Reserves  21,618  278,659 

Coast  Guard 688  6,101 

Total 32,896        503,011 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  above  enlistment  for  the 
World  War  with  those  who  served  in  the  Navy  in  previous  wars : 

War  of  1812 20,000 

Mexican  War 7,500 

Civil  War 121,000 

Spanish- American 23,000 

The  Navy  was  called  upon  to  perform  many  new  tasks — to 
man  troopships  and  cargo  transports,  to  furnish  guards  for  mer- 
chant ships,  to  maintain  forces  ashore,  in  Europe  as  well  as 
this  country,  and  to  render  other  services  that  no  navy  had 
previously  contemplated.  All  this  required  personnel  in  large 
numbers.  But  no  matter  what  the  service  or  requirement,  when 
the  call  came  the  Navy  was  ready  with  officers  and  men,  regu- 
lars or  reserves. 

During  the  entire  war  "we  never  had  a  delay  of  a  vessel  on 
account  of  not  having  the  officers  and  men,"  said  the  Chief  of 
the  Bureau  of  Navigation.  ' '  The  personnel  were  actually  ready 
at  seaports  to  put  on  vessels  before  the  vessels  were  ready." 

Few  of  the  recruits  had  any  previous  sea  experience.  Most 
of  them  were  from  the  interior,  many  had  never  seen  the  ocean. 


MAKING  SAILOES  OUT  OF  LANDSMEN         313 

But  the  enthusiasm  and  energy  of  teachers  and  pupils  would 
have  surprised  Dana,  who  in  his  "Two  Years  Before  the  Mast," 
said:  " There  is  not  so  helpless  and  pitiable  an  object  in  the 
world  as  a  landsman  beginning  a  sailor 's  life. ' '  They  knew  they 
were  woefully  ignorant  of  the  sea,  but  they  had  a  stimulus 
Dana's  landsmen  lacked — the  eager  desire  to  fit  themselves  to 
fight.  That  sharpened  their  capacity  so  that  in  a  few  weeks 
they  learned  more  than,  without  such  incentive,  they  could  have 
mastered  in  a  twelve-month. 

At  training  stations  naval  terms  were  used  for  everything. 
The  barracks  building  was  the  "ship";  the  floor  was  the 
"deck";  offenders  were  tried  at  the  "mast";  requests  for  leave 
were  to  "  go  ashore, ' '  and  returning  the  men ' '  reported  aboard. ' ' 
Meals  were  "chow"  and  there  was  slang  for  every  article  of 
food — stews  being  known  as  " slumgullion, "  salt  as  "sand," 
coffee  as  "Java,"  and  bread  was  called  "punk."  Recruits  soon 
picked  up  the  lingo  of  the  sea,  and  found  their  "sea  legs." 

Every  feature  of  life  at  sea  was  simulated  as  closely  as  pos- 
sible in  the  stations,  and  when  sent  into  service,  the  men  felt  at 
home  aboard  ships.  It  was  no  new  experience  for  them  to  sleep 
in  hammocks.  They  had  slept  in  them  while  under  training. 
"Hit  the  deck,  boys,"  was  always  the  morning  order  in  station 
as  it  is  on  shipboard.  Before  they  had  so  much  as  seen  a  man- 
of-war  or  transport,  their  motto  was,  "for  the  good  of  the  ship." 

"Do  your  bit,"  never  found  favor  in  the  Navy;  we  had  a 
better  term.  As  the  commanding  officer  of  one  station  passed  a 
squad  at  drill,  he  heard  ringing  out  the  words:  "Don't  just 
do  your  bit.    The  men  on  this  station  do  their  best." 

Serious  as  was  the  work,  recruits,  with  the  spirit  of  eternal 
youth,  enlivened  it  by  fun,  humor  and  pranks.  This  was  always 
in  evidence.  No  hardship  could  dispel  it.  A  story  is  told  of 
a  young  Texan,  just  enlisted  and  being  inspected  at  Great  Lakes. 
All  the  recruits  were  ordered  to  fall  in  line  and  strip  for  in- 
spection. Sans  shoes,  sans  shirts,  sans  pants,  in  fact  sans  every- 
thing in  the  way  of  clothing,  the  boy  marched  past  the  doctor. 
The  Texan,  with  utter  lack  of  the  awe  which  a  gold-striped 
surgeon  is  supposed  to  inspire,  had  secured  a  paper  stencil, 
used  to  mark  clothing,  and  using  black  paint  had  lettered  his 
bare  stomach  with  the  words,  ' '  Good  morning,  doctor. ' ' 


314  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  grave  surgeon  saw  the  joke  was  on  him,  and  led  the 
hearty  laughter  at  this  original  greeting.  Another  recruit  from 
a  "Western  state,  hearing  of  the  various  detentions  and  occa- 
sional surgical  operations  supposed  to  precede  acceptance,  hung 
over  the  place  where  he  supposed  his  appendix  was  located  this 
placard:  "I  have  had  my  appendix  removed."  He  probably 
thinks  to  this  day  that  this  saved  him  from  an  operation. 

"I  never  knew  what  patriotism  meant  before  I  learned  it  by 
service  in  the  Navy." 

That  remark  was  addressed  to  me  by  an  upstanding,  clear- 
headed youth  in  naval  uniform  as  the  mine-sweepers  were  wel- 
comed back  to  New  York  after  they  had  finished  the  worst  job 
assigned  to  the  navy,  that  of  sweeping  up  the  mines  in  the  drab 
days  after  the  armistice. 

He  was  bronzed  by  the  wind  and  the  sun  of  the  North  Sea. 
His  muscles  seemed  made  of  steel.  Exposure  had  given  a  vigor 
of  body  that  made  you  feel  that  he  could  do  anything. 

"Tomorrow,"  he  went  on,  "I  am  going  back  to  my  job  in 
civil  life,  but  I  am  a  different  man.  Before  the  war  I  think  I 
loved  my  country  and  I  suppose  the  flag  meant  something  to 
me.  But  I  felt  no  passion  of  patriotism.  It  was  a  matter  of 
course.  But  the  Navy  has  taught  me  such  reverence  for  the 
flag  that  I  have  a  thrill  every  time  it  is  raised,  and  somehow 
my  country  became  something  more  than  land  and  water  and 
houses.  It  seems  something  holy  to  me.  And  that's  what  my 
naval  service  did  for  me,"  he  added  as  he  passed  to  his  place 
at  the  banquet  table. 

Such  inculcation  of  love  of  country  was  the  best  by-product 
of  the  war. 

How  was  it  that  the  regulars  in  the  Navy  were  able  to  train 
so  rapidly  the  recruits  that  poured  in  after  war  was  declared? 
How  did  they  attain  the  efficiency  which  led  to  the  promotion 
of  ten  thousand  of  them  to  warrant  or  commissioned  officers? 

The  answer  is  that  the  Navy  had  been  organized  as  an  educa- 
tional and  industrial,  as  well  as  a  fighting,  institution.  Officers 
and  men  had  gone  to  school,  they  were  subjected  to  frequent 
examinations,  and  promotions  were  given  from  ascertained 
fitness  rather  than  from  the  outgrown  policy  of  seniority.  Post- 
graduate schools  enabled  officers  to  qualify  as  experts.    Voca- 


MAKING  SAILORS  OUT  OF  LANDSMEN         315 

tional  and  grammar  schools  for  enlisted  men  had  kindled 
ambition  and  given  mental  as  well  as  physical  and  naval  train- 
ing. The  war,  therefore,  found  the  Navy  not  only  fit  to  fight, 
but  its  officers  and  men  equipped  to  train  quickly  the  half-mil- 
lion young  men  who  enlisted  in  1917-18.  The  Navy  had  years 
before  instituted  educational  preparedness — professional,  voca- 
tional, elementary — as  a  part  of  its  policy.  And  the  test  of  war 
proved  that  no  other  form  of  preparedness  produced  better 
results. 

In  1913  I  issued  orders  which  established  a  school  on  every 
ship  in  the  Navy,  the  officers  instructing  the  men  in  reading, 
spelling,  writing  and  arithmetic,  geography,  grammar  and  his- 
tory, as  well  as  in  naval  and  technical  subjects.  Nearly  every 
enlisted  man  who  availed  himself  fully  of  this  instruction  afloat 
received  promotion,  and  all  of  them  became  more  proficient. 

The  war  proved  that  vessels  manned  by  seamen  having 
trained  minds  as  well  as  trained  hands  are  superior  to  ships 
with  uneducated  crews.  Neither  speed  nor  armor  wins  battles. 
It  is  intellect,  education,  training,  discipline,  team-work,  courage. 

As  a  logical  result  of  the  schools  afloat,  Congress  later 
authorized  the  appointment  of  one  hundred  enlisted  men  annu- 
ally as  midshipmen  at  the  Naval  Academy.  In  the  first  class 
after  this  law  made  it  possible,  the  honor  graduate  at  Annapolis 
came  from  the  enlisted  personnel.  Others  have  since  attained 
high  standing  in  their  class  and  in  the  service.  The  day  will 
come  when  all  appointments  to  the  Naval  Academy  will  be  made 
from  the  ranks. 

The  educational  system,  adopted  in  the  Navy  in  1913,  became 
part  of  the  army  system  of  training  before  the  American  Ex- 
peditionary Force  returned  from  France,  and  Secretary  Baker 
made  such  instruction  an  integral  part  of  the  training  for  men 
enlisting  in  the  Army. 

With  the  advent  of  war  the  educational  work  of  the  Navy 
was  greatly  enlarged  and  changed  to  meet  war  conditions.  In 
addition  to  many  technical  schools  the  fleet  at  Yorktown  was 
utilized  for  intensive  training,  and  prepared  over  45,000  officers 
and  men  for  important  and  varied  duties  afloat.  The  older  type 
of  battleships  became  virtual  training  schools,  devoting  par- 
ticular attention  to  gunnery,  navigation  and  engineering,  quali- 


316  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

fying  men  for  various  duties  requiring  experience.  When  or- 
dered to  sea  the  men  who  had  enjoyed  this  special  training  gave 
full  proof  of  the  practical  schooling  through  which  they  had 
passed. 

It  required  war  to  bring  appreciation  of  the  school  as  a  neces- 
sary part  of  military  instruction.  The  Navy  had  started  schools 
for  sailors  in  1914,  but  it  was  not  until  1919  that  the  Army  and 
Marine  Corps  felt  the  necessity  of  such  schools,  which  they  then 
established,  though  in  1913  General  Butler,  in  command  of  the 
Marines  at  Panama,  was  teaching  them  Spanish.  "It  opened 
my  eyes  to  what  might  be  done,"  said  Judge  Garrison,  then 
Secretary  of  War,  upon  his  return  from  an  inspection  trip,  "and 
I  am  going  to  advise  Army  officers  to  go  down  to  Panama  and 
learn  from  General  Butler  how  to  teach  men  in  the  Army.,, 
Upon  their  return  from  France  General  Lejeune  and  General 
Butler  established  schools  for  the  teaching  of  Marines  at  Quan- 
tico,  a  plan  which  is  being  extended  to  all  Marine  bases  and 
attracting  a  superior  type  of  recruits. 

In  1866  General  Lew  Wallace  outlined  a  plan  of  education 
for  soldiers,  approved  by  Charles  Sumner,  declaring  that  the 
"military  system  as  respects  the  rank  and  file  is  founded  on 
egregious  errors."  The  chief  error  was  that  no  system  of 
giving  the  rank  and  file  the  same  character  of  instruction  as 
imparted  at  West  Point  was  at  that  time  offered  in  order  that 
they  might  win  commissions.  He  urged  that  the  hours  of  serv- 
ice of  a  private  soldier  be  "so  divided  as  to  give  him  time  for 
study  and  meditation  without  interference  with  his  routine  of 
duty."  The  "proverbial  idleness  of  military  life"  which  then 
prevailed  was  due  to  lack  of  schools  and  proper  instruction.  By 
the  addition  of  the  education  and  promotion  policy  suggested, 
General  Wallace  said,  we  would  "not  only  get  better  military 
service,  but  as  an  act  of  wisest  statesmanship  you  offer  in  a 
constitutional  way  the  coveted  opportunity  for  education  to 
every  youth  in  the  land." 

The  Navy,  having  given  trial  to  the  policy,  found  that  all 
that  General  Wallace  claimed  for  it  was  true,  and  now  that  the 
Army  and  Marine  Corps  have  established  like  schools,  educa- 
tional advantages  as  a  part  of  military  duty  have  become  the 
accepted  American  policy. 


MAKING  SAILORS  OUT  OF  LANDSMEN  317 

The  war  emphasized  the  worth  of  education  for  military 
efficiency.  While  excellent  officers  were  obtained  from  every 
source  possible,  the  main  dependence  for  all-around  naval  offi- 
cers was  upon  the  Naval  Academy  graduates.  In  the  test  of 
war  they  more  than  justified  what  was  expected  of  them.  In 
order  to  secure  more  officers  with  Annapolis  training,  the  course 
for  midshipmen  was  reduced,  during  the  war,  to  three  years 
and  made  more  intensive,  upon  the  recommendation  of  Rear 
Admiral  Edward  W.  Eberle,  the  able  and  resourceful  super- 
intendent of  the  Naval  Academy.  He  and  his  associates,  anxious 
to  get  into  the  active  fighting,  were  doing  more  by  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  increasing  number  of  midshipmen  and  the  zeal  with 
which  they  inspired  all  who  came  under  their  influence. 

Before  the  war,  plans  had  been  adopted  and  appropriations 
made  for  greatly  increasing  the  Naval  Academy.  A  new  Sea- 
manship and  Navigation  Building  that  cost  $1,000,000  was  con- 
structed. Four  million  dollars  was  expended  in  enlarging 
Bancroft  Hall,  which  was  more  than  doubled  to  accommodate 
the  increased  number  of  midshipmen.  In  1912  there  were  768 
midshipmen  at  Annapolis.  Legislation  adopted  before  the  war 
increased  the  number  to  2,120  in  1917.  The  enlarged  facilities 
will  accommodate  2,400. 

Two  special  courses  were  established  at  the  Naval  Academy 
in  the  spring  of  1917,  one  for  line  officers  and  the  other  for 
men  of  the  supply  corps.  A  total  of  1,622  were  graduated  as 
ensigns  for  line  duty  and  400  as  supply  officers.  They  went 
right  into  the  fleet,  and  though  they  had  received  only  a  few 
months'  drill,  they  carried  the  Annapolis  spirit  into  the  service 
— a  spirit  of  valor  and  invincibility.  The  institution  at  An- 
napolis, the  pride  of  America  and  the  admiration  of  all  visitors 
to  our  country,  is  easily  the  greatest  naval  school  in  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XXX 
THREE  HUNDRED  THOUSAND  STRONG 

VAST   OPERATIONS   COULD   HARDLY   HAVE   BEEN   CARRIED   ON    WITHOUT 

NAVAL    RESERVES    AND    NATIONAL    NAVAL    VOLUNTEERS MANNED 

HUNDREDS  OF  VESSELS  PLYING  TO  FRANCE — SERVED  ON  TRANS- 
PORTS, DESTROYERS,  SUB-CHASERS  AND  EVERY  KIND  OF  CRAFT — 
NAVAL  AVIATION  COMPOSED  MAINLY  OF  RESERVISTS — THIRTY  THOU- 
SAND MADE  OFFICERS. 


W 


i6\  J|  T^E  ARE  coining,  Uncle  Samuel,  three  hundred 
thousand  strong!"  That  was  the  spirit  if  not 
the  song  of  the  reservists  who  besieged  the 
recruiting  stations  and  flocked  into  the  Navy 
at  the  call  of  war. 

They  came  from  every  walk  of  life — mechanics  and  million- 
aires, farm  boys  and  college  students,  clerks  and  merchants, 
yacht  owners  and  boatmen,  fishermen  and  firemen.  There  was 
hardly  a  trade,  profession  or  calling  that  was  not  represented. 
Ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  were  landsmen,  knowing  noth- 
ing of  the  sea.  But  they  took  to  the  naval  service  like  ducks  to 
water,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  they  learned,  and  the  effi- 
ciency with  which  they  served,  amazed  the  old  sea-dogs. 

Never  again  will  men  dare  to  ridicule  the  volunteer,  the  re- 
servist, the  man  who  in  a  national  crisis  lays  aside  civilian  duty 
to  become  a  soldier  or  sailor,  to  shoulder  a  gun  or  take  his  place 
in  the  turret.  The  splendid  body  of  young  men  from  civil  life 
who  quickly  adapted  themselves  to  military  service  astonished 
the  old  timers,  who  believed  that  long  service  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  make  one  efficient. 

On  every  ship  in  the  Navy  were  found  young  men  who,  with- 
out previous  training,  had  enrolled  for  the  war,  and  in  a  short 
time  were  performing  well  the  duties  of  naval  service.  Moved 
by  a  zeal  and  patriotism  which  quickened  their  ability  to  learn, 
the  ambitious  young  men  who  responded  to  the  call  in  1917-18 

318 


THREE  HUNDRED  THOUSAND  STRONG         319 

mastered  military  knowledge  so  rapidly  as  to  astonish  naval 
officers,  as  well  as  the  country.  The  most  capable  were  placed 
in  command  of  small  naval  craft,  and  the  commendation  of 
older  officers  was  hearty  and  enthusiastic. 

Before  1917,  responsible  naval  officials  knew  that  the  chief 
need  when  war  came  would  be  trained  leaders.  There  was  never 
any  doubt  that  patriotic  young  men  would  enroll  by  the  thou- 
sands and  tens  of  thousands.  But  you  cannot  make  a  naval  offi- 
cer in  a  day.  It  is  easier  to  secure  good  officers  on  land  than 
on  sea.  It  was  leadership,  a  quality  indefinable,  that  the  Navy 
needed. 

There  was  need  for  many  more  officers.  After  promoting 
many  capable  regulars,  we  turned  for  officer  material  to  the  apt 
and  alert  young  men  in  colleges  and  schools,  in  shops,  in  profes- 
sions and  on  the  farms.  Most  of  them  were  given  their  inten- 
sive training  on  board  ship,  but  the  Navy  was  able  to  give  1,700 
a  special  course  at  the  Naval  Academy.  Securing  that  assign- 
ment by  competition  with  all  other  reservists,  they  came  with 
the  imprimatur  of  approval  from  ships  or  shore  stations.  After 
the  thorough  course  at  Annapolis  they  went  immediately  to 
service  afloat,  and  from  admirals  and  captains  I  received  re- 
ports that  gave  proof  of  their  efficiency.  Some  did  so  well  that 
they  were  keen  competitors,  in  the  special  duties  they  per- 
formed, with  those  who  had  enjoyed  a  full  four-year  course  at 
the  Naval  Academy. 

Over  30,000  reservists  were  made  commissioned  or  warrant 
officers,  nearly  three  times  as  many  as  the  total,  10,590,  in  the 
regular  Navy.  They  served  on  vessels  of  every  type,  from  sub- 
marine chasers  to  battleships.  On  the  transports  the  larger  per- 
centage of  the  officers  were  reservists.  The  usual  plan  was  to 
have  the  duties  of  the  captain,  executive  officer,  chief  engineer, 
gunnery  officers,  senior  supply  and  medical  officers  performed  by 
regulars,  the  others  being  of  the  reserve  force.  Out  of  a  total 
of,  say,  thirty  officers  on  board  a  transport,  twenty-four  of  them 
would  be  reservists.  They  were  on  duty  on  deck,  in  the  engine 
room,  in  the  sick  quarters,  in  the  supply  office,  and  in  practically 
every  part  of  the  ship. 

The  idea  of  some  who  thought  in  the  early  days  of  1917 
that  family  or  political  influence  would  get  them  a  commission 


320  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

was  the  subject  of  not  a  little  good  natured  ridicule  in  the  serv- 
ice, which  found  expression  in  verses  like  these : 

I  never  thought  I'd  be  a  gob — 

You  see,  dad  owns  a  bank — 
I  thought  at  least  I'd  get  a  job 

Above  a  captain's  rank. 

But  woe  to  me,  alack,  alas! 

They  've  put  me  in  white  duds ; 
They  don't  quite  comprehend  my  class — 

They've  got  me  peeling  spuds. 

It  was  not  easy  work,  this  learning  to  be  a  seaman  and  study- 
ing to  be  an  officer.  But  it  made  men  of  those  youngsters.  The 
fact  that  promotion  depended  on  their  own  efforts,  that  there 
was  a  fair  field  and  no  favor,  inspired  them  to  effort  as  noth- 
ing else  could  have  done. 

Men  of  all  trades  and  professions  were  in  the  reserve.  Mil- 
lionaires from  New  York  and  graduates  of  Princeton  served 
alongside  young  fellows  who  a  year  before  had  been  plowing 
behind  Missouri  mules.  An  heir  of  one  of  the  country's  largest 
fortunes  was  a  seaman  gunner,  and  his  mate  in  the  same  crew 
was  a  strapping  youngster  who  had  been  working  in  a  factory. 

An  officer  who  went  out  for  a  run  on  a  sub-chaser  from  Brest 
thought  there  was  something  familiar  about  the  grimy  seaman 
who  was  testing  the  forward  gun.  As  the  man  turned  the  officer 
recognized  him. 

1 'Well,  of  all  things!"  exclaimed  the  officer.  "You're  the 
last  man  in  the  world  I'd  ever  expect  to  find  here.  The  last  time 
I  saw  you,  you  were  the  ladies '  favorite,  engaged  in  photograph- 
ing every  debutante  and  stage  celebrity  in  New  York.  How  did 
you  get  into  the  Navy?" 

"Well,  it  is  funny,  even  to  myself,"  he  laughed,  and  told  his 
story. 

He  had  made  a  picture  of  a  well-known  actress  and  her  baby, 
and  was  on  his  way  back  to  the  studio  when  he  struck  a  recruit- 
ing party  holding  a  meeting  in  the  street.  Aroused  by  the 
enthusiasm,  he  felt  he  ought  to  do  his  part.  He  enlisted  on  the 
spot,  turned  over  his  studio  to  others,  and  in  a  month  was  shoot- 
ing a  gun  on  a  sub-chaser  instead  of  a  camera.    He  stayed  on 


THE  LIVING  FLAG 


Ten  thousand  blue-jackets,  at  Great  Lakes,  the  largest  naval    training   station 
the  world.     Inset:    Captain  William  A.  Moffett,  Commandant. 


THREE  HUNDRED  THOUSAND  STRONG         321 

that  boat  until  the  last  horn  blew,  and  the  boys  were  ordered 
home.  One  of  his  mates  at  the  gun  was  a  former  actor,  another 
a  clerk  in  a  store. 

One  day  in  New  York  four  young  fellows  suddenly  walked 
out  of  a  motion-picture  studio  and  enlisted.  Two  of  them  were 
high  salaried  photographers,  but  they  said  nothing  about  that 
and  went  in  as  seamen.  Several  months  afterwards  a  call  was 
sent  out  for  a  few  men  experienced  in  photo  work.  One  of  these 
four  was  found  shoveling  coal  at  Pemam.  He  had  been  for  three 
years  the  photographer  for  Sidney  Drew,  but  he  was  plugging 
along  at  coal  passing,  and  doing  a  good  job  until  found  fitted 
for  other  work. 

4 'Captain,  I'd  like  to  get  a  transfer,"  was  the  request  a  young 
reservist  made  of  his  commanding  officer  in  1918.  The  captain 
was  surprised.  The  youngster  had  rendered  service  in  the 
armed  guards  and  was  doing  well  on  a  cargo  transport. 

"What  is  the  trouble  with  your  present  duty?"  the  Captain 
asked. 

"Well,  sir,"  he  answered,  "I've  been  going  across  on  mer- 
chantmen. I  have  been  torpedoed  three  times,  but  I'd  like  to 
get  on  a  destroyer  or  a  submarine-chaser,  where  I  can  see  a  little 
real  action." 

That  was  the  spirit  of  the  reservists.  Willing  to  perform 
any  duty,  they  wanted  to  get  into  action,  to  be  sent  where  the 
fighting  was. 

Naval  aviation  was  made  up  largely  of  reservists,  and  the 
Naval  Reserve  Flying  Corps  grew  during  the  war  into  a  force 
of  more  than  26,000,  with  1,500  qualified  pilots  and  4,000  student 
officers  in  training.  Not  only  were  hundreds  of  bright  young 
men  enrolled  as  prospective  aviators,  but  thousands  of  skilled 
mechanics  were  enlisted  in  the  ground  personnel. 

Looking  over  the  list  of  officers  of  the  Cruiser  and  Transport 
Force,  I  find  that  eight  reservists  were  on  Admiral  Gleaves' 
staff,  eighteen  on  that  of  Admiral  Jones.  Of  the  166  officers  who 
served  on  the  Leviathan,  the  largest  of  all  transports,  93  were 
reservists.  On  the  George  Washington  there  were  63  out  of  the 
total  of  one  hundred.  Thirty-five  served  on  the  President  Lin- 
coln, 46  on  the  President  Grant,  69  on  the  Mount  Vernon,  51  on 
the  Great  Northern,  43  on  the  Orizaba,  28  on  the  Pastores,  33  on 


322  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  Pocahontas,  24  on  the  Powhatan,  30  on  the  Princess  Matoika. 
Of  this  large  force,  there  was  not  a  transport  or  cruiser  which 
did  not  have  a  large  proportion  of  reservists  in  its  officers  and 
crew.  In  carrying  the  American  Army  to  France  and  bringing  it 
home,  the  reservists  did  their  full  share  of  the  work. 

They  played  an  even  larger  part  in  the  Naval  Overseas 
Transportation  Service.  Five  thousand  officers  and  thirty 
thousand  men  were  required  to  man  this  vast  fleet  of  cargo  ships 
carrying  munitions  and  supplies  to  France.  Of  the  officers  all 
but  twelve  were  reservists,  as  were  a  large  majority  of  the 
enlisted  men.  Thousands  more  were  in  training  to  furnish  crews 
for  the  hundreds  of  vessels  being  built  by  the  Shipping  Board 
which  the  Navy  was  preparing  to  man. 

Of  our  350  submarine  chasers,  which  were  on  patrol  duty  in 
French  and  English  waters,  in  the  Adriatic  and  all  along  the 
American  coast,  the  large  majority  were  manned  by  reservists, 
who  performed  this  hard  and  often  monotonous  duty  with  a 
cheerfulness  that  was  unfailing.  These  sturdy  little  110-foot 
boats  stayed  at  sea  in  all  kinds  of  weather,  and  braved  storms 
that  even  the  largest  vessels  did  not  relish. 

The  record  shows  that  the  reservists  could  have  done  any- 
thing required  at  any  time  anywhere.  At  the  aviation  assembly 
and  repair  base  at  Pauillac,  France,  during  an  inspection  by 
members  of  the  Naval  Affairs  Committee,  one  of  the  party,  Con- 
gressman Peters,  of  Maine,  remarked : 

"My  watch  is  broken  and  I  have  tried  both  in  Paris  and  at 
Bordeaux  to  get  it  repaired,  but  was  told  that  it  would  take  two 
weeks  to  do  so." 

Lieutenant  Commander  Briscoe,  in  command  of  the  repair 
base,  told  the  Congressman  that  it  could  be  fixed  right  there  at 
the  station. 

"But,"  said  Mr.  Peters,  "I  have  only  an  hour  to  spend 
here." 

"All  right,"  said  Briscoe,  "we  can  do  it." 

An  instrument  repair  man  was  sent  for.  He  took  the  watch, 
and  fifteen  minutes  later  handed  it  back  to  the  astonished  Con- 
gressman, who  found  it  running  and  set  at  the  correct  hour. 

"Well,  well,  I  didn't  think  that  you  had  such  skilled  me- 
chanics in  the  service." 


THREE  HUNDRED  THOUSAND  STRONG         323 

"That's  nothing,"  said  Briscoe.  "We  can  build  a  locomo- 
tive here — and  run  it,  too." 

It  was  a  fact.  The  mechanical  personnel  of  the  Flying  Corps 
was  competent  to  manufacture,  overhaul,  repair  and  operate 
almost  any  mechanical  device  made  in  America. 

The  United  States  had  no  naval-reserve  legislation  until  Con- 
gress authorized  the  creation  of  a  reserve  in  1915.  It  did  have 
the  nucleus  of  a  naval  militia  prior  to  the  act  of  February  16, 
1914,  when  Congress  coordinated  these  distinct  and  scattered 
branches  into  a  cohesive  real  naval  militia  organization,  subject 
in  time  of  war  to  the  call  of  the  President.  In  pursuance  of  that 
act  a  division  of  Naval  Militia  was  organized  in  the  department, 
and  a  board  named  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  formulate 
standards  of  professional  examinations  for  officers  and  enlisted 
men,  and  also  to  strengthen  the  militia  as  an  effective  arm  of 
naval  power.  That  board,  which  pioneered  the  organization  so 
well  that  it  met  the  test  of  war  with  credit,  was  composed  of 
Captains  W.  A.  Gill,  Edward  Capehart,  and  Harold  Norton,  and 
Commanders  J.  J.  Poyer  and  F.  B.  Bassett,  of  the  Navy,  and 
Commodore  R.  P.  Forshew,  Captain  C.  D.  Bradham,  Captain 
E.  A.  Evers,  Commander  J.  M.  Mitcheson,  and  Lieutenant  J. 
T.  McMillan,  of  the  Naval  Militia. 

Cruises  covering  several  weeks  in  the  summer  were  organ- 
ized for  training  and  were  continued  until  1917,  when  these  short 
cruises  merged  into  war  service.  In  encouraging  and  training 
these  reserves  \ca.  were  carrying  out  the  wise  counsel  of  Jeffer- 
son given  in  1807:  "I  think  it  will  be  necessary  to  erect  our 
seafaring  men  into  a  naval  militia  and  subject  them  to  tours  of 
duty  in  whatever  port  they  may  be."  The  act  of  August  29, 
1916,  provided  that  the  militia  in  Federal  service  be  designated 
as  "National  Naval  Volunteers."  The  force  grew  to  twelve 
thousand  by  1917,  and  when  war  was  declared  this  body  of  men, 
who  had  enjoyed  practical  training,  were  at  once  available  for 
duty.  They  were  given  important  assignments,  ashore  and  afloat, 
in  the  fighting  zone  on  ships  of  all  types,  in  administrative  posi- 
tions ;  and,  as  leaders  and  instructors  of  newly  enlisted  reserves 
they  rendered  timely  and  useful  service.  During  the  war  the 
National  Naval  Volunteers  and  Reserves  were  amalgamated 
along  lines  largely  worked  out  by  naval  militia  officers. 


324  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

But  for  the  naval  reserve  legislation  of  1916,  I  do  not  see 
how  we  could  have  promptly  provided  naval  personnel  for  the 
war.  It  will  always  be  a  monument  to  the  wisdom  of  the  then 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation,  Admiral  Victor  Blue,  who 
was  again  called  to  that  post  after  serving  as  captain  of  the 
Texas  under  Rodman  in  the  North  Sea  Fleet,  that  the  legisla- 
tion was  made  ready  and  prepared  against  the  day  which  we 
hoped  would  never  come,  but  which  did  come,  with  all  sudden- 
ness, upon  us. 

It  was  the  act  of  August  29,  1916,  that  created  a  Naval  Re- 
serve Force  of  six  classes — the  Fleet  Naval  Reserve,  of  former 
officers,  and  enlisted  men  who  had  completed  as  much  as  sixteen 
years'  service  in  the  Navy;  the  Naval  Reserve  of  men  of  sea- 
going experience;  the  Naval  Auxiliary  Reserve,  men  employed 
on  merchant  vessels  suitable  for  naval  auxiliaries;  the  Naval 
Coast  Defense  Reserve,  in  which  civilians  without  previous  sea 
experience  could  be  enrolled;  the  Volunteer  Naval  Reserve, 
whose  members  obligated  themselves  to  serve  in  the  Navy  in 
any  of  the  various  classes  without  retainer  pay  or  uniform 
gratuity  in  time  of  peace ;  and  the  Naval  Reserve  Flying  Corps, 
composed  of  officers  and  student  flyers  and  enlisted  men  quali- 
fied for  aviation  duties.  At  the  same  time  a  Marine  Corps 
Reserve  of  five  classes  was  authorized,  corresponding  to  the 
Naval  Reserve  Force. 

This  was  the  basis  upon  which  was  built  up  the  vast  reserve 
force  of  more  than  300,000  which  was  enrolled,  trained  and  put 
into  service  during  the  war.  Beginning  with  a  few  hundred  the 
force  grew  rapidly  after  the  break  with  Germany.  Upon  the 
declaration  of  war  the  Naval  Militia  were  mustered  in,  and  from 
977  officers  and  12,407  enlisted  militiamen  and  reserves  in  serv- 
ice April  6,  1917,  the  reserves  grew  in  six  months  to  77,000,  in 
a  year  to  123,000,  and  eventually  reached  a  total  of  355,447 — 
30,358  officers  and  305,089  men. 

Except  for  a  few  thousand  ex-service  men  and  merchant  sea- 
men, this  immense  force  was  made  up  of  men  who  had  had  no 
seagoing  experience,  men  who  had  to  learn  the  game  from  the 
beginning.  And  the  rapidity  with  which  they  were  turned  from 
landsmen  into  sailors  reflected  great  credit  on  instructors  and 
apprentices. 


THREE  HUNDRED  THOUSAND  STRONG         325 

There  is  no  page  of  the  war  more  illustrative  of  what  the 
colleges  did,  in  addition  to  the  college  spirit  of  lofty  patriotism 
which  sent  educated  youths  into  the  service  by  the  thousands, 

"Who  took  the  khaki  and  the  gun 
Instead  of  cap  and  gown," 

than  preparing  students  for  all  branches  of  the  service.  The 
college  campus  became  a  national  training  ground.  Institutions 
of  learning  were  converted  into  naval  schools  where  young  men 
were  given  instruction  in  branches  fitting  for  service  in  the 
Navy.  Harvard  became  a  radio  school;  Massachusetts  "Tech" 
taught  aviators,  Princeton  specialized  in  cost  accounting,  Yale 's 
units  were  commanded  by  a  retired  admiral,  Stevens  Institute 
had  its  engineering  school.  Scores  of  other  colleges  and  univer- 
sities in  all  parts  of  the  country  extended  their  facilities  in  what- 
ever way  was  most  needed.  There  was  not  a  rating  in  the  Navy, 
from  the  new  duty  in  connection  with  listening  devices  to  the 
oldest  calling  of  cook,  without  special  schools.  Intensive  courses 
sent  men  afloat  with  the  best  instruction  possible  in  the  brief 
period  allotted. 

College  men  did  everything  from  peeling  spuds  to  command- 
ing ships.  Trained  minds,  plus  work  and  courage  in  the  test  of 
war,  forever  answered  in  the  affirmative  the  question  whether 
college  education  is  worth  what  it  costs.  The  college  man  mas- 
tered navigation  more  rapidly  because  he  had  mastered  mathe- 
matics. His  ability  to  learn  readily  paid  his  country  a  large 
dividend  upon  its  investment  in  educational  institutions. 

Though  colleges  and  universities  were  giving  instruction  and 
nearly  all  our  ships  and  stations  engaged  in  training  reserves 
as  well  as  regulars,  the  typical  reserve  camp  was  at  Pelham  Bay. 
We  needed  a  training  station  near  New  York.  We  had  to  have 
a  good  waterside  location  with  plenty  of  space,  well  drained  and 
wholesome,  and  we  found  it  in  the  park  at  Pelham,  which  the 
municipal  authorities  generously  tendered  for  temporary  use. 
Ten  miles  from  the  heart  of  the  city,  with  water  on  two  sides, 
Pelham  Bay  was  an  ideal  location,  and  there  we  built  a  station 
capable  of  providing  for  25,000  men.  It  was  efficiently  com- 
manded by  Captain  W.  B.  Franklin,  a  former  officer  in  the 
regular  Navy,  and  a  fine  type  of  the  reservist  of  mature  years. 


326  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

I  made  it  a  habit  during  the  war,  whenever  my  duties  called 
me  to  New  York,  to  run  over  to  Pelham.  Being  myself  in  the 
reserve  class,  called  from  civilian  life  to  service  with  the  naval 
forces  for  a  period,  the  chance  to  touch  elbow  to  elbow  with  these 
men  was  always  embraced,  and  after  every  visit  I  returned  to 
Washington  with  new  inspiration  and  new  zeal.  Many  young 
reservists  trained  there  won  promotion — I  say  won,  because 
commissions  were  not  handed  out.  They  were  awarded  by 
demonstration  of  fitness.  The  course  was  so  thorough  that  the 
reserves  called  Pelham  the  "Reserve  Naval  Academy." 

Eighteen  reservists  were  commended  for  acts  of  personal 
bravery,  110  for  courageous  and  heroic  action.  Four  Medals  of 
Honor  were  awarded  reservists;  eleven  received  Distinguished 
Service  Medals ;  the  Navy  Cross  was  awarded  to  265  officers  and 
50  enlisted  men,  and  special  letters  of  commendation  for  ex- 
ceptional performance  of  duty  were  sent  to  171  officers  and 
20  men  of  the  Naval  Reserve  Force. 

This  is  the  record  that  glorified  all  the  reservists,  not  alone 
those  marked  for  special  distinction  but  the  thousands  who 
were  of  the  same  stuff  and  spirit.  They  fought  well.  They  died 
well.  They  have  left  in  deeds  and  words  a  record  that  will  be 
an  inspiration  to  unborn  generations.  As  illustrating  their 
spirit  I  recall  a  legacy  left  by  a  valorous  young  aviator  for  whom 
I  named  a  destroyer. 

Kenneth  MacLeish,  of  Glencoe,  111.,  was  enrolled  in  the  Re- 
serve Flying  Corps  in  March,  1917.  In  October  he  went  to 
France  and  became  a  member  of  the  bombing  group,  taking  part 
in  many  air  raids  over  the  enemy's  lines.  While  on  a  raid  his 
squadron  was  attacked  by  a  dozen  enemy  airplanes.  Fighting 
desperately,  to  enable  his  fellows  to  escape,  MacLeish 's  plane 
was  shot  down  and  he  was  killed.  His  daring,  his  fortitude,  his 
Christian  spirit  were  a  trinity  which  make  him  immortal.  Writ- 
ing to  his  parents,  just  before  he  was  killed,  MacLeish  penned 
this  classic  that  will  live  in  the  annals  of  the  Naval  Reserves : 

In  the  first  place,  if  I  find  it  necessary  to  make  the  supreme  sacri- 
fice, always  remember  this ;  I  am  firmly  convinced  that  the  ideals  which 
I  am  going  to  fight  for  are  right,  and  splendid  ideals,  that  I  am  happy 
to  be  able  to  give  so  much  for  them.  I  could  not  have  any  self-respect, 
I  could  not  consider  myself  a  man,  if  I  saw  these  ideals  defeated  when 


THREE  HUNDRED  THOUSAND  STRONG         327 

it  lies  in  my  power  to  defend  them.  *  *  *  So  you  see,  I  have  no 
fears,  I  have  no  regrets.  I  have  only  to  thank  God  for  such  a  wonder- 
ful opportunity  to  serve  Him  and  the  world.  *  *  *  And  the  life 
that  I  lay  down  will  be  my  preparation  for  the  grander,  finer  life  that 
I  take  up. 

I  shall  live!  *  *  *  you  must  not  grieve;  I  shall  be  supremely 
happy  *  *  *  so  must  you — not  that  I  have  "gone  west,"  but  that 
I  have  bought  such  a  wonderful  life  at  such  a  small  price,  and  paid  for 
it  so  gladly, 


CHAPTER  XXXI 
WOMEN  IN  THE  NAVY 

MORE  THAN  ELEVEN  THOUSAND  REGULARLY  ENLISTED — THEY  CONSTI- 
TUTE THE  ONLY  WOMEN  ENTITLED  TO  MEMBERSHIP  IN  THE  AMERI- 
CAN LEGION — NO  LACK  OF  WOMAN 's  NURSING GIRLS  WORKED  IN 

TORPEDO  FACTORY  AND  MUNITION  PLANTS — THE  INSPIRING  LEADER- 
SHIP OF  MRS.  ANNA  HOWARD  SHAW,  HEAD  OF  WOMAN  's  COUNCIL  OF 
NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 

THE  Navy  was  long  regarded  as  an  institution  for  men 
only.  It  was  the  only  place  where  there  was  no  opening 
for  women.  To  be  sure  no  sailor  would  have  felt  com- 
fortable going  to  sea  in  a  ship  which  had  not  been  spon- 
sored by  a  woman's  breaking  the  bottle  as  it  slid  into  the  waters 
at  the  launching.  A  ship,  feminine  in  all  our  language,  de- 
manded a  woman's  benediction  as  the  assurance  of  favoring 
winds  and  prosperous  voyages.  But  men  alone  wore  the  naval 
uniform  prior  to  1917. 

It  is  true  that  before  that  time  it  had  been  found  that  the 
naval  establishment  could  not  get  along  without  women,  and 
they  had  been  admitted  to  hospitals  and  dispensaries  ashore, 
where  they  were  found  indispensable. 

In  March,  1917,  after  the  break  with  Germany,  the  Navy 
stood  in  great  need  of  clerical  assistants  in  Washington  and  at 
all  the  shore  stations.  There  was  no  appropriation  to  pay 
civilians  for  the  work  that  was  immediately  necessary.  Every 
bureau  and  naval  establishment  appealed  for  clerks  and  stenog- 
raphers. How  could  they  be  secured  at  once?  The  Civil  Service 
Commission  could  not  furnish  a  tithe  of  the  number  required, 
even  if  there  had  been  the  money  to  pay  them. 

"Is  there  any  law  that  says  a  yeoman  must  be  a  man?"  I 
asked  my  legal  advisers.  The  answer  was  that  there  was  not, 
but  that  only  men  had  heretofore  been  enlisted.  The  law  did  not 
say  "male." 

328 


WOMEN  IN  THE  NAVY  329 

"Then  enroll  women  in  the  Naval  Reserve  as  yeomen,"  I 
said,  "and  we  will  have  the  best  clerical  assistance  the  country 
can  provide." 

It  was  done,  and  they  were  given  the  designation  Yeomen 
(F) — not  "Yeomanettes,"  but  regular  yeomen,  the  F  indicating 
female.  They  were  truly  yeomen  and  did  yeoman  service.  In 
the  Marine  Corps  they  were  equally  efficient,  and  were  known  as 
"Marinettes"  or  Lady  Marines. 

"I  do  not  wish  to  enroll  as  a  Naval  Reservist,"  said  an 
independent  young  woman  to  the  enrolling  officer  at  the  Wash- 
ington Navy  Yard,  ' '  until  I  know  what  ship  I  am  to  serve  on. ' ' 

It  was  explained  to  her  that  women  yeomen  were  not  to  go 
to  sea. 

"But  I  want  to  go  on  the  Nevada,"  she  said,  in  tones  of  dis- 
appointment. 

These  women  yeomen,  enlisting  as  reservists,  served  as 
translators,  stenographers,  clerks,  typists,  on  recruiting  duty, 
and  with  hospital  units  in  France.  Too  much  could  not  be  said 
of  their  efficiency,  loyalty  and  patriotism. 

Eleven  thousand  Yeomen  (F),  1,713  nurses,  and  269  Marin- 
ettes  were  enrolled.  They  were,  I  am  informed,  the  only  women 
serving  during  the  war  who  were  on  the  same  footing  as  men 
with  all  allowances  and  pay  and  clothing  outfits,  and  the  only 
women  eligible  to  membership  in  the  American  Legion.  Those 
who  made  up  the  four  companies  in  Washington  became  profi- 
cient in  military  drill.  They  made  a  handsome  appearance 
when,  upon  the  return  of  the  Rainbow  Division,  they  were  the 
guard  of  honor  to  the  President,  having  previously  taken  part, 
with  other  military  units,  in  the  welcome  to  President  Wilson 
when  he  returned  from  Paris.  They  made  a  notable  showing  as 
they  formed  in  double  lines  of  spotless  white  uniforms  as  the 
presidential  party  passed  through  the  Union  Station  at  Wash- 
ington to  receive  the  enthusiastic  welcome  given  by  the 
multitudes. 

The  uniforms  of  the  Yeomen  (F)  and  the  Marines  (F)  were 
natty  and  beautiful,  were  worn  with  pride,  and  are  preserved  by 
them  as  the  honorable  token  of  service  during  the  great  war. 
They  were  both  becoming  and  suited  to  the  duty  assigned.  As 
a  designer  of  woman's  uniforms  the  Navy  Department  scored 


330  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

a  distinct  success,  for  these  uniforms  were  copied  by  women  all 
over  the  country. 

The  last  drill  of  these  Yeomen  (F)  was  held  on  July  31, 1919, 
upon  their  demobilization.  They  had  saved  the  day  in  war,  and 
the  Navy  regretted  the  legislation  which  compelled  the  disband- 
ing. I  do  not  know  how  the  great  increase  of  work  could  have 
been  carried  on  without  them.  I  voiced  the  thanks  of  the  Navy 
in  expressing  ''gratitude  and  appreciation  of  their  splendid 
service  and  patriotic  cooperation,"  as  they  were  mustered  out. 
They  are  organized  in  posts  in  the  American  Legion,  and  have 
carried  into  civil  life  the  spirit  of  devotion  to  country  which  they 
displayed  in  the  days  of  the  war. 

I  issued  an  order  early  in  the  war  that  women  be  given  pref- 
erence in  appointments  to  clerical  positions  in  the  Navy.  This 
released  men  for  military  duty.  The  war  taught  that  the  Navy 
was  dependent  upon  woman's  deftness  not  only  to  prevent  "lack 
of  woman's  nursing,"  but  also  in  multifarious  duties,  including 
assembling  parts  for  torpedoes  and  other  war  munitions.  Upon 
a  visit  to  the  Newport  Torpedo  Station,  I  found  women  in  over- 
alls at  work,  putting  together  parts  of  torpedoes  made  there. 
They  were  so  capable  and  showed  such  skill  that  scores  were 
enabled  to  do,  and  to  do  excellently,  a  character  of  work  for- 
merly done  exclusively  by  men.  Not  a  few  of  them  were  school 
teachers,  who,  feeling  the  compulsion  for  war-work,  shared  the 
feeling  of  the  wealthy  woman  in  Washington,  who,  applying  for 
a  position  in  the  gun  factory  at  Washington,  said : 

"I  can  knit  at  night.  If  I  cannot  fight,  I  wish  something  to 
do  where  I  can  feel  I  am  really  in  the  war,  helping  to  make  guns 
or  torpedoes  or  other  real  instruments  of  war — a  job  that  is 
hard,  and  where  labor  in  the  heat  and  burden  of  the  day  taxes 
all  my  strength. ' ' 

She  was  a  sister  in  spirit  of  the  many  women  who  worked  in 
munition  plants,  fashioning  rifles,  dressed  in  overalls,  faces  be- 
grimed, proud  that  they  were  thus  helping  on  with  the  war.  If 
there  had  been  need,  many  more  would  have  gone  into  the  shops, 
glad  to  tax  their  strength  for  the  cause  in  which  their  very  souls 
were  enlisted. 

Not  only  does  the  world  owe  a  lasting  debt  of  gratitude  to 
women  who  served,  in  shops,  in  the  Navy  Department,  in  fac- 


WOMEN  IN  THE  NAVY  331 

tories  making  naval  aircraft,  at  navy  bases,  in  work  for  the 
Army,  but  likewise  the  larger  number,  who  in  their  homes  and 
communities  and  in  welfare  work  at  home  and  abroad,  dedicated 
their  hands  and  spirit  to  the  varied  war  activities.  Their  most 
notable  organized  duties  were  in  the  Red  Cross  and  the  Young 
Women's  Christian  Association.  A  story  of  the  benefactions  of 
the  Red  Cross  is  chiefly  the  story  of  woman 's  work  and  woman 's 
ministrations.  With  the  mothers  of  our  fighting  forces,  they 
constituted  in  truth  the  irresistible  first  line  of  defense  and 
offense  which  would  have  held  to  the  last  against  all  odds.  They 
furnished  the  basis  of  what,  for  lack  of  a  better  name,  we  called 
morale — the  will  to  win — without  which  ships  and  guns  and 
fighting  machinery  never  yet  won  a  battle.  A  Woman's  Ad- 
visory Committee  on  Naval  Auxiliaries  to  the  Red  Cross  War 
Council  rendered  patriotic  and  useful  service. 

The  Government  early  found  the  necessity  for  the  organiza- 
tion and  direction  of  women  in  war  work,  and  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  set  up  a  Woman's  Council,  headed  by  that 
great  woman  of  statesmanship  and  vision,  the  late  Dr.  Anna 
Howard  Shaw.  The  women  who  composed  this  Council,  in 
addition  to  Dr.  Shaw,  were  Mrs.  Philip  N.  Moore,  Mrs.  Josiah 
E.  Cowles,  Miss  Maude  Wetmore,  Mrs.  Carrie  Chapman  Catt, 
Mrs.  Antoinette  Funk,  Mrs.  Stanley  McCormick,  Mrs.  Joseph 
R.  Lamar,  Miss  Ida  M.  Tarbell,  Miss  Agnes  Nestor,  Mrs.  Ira 
Couch  Wood,  secretary.  Under  the  direction  of  this  Woman's 
Council  the  women  of  America  were  mobilized  for  war  work 
in  all  parts  of  America.  Women  were  found,  wholly  enlisted, 
with  their  counsel  and  labors  and  sacrifice,  wherever  men 
planned  or  fought  or  died.  Some  gave  their  lives,  many  gave 
their  health,  all  gave  complete  consecration. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 
COAST  GUARD  WON  DISTINCTION 

ESCORTING    CONVOYS    BETWEEN     GIBRALTAR    AND    ENGLAND,    CUTTERS 

MADE  NOTABLE  RECORD "  TAMPA  "  SUNK,  WITH  ALL  HER  GALLANT 

OFFICERS  AND  MEN — " SENECA "  SAVED  SURVIVORS  OF  "  COWSLIP* ' 

AND    " QUEEN" COAST   AND    GEODETIC    SURVEY   AND   LIGHTHOUSE 

SERVICE  DID  FINE  WORK. 

THE  Coast  Guard  automatically  came  under  control  of  the 
Navy  when  war  was  declared.     Its  vessels,  its  trained 
officers  and  men  proved  a  valuable  addition  to  our  forces, 
and  rendered  notable  service  in  various  areas  and  in 
many  lines  of  activity,  at  home  and  abroad. 

They  formed  a  very  important  part  of  our  forces  at  Gibral- 
tar, which  included  six  Coast  Guard  cutters,  the  Seneca,  Yama- 
craw,  Algonquin,  Ossipee,  Manning  and  Tampa,  constantly  en- 
gaged in  escorting  convoys. 

The  splendid  service  they  performed  was  commended  in  Ad- 
miral Niblack's  letter  of  September  5,  1918,  to  Captain  Charles 
Satterlee,  commanding  officer  of  the  Tampa,  in  which,  after 
detailing  her  record,  under  way  more  than  3,500  miles  each 
month  since  October  1,  1917,  "  never  disabled,  ready  whenever 
called  on,"  he  said: 

This  excellent  record  is  an  evidence  of  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  an 
excellent  ship  spirit,  and  organization  capable  of  keeping  the  vessel 
in  service  with  the  minimum  of  shore  assistance.  The  squadron  com- 
mander takes  great  pleasure  in  congratulating  the  commanding  officer, 
officers  and  crew  on  the  record  which  they  have  made. 

Three  weeks  after  notable  service  had  evoked  this  commen- 
dation, every  officer  and  man  of  the  Tampa  met  sudden  and 
mysterious  death.  The  night  of  September  26, 1918,  the  Tampa, 
having  escorted  a  convoy  from  Gibraltar,  was  proceeding 
toward  Milford  Haven,  Wales.    At  8 :45  p.  m.,  a  loud  explosion 

332 


COAST  GUARD  WON  DISTINCTION  333 

was  heard  by  vessels  of  the  convoy,  but  the  night  was  so  dark 
that  the  Tampa  disappeared  before  her  companions  could  see 
what  had  happened.  American  destroyers  and  British  patrol 
craft  searched  the  vicinity. 

Nothing  was  found  except  a  small  amount  of  wreckage  and 
the  bodies  of  two  men  in  naval  uniforms.  It  is  believed  that 
the  Tampa  was  torpedoed  by  a  submarine.  The  German  U-53 
claimed  to  have  sunk  a  United  States  vessel  of  her  description. 
"Listening-in"  stations  on  shore  reported  that  they  detected 
the  presence  of  a  submarine  near  the  spot  where  the  Tampa 
was  destroyed.  But  no  one  knows  how  she  met  her  fate.  Every 
soul  on  board  the  vessel  perished,  115  in  all,  of  whom  111  were 
Coast  Guard  personnel.  The  officers  lost  were  Captain  Satter- 
lee,  First  Lieutenants  Archibald  H.  Scally  and  John  T.  Carr, 
Second  Lieutenants  Roy  A.  Bothwell,  James  M.  Earp  and  John 
F.  McGourty,  and  Third  Lieutenant  James  A.  Frost,  Jr. 

It  must,  indeed,  be  a  matter  of  solemn  pride  to  the  Coast 
Guard  to  know  that  the  Tampa,  lost  with  all  her  gallant  officers 
and  men,  was  distinguished  by  such  service  and  sacrifice  that 
it  will  always  be  remembered  in  the  naval  annals  of  our  country. 
It  was  my  pleasure  to  name  one  of  the  modern  destroyers  of 
the  Navy  for  Captain  Satterlee,  and  on  April  16,  1921,  a  new 
cruising  vessel  of  the  Coast  Guard  was  launched  at  Oakland, 
California,  named  the  Tampa. 

Few  instances  that  occurred  during  the  war  are  more  in- 
dicative of  devotion  to  duty  than  the  gallant  attempt  of  the 
Seneca  to  salvage  the  steamer  Wellington,  torpedoed  September 
16,  1918.  Though  damaged,  its  officers  thought  that  the  vessel 
would  probably  float,  but  the  crew  refused  to  remain  on  board. 

Lieutenant  F.  W.  Brown  (U.  S.  Coast  Guard),  the  Seneca's 
navigating  officer,  asked  permission  to  take  a  volunteer  crew 
and  endeavor  to  work  the  Wellington  into  port.  Nearly  all  the 
Seneca's  complement  volunteered  for  this  duty.  Lieutenant 
Brown  made  a  hasty  selection  from  the  many  volunteers,  taking 
Acting  Machinist  William  L.  Boyce  and  eighteen  men.  En  route 
to  the  torpedoed  vessel,  lookouts  and  gun's  crew  were  detailed. 
Upon  boarding  the  ship,  ammunition  was  broken  out,  the  gun 's 
crew  was  assigned,  and  lookouts  posted.  It  was  highly  prob- 
able that  the  submarine  would  make  another  attack.     Soon  a 


334  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

second  boat,  containing  the  master,  first  and  second  officers  and 
eleven  of  the  Wellington's  crew  came  on  board.  The  Seneca  had 
to  leave  at  once  to  protect  the  remainder  of  the  convoy,  and 
could  only  send  out  radio  calls  for  assistance.  There  followed 
an  heroic  and  all  but  successful  effort  on  the  part  of  Lieutenant 
Brown  and  his  men  to  save  the  steamship. 

Within  half  an  hour,  the  Wellington  was  started  at  slow 
speed,  heading  for  Brest.  Men  took  turns  in  passing  coal  and 
firing,  coming  out  on  deck  when  relieved  and  taking  a  gun- 
watch.  One  of  the  men  from  the  Seneca  was  a  cook,  Russell 
Elam,  who  disappeared  into  the  galley,  and  in  a  short  time 
announced  that  dinner  was  served  for  all  hands.  When  he  ap- 
peared on  the  bridge  with  Lieutenant  Brown's  dinner,  he  was 
clad  in  an  immaculate  white  serving  jacket  and  had  omitted  no 
detail  of  service.  And  this  on  a  torpedoed  steamer  in  imminent 
danger  of  sinking!  Cook  Elam  met  a  heroic  death  with  others 
of  this  gallant  party. 

During  the  afternoon  all  went  well,  but  at  sundown  the  wind 
increased,  seas  crashed  over  the  bow,  and  all  on  board  were  in 
danger.  The  ship  listed  sharply,  rolling  so  that  the  davit  heads 
threatened  to  force  the  lifeboat  under.  Those  aboard  were  or- 
dered to  get  into  the  boat,  and  hold  on  to  the  Wellington  by 
use  of  a  long  rope,  a  sea  painter.  Seven  of  the  Wellington's 
crew  got  into  the  boat  with  one  Seneca  man  detailed  to  unhook 
it,  the  other  Coast  Guardsmen  standing  by  to  lower  it.  The 
radio  operator,  M.  S.  Mason,  remained  at  his  instruments  to 
keep  in  touch  with  the  destroyer  Warrington,  which  was  pro- 
ceeding to  their  assistance,  and  three  men  kept  the  pumps  going. 
Just  after  the  boat  was  lowered,  someone  cut  the  painter,  and 
the  boat  drifted  away.  The  Seneca's  party  and  some  of  the 
collier's  men  were  left  on  board  with  nothing  to  rely  upon  ex- 
cept a  small  raft  which  they  had  constructed. 

At  11:35  p.  m.,  the  Wellington's  position  was  sent  to  the 
Warrington  (Lieutenant  Commander  Van  der  Veer).  To  aid 
the  destroyer  in  her  search,  rockets  were  sent  up  at  fifteen- 
minute  intervals,  and  at  2:30  a.  m.,  answering  rockets  were 
seen.  The  men  in  the  lifeboat  were  gotten  aboard  the  Warring- 
ton, but  the  boat  was  crushed.  Lieutenant  Brown  found  some 
long,  heavy  planks;  from  these  three  rafts  were  improvised, 


COAST  GUARD  WON  DISTINCTION  335 

which  were  lowered  and  lines  let  down  so  the  men  could  reach 
them  in  the  darkness.  The  lights  of  the  destroyer  were  now  in 
sight.  The  Wellington  listed  rapidly.  With  a  hand  flashlight, 
Lieutenant  Brown  signaled  that  he  had  to  abandon  ship  imme- 
diately, and  asked  the  destroyer  to  work  in  close  and  pick  up 
his  men.  As  the  collier  settled  by  the  head,  at  the  same  time 
turning  over,  Brown  crawled  out  over  the  railing  and  flashed 
his  last  appeal,  "My  men  are  in  the  water." 

At  that  moment  the  boilers  exploded,  the  vessel  seemed  to 
rise  up,  and  as  she  lurched  into  her  final  plunge,  Brown  sprang 
into  the  water.  This  was  at  4  a.  m.,  in  pitch  darkness,  a  raging 
gale  and  tempestuous  seas. 

After  swimming  awhile,  casting  about  for  something  to  cling 
to,  and  finding  nothing,  Brown  heard  a  cry  for  help.  Swimming 
towards  the  man,  he  saw  that  he  was  clinging  to  a  plank,  and  told 
him  to  hold  on  and  keep  his  mouth  closed,  so  as  not  to  take  in 
water.  Finding  two  calcium  lights  burning,  he  extinguished 
them  so  no  one  should  be  misled  into  thinking  they  marked  a 
raft.  As  he  approached  the  destroyer,  Brown  called  out  re- 
peatedly: "I  had  eighteen  men."  His  sole  thought  was  that 
the  men  committed  to  his  charge  should  be  saved. 

Running  close  to  the  Wellington,  the  Warrington  floated 
down  three  life-rafts  and  all  available  buoys,  well  lighted.  It 
was  still  very  dark,  but  from  a  few  hundred  yards  to  leeward 
the  men  on  the  Warrington  watched  the  black  hull  turn  turtle, 
slowly  settle  in  the  water,  and  then  disappear.  When  dawn 
broke,  they  began  to  see  men  in  the  water,  some  on  rafts  and 
buoys,  some  on  floating  wreckage.  Eight  men  were  finally  picked 
up,  one  of  whom  died  on  board.  One  of  the  first  rescued  proved 
to  be  Lieutenant  Brown.  A  heaving  line  was  flung  to  him  and  he 
grabbed  it,  but  said  he  did  not  remember  having  been  hauled 
on  board.  Apparently  he  lost  consciousness,  and  his  identity 
was  not  discovered  until  he  awoke. 

Three  of  the  Warrington's  crew  had  jumped  into  the 
heavy  sea,  with  lines  made  fast  to  their  waists,  in  attempting 
to  save  life.  Seaman  James  C.  Osborne,  of  the  Coast  Guard, 
supporting  a  shipmate,  Coxswain  Peterson,  swam  through  the 
heavy  seas  and  placed  Peterson,  who  was  only  half  conscious, 
on  a  raft.    Several  times  both  were  washed  off,  but  each  time 


336  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Osborne  went  to  his  shipmate's  assistance  and  replaced  him  on 
the  raft.  Finally  Osborne  semaphored,  "I  am  all  right,  but  he 
is  gone  unless  you  come  right  away."  The  Warrington  rescued 
them  both. 

Lieutenant  Brown  and  eight  men  of  the  Seneca  were  saved, 
Machinist  Boyce  and  ten  Coast  Guardsmen  were  lost,  besides 
five  belonging  to  the  Wellington's  crew.  But  for  the  heavy  gale 
and  rough  sea  that  developed,  Brown  and  his  volunteers  would 
probably  have  won  out  and  saved  ship  and  cargo.  They  upheld 
to  the  fullest  the  high  traditions  of  the  Navy  and  Coast  Guard. 

Another  example  of  readiness  to  assume  responsibility  and 
act  as  the  necessities  of  the  occasion  require,  is  that  of  Captain 
William  J.  Wheeler  (U.  S.  Coast  Guard),  commanding  the 
Seneca,  which  rescued  the  survivors  from  the  British  patrol 
sloop,  Cowslip.  After  dark  on  April  2,  1918,  the  danger  zone 
escort  from  Gibraltar,  including  the  Cowslip,  joined  the  con- 
voy which  the  Seneca  had  escorted  from  England.  A  loud 
explosion  was  heard  and  the  Cowslip  displayed  distress  signals. 
The  Seneca  immediately  headed  for  her,  although  the  sloop 
flashed  the  signal,  ' '  Stay  away !  Submarine  in  sight,  port  quar- 
ter." Circling  the  Cowslip  in  search  of  the  submarine,  the 
Seneca  and  the  destroyer  Dale,  which  had  also  come  up,  began 
to  search  for  the  enemy.  The  established  doctrine  then  was 
that,  when  a  vessel  was  torpedoed,  other  vessels  in  the  vicinity 
should  not  risk  their  own  destruction  by  endeavoring  to  go  to 
her  relief  and  that  rescue  of  survivors  should  be  considered  as 
a  secondary  duty.  But  American  officers  could  not  witness  a 
disabled  and  sinking  ship  without  making  every  effort  to  save 
her  people. 

Three  times  the  Seneca  approached,  stopping  to  lower  her 
own  boats  and  take  off  survivors  from  the  British  sloop.  One 
enlisted  man  and  all  the  wardroom  officers  of  the  Coivslip,  ex- 
cept the  officer-of-the-deck,  had  been  killed  by  the  explosion. 
The  Seneca  rescued  all  the  survivors,  including  the  commanding 
officer,  another  commissioned  officer,  and  79  enlisted  men.  For 
this  courageous  and  meritorious  act,  Captain  Wheeler  was  com- 
mended by  Admiral  Niblack,  Admiral  Sims,  and  the  British 
admiral  commanding  at  Gibraltar. 

On  June  29,  1918,  the  Seneca  was  acting  as  ocean  escort  to  a 


THEY  SAVED   SURVIVORS   OF   TORPEDOED   VESSELS 

At  the  risk  of  their  own  destruction,  the  crew  of  the  Coast  Guard  Cutter  Seneca 
repeatedly  rescued  survivors  of  torpedoed  vessels,  although  it  was  an  established  rule 
that  when  a  vessel  was  torpedoed  other  vessels  in  the  vicinity  should  not  go  to  her 
aid  because  of  the  almost  certain  destruction  which  would  await  the  rescuers.  Inset: 
Captain  William  J.  Wheeler,  commanding  the  Seneca. 


GALLANT  OFFICERS  OF  THE  COAST  GUARD 
Left  to  right:  Commodore  E.  P.  Bertholf,  commandant  of  the  Coast  Guard 
from  1911  to  July,  1919;  Lieutenant  F.  W.  Brown,  navigating  officer  of  the  Seneca, 
who  volunteered  to  work  the  torpedoed  Wellington  to  port;  Boatswain  John  A. 
Midgett,  of  Coast  Guard  Station  No.  179,  who  led  the  rescue  of  survivors  of  the 
torpedoed  Mirlo  under  extraordinary  danger  from  fire. 


COAST  GUARD  WON  DISTINCTION  337 

convoy,  when  at  6:45  a.  m.,  the  British  steamer  Queen  was  tor- 
pedoed and  sank  in  five  minutes.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Cowslip, 
Captain  Wheeler  boldly  approached  the  Queen.  Dropping 
depth  charges  and  firing  his  guns  to  keep  the  submarine  down, 
he  picked  up  the  survivors. 

It  was  work  like  this,  calling  for  daring  and  quick  decision, 
that  distinguished  the  vessels  of  the  Coast  Guard,  which,  opera  I 
ing  in  the  Navy,  performed  such  signal  sendee  for  the  Allies 
and  the  commerce  of  the  world. 

On  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  the  main  contribution  by  the 
Coast  Guard  was  as  part  of  the  patrol  service  under  Admiral 
Anderson  in  the  Caribbean  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  protecting 
the  oil  supply  that  went  in  large  volume  from  Texas  and  Mexico 
to  British  and  other  Allied  naval  ships  and  for  the  necessary 
uses  by  the  Allied  armies  in  France. 

In  the  great  disaster  that  followed  the  blowing  up  of  a 
munition  ship  at  Halifax,  the  U.  S.  Coast  Guard  cutter  Morrill, 
in  command  of  Lieutenant  H.  G.  Hemniingway,  and  its  crew 
gave  first  aid  to  the  injured  in  that  stricken  city.  Coast  Guard 
men  supervised,  without  accident  or  loss  of  life,  the  landing  of 
345,602  tons  of  high  explosives  in  New  York  and  the  loading 
on  1,698  vessels.  The  total  value  of  the  explosives  on  these  ships 
was  more  than  five  hundred  million  dollars. 

When  the  tug  Perth  Amboy  and  four  barges  were  shelled  by 
a  German  submarine  on  July  21,  1918,  within  sight  of  Coast 
Guard  station  No.  40,  at  East  Orleans,  Mass.,  Keeper  Robert 
F.  Pierce,  with  his  crew,  launched  their  surfboat,  and  while  the 
shelling  was  continuing,  proceeded  out  to  assist  the  tug  and  her 
tow  and  aided  in  safely  landing  the  crew  and  treating  the 
wounded. 

A  very  gallant  action  was  that  of  the  keeper  and  crew  of 
Coast  Guard  Station  No.  179  at  Chicamacomico,  North  Carolina, 
in  rescuing  life  under  extraordinary  circumstances  following  the 
destruction  of  the  steamship  Mirlo,  on  August  16,  1918.  At 
4:30  p.  m.  the  lookout  reported  seeing  a  great  mass  of  water 
shoot  into  the  air.  It  seemed  to  cover  the  after  portion  of  a 
steamer  that  was  about  seven  miles  away.  At  the  same  time  a 
quantity  of  smoke  rose  from  the  steamer.  Fire  was  seen,  and 
heavy  explosions  were  heard.     The  Coast  Guard  boat  went  to 


338  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

the  rescue.  Five  miles  off  shore  they  met  one  of  the  ship's 
boats  with  the  captain  and  six  men  in  it,  who  informed  them 
that  the  ship  was  a  British  tank  steamer  and  that  she  had  been 
torpedoed.  Keeper  John  A.  Midgett  directed  the  captain  where 
to  go.  The  Coast  Guard  boat  was  headed  for  the  burning  mass 
of  wreckage  and  oil.  On  arrival  the  sea  was  found  to  be  covered 
with  burning  oil  and  blazing  gas  for  a  hundred  yards,  with  two 
masses  of  flames  about  a  hundred  yards  apart.  In  between 
these,  when  the  smoke  would  clear  away  a  little,  a  life-boat  could 
be  seen,  bottom  up,  with  six  men  clinging  to  it.  Heavy  seas 
washed  over  the  boat. 

The  Coast  Guardsmen  made  their  way  through  that  inferno 
of  smoke,  thrashing  wreckage  and  blazing  oil.  They  evaded  the 
perils  of  floating  debris,  fire,  and  wave.  Lifting  the  six  men 
on  board,  all  that  survived  of  the  sixteen  who  had  been  in  that 
lifeboat,  the  Coast  Guard  rescuers  sought  the  safety  of  clear 
water.    Thirty-six  men  of  the  Mirlo  were  rescued. 

The  first  United  States  vessel  to  pass  the  German  fortifica- 
tions at  Heligoland  and  through  the  Kiel  Canal  after  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice  was  the  Aphrodite,  commanded  by  a  Coast 
Guard  officer,  Captain  F.  C.  Billard.  While  passing  through  the 
North  Sea,  the  Aphrodite  struck  a  German  mine,  but  escaped 
destruction  and  was  able  to  proceed  to  Germany. 

The  danger  to  American  shipping  by  a  submarine  base  on 
our  coast,  not  to  speak  of  the  violation  of  neutrality  which  such 
action  would  involve,  necessitated  a  patrol  of  the  coast  to  make 
sure  that  there  was  no  such  base  and  to  prevent  U-boat  opera- 
tions. These  requirements  were  admirably  met  by  the  co- 
operation of  the  Coast  Guard.  There  were  on  the  Atlantic  and 
Gulf  coasts  199  stations. 

On  April  6,  1917,  one  message,  "Plan  One.  Acknowledge," 
incorporated  the  Coast  Guard  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Navy 
during  the  war.  That  service  had  138  line  officers,  70  engineer 
officers,  13  district  superintendents,  and  2  constructors,  a  total 
of  233  commissioned  and  257  warrant  officers,  and  3,478  men 
— a  valuable  addition  to  the  naval  forces.  The  professional 
ability  of  the  Coast  Guard  officers  is  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that  twenty-four  commanded  combatant  ships  operating  in 
European  waters,  five  vessels  of  the  patrol  force  in  the  Carib- 


COAST  GUARD  WON  DISTINCTION  339 

bean  Sea,  and  twenty-three  combatant  craft  attached  to  naval 
districts.  Five  Coast  Guard  officers  commanded  training  camps, 
six  performed  aviation  duty,  two  being  in  command  of  air  sta- 
tions, one  of  these  in  France.  The  Navy  Department,  naturally 
enough,  assigned  to  the  command  of  combatant  ships  only  offi- 
cers whose  experience  and  ability  warranted  such  detail  and 
only  those  officers  in  whom  the  Department  had  implicit 
confidence. 

Commodore  E.  P.  Bertholf,  then  commandant,  and  Com- 
modore W.  E.  Reynolds,  later  commandant  of  the  Coast  Guard, 
and  other  officers  were  assigned  important  administrative  duties. 
Ashore  and  afloat,  officers  and  men  discharged  their  duties  with 
such  efficiency  that  at  the  close  of  the  war  I  strongly  recom- 
mended to  the  President  and  Congress  that  the  Coast  Guard  be 
continued  permanently  as  a  part  of  the  Navy. 

Not  only  was  the  Coast  Guard  an  integral  part  of  the  Navy 
during  the  war,  but  the  Lighthouse  Service  added  1,284  men  to 
the  naval  personnel  and  fifty  vessels  to  the  naval  force.  These 
vessels  did  a  large  part  of  the  work  on  the  defensive  entrance 
areas,  laid  mines,  and  were  employed  as  patrols.  The  light  ves- 
sels and  lighthouses  served  as  lookouts  and  reporting  stations. 
The  Diamond  Shoal  Light  vessel,  off  Cape  Hatteras,  was  sunk 
by  a  German  submarine,  but  not  until  after  it  had  given  warning 
and  saved  a  number  of  vessels.  The  larger  lighthouse  tenders 
were  almost  continuously  in  the  danger-zone  and  were  employed 
to  buoy  the  wrecks  of  torpedoed  vessels. 

The  transfer  of  forty-one  commissioned  officers  of  the  Coast 
and  Geodetic  Survey  gave  the  Navy  additional  officers  who,  from 
their  previous  training  and  experience,  immediately  assumed 
important  duties.  In  addition  to  commanding  patrol  boats  and 
auxiliaries  and  other  service  afloat,  their  scientific  attainments 
made  them  particularly  useful.  For  example,  one  officer,  by 
his  experience  in  developing  the  wire-drag  method  of  search- 
ing for  hidden  rocks  and  dangers,  was  well  fitted  for  research 
work  on  the  anti-submarine  problem.  His  services  were  so  valu- 
able that  he  was  ordered  to  London  to  cooperate  with  the  British 
Admiralty  in  further  study  of  anti-submarine  devices.  Officers 
of  this  service  at  the  Naval  Observatory,  among  other  contribu- 
tions, designed  a  new  type  of  submarine  compass  binnacle  and 


340  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

new  type  of  aircraft  compass.  One  of  the  ships  of  the  Coast  and 
Geodetic  Survey,  the  Surveyor,  did  excellent  service  at  Gibraltar 
and  shared  with  the  Wheeling  and  the  Venita  the  credit  for  a 
successful  attack  on  a  submarine. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 
WINNING  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  THE  WAR 

THE    WAR   AGAINST   DISEASE   FOUGHT   AND    WON    BY    MEDICAL  DEPART- 
MENT  GENERAL    ORDER    NO.     99 — SAFETY    ZONES    ESTABLISHED 

HOSPITALS    OVERSEAS — SKY    PILOT    LEADERSHIP COOPERATION    OF 

VOLUNTEER  WELFARE  ORGANIZATIONS NAVAL  OFFENDERS  HELPED 

TO  FIND  THEMSELVES. 

THE  death  rate  in  the  Navy  by  disease  in  1917-18  was  the 
lowest  in  the  history  of  wars.  Sickness,  until  the  in- 
fluenza epidemic,  was  less  than  in  peace  time.  The  loss 
of  days  by  immoral  disease  decreased  below  the  rate 
prevailing  before  the  war.  Preventive  medicine,  and  war 
against  disease  and  vice  gave  a  record  to  the  Navy  Medical 
Corps  which  is  a  tribute  alike  to  them  and  to  the  profession  to 
which  they  belong. 

No  branch  of  the  military  service  was  more  forehanded  and 
no  officer  saw  more  clearly  the  possible  needs  that  war  would 
entail  or  made  ampler  provision  for  them  than  the  Surgeon  Gen- 
eral of  the  Navy,  Admiral  William  C.  Braisted,  who  in  recogni- 
tion of  his  distinguished  service  was  given  the  privilege  of  re- 
tirement by  a  special  act  of  Congress.  He  was  later  elected 
president  of  the  American  Medical  Association. 

"The  first  battle  of  the  war,  that  against  disease,  was  won 
by  the  Medical  Department  of  the  Navy,"  reported  the  House 
Naval  Affairs  Committee. 

WTien  I  was  pressing  for  large  appropriations  for  the  Med- 
ical Department  of  the  Navy,  the  Chairman  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  asked  me: 

"Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  really  think  there  is  proof  of  the 
absolute  need  for  the  whole  of  the  large  amount  asked  for  by 
the  Surgeon  General?" 

"I  do  not,"  was  my  reply. 

341 


342  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

1 '  Then  why  are  you  here  urging  the  appropriation  of  so  large 
a  sum?"  he  asked. 

"For  the  same  reason,"  I  replied,  "that  will  cause  you  to 
appropriate  it." 

He  looked  at  me  with  some  astonishment  and  I  added : 

I  have  not  the  information  that  justifies  so  large  an  expenditure; 
nobody  has.  The  Surgeon  General,  who  is  a  wise  and  economical  ad- 
ministrator, has  estimated  that  under  certain  contingencies  this  money 
will  be  required.  I  cannot  see  into  the  future.  If  there  are  no  unfore- 
seen casualties  and  no  epidemics,  we  will  neither  need  nor  spend  the 
money.  But  if  the  possible  in  war  happens,  and  some  great  disaster 
or  far-reaching  epidemic  befalls  us,  what  could  I  say  to  the  fathers  and 
mothers  of  the  Republic  if  I  had  disapproved  the  recommendation  of  the 
Surgeon  General,  and  what  would  they  say  of  you  and  the  Congress  if 
you  refused  to  vote  the  appropriation?  The  sum  may  seem  too  large 
to  you  or  to  me.  It  is,  if  past  experience  can  be  depended  upon.  But 
in  war,  in  matters  of  battles  and  wounds  and  death  and  possible  epi- 
demics, our  duty  is  to  make  large  provision  in  the  hope  that  it  may  not) 
all  be  needed. 

The  Chairman,  zealous  to  win  the  war  and  to  give  every  aid, 
led  the  fight  for  the  large  appropriation. 

The  administration  at  Washington,  charged  with  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  early  realized  that  health  was  the  foundation  of 
military  efficiency,  that  health  was  dependent  upon  clean  living, 
and  that  protection  of  men  in  uniform  from  drink  and  disease 
was  the  prime  duty  owed  to  them,  to  their  parents,  and  to  the 
world  dependent,  in  the  last  analysis,  upon  their  fitness  to  fight. 
Ignorance,  intemperance  and  indifference  were  the  first  foes 
to  be  faced  in  1917. 

The  war  broke  precedents.  The  first  broken  was  to  override 
the  ancient  theory  that  Government  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
private  life  of  a  fighter  and  no  duty  to  protect  him  from  immoral 
surroundings.  Our  Government  recognized  that  "the  single 
man  in  khaki  ain't  no  plaster  saint."  As  the  youths  poured  into 
the  training  camps,  harpies  set  up  their  joints  hard  by.  For 
the  first  time  in  history  the  Government  said  to  them:  "Thou 
shalt  not."  It  drove  them  and  their  establishments  from  the 
vicinity  of  stations  and  camps. 

Authority  was  given  by  Congress  for  the  Chief  Executive  to 
establish   zone  systems   for  protection   of  camps.     President 


WINNING  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  THE  WAR      343 

Wilson  established  zones  wherever  sailors,  soldiers,  or  marines 
were  undergoing  training.  Appeals  were  made  to  state  and 
local  authorities  for  assistance.  Writing  early  in  1917  to 
the  Governor  of  Rhode  Island,  where  military  efficiency  was 
jeopardized  by  failure  to  enforce  laws,  I  said : 

There  lies  upon  us  morally,  to  a  degree  far  outreaching  any  technical 
responsibility,  the  duty  of  leaving  nothing  undone  to  protect  these  young 
men  from  that  contamination  of  their  bodies  which  will  not  only  impair 
their  military  efficiency  but  *  *  *  return  them  to  their  homes  a 
source  of  danger  to  their  families  and  the  community  at  large. 

Seeking  his  hearty  cooperation,  I  reminded  this  executive 
that  these  dangers  were  bad  enough  in  ordinary  times,  but  were 
multiplied  manifold  in  times  of  war  when  great  bodies  of  men 
are  necessarily  gathered  together  away  from  the  restraints  of 
home  and  under  the  stress  of  emotions  and  reaction  which  tend 
to  dislodge  the  standards  of  normal  life. 

A  Commission  on  Training  Camp  Activities,  headed  by  Mr. 
Raymond  Fosdick,  led  in  the  welfare  work,  extending  from  the 
home  to  the  trenches  and  turrets.    The  other  members  were : 

John  J.  Eagan,  Vice  Chairman,  Clifford  W.  Barnes,  Lieutenant 
Richard  E.  Byrd,  U.  S.  N.,  Walter  Camp,  Selah  Chamberlain,  Lee  F. 
Hanmer,  Joseph  Lee,  Lieutenant  Commander  Claude  B.  Mayo,  U.  S.  N., 
E.  T.  Meredith,  Barton  Myers,  Charles  P.  Neill,  Mrs.  Helen  Ring  Robin- 
son, Mrs.  Finley  J.  Shepard,  Mrs.  Daisy  McLaurin  Stevens,  Mrs.  Edward 
T.  Stotesbury,  John  S.  Tichenor,  Dean  C.  Mathews,  Secretary,  Marion 
M.  Jackson,  Field  Secretary. 

The  multitude  of  religious  and  social  agencies,  anxious  to 
serve,  made  it  necessary  for  the  Government  to  give  its  im- 
primatur to  certain  organized  forces  whose  benefactions  justi- 
fied such  recognition.  I  refer  to  the  Red  Cross,  Young  Men's 
Christian  Association,  Young  Women's  Christian  Association, 
Knights  of  Columbus,  Young  Hebrew  Association,  Salvation 
Army  and  American  Library  Association.  They  cooperated 
cordially  with  Army  and  Navy  authorities. 

The  inspiration  and  leadership  of  the  religious  and  welfare 
work  of  the  Navy  came  from  its  corps  of  chaplains.  There  had 
been  no  addition  to  the  number  of  the  corps  for  forty  years  be- 
fore 1914.  The  increase  gave  a  "sky  pilot"  for  every  great  ship 
and  every  important  station.  Additions  in  the  regular  and  re- 
serve  corps    when   war   came    enabled    the    Navy   to    supply 


344  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

religious  direction  by  consecrated  men  of  every  creed.  They 
went  with  the  Marines  into  Belleau  Wood,  with  Rodman's  fleet 
in  the  North  Sea,  guided  the  new  recruits  on  sea  and  shore — 
faithful,  devoted  spiritual  leaders  in  days  when  men  unafraid 
looked  death  in  the  face.  These  soldiers  of  the  cross  were  com- 
rades in  battle,  shipmates  in  storm,  and  comforters  in  death. 

In  1914  an  order  was  issued  known  as  "General  Order  99" 
prohibiting  the  introduction  of  intoxicants  as  a  beverage  on  any 
ship  or  station  in  the  Navy.  That  temperance  order  was  in  these 
words : 

General  Order  No.  99 

Navy  Department 
Washington,  D.  C,  June  1,  1914. 

On  July  1,  1914,  article  827,  Naval  Instructions,  will  be  annulled, 
and  in  its  stead  the  following  will  be  substituted : 

"The  use  or  introduction  for  drinking  purposes  of  alcoholic  liquors 
on  board  any  naval  vessel,  or  within  any  navy  yard  or  station,  is  strictly 
prohibited,  and  commanding  officers  will  be  held  responsible  for  the 
enforcement  of  this  order. ' ' 

Josephus  Daniels, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

This  was  recommended  by  the  Surgeon  General  of  the  Navy. 
If  not  universally  popular  when  it  was  promulgated,  when  war 
came  it  was  recognized  that  it  had  contributed  to  the  fitness  of 
the  naval  personnel.  The  zone  system  of  excluding  drink  and 
houses  of  ill  fame  from  training  places,  laws  prohibiting  the 
sale  of  liquor  to  any  man  in  uniform,  war-time  prohibition,  and 
finally  the  ratifying  of  the  national  prohibition  amendment  to 
the  Constitution  evidenced  the  progressive  steps  taken  for  pro- 
tection of  men  in  uniform. 

With  the  coming  of  war,  plans  made  long  before  were  put 
into  effect.  Permanent  hospitals  were  enlarged  and  temporary 
hospitals  built  to  make  ready  for  the  large  expansion  in  per- 
sonnel. The  bed  capacity  within  eight  months  was  increased 
from  3,850  to  15,689,  and  before  the  end  of  the  war  to  over 
19,000.  Four  hospitals  were  established  in  Great  Britain.  One 
was  at  Strathpeffer,  Scotland,  in  easy  communication  with  the 
Grand  Fleet  and  the  bases  established  by  the  North  Sea  mining 
groups.    It  was  magnificently  located  and  splendidly  equipped, 


WINNING  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  THE  WAR      345 

and  proved  of  great  service  to  the  British  Navy  as  well  as  our 
own.  Another  at  Leith  was  near  one  of  the  North  Sea  bases, 
and  a  third  was  established  at  Queenstown,  the  chief  base  of 
our  destroyers  operating  with  the  British.  Early  in  the  war 
two  base  hospital  units  were  sent  to  Brest.  Dispensaries  and 
hospitals  were  established  in  the  Mediterranean  at  Corfu,  in 
Italy,  France,  Gibraltar  and  the  Azores.  Three  hospital  ships 
were  in  service  commanded  by  medical  officers,  who,  as  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  wisely  said,  should  always  be  in  command  of 
hospital  ships. 

When  the  armistice  was  signed  the  Navy  was  ready  to  bring 
back  from  France  30,000  sick  and  wounded  men  per  month. 
Wherever  men  of  the  Navy  and  Marine  Corps  were  on  duty  in 
Europe,  naval  medical  officers  were  with  them  with  all  equip- 
ment needed.  The  personnel  of  the  Medical  Corps  increased 
from  353  doctors  to  3,093;  from  34  to  485  dentists;  woman 
nurses  from  160  to  1,713;  members  of  the  Hospital  Corps 
from  1,585  to  16,564.  Into  the  Medical  Reserve  came  many  of 
the  ablest  men  in  the  profession.  To  the  regulars  and  the  re- 
serves, the  woman  nurses  and  the  hospital  corps,  went  out  the 
gratitude  of  the  men  wounded  and  ill  to  whom  they  administered 
unselfishly.  Private  John  C.  Geiger,  a  Marine,  who  lost  his  right 
foot  as  a  result  of  a  wound  in  Belleau  Wood,  voiced  the  feeling 
of  all  fighting  men  when  he  said : 

But  I  want  to  give  credit  to  those  hospital  corps  men  of  the  Navy, 
who  worked  with  the  Marines.  Those  fellows  deserve  a  gold  medal  or 
the  highest  award  they  can  receive.  Why,  before  we  could  reach  our 
objective,  they  were  right  out  on  the  field  picking  up  and  tagging  the 
wounded.  They  didn't  mind  the  danger  and  did  their  duty  without 
protection  of  any  kind.  They  were  unarmed  and  could  not  shoot  a 
German  if  they  did  run  across  one. 

With  the  arrangements  by  which  the  Navy  was  to  man  the 
transports,  a  new  and  unexpected  duty,  it  became  necessary  for 
the  Medical  Corps  to  expand  its  personnel  and  undertake  a  serv- 
ice that  called  for  discretion  and  judgment  as  well  as  medical 
skill.  Never  in  the  history  of  troop  movements  have  troops  been 
so  well  taken  care  of,  their  health  protected  in  every  possible 
manner,  the  sanitary  precautions  provided,  and  such  attention 
and   elaborate  provision  made  for  the  care  of  the   sick   and 


346  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

wounded.  The  larger  transports  were  indeed  combined  trans- 
ports and  hospital  ships. 

This  transport  work  was  taken  over  and  performed  entirely 
by  the  Medical  Department  of  the  Navy  without  extra  appro- 
priation and  without  expense  to  the  Army.  Every  contingency 
was  met.  The  provisions  were  ample  for  the  care  of  sick  troops 
in  transit,  and  there  were  returned  on  naval  transports,  151,649 
Army  sick,  wounded  and  insane ;  4,385  Navy ;  and  3,625  Marines 
from  the  expeditionary  forces  in  France. 

The  Navy  always  put  the  man  before  the  gun.  If  a  member 
of  the  Navy  did  wrong,  we  sought  to  save  him.  Two  thousand 
men,  punished  for  offenses  committed,  were  restored  during  the 
war,  and  most  of  them  made  good.  This  was  possible  by  the 
restoration  of  morale  through  the  Mutual  Welfare  League  or- 
ganized in  naval  prisons.  It  was  an  experiment  that  contra- 
vened all  former  military  methods,  and  was  inaugurated  by 
Thomas  Mott  Osborne.  Desiring  to  substitute  modern  penology 
for  the  methods  in  vogue,  I  requested  Mr.  Osborne  to  become 
head  of  the  naval  prison,  and  he  was  commissioned  as  lieutenant 
commander  in  the  Reserves.  In  the  League  he  gave  a  large 
measure  of  self  government  to  prisoners.  He  used  discipline  as 
a  means  of  helping  young  men  to  find  themselves,  and  its  success 
was  most  encouraging.    Too  much  honor  cannot  be  given  him. 

" Treat  men  as  pawns  and  nine-pins,"  said  Emerson,  "and 
you  shall  suffer  as  well  as  they.  If  you  leave  out  their  heart 
you  shall  lose  your  own."  It  was  that  spirit,  as  well  as  the 
disuse  of  bread  and  water  and  solitary  confinement  and  other 
ancient  punishments,  which  made  naval  discipline  the  pattern 
for  dealing  with  military  offenders. 

There  was  no  "hard  boiled"  discipline  tolerated  in  the  Navy. 
Courts-martial  were  reviewed  in  a  spirit  of  meting  out  justice, 
with  consideration  and  discrimination,  as  well  as  mercy.  Ad- 
miral George  R.  Clark,  Judge  Advocate  General  during  most 
of  the  war,  set  new  standards  of  military  court  procedure  and 
lessened  the  rigors  of  punishment. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 
FIGHTING  THE  PROFITEERS 

MANY    MILLIONS    SAVED    BY    REFUSING   TO    PAY    EXORBITANT    PRICES 

i  '  NAVY     ORDER"     PREVENTED     EXTORTION OVER     THREE     BILLION 

DOLLARS  EXPENDED  WITH  NEVER  A  HINT  OF  GRAFT  OR  EXTRAVA- 
GANCE  COMPETITION  ADHERED  TO  IN  WAR — FEEDING  AND  CLOTH- 
ING 500,000  MEN  A  BIG  TASK,  ACCOMPLISHED  WITH  SIGNAL  SUC- 
CESS— SAVING  IN  HUGE  SHORE  CONSTRUCTION. 

THE  Navy  spent  over  three  billion  dollars  for  war  pur- 
pose without  a  suggestion  of  extravagance  or  graft.    To 
be  exact,  Congress  appropriated  $3,692,354,324.71.     Of 
the  amount  $334,360,000  were  returned  to  the  Treasury, 
in  February,  1919,  and  additional  sums  later  by  the  sale  of 
excess  supplies  and  vessels  that  were  no  longer  needed. 

The  rule  of  the  Department,  "A  dollar's  worth  of  Navy  for 
every  dollar  spent,"  was  adhered  to  in  war  as  well  as  in  peace. 
Early  in  1917  steel  was  contracted  for  at  2.90  for  Navy  ships 
when  the  price  was  soaring  in  the  market.  Coal  and  oil  and 
copper  were  purchased  at  reasonable  prices  or  commandeered. 
Manufacturers  of  torpedoes  and  smokeless  powder  and  other 
makers  of  munitions  were  held  to  reasonable  profits.  Where 
munition  or  supply  dealers  wished  more  than  a  fair  profit,  a 
"Navy  Order"  was  placed. 

The  history  of  the  "Navy  Order"  should  be  told,  for  it  was 
the  weapon  that  saved  the  Navy  from  profiteering.  Competition 
prevailed  through  the  war  in  all  purchases  except  where  the 
supply  was  inadequate  for  war  necessities.  In  some  cases  the 
exigency  of  war  demanded  commandeering  orders.  Such  orders 
were  sometimes  required  because  excessive  prices  were  quoted, 
but  often  because  the  only  private  concerns  which  could  manu- 
facture the  article  needed  were  under  contract  for  all  their  out- 
put. If  they  furnished  the  government  of  their  own  will,  they 
were  liable  to  the  parties  who  had  contracted  for  their  product. 

347 


348  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

In  such  instances,  a  commandeering  order  was  necessary  both 
to  obtain  a  war  necessity  and  to  protect  the  manufacturers. 

In  the  naval  appropriation  act  a  provision  was  early  in- 
serted, drawn  by  Chairman  Padgett,  giving  the  power,  when 
agreement  could  not  be  reached  as  to  the  price  for  something 
essential,  to  commandeer  it — whether  ships  or  land  or  munitions 
or  supplies — and  pay  75  per  cent  of  the  appraisement,  leaving 
to  the  owner  the  right  to  contest  in  the  courts  the  reasonableness 
of  the  compensation  so  fixed.  That  provision  later  became  ap- 
plicable to  all  war  agencies  of  Government.  It  was  not  often 
invoked.  The  knowledge  that  the  power  was  there  and  the 
declaration  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  he  would  invoke 
it  when  any  excessive  price  was  demanded,  and  its  use  in  some 
notable  instances,  made  profiteering  on  the  Navy  not  easy,  and 
it  was  seldom  undertaken. 

"  Certain  coal  operators  are  demanding  excessive  prices  for 
coal,"  said  an  officer  of  the  Supply  Department  when  coal  was 
necessary  to  bring  back  soldiers  and  munitions  from  Europe 
and  carry  on  naval  operations. 

" Place  a  Navy  Order"  was  the  direction,  and  the  Navy 
secured  its  coal  from  mines  that  produced  Navy  coal  at  prices 
that  were  not  excessive. 

At  another  time  some  oil  operators,  while  selling  oil  to 
foreign  ships,  were  refusing  to  deliver  any  oil  to  our  ships  on 
a  naval  order. 

''What  shall  we  do?"  asked  the  officer  in  charge. 

''Order  the  Marines  to  seize  the  oil,"  was  the  direction. 

The  Marines  had  the  reputation  for  carrying  out  orders.  It 
was  not  necessary  for  them  to  take  the  oil  by  force,  but  they 
were  ready  to  do  it  if  the  oil  had  not  been  furnished  otherwise. 

These  two  cases  were  exceptional  and  they  occurred  after 
the  armistice.  As  a  rule,  manufacturers  and  business  men  and 
bankers,  as  well  as  farmers  and  mechanics,  showed  from  the 
moment  war  began  that  they,  like  our  soldiers  and  sailors,  had 
forgotten  all  selfish  interests,  all  class  interests  of  every  kind. 
While  the  fighting  men  in  the  field  gave  the  world  a  new  con- 
ception of  democracy,  men  of  affairs  were  given  the  opportunity 
which,  with  few  exceptions,  they  embraced,  of  showing  to  the 
world  that  the  American's  idea  of  his  money,  like  his  idea  of 


FIGHTING  THE  PROFITEERS  349 

his  life,  was  something  which  was  to  be  freely  and  ungrudgingly 
given  for  his  ideals  and  his  country  whenever  his  country  called. 

One  of  the  early  supplies  that  had  to  be  husbanded  was  coal. 
At  a  conference  of  coal  operators  held  in  Washington  in  the 
spring  of  1917,  an  agreement  was  made  for  Navy  coal  at  reason- 
able prices,  all  operators  to  furnish  their  fair  proportion  to 
meet  the  needs. 

In  1916  a  board  of  officers  in  the  Navy  Department  was 
named  which  was  an  important  step  in  preparedness.  Its  duties 
were  to  get  together  at  frequent  intervals,  to  compare  notes,  to 
place  on  record  probable  needs  and  then  to  find  out  definitely 
where  the  necessary  supplies  could  be  obtained,  in  what  quan- 
tities and  how  soon.  Its  work  was  most  helpful  in  securing 
active  cooperation  all  along  the  line  and  also  in  pointing  the 
path — in  a  very  modest  way — toward  the  successful  accomplish- 
ment of  the  task  which  was  soon  to  be  faced  by  the  War  In- 
dustries Board.  This  commodity-section  plan,  according  to 
which  the  War  Industries  Board  effected  its  own  first  success- 
ful internal  organization,  originated  for  naval  uses  in  the  Bureau 
of  Supplies  and  Accounts,  and,  while  the  War  Industries  Board 
rendered  most  useful  and  invaluable  service  to  the  Navy,  such 
help  as  was  received  related  solely  to  priorities  and  to  items  of 
supplies  and  services  of  which  there  was  a  shortage.  So  long 
as  supply  exceeded  or  equalled  demand  and  the  usual  orderly 
processes  of  business  could  consequently  function,  the  Navy's 
long-established  methods  of  procedure  stood  the  test  of  war 
unchanged  and  unscathed. 

The  Navy,  as  did  all  other  war  agencies,  leaned  upon  the 
War  Industries  Board  which,  by  priority  orders,  saw  that  war 
material  was  furnished  where  most  needed.  Admiral  Frank 
F.  Fletcher  was  the  Navy's  representative  on  the  Board.  He 
showed  the  same  ability  in  that  important  position  which  he  had 
demonstrated  when  commander-in-chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet. 

The  War  Industries  Board,  which  rendered  invaluable  serv- 
ice, was  made  up  of  men  who  won  national  approval  by  their 
masterful  handling  of  the  big  tasks  committed  to  them.  Its 
membership  was:  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  chairman;  Andrew 
Legge,  vice-chairman ;  Robert  S.  Brookings,  Hugh  Prayne,  Roar 
Admiral  F.  F.  Fletcher,  Brigadier  General  Hugh  S.  Johnson, 


350  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Judge  Edwin  B.  Parker,  George  N.  Peek,  J.  L.  Replogle,  L.  L. 
Summers;  H.  P.  Ingels,  secretary;  Albert  C.  Ritchie,  general 
counsel ;  Herbert  Bayard  Swope,  associate  member  of  the  board, 
assistant  to  chairman.  Admiral  C.  J.  Peoples  was  the  Navy 
representative  on  priorities. 

All  supplies  for  the  Navy,  except  such  as  were  regulated  by 
priority  orders,  were  obtained  throughout  the  war  by  formal 
contracts  entered  into  after  the  widest  possible  public  com- 
petition in  the  open  market,  the  only  restriction  being  that — as 
required  by  Section  3722  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States — no  person  was  allowed  to  bid  unless  he  was  a  manufac- 
turer or  regular  dealer. 

Throughout  the  war,  all  formalities  attendant  upon  the  open- 
ing of  bids  were  strictly  adhered  to.  The  proposals  were  opened 
every  day — sometimes  far  into  the  night — and  read  out  publicly, 
each  bidder  having  ample  opportunity  to  know  his  competitors ' 
offers  and  also  to  be  sure  that  his  own  were  not  overlooked.  Even 
in  the  few  cases  where  military  secrecy  was  obligatory,  there  was 
still  genuine  competition.  The  eight  bidders,  for  instance,  on 
the  mines  for  the  North  Sea  Barrage  were  invited  to  meet  each 
other  and  the  purchasing  officials  in  a  locked  and  guarded  room, 
even  these  confidential  bids  being  strictly  competitive. 

The  idea  in  all  business  dealings  by  the  Navy  was  that  every 
single  transaction — indeed  every  part  of  every  transaction — 
must  not  only  be  right  but  look  right. 

It  is  scarcely  to  be  wondered  at  that  by  following  this  rule 
and  also  by  giving  prompt  inspections  and  making  immediate 
payments,  the  Navy  throughout  the  war  maintained  most  cordial 
relations  with  a  business  public  which  well  knew  that  every 
contract  was  awarded  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder  whose 
goods  were  up  to  the  standard  required  by  specifications  and 
fit  for  the  use  for  which  they  were  intended.  It  was  largely  for 
this  reason  that  the  purchasing  machinery  was  able  to  expand  so 
enormously  without  confusion  or  delay.  In  one  day  during  the 
war  the  purchases  amounted  to  over  $30,000,000,  as  compared 
with  $19,000,000  during  the  heaviest  pre-war  year. 

Looking  back  at  it  now,  the  mere  suggestion  of  waiving  com- 
petition— and  thereby  striking  at  the  very  foundation  of  the 
system — brings  a  smile  of  incredulity.    But  it  was  no  joke  at 


FIGHTING  THE  PROFITEERS  351 

the  time.  Scarcely  had  war  been  declared  when  requests  came 
from  a  number  of  quarters  for  authority  ' '  to  cut  red  tape ' '  by 
doing  away  with  competition,  the  argument  being  advanced  that 
deliveries  could  thereby  be  expedited  and  important  work  ac- 
celerated. The  idea  was  not  easy  to  suppress,  because  its  many 
advocates  really  believed  they  were  right  and  insisted  upon  con- 
vincing superior  authority.  The  answer  was  that  competition 
was  bound  to  speed  things  up  rather  than  retard  them  and  that, 
in  any  event,  the  responsible  officials  in  Washington  had  given 
the  matter  due  consideration  and  decided  definitely  and  finally 
that  competition  must  continue  uninterruptedly,  as  to  every- 
thing except  where  the  demand  so  largely  exceeded  the  supply 
as  to  compel  priority  orders. 

The  record  of  the  commissary  branch — and  this  applies  to 
the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  soldiers  transported  overseas  and 
back  as  well  as  the  half-million  men  within  the  Navy  itself — was 
one  of  unqualified  success  from  first  to  last  and  one  of  which 
the  service  has  good  reason  to  be  proud.  Never  were  men  in 
uniform  so  well  fed  or  was  so  much  attention  paid  to  a  balanced 
and  abundant  ration.  "Only  the  best  (with  no  substitute  said 
to  be  'equally  as  good'),  is  good  enough  for  our  fighting  men," 
was  the  motto  of  Rear  Admiral  Samuel  McGowan,  Chief  of  the 
Bureau  of  Supplies  and  Accounts,  and  his  capable  assistants, 
who  took  the  greatest  pride  in  seeing  that  men  in  the  service 
never  even  knew,  except  by  reading  in  the  papers,  that  Govern- 
ment restriction  was  put  upon  the  quantity  and  kind  of  food  for 
civilians. 

With  respect  to  the  forwarding  of  supplies  of  every  descrip- 
tion to  the  forces  abroad,  an  intra-bureau  order  issued  by 
Admiral  McGowan  in  July,  1917,  directed  that  every  wish  of 
the  senior  naval  officer  in  European  waters  should  be  complied 
with  on  the  same  day  that  it  became  known — indeed  that  the 
discretion  vested  in  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Supplies  was 
already  exercised  when  the  needs  of  European  forces  were  made 
known. 

WTien  the  armistice  was  signed  and  demobilization  followed, 
there  was  on  hand  a  quantity  of  supplies  in  excess  of  prospective 
needs.  The  same  supply  officers,  who  had  so  capably  provided 
for  the  Navy's  wants  during  hostilities,  promptly  inaugurated 


352  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

a  selling  campaign;  and,  on  the  first  $70,000,000  worth  of  sur- 
plus thus  disposed  of,  the  Government  realized  a  net  profit  of 
more  than  three  millions. 

Throughout  the  entire  ordeal — preparation,  operation,  de- 
mobilization— the  Navy's  business  organization  functioned  in 
all  its  various  branches  with  full  one  hundred  per  cent  effective- 
ness. So  much  so,  in  fact,  that  an  investigating  sub-committee 
from  the  House  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  officially  reported 
to  Congress  that  the  Bureau  of  Supplies  and  Accounts  ''has  won 
and  well  deserves  a  nation-wide  reputation  for  business 
efficiency. ' ' 

In  appreciation  of  the  service  rendered  by  Admiral  Mc- 
Gowan,  Congress  passed  an  act  authorizing  his  retirement 
earlier  than  the  usual  time  prescribed.  This  recognition  was 
limited  in  its  terms,  applicable  only  to  the  Paymaster  General, 
the  Surgeon  General  and  the  Chief  Naval  Constructor.  And  no 
special  distinction  was  ever  more  deserved. 

Sound  business  principles  were  adhered  to  when  it  became 
necessary  to  give  navy  orders  and  provide  funds  for  enlarge- 
ment or  construction  of  plants.  Reference  has  been  made  to 
the  methods  of  securing  munitions  of  all  characters.  When  it 
was  necessary  to  take  over  an  optical  plant,  for  example,  expert 
ordnance  officers  carried  on  its  operation  without  injury  to  the 
rights  of  its  owners,  and  expert  accountants  kept  all  trans- 
actions in  accordance  with  the  most  approved  business  practice. 

Most  of  the  great  construction  was  done  under  contract,  as 
for  example  the  giant  armor  plate  and  projectile  plant  at 
Charleston,  W.  Va.,  and  the  big  dry-docks  at  Philadelphia  and 
at  Norfolk. 

When  the  demand  for  new  and  larger  training  stations  and 
other  shore  establishments,  which  ran  into  hundreds  of  millions 
of  dollars,  made  it  impossible  to  secure  fixed  price  contracts, 
the  supervision  of  the  work  was  so  efficient  in  the  few  cost-plus 
contracts  that  the  cost  was  less  than  if  undertaken  under  con- 
tract at  a  fixed  price.  This  was  notably  true  of  the  two  mam- 
moth office  buildings  occupied  by  the  Navy  Department  and  cer- 
tain divisions  of  the  War  Department.  The  story  of  these  two 
buildings — the  largest  office  structures  in  the  world — is  interest- 
ing.   The  need  for  more  space  by  the  two  war  departments  of 


A  GENERAL  VIEW  OF  BANTRY  BAY 
At  Berehaven,  in  Bantry  Bay,  the  Americans  maintained  a  large  Bubmarine  base. 


t& 


A     CLOSE-UP  VIEW  OF  AMERICAN  "SUBS"   AT   BEREHAVEN 


EODMAN  AND  BEATTY 

Rear  Admiral  Hugh  Eodman,  who  commanded  the  American  battle  squadron  in 
the  North  Sea,  and  Admiral,  the  Earl  Beatty,  commander-in-chief  of  the  British  Grand 
Fleet. 


FIGHTING  THE  PROFITEERS  353 

the  Government  was  recognized,  even  after  temporary  modern 
structures  had  been  completed.  Congress  was  asked  for  relief, 
and  plans  were  presented.  The  Navy  urged  upon  the  ( Ihairman 
of  the  House  Appropriations  Committee  the  construction  of  fire- 
proof concrete  buildings  instead  of  the  flimsy  wooden  fire-traps 
built  in  the  hurry  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  suggestion 
met  with  favor,  and  the  Navy  was  authorized  to  proceed  with 
the  construction  of  both  buildings,  the  one  for  the  Army  as  well 
as  the  one  for  the  Navy.  Under  the  direction  of  Captain  A.  L. 
Parsons,  U.  S.  N.,  these  structures  were  completed  within  five 
months  at  a  price  lower  than  the  sums  estimated  by  most  con- 
tractors. They  stand  today  as  the  best  arranged  office  buildings 
in  Washington,  a  monument  to  naval  business  methods  and  con- 
struction efficiency  and  to  the  wisdom  of  Congress. 

The  vast  shore  construction  program,  involving  more  than 
$300,000,000,  was  carried  out  with  the  greatest  energy  and  effi- 
ciency by  the  Bureau  of  Yards  and  Docks,  under  the  direction, 
first,  of  Admiral  F.  R.  Harris  and,  later,  of  Admiral  Charles  W. 
Parks.  The  civil  engineers,  permanent  and  reserve,  who  di- 
rected shore  construction  in  this  country  and  in  Europe,  more 
than  measured  up  to  war  demands. 

The  Board  of  Compensation,  of  which  Admiral  Washington 
Capps  was  made  chairman,  rendered  service  beyond  computa- 
tion in  protecting  the  government  in  all  ''Navy  order"  contracts. 
Millions  of  dollars  were  saved  by  the  thoroughness  and  effi- 
ciency with  which  this  important  board  performed  its  manifold 
and  difficult  duties. 

The  only  criticism  of  the  Navy  voiced  during  the  war  was 
that  it  was  too  insistent  upon  holding  on  to  peace-time  com- 
petition and  economies.  One  officer  complained  that  I  "held  up 
an  order  for  torpedoes."  He  was  correct.  It  was  held  up  long 
enough  to  secure  a  conference  with  the  makers.  By  a  few  days' 
delay  on  one  order,  $5,000,000  was  saved,  and  we  always  had 
an  abundant  supply.  In  one  order  for  shells  $200,000  was  saved. 
Such  instances  could  be  multiplied  many  times.  Insistence 
upon  competition,  where  possible,  and  strict  inspection  in  other 
cases,  enabled  the  Navy  to  close  the  war  with  the  assurance  that 
naval  expenditures  were  as  free  from  extravagance  as  they  were 
untainted  by  graft  or  favoritism. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 
"SIRS,  ALL  IS  WELL  WITH  THE  FLEET" 

TWO    THOUSAND    VESSELS    IN    SERVICE 200,000     MEN     OVERSEAS    OR 

TRANSPORTING  TROOPS  AND  SUPPLIES  ACROSS  ATLANTIC 373  SHIPS, 

81,000  OFFICERS  AND  MEN  IN  EUROPEAN  FORCES — VISITS  OF  ROOSE- 
VELT, BENSON,  MAYO  AND  CONGRESSIONAL  COMMITTEE PER- 
SHING 's  TRIBUTE. 

WITH  more  than  two  thousand  vessels  in  service  and 
533,000  officers  and  men,  the  largest  personnel  ever 
possessed  by  any  Navy,  our  naval  operations  in 
the  World  War  literally  belted  the  globe.  Operating 
with  the  Allies  from  the  Arctic  to  the  Adriatic,  from  Corfu  to 
the  Azores,  we  manned  and  operated  the  vast  fleet  of  American 
transports  carrying  troops,  munitions  and  supplies  across  the 
Atlantic,  and  furnished  man-of-war  escort  to  protect  them. 

Patrolling  our  own  coasts  and  the  Western  Atlantic,  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea,  our  vessels  also  kept 
watch  in  South  American  waters  and  guarded  the  approaches 
to  the  Panama  Canal.  Our  ships  in  South  American  waters, 
commanded  by  Admiral  W.  B.  Caperton,  cooperated  with  the 
naval  forces  of  our  sister  republics  and  gave  insurance  against 
possible  raiders  and  submarines.  Ships  under  Caperton,  the 
squadron  under  Anderson  in  the  Caribbean  and  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  and  Mayo's  ships  further  north  maintained  the  patrol 
throughout  the  war  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

Guarding  against  raiders  and  German  activities  in  the 
Pacific,  our  operations  extended  from  our  west  coast  to  Hawaii, 
Guam  and  the  Philippines,  and  our  vessels  in  the  Orient  co- 
operated with  the  Japanese  and  other  Allied  naval  forces  from 
Manila  to  Vladivostok.  The  destroyers  sent  from  Cavite,  which 
voyaged  twelve  thousand  miles  through  the  Straits,  the  Indian 
Ocean,  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Mediterranean,  met  at  Gibraltar  the 
forces  from  the  other  side  of  the  world. 

Eight  hundred  and  thirty-four  vessels  and  two  hundred 

354 


"SIRS,  ALL  IS  WELL  WITH  THE  FLEET"       355 

thousand  men  of  the  United  States  Navy  were  either  serving  in 
European  waters  or  engaged  in  transporting  troops  and  sup- 
plies to  Europe,  before  hostilities  ended.  This  was  more  than 
twice  as  many  ships  and  nearly  three  times  as  many  officers  and 
men  as  were  in  naval  service  before  the  war. 

Four  hundred  vessels  were  assigned  to  the  Naval  Forces 
Operating  in  European  WTaters,  373  being  present  at  the  time 
of  the  armistice— 70  destroyers,  5  gunboats,  5  Coast  Guard  cut- 
ters, 120  submarine  chasers,  27  yachts,  12  submarines,  13 
mine  sweepers,  10  mine  planters,  8  battleships,  3  cruisers,  16 
tugs,  4  cross-channel  transports,  55  vessels  carrying  coal  for 
the  army,  18  tenders  and  repair  ships,  and  7  vessels  of  miscel- 
laneous types.  In  addition  three  Russian  destroyers  were 
manned  by  United  States  naval  personnel.  Eighty-one  thousand 
officers  and  men  of  the  Navy  were  in  service  in  Europe.  Thirty 
thousand  Marines  were  sent  overseas  for  service  with  the  Army 
and  1,600  for  naval  duty  ashore. 

But  that  by  no  means  covers  all  the  service  performed  for 
the  Allies  and  our  own  forces  in  Europe.  The  entire  Cruiser 
and  Transport  Force,  with  its  83  vessels,  3,000  officers  and 
41,000  men;  and  the  Naval  Overseas  Transportation  Service, 
with  378  vessels  in  operation,  manned  by  4,692  officers  and 
29,175  men,  were  in  trans- Atlantic  service,  carrying  troops  and 
supplies.  Practically  all  the  384  merchant  ships  which  had 
naval  armed  guards  and  navy  guns  were  carrying  food,  ma- 
terials and  other  articles  to  allied  armies  and  peoples.  Thirty 
thousand  of  the  naval  personnel  were,  at  one  time  or  another, 
engaged  in  this  service.  Thus,  a  total  of  834  vessels  and  more 
than  200,000  officers  and  men  of  the  Navy  and  Marine  Corps 
were  engaged  either  in  European  service  or  in  trans-Atlantic 
service  to  and  from  Europe. 

Our  forces  in  Europe  operated  in  forty-seven  different 
localities,  extending  from  the  Arctic  Ocean  all  the  way  around 
to  the  Adriatic  Sea.  The  extent  of  our  operations  is  seen  from 
this  list  of  the  principal  naval  bases,  and  the  United  States  naval 
vessels  on  duty  at  each  of  them  on  November  11,  1918: 

Queenstown  (2  tenders,  24  destroyers,  30  chasers,  3  tugs) 59 

Berehaven  (3  battleships,  1  tender,  7  submarines,  1  tug,  1  oiler) 13 


356  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Brest  (1  gunboat,  16  yachts,  3  tenders,  38  destroyers,  9  tugs,  1  station 

ship,  4  steam  barges,  4  barges,  9  mine  sweepers) 85 

Cardiff  (1  tender,  1  refrigerator  hulk,  55  colliers) 57 

Gibraltar  (2  cruisers,  4  gunboats,  5  Coast  Guard  cutters,  9  yachts, 

1  tender,  6  destroyers,  18  chasers) 45 

Genoa  (2  tugs)    2 

Azores  (2  yachts,  1  tender,  1  oiler,  2  mine  sweepers,  5  submarines, 

1  tug)    12 

Grand  Fleet  (5  battleships) 5 

Murmansk  (1  cruiser,  also  3  Russian  destroyers) 1 

Mine  Force  (1  tender,  10  mine  layers,  2  mine  sweepers) 13 

Southampton  (4  transports)   4 

Plymouth  (1  tender,  2  destroyers,  36  chasers) 39 

Corfu  (1  tender,  36  chasers) 37 

Liverpool   (1  oiler)    1 

Naval  aviation  activities  were  almost  as  extensive  as  those 
of  our  ships,  extending  from  England,  Ireland  and  Northern 
France  to  eastern  Italy.    There  were  thirty  aviation  bases,  the 
Northern  Bombing  Group  considered  as  one  base: 
Ireland — Queenstown  (2  stations,  seaplane,  and  assembly  and  repair)  ; 

Whiddy  Island,  "Wexford,  Lough  Foyle,  Berehaven. 
England — Killingholme,  Eastleigh. 
France — Dunkirk,  Northern  Bombing  Group ;  Treguier,  L '  Aber  Vrach, 

Fromentine,  St.  Trojan,  Arcachon,  Pauillac,  La  Trinite,  La  Pallice, 

Moutchic,  Paimboeuf,  Rochefort,  Gujan,  Brest,  Guipivas,  Le  Croisic, 

and  He  Tudy. 
Italy — Lake  Bolseno,  Pofto  Corsini,  Pescara. 
Azores — Marine  Corps  aviators. 

Two  divisions  of  our  submarines  operated  in  European 
waters — seven  at  Berehaven,  Ireland,  with  the  Bushnell  as  ten- 
der, and  five  at  the  Azores.  Twenty-one  sightings  of  enemy 
submarines  and  four  torpedo  attacks  were  reported  by  the  Bere- 
haven division.  The  AL-2  (Lieutenant  P.  F.  Foster,  command- 
ing) had  a  remarkable  encounter  on  July  10, 1918.  Shaken  by  a 
terrific  explosion,  evidently  that  of  a  torpedo,  the  AL-2  discov- 
ered the  periscope  of  a  submarine  apparently  injured  and  at- 
tempting to  get  to  the  surface.  The  only  chance  to  get  the 
U-boat  was  to  ram  it  submerged,  and  the  AL-2  executed  a  crash 
dive,  which  carried  it  down  a  hundred  feet.  It  barely  missed  the 
German,  who  was  trying  to  slip  under  the  American  submarine. 
Swinging  around,  the  AL-2  started  again  after  the  enemy,  which 
was  trying  to  rise.  But  it  never  came  to  the  surface.  Radio  calls 
from  another  U-boat  were  unanswered.    The  lost  submarine  was 


"SIRS,  ALL  IS  WELL  WITH  THE  FLEET"       357 

the  German  U-B-65,  known  to  be  operating  in  that  vicinity. 
"Known  sunk,"  was  the  verdict  of  the  British  Admiralty,  and 
for  this  the  AL-2  was  given  the  major  part  of  the  credit.  Our 
submarines  did  excellent  and  faithful  service,  and  proved  their 
usefulness  in  that  new  and  strange  phase  of  undersea  warfare 
where  ' '  sub  hunts  sub. ' ' 

Our  vessels  in  European  waters  were  employed  in  so  many 
regions  that  they  did  not  operate  together  as  one  fleet,  but  oon 
stituted  a  "task  force"  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet.  In  British  waters 
our  ships  usually  operated  with  British  forces  under  the  direc- 
tion of  British  officers.  Elsewhere  they  remained  under  the 
direction  of  American  officers,  always  cooperating  freely  with 
Allied  naval  forces.  At  the  United  States  Naval  Headquarters 
at  London  there  was  a  force  of  1,200.  The  200  commission* •<! 
personnel  included  a  number  of  the  ablest  officers  in  the  Navy, 
with  Captain  (later  Rear  Admiral)  N.  C.  Twining  as  chief  of 
staff,  and  Captain  W.  R.  Sexton  as  assistant  chief  of  staff.  It 
embraced  experts  whose  daily  association  with  officers  in  the 
Admiralty,  under  the  leadership  of  Admiral  Sims,  brought 
about  complete  understanding  and  perfect  team-work.  Those 
at  the  head  of  important  divisions  were : 

Intelligence  Department,  Commander  J.  V.  Babcock,  who  also  acted 
as  aid;  Convoy  Operations,  Captain  Byron  A.  Long;  Anti-Submarine 
Section,  Captain  R.  H.  Leigh;  Aviation,  Captain  II.  I.  Cone,  and  after- 
ward, Lieutenant  Commander  W.  A.  Edwards;  Personnel,  Commander 
H.  R.  Stark;  Communications,  Lieutenant  Commander  E.  G.  Blakeslee; 
Material,  Captain  E.  C.  Tobey;  Repairs,  Captain  S.  F.  Smith,  and 
afterward,  Naval  Constructor  L.  B.  McBride;  Ordnance,  Commander 
G.  L.  Schuyler,  and  afterward  Commander  T.  A.  Thomson;  Medical 
Section,  Captain  F.  L.  Pleadwell,  and  afterward,  Commander  Edgar 
Thompson;  Legal  Section,  Commander  "W.  H.  McGrann;  Scientific 
Section,  Professor  H.  A.  Bumstead,  Ph.  D. 

This  large  establishment  in  Grosvenor  Gardens  had  been 
built  up  from  the  small  beginning  in  1917  when  Admiral  Sims, 
accompanied  by  his  aid,  arrived  just  after  war  was  declare*  1. 
Entrusted  first  with  the  duty  of  conferring  with  the  British 
Admiralty  and  reporting  the  naval  situation  with  his  recommen- 
dations, Admiral  Sims  was  soon  designated  as  commander  of 
our  forces  in  European  waters  with  the  rank  of  vice  admiral, 


358  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

and  before  the  armistice  was  promoted  to  admiral.  Keeping  in 
constant  touch  with  the  British  and  other  Admiralties,  repre- 
senting our  Navy  upon  the  Allied  Naval  Council,  the  information 
he  secured,  with  that  furnished  us  by  Allied  naval  officers 
stationed  in  Washington,  enabled  the  Navy  Department  to  keep 
pace  with  all  naval  activities,  and  his  recommendations  were 
taken  into  consideration  in  important  decisions  that  were  made. 
Serving  with  zeal  and  ability,  he  won  the  regard  and  confidence 
of  his  associates  of  the  allied  navies,  and  received  high  honors 
from  European  governments. 

In  addition  to  the  daily  exchange  of  messages  between  Lon- 
don headquarters  and  Washington,  information  from  special 
Government  missions,  and  the  intimate  intercourse  of  officers 
of  all  the  Allied  navies,  high  ranking  officials  of  our  Navy  from 
time  to  time  went  to  Europe  for  conferences  and  inspection  of 
our  forces  and  activities,  among  them  Assistant  Secretary 
Roosevelt  and  Admirals  Benson,  Mayo  and  Gleaves.  The 
Assistant  Secretary,  going  over  in  the  destroyer  Dyer,  spent  six 
weeks  abroad  in  the  summer  of  1918.  He  had  conferences  with 
the  Allied  naval  authorities  in  London,  Paris  and  Rome,  and 
inspected  our  bases  and  mine  depots,  and  witnessed  the  work  of 
laying  the  North  Sea  barrage.  Reporting  that  our  personnel 
there  had  done  well  under  hazardous  and  difficult  circumstances, 
he  advised  a  like  mine  barrage  across  the  strait  of  Otranto. 

Admiral  Benson,  going  abroad  in  1917,  took  part  in  the  or- 
ganization of  the  Allied  Naval  Council,  and  urged  a  more  vigor- 
ous offensive,  which  we  had  favored  from  our  entrance  into  the 
war.  Months  before,  Admiral  Benson  had  prepared,  and  I  had 
approved  and  sent  to  the  British  Admiralty,  "proposed  meas- 
ures to  prevent  German  submarines  from  operating  against 
Allied  commerce  in  the  Atlantic,"  which  pointed  out  the  follow- 
ing courses  which  were  open  to  us : 

We  may  attempt  to — 

(a)  Reduce  the  Heligoland  region  and  close  exits  for  submarines. 

(b)  Reduce  the  Zeebrugge  region  and  close  exits  for  submarines. 

(c)  Enter  the  Baltic  and  close  exits  for  submarines  from  the  Bal- 
tic bases. 

(d)  Prevent  Danish  and  Dutch  territory  being  used  for  sub- 
marine bases. 


' 'SIRS,  ALL  IS  WELL  WITH  THE  FLEET"       359 

(e)  Construct  and  maintain  mine  barriers  about  the  Heligo. 
land  area. 

(f)  Construct  and  maintain  a  mine  barrier  in  the  Skagerrack  or 
Kattegat. 

(g)  Construct  and  maintain  mine  barriers  in  the  Zeebrugge  region, 
(h)     Construct  and  maintain  a  mine  barrier  across  the  North  Sea. 
(i)     Close  Dover  straits  to  submarines  by  a  mine  barrier  and  sur- 
face patrol. 

These  matters  were  discussed  by  Benson  with  officers  of  the 
British  Admiralty,  and  the  methods  and  the  difficulties  of  carry- 
ing them  out  were  considered.  Speaking,  sometime  after  the 
war,  of  the  offensive  plans  he  advocated,  Benson  said : 

I  think  that  the  bases  of  the  German  submarines  should  have  been 
attacked,  and  I  so  urged  when  the  war  was  in  progress ;  and  one  of  my 
conferences  with  the  British  Admiralty  in  London  in  1917  was  to  urge 
more  active  operations  against  the  bases  of  the  submarines.  But  it  was 
an  operation  that  had  to  be  not  only  a  concerted  action,  but  the  prin- 
cipal part  of  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  be  taken  by  the  Allies, 
we  simply  to  add  our  part  to  it;  and  all  during  the  summer  of  1917, 
I  urged  active  operations  of  that  kind  and  could  never  understand  why 
we  did  not  get  definite  plans  from  the  other  side  as  to  how  such  opera- 
tion should  be  carried  out. 

While  in  London  I  agreed  with  Admiral  Jellicoe  on  a  plan,  a  very 
confidential  plan,  that  was  to  be  carried  out  later  on,  in  which  I  not  only 
volunteered  to  place  our  ships  but  insisted  that  our  ships  should  be 
placed  there. 

During  Benson's  absence  from  Washington,  Captain  (later 
Admiral)  W.  V.  Pratt  in  both  1917  and  1918  acted  as  Chief  of 
Operations.  In  the  discharge  of  that  duty,  as  well  as  Assistant 
Chief  of  Operations,  succeeding  Captain  Volney  Chase,  who 
died  in  the  summer  of  1917,  Admiral  Pratt  demonstrated  ability 
unsurpassed  by  any  officer  serving  in  any  important  position 
during  the  World  war.  When  Captain  Pratt  later  was  ordered 
to  sea,  Admiral  Josiah  S.  McKean,  who  had  served  with  marked 
ability  as  Chief  of  Material  during  the  war,  became  Acting  Chief 
of  Operations  and  added  to  his  well-earned  reputation. 

Admiral  Mayo,  in  his  capacity  of  commander-in-chief  of 
our  ships  in  European  as  well  as  home  waters,  made  an  official 
visit  to  Europe  in  September,  1917,  inspecting  bases  and  fore-, 
and  conferring  with  naval  leaders  of  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Italy.    He  was  on  duty  again  in  Europe  in  1918.    Attending  the 


360  OUR  NAVY  AT  AVAR 

Allied  Naval  Conference  in  London,  he  urged  the  construction 
of  the  North  Sea  Barrage,  which  was  shortly  afterwards 
approved. 

Visiting  the  famous  Dover  Patrol,  he  witnessed  a  bombard- 
ment of  Ostend  by  British  monitors,  and  had  the  experience  of 
being  under  enemy  fire.  The  flotilla  leader  Broke,  in  which  he 
embarked  with  Sir  John  Jellicoe,  First  Sea  Lord  of  the  Ad- 
miralty, and  other  British  officers  of  high  rank,  flew  the  flags 
of  both  Mayo  and  Jellicoe. 

The  monitors,  armed  with  15-inch  naval  guns,  were  accom- 
panied on  these  expeditions  by  spotting  aircraft  and  destroyers. 
The  party  accompanied  the  Terror.  Soon  after  she  began  to 
fire,  the  German  shore  batteries  got  the  range.  Firing  with 
precision  and  accuracy,  some  of  the  German  shells  fell  within 
a  short  distance  of  the  Broke.  Admiral  Reginald  Bacon  gives 
this  interesting  account  of  the  incident : 

On  Tuesday,  September  25th  [1917],  Sir  John  Jellicoe,  Admiral 
Sir  Henry  Oliver,  and  Admiral  Philpotts  arrived  at  Dover  and  came 
with  Admiral  Mayo  and  his  staff  up  the  patrol  line.  It  was  a  quaint 
experience  for  them.  Half  an  hour  after  leaving  Dunkirk  in  the  Broke 
we  lost  sight  of  the  shore.  After  an  hour's  steaming  we  sighted  the 
Terror  and  destroyers  in  the  open  sea,  and  the  motor-launches  just 
starting  their  smoke-screen.  Nothing  else  was  in  sight  except  a  small 
monitor  five  miles  away  right  out  at  sea,  burning  her  searchlight  for 
an  aiming  mark.  Really  our  visitors  must  have  thought  we  were  hum- 
bugging when  the  Terror  opened  fire  and  fired  single  rounds  at  fixed 
intervals. 

A  few  seconds  afterwards  while  steaming  about  in  the  Broke — we 
had  altered  course  three  points — a  splash  came  from  a  Tirpitz  shell 
about  300  yards  off.  It  fell  very  near  the  spot  where  we  would  have 
been  if  we  had  kept  on  our  original  course.  I  apologized  to  the  Ameri- 
can Chief  of  the  Staff  for  not  having  kept  on  and  brought  the  shell 
nearer.    His  reply  was  quaintly  American  in  humor : 

"Don't  mention  it,  Admiral;  by  the  time  we  get  to  New  York  that 
shell  will  have  been  close  alongside  right  enough !" 

The  result  of  the  Terror's  shooting  was  most  successful,  as  all  the 
rebuilding  in  the  dockyard  done  by  the  Germans  was  again  demolished. 
On  October  19th,  the  Terror  was  torpedoed,  and  had  to  be  docked.  On 
the  following  day  the  Soult  fired  at  Ostend  and  destroyed  a  high  explo- 
sive magazine.    One  German  craft  was  sunk,  and  two  more  damaged. 

Upon  his  return,  Admiral  Mayo  made  detailed  reports  cover- 
ing the  entire  naval  situation,  with  important  recommendations 


"SIRS,  ALL  IS  WELL  WITH  THE  FLEET"       361 

as  to  plans  and  measures.  When  war  began  it  was  expected  thai 
the  time  would  come  when  the  entire  Atlantic  Fleet  would  be 
sent  abroad,  and  Admiral  Mayo  would  command  all  our  forces 
in  the  looked-for  great  naval  battle  with  the  German  fleet.  ( >ur 
vessels  in  Europe  were,  therefore,  considered  our  advance 
forces,  a  "task  force"  assigned  to  special  duties  until  the  whole 
fleet  should  be  united  for  action.  But  the  character  of  the  war 
called  for  wide  dispersion  of  its  units,  and  it  was  not  until  after 
hostilities  ended  that  they  were  reunited  under  the  commander 
in-chief,  who  was  in  command  when  the  dreadnaughls  sailed 
from  Brest  in  December,  1918. 

No  navies  in  all  history  ever  worked  together  in  such  close 
cooperation  as  did  ours  with  the  British,  French  and  Italians. 
The  cordial  relations  between  the  civilian  populations,  as  well  as 
the  naval  personnel,  will  be  a  lasting  tie.  I  wish  it  were  possible 
to  put  on  record  the  sentiments  expressed,  the  appreciation  felt 
by  all  Americans  in  the  Navy  for  the  gracious  courtesies  and 
friendly  offices  shown  to  our  men  serving  a  common  cause  far 
from  their  homes.  The  one  regrettable  incident  at  Cork,  where 
an  unruly  element  attacked  some  of  our  sailors,  was  recognized 
as  an  exception.  It  was  confined  to  the  few  engaged  in  the 
trouble,  the  people  of  that  city  and  country  having  no  relation 
to  it  and  not  affected  by  it  in  their  feeling  of  friendship  for  our 
sailors  and  our  country.  It  left  no  resentment  towards  the  great 
Irish  people,  who  received  us  with  open  arms  and  showed  hos- 
pitality and  cordiality  towards  our  forces  domiciled  in  that 
country. 

One  of  the  services  which  the  people  of  Lille,  France,  will 
long  remember  is  the  voluntary  act  of  men  of  the  Navy  in  turn- 
ing carpenters  for  the  time,  and  building  with  their  own  hands 
scores  of  houses  for  the  homeless  people.  That  act,  together 
with  the  generous  gift  by  American  sailors  of  their  own  rations 
to  needy  peoples,  illustrates  the  spirit  that  actuated  our  men. 
At  one  place,  so  moved  were  they  by  the  lack  of  food  for  women 
and  children,  the  sailors  denied  themselves  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  captain  was  forced  to  issue  an  order  limiting  their  generosity 
to  prevent  a  shortage  of  food  for  the  sustenance  of  the  crew. 

Cardiff  does  not  bulk  large  on  the  war  maps.  Mention  of 
it  recalls  no  such  adventure  as  at  Zeebrugge,  no  such  achieve 


362  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

ment  as  laying  the  mine-barrage  in  the  North  Sea,  or  sinking 
of  submarines  at  Durazzo  or  on  the  high  seas.  But  it  spelled 
coal  for  our  forces,  and  meant  hard  work  and  called  for  efficient 
management.  The  limited  number  of  colliers,  the  time  for  mak- 
ing voyages  to  American  coal  fields,  and  the  hazard  from 
U-boats  suggested  obtaining  coal  from  Wales  for  the  needs  of 
the  army  in  France.  The  Army  requested  the  Navy  to  release 
colliers  for  that  service,  and  at  first  to  operate  twenty  "lake" 
and  other  chartered  boats  and  undertake  the  carrying  of  coal 
from  Great  Britain  to  supplement  the  steady  flow  from  America. 
Admiral  Philip  Andrews,  with  headquarters  at  Cardiff,  directed 
this  work,  which  required  a  naval  personnel  of  4,101,  operated 
65  ships,  and  delivered  30,000  to  45,000  tons  of  coal  each  month. 

There  is  no  glamour  about  the  work  of  repairing  ships.  Even 
in  peace  times  it  is  a  hard  overalls  job,  but  our  nine  European 
bases  with  eleven  repair  ships  and  tenders,  kept  our  ships  in 
condition.  If  I  were  a  poet  I  would  immortalize  the  skilled  men, 
working  in  the  dark,  often  flat  on  their  backs,  to  keep  our  ships 
fit  and  to  repair  the  ravages  of  U-boat  attacks.  Not  counting 
the  500  ships  going  and  coming  from  the  United  States  to 
Europe,  often  calling  for  first  aid,  we  had  nearly  400  ships  on 
duty  in  European  waters.  Though  taxed  by  their  own  needs, 
the  facilities  of  our  Allies  were  freely  at  our  disposal,  but  the 
fact  that  it  was  possible  to  make  our  forces  so  nearly  self-sus- 
taining is  a  high  tribute  to  the  officers  and  men  charged  with 
that  duty.  Allied  navies  expressed  admiration  for  the  ability 
of  a  ship's  force  to  do  much  of  their  own  repairing,  and  mar- 
velled at  the  efficiency  of  the  repair  ships — the  Melville,  Dixie, 
Panther,  Prometheus,  Bridgeport,  Black  Hawk. 

Our  own  Shipping  Board  voiced  its  thanks  for  naval 
assistance  abroad  as  well  as  at  home.  In  fact,  in  all  ship  con- 
struction and  repair  work  as  well  as  plans  for  operation  and 
navigation  undertaken  by  that  organization  the  Navy  furnished 
constructors  and  other  experts,  and  was  ready  upon  call  with 
its  entire  facilities. 

Little  has  been  heard  of  the  Scorpion,  which  was  interned  in 
Turkish  waters  during  the  war.  The  crew  of  that  ship,  whose 
base  had  long  been  at  Constantinople,  protected  the  American 
and  British  embassies,  one  regular  duty  of  the  vessel  being  to  act 


"SIRS,  ALL  IS  WELL  WITH  THE  FLEET"       363 

as  despatch  boat  to  our  Ambassador  to  Turkey.  After  America 
entered  the  war,  some  of  them,  eager  to  get  into  the  fray,  made 
their  escape  over  land  and  joined  the  American  forces  in  France. 

From  the  outbreak  of  the  European  conflict  the  Scorpion's 
men  had  a  "front  seat  at  the  show,"  and  witnessed  many  inter- 
esting sights.  From  the  deck  of  their  ship  they  saw  the  thrilling 
finish  of  the  race  of  the  German  cruisers  Goeben  and  Breslau, 
which  made  their  sensational  escape  from  British  pursuers  and 
then  interned  in  the  harbor  of  Constantinople.  They  saw  the 
Teutonic  crews  of  the  erstwhile  ships  of  the  Germany  Navy, 
hastily  doffing  their  German  caps  and  donning  Moslem  fezzes 
to  camouflage  their  nationality,  as  the  Turkish  flag  was  hoisted 
to  the  mastheads.  They  observed,  from  their  point  of  vantage, 
the  gallant  sweep  of  the  harbor  by  a  British  submarine  which 
bobbed  up  in  the  Bosporus  as  the  Turks  were  preparing  to  send 
reinforcements  to  Gallipoli,  torpedoed  a  Turkish  vessel  at  its 
dock,  and  caused  such  consternation  that  the  Turks,  at  the  quays 
ready  to  sail  with  40,000  troops,  did  not  dare  venture  out  with 
their  transports.  One  single  daring  British  submarine  caused 
all  the  troops  to  be  disembarked,  and  the  sea  expedition  to  the 
Dardanelles  was  abandoned. 

The  "Scorpions,"  as  they  called  themselves,  brought  one 
story  home  with  them  which,  if  verified,  is  worthy  of  the  best 
French  epic.  The  Turks,  as  the  story  was  told  in  Constanti- 
nople, captured  a  French  submarine,  the  Turquoise.  Not  one  of 
the  captors  who  boarded  the  ship  understood  how  to  operate  its 
delicate  mechanism.  Therefore,  the  French  engineers  were 
ordered  to  start  the  engines.  Nothing  loath,  the  orders  were 
obeyed.  The  sub  dived,  carrying  with  it  Turkish  captors  and 
French  engineers,  never  to  return.  Whether  or  not  that  par- 
ticular act  can  be  confirmed,  the  war  produced  many  men  of  the 
navies  with  the  spirit  which  the  incident  illustrates. 

The  Scorpion  was  truly  a  ship  of  mercy.  First,  under  the 
direction  of  Ambassador  Morgenthau  and  afterwards  of  Ambas- 
sador Elkus,  it  carried  hundreds  of  refugees  to  places  of  safety, 
was  the  almoner  of  many  in  distress  and  gave  asylum  to  Ameri- 
cans, who  were  heartened  in  that  harbor,  crowded  with  ships 
carrying  the  flags  of  many  nations,  to  see  the  glorious  Stars  and 
Stripes  floating  from  the  mainmast. 


364  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

No  story  of  the  Navy's  preparedness  and  efficiency  would  be 
complete  without  recognition  of  the  wisdom  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense,  authorized  by  Congress  and  appointed  by  the 
President  in  1916.  That  Council  had  large  responsibility,  and 
measured  up  to  its  great  duties  before  and  during  the  war.  The 
Council  was  thus  constituted:  Secretary  of  War  Newton  D. 
Baker,  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Josephus  Daniels,  Secretary  of 
the  Interior  Franklin  K.  Lane,  Secretary  of  Agriculture  David 
F.  Houston,  Secretary  of  Commerce  William  C.  Redfield,  Secre- 
tary of  Labor  William  B.  Wilson. 

The  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  was  composed  of 
these  men:  Daniel  Willard,  Howard  E.  Coffin,  Julius  Rosen- 
wald,  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  Dr.  Hollis  Godfrey,  Samuel  Gompers, 
Dr.  Franklin  Martin,  Walter  S.  Gilford,  director,  Grosvenor 

B.  Clarkson,  secretary. 

Eight  months  before  the  Armistice,  March  11,  1918,  the 
House  Sub-Committee,  composed  of  men  of  both  parties — W.  B. 
Oliver,  chairman,  W.  W.  Venable,  Adam  B.  Littlepage,  James 

C.  Wilson,  Fred  A.  Britten,  John  A.  Peters  and  Frederick  C. 
Hicks — which  had  made  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  Navy 
and  naval  administration,  unanimously  reported : 

First.  All  appropriations  have  been  expended  or  obligated  with 
judgment,  caution  and  economy,  when  you  consider  that  haste  was 
necessary  to  bring  results  and  abnormal  conditions  obtained  in  reference 
to  all  problems  of  production  or  operations. 

Second.  The  Navy,  with  limited  personnel  and  material,  was  sud- 
denly called  to  face  many  difficult  and  untried  problems  in  sea  war- 
fare, and  has  met  the  situation  with  rare  skill,  ingenuity,  and  dispatch 
and  a  high  degree  of  success. 

Third.  The  efficiency  of  the  Navy's  prewar  organization,  the  readi- 
ness and  fitness  of  its  men  and  ships  for  the  difficult  and  arduous  tasks 
imposed  by  war  were  early  put  to  the  acid  test  and  thus  far  in  no  way 
have  they  been  found  wanting,  and  we  feel  that  the  past  twelve  months 
presents  for  the  Navy  a  remarkable  record  of  achievement,  of  steadily 
increasing  power  in  both  personnel  and  material,  of  rapidly  expanding 
resources,  and  of  well-matured  plans  for  the  future,  whether  the  war 
be  of  long  or  short  duration. 

They  could  say  at  the  close  of  hostilities,  as  they  said  then : 
"Sirs,  all  is  well  with  the  fleet." 

The  immense  scope  and  signal  success  of  our  operations  in 
Europe  surprised  even  those  familiar  with  the  Navy,  and  the 


"SIRS,  ALL  IS  WELL  WITH  THE  FLEET"       365 

great  work  of  the  war.  Leading  members  of  the  House  Com 
mittee  on  Naval  Affairs — Chairman  Lemuel  P.  Padgett,  Repre- 
sentative Thomas  S.  Butler,  the  present  Chairman,  and  Rep- 
resentatives Daniel  J.  Riordan,  Walter  L.  Hensley,  John  R. 
Connelly,  William  B.  Oliver,  William  W.  Venable,  James  C. 
Wilson,  William  J.  Browning,  John  R.  Farr,  John  A.  Peters, 
Frederick  C.  Hicks  and  Sydney  A.  Mudd— in  July  and  August, 
1918,  made  an  inspection  of  our  naval  activities  in  Europe. 
Chairman  Padgett,  for  the  committee,  on  his  return,  said : 

The  magnitude  of  our  naval  operations  overseas,  on  the  water  and 
in  the  air,  reflects  credit  upon  the  American  people,  and  commands  the 
respect  and  admiration  of  our  Allies.  When  the  war  is  over  and  the 
full  history  of  our  naval  operations  abroad  may  be  given  in  detail,  it 
will  be  a  source  of  pride  and  honor  to  the  American  people,  and  the 
fidelity,  patriotism  and  devotion  of  our  naval  officers  and  enlisted  men, 
embracing  as  a  part  of  the  Navy  the  Marine  Corps  officers  and  men, 
will  form  a  bright  part  in  the  world 's  history.     *     *     * 

The  record  speaks  for  itself.  "Hindsight  is  better  than  fore- 
sight," and  if  it  was  to  be  done  over  again,  the  Navy,  with  its 
war  experience,  might  do  it  better.  But  when  all  is  said  as  to 
errors  and  achievements,  this  is  the  imperishable  record : 

The  Navy  performed  successfully  every  task  with  which  it 
was  entrusted.   In  not  one  did  it  fail. 

If  it  made  mistakes — (and  some  ivere  made) — not  one  of 
them  had  any  serious  or  disastrous  result. 

If  there  were  delays — (and  there  were  some  unavoidable 
ones) — not  one  of  them  had  any  material  effect  upon  the  trend 
or  duration  of  the  war. 

If  all  the  criticisms,  of  whatever  kind  or  character,  that  have 
been  made  be  lumped  together,  they  ivoidd  not  tilt  the  scales1 
one  degree,  if  balanced  against  the  Navy's  achievements. 

After  the  war  was  all  over  and  the  men  were  returning  home, 
with  time  and  opportunity  to  assess  the  value  of  the  servi ce 
rendered,  General  John  J.  Pershing,  in  command  of  the  Ameri- 
can Expeditionary  Forces,  wrote  on  April  21,  1919 : 

We  fully  realize  that  had  it  not  been  for  the  Navy,  who  kept  watch 
and  guard  night  and  day  over  our  transport  fleet,  the  American  effort 
in  France  would  never  have  been  successful.  The  Navy's  assistance  was 
whole-hearted  and  arduous,  and  was  always  given  in  a  most  generous 
spirit  of  cooperation. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 
AFTER  THE  ARMISTICE 

NAVAL  DIPLOMACY  PREVENTED  CLASH  IN  FORMER  AUSTRIAN  TER- 
RITORY AND  STABILIZED  CONDITIONS  IN  DISTURBED  AREAS — AN- 
DREWS IN  THE  ADRIATIC — BRISTOL  AT  CONSTANTINOPLE — MC  CUL- 
LY *S  CONFIDENTIAL  MISSION  TO  RUSSIA — MISSIONS  OF  ROOSEVELT 
AND  BENSON — SHIPS  AND  MEN  SERVED  AS  ALMONERS  TO  THE 
STARVING. 

MEN  in  the  fighting  line  were  full  of  solemn  thanksgiv- 
ing the  day  the  armistice  was  signed.    At  home  we 
built  bonfires  and  rejoiced.    In  Paris  the  celebration 
was  a  jubilee.    It  meant  home  to  the  Americans,  with 
eyes  turned  toward  our  shores,  coming  back  to  firesides  with  the 
sense  of  a  hard  duty  finished  with  honor. 

Much  has  been  heard  since  November  11, 1918,  of  regret  that 
war  was  not  continued  until  Berlin  was  captured.  There  was  no 
such  feeling  on  the  front  line  on  that  glad  day  in  November. 
The  Allies  could  have  gone  on  to  Berlin,  but  the  victory  would 
have  been  no  greater,  only  costlier  in  lives.  Those  who  think 
that  the  troops  should  have  been  ordered  "On  to  Berlin,"  in- 
stead of  accepting  the  victory  through  the  terms  of  the  armistice, 
ought  to  recall  the  statement  by  Marshal  Foch.  When  the  terms 
had  been  drawn  up,  one  of  the  American  Peace  Commissioners 
asked  General  Foch  whether  he  would  rather  the  Germans  would 
reject  or  accept  the  armistice  that  had  been  drawn  up.  The 
commander  of  the  Allied  armies  answered: 

The  only  aim  of  war  is  to  obtain  results.  If  the  Germans  sign  an 
armistice  on  the  general  lines  we  have  just  determined  we  shall  have 
obtained  the  result  we  seek.  Our  aims  being  accomplished,  no  one  has 
the  right  to  shed  another  drop  of  blood. 

But  the  armistice  did  not  end  naval  operations  in  Europe. 
It  changed  them  and  lessened  the  number  of  ships  and  men 

366 


AFTER  THE  ARMISTICE  367 

required.  The  terms  of  the  armistice  were  to  be  carried  out. 
The  Second  Division  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces, 
commanded  by  General  Lejeune,  now  head  of  the  Marine  Corp, 
composed  of  men  of  the  Army  and  the  Marine  Corps,  was 
sent  to  Germany  as  part  of  the  Army  of  Occupation. 

The  starving  had  to  be  fed,  and  the  Americans  alone  had 
the  food  and  the  organization.  Everywhere  in  Europe  there 
was  the  reaction  from  long  strain.  Having  put  our  hands  to 
the  plow,  we  could  not  turn  back  until  stable  conditions  were 
restored.  And  there  were  problems  more  difficult  than  those 
confronted  in  war. 

When  I  reached  Paris  in  March,  1919,  the  conditions  in  the 
Adriatic  had  reached  an  acute  state.  Vice-Admiral  Niblack,  the 
senior  Allied  officer  charged  with  carrying  out  the  armistice 
agreements  on  the  Adriatic,  came  to  Paris,  and  outlined  to  me 
the  imminence  of  such  clashes  as  later  occurred  at  Trau,  and 
such  coups  as  that  of  D'Annunzio  at  Fiume,  unless  the  authority 
of  the  Allied  Council  was  promptly  invoked.  He  had  recently 
succeeded  Rear  Admiral  W.  H.  G.  Bullard  on  the  Adriatic  Mis- 
sion. Before  leaving  Spalato,  where  he  maintained  headquar- 
ters, Admiral  Niblack,  in  concert  with  other  Allied  commanders, 
had  established  a  shore  patrol,  because  of  the  fear  of  an  out- 
break. By  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  an  Allied  Naval  Mission 
was  created,  and  the  Americans  were  given  oversight  over  a 
stretch  of  ex-Austrian  territory  about  three  hundred  miles  long 
on  the  Dalmatian  coast,  embracing  the  ancient  towns  of  Trau 
and  Spalato.  Admiral  Niblack  urged  that  the  duties  and  rights 
of  the  Italians  and  Jugo-Slavs  be  set  forth  and  their  observance 
enforced. 

It  was  a  tense  time.  I  had  just  returned  from  Rome  as  the 
guest  of  the  Italian  Navy,  where  American  and  Italian  admirals 
exchanged  views  upon  future  naval  problems  and  the  future 
type  of  naval  craft.  In  both  nations  there  was  the  earnest  desire 
to  strengthen  and  cement  the  American  and  Italian  friendship, 
jeopardized  by  the  situation  on  the  Dalmatian  coast.  I  had 
scarcely  finished  my  interview  with  Admiral  Niblack,  who  felt 
the  need  of  prompt  action  to  prevent  trouble  in  the  Adriatic, 
when  I  received  a  visit  from  Count  V.  Macchi  Cellere,  the  Italian 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States.    He  had  felt  the  approaching 


368  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

disagreement  between  Wilson  and  Orlando  and  had  hurried  to 
Paris  to  make  an  earnest  effort  to  avert  it.  A  charming  gentle- 
man, who  loved  his  country  passionately,  he  had  a  sincere  attach- 
ment for  the  United  States,  where  he  was  highly  esteemed.  He 
sensed  that,  if  President  Wilson  did  not  approve  Italy's  claims 
on  the  Adriatic,  the  people  of  his  country  would  feel  deep  dis- 
appointment. He  foresaw  that  the  sincere  admiration  of  the 
Italians  for  President  Wilson,  as  shown  on  his  visit  to  Rome, 
would  be  turned  into  resentment.  He  was  deeply  moved  in  his 
appeal  in  advocacy  of  the  position  of  his  country,  which  he 
pressed  with  great  earnestness.  He  believed  in  his  soul  that  if 
the  aspirations  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  were  approved  and  they 
obtained  important  bases  on  the  Adriatic,  such  settlement  would 
prove  disastrous  to  his  country.  Knowing  my  regard  for  Italy 
and  his  countrymen,  and  assured  of  my  personal  friendship,  he 
felt  free  to  speak  without  reserve.  I  never  saw  him  after  the 
break  at  Paris,  but  I  knew  his  disappointment  was  poignant. 
When  he  died,  not  long  afterwards,  at  Washington,  I  had  the 
honor  to  send  his  body  home  on  an  American  dreadnaught  with 
distinguished  escort,  a  token  of  American  regard  for  Italy  and 
its  diplomatic  representative. 

When,  during  the  command  of  Rear  Admiral  Philip  An- 
drews, who  served  two  years  in  charge  of  our  naval  forces  in 
the  Adriatic,  as  well  as  the  American  member  of  the  Allied 
Armistice  Commission,  the  shore  patrol  was  removed,  the  duty 
of  preserving  order  fell  on  the  Serbs.  Their  central  authority 
was  light  and  order  was  not  always  preserved.  Though  there 
was  no  real  authority  for  it,  the  American  naval  force  was  the 
real  factor  in  maintaining  order.  Admiral  Andrews  came  to  be 
recognized  by  common  consent  as  the  controlling  influence  in 
that  zone  in  the  early  days  when  authority  was  feeble.  That 
country  being  ex-Austrian  territory,  some  one  did  at  times 
have  to  exercise  authority.  Our  naval  representative  was 
looked  upon  to  do  this,  and  exercised  it  principally  by  moral 
force  and  fair  dealing.  His  leadership  was  recognized,  even 
demanded,  by  the  Allies  and  by  the  Jugo-Slav  government  at 
Belgrade. 

He  promoted  trade  between  the  Italians  and  Jugo-Slavs,  the 
first  transaction  being  made  on  his  flagship,  the  historic  Olym- 


AFTER  THE  AEMISTICE 

pia.    That  opened  the  door  to  better  understanding.     Be  wa- 
in direct  touch  with  the  governments  a1  Rome  and  Belgrade  and 
was  in  a  very  real  sense  the  friendly  mediator.    His  duties  v. 
mainly  diplomatic,  and  he  exercised  the  good  offices  of  hie  conn 
try  so  impartially  and  fairly  as  to  secure  and  maintain  peace  and 
business  dealings.    This  was  made  possible,  of  coins.',  through 
earnest  friendly  intervention,  whose  disinterested   uature 
soon  recognized,  and  the  judgment,  ability,  poise  and  courtesy 
of  Admiral  Andrews.     In  proof  of  his    impartiality    and    the 
appreciation  of  both  nations,  he  was  decorated  both  at  Belgrade 
and  Rome. 

It  was  only  the  wise  and  prompt  action  of  Captain  l  >a\  id  F. 
Boyd,  of  our  Navy,  that  saved  the  situation  when  Trau  was 
captured  by  soldiers  from  the  Italian  Zone,  September  23,  1920. 
They  crossed  the  armistice  line  without  Italian  authority  and 
surprised  and  captured  the  small  Serbian  guard.  This  imitation 
of  D'Annunzio's  coup  was  short-lived.  Captain  Boyd,  after 
agreement  with  the  Italian  admiral,  put  the  offending  Italian 
army  captain  and  soldiers  in  an  Italian  motor  boat,  and  turned 
them  over  to  an  Italian  naval  officer.  The  situation  was  so  acute 
that  Captain  Boyd's  service  called  for  this  high  commendation 
from  Vice  Admiral  Knapp:  "The  whole  affair  was  most  credit- 
ably handled  and  the  very  prompt  action  of  Captain  Boyd,  in 
my  opinion,  undoubtedly  prevented  a  very  serious  incident 
which  might  have  resulted  in  open  warfare  between  Italians  and 
Serbians."  Admiral  Andrews  thought  that,  but  for  the  action 
in  securing  the  withdrawal  of  the  Italians  so  promptly,  " tin- 
Serbs  would  have  killed  them  all,  and  a  small  war  would  have 
been  started." 

War  between  the  other  Allies  and  Italians  was  narrowly 
averted  at  Fiume  at  the  time  of  the  D'Annunzio  coup.  The 
French  and  British  had  troops  ashore,  and  there  were  Allied 
ships  in  the  harbor,  Admiral  Andrews  having  with  him  on  his 
flagship  Major  General  C.  P.  Summerall,  U.  S.  A.  The  question 
was  whether  the  Allied  troops  would  drive  oul  the  D'Annunzio 
forces  or  withdraw.  They  were  disinclined  to  withdraw.  Ad 
miral  Andrews  urged  withdrawal  on  the  ground  that,  as  it  was 
the  Italian  regulars  who  had  let  D'Annunzio's  troops  into  the 
city,  it  was  the  duty  of  Italy  to  get  them  out  and  not  the  duty 


370  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

of  the  Allies  to  make  war  in  order  to  expel  them.  This  course 
opened  the  way  for  continued  Allied  friendship  after  the  pass- 
ing of  the  storm. 

Though  he  had  no  control  on  land,  the  American  Admiral 
was  looked  to  by  the  people  for  guidance.  They  not  only  re- 
spected him  but  he  won  their  regard  as  he  won  the  approval  of 
the  Allies  and  the  plaudits  of  his  countrymen.  The  children 
flocked  about  him.  They  had  not  seen  sugar  or  sweets  for  four 
or  five  years.  As  he  traveled  about  the  country  from  Spalato, 
Admiral  Andrews  always  took  with  him  plenty  of  cakes  of  choco- 
late for  the  children.  They  welcomed  the  chocolate  and  as  his 
car  would  go  from  place  to  place,  the  happy  children  would  call 
out:  "Here  comes  the  Chocolate  Admiral,"  in  terms  of  grati- 
tude and  affection. 

"At  that  time,"  wrote  a  navy  officer,  "President  Wilson  was 
venerated  by  the  Jugo-Slavs.  They  were  always  appealing  to 
him  through  Admiral  Andrews.  He  was  to  them  an  idol,  able 
and  willing  to  redress  all  wrongs,  and  all  powerful.  The  only 
way  President  Wilson  was  known  to  the  children  was  as  the 
owner  of  a  chocolate  factory,  whose  chocolate  was  dispensed  by 
the  Admiral  as  his  agent." 

The  duties  assigned  the  Navy  in  the  Near  East  were  largely 
diplomatic,  though  naval  vessels  carried  on,  and  still  carry  on, 
the  work  of  mercy  begun  by  the  Navy  in  1914  when  the  Ten- 
nessee carried  persecuted  Jews  and  others  from  Turkey  to 
places  of  safety.  Our  ships  were  employed  in  these  waters, 
whenever  occasion  made  it  possible,  in  carrying  food  and  cloth- 
ing to  suffering  peoples.  Rear  Admiral  Mark  L.  Bristol,  in 
command  of  the  naval  forces  in  Turkish  waters  during  the 
early  days  of  transition,  was  appointed  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  in  August,  1919,  as  High  Commissioner  at  Con- 
stantinople. The  unsettled  conditions  and  the  fact  that  our 
country  had  recognized  no  government  in  Turkey  made  the 
selection  of  a  naval  officer  the  best  agency  for  the  protection 
of  Americans  and  American  interests,  the  hastening  of  stabil- 
ity, and  helpfulness  to  those  in  dire  need. 

As  naval  commander  in  these  important  waters,  Admiral 
Bristol  maintained  a  system  of  communications,  sometimes  sta- 
tioning vessels  at  various  points  as  radio  traific  ships,  and 


AFTER  THE  ARMISTICE  371 

operated  vessels  on  regular  schedules  for  relief  work,  for  trans- 
porting army  officers  and  members  of  recognized  philanthropic 
societies  to  ports  where  their  duties  demanded  their  presence, 
or  where  stores  were  needed  for  the  immediate  sustenance  of 
the  impoverished  inhabitants.  During  the  severe  fighting  in 
southern  Russia,  he  aided  in  evacuating  Americans,  non-com- 
batants and  sick  and  wounded. 

As  High  Commissioner,  he  performed  the  varied  duties  of 
an  ambassador,  commercial  representative  and  shipping  expert 
at  Constantinople,  where  all  roads  meet  and  all  nationalities 
struggle  for  trade  and  power.  Like  other  American  naval  offi- 
cers on  duty  in  Europe  since  the  armistice,  he  illustrated  the 
best  traditions  of  naval  capacity  by  the  wise  performance  of 
the  varied  diplomatic  duties  entrusted  to  them.  They  did  this 
so  well  that  Lord  Palmerston's  estimate  of  a  British  naval  officer 
was  proved  to  be  true  of  American  officers.  "When  I  have  a 
hard  job  to  be  done  anywhere  in  the  world,  calling  for  a  clear 
head  and  a  steady  hand,"  said  Palmerston.  "I  send  a  captain 
of  the  Navy. ' ' 

Conditions  in  Russia  were  chaotic  and  deplorable.  Rear 
Admiral  Newton  A.  McCully,  who  had  first  been  naval  attache 
at  Petrograd  and  afterwards  in  command  of  Naval  Forces 
in  Northern  Russian  Waters,  was  ordered  to  Southern  Russia 
upon  a  confidential  mission  after  the  armistice.  This  was  done 
at  the  request  of  the  State  Department.  Admiral  McCully 
speaks  the  Russian  language  like  a  native.  He  is  trusted  and 
esteemed  by  Russians  and  he  reciprocates  their  regard.  He 
was  not  accredited  to  any  Russian  government.  His  reports 
were  invaluable  in  keeping  the  American  authorities  and  the 
Allies  acquainted  with  the  rapidly  changing  conditions  in  that 
disturbed  region  in  a  period  when  practically  no  other  accurate 
information  could  be  obtained.  In  addition  to  that  diplomatic 
duty,  Admiral  McCully  was  instrumental  in  safeguarding  the 
lives  of  Americans,  and  in  ameliorating  the  conditions  of  Rus- 
sians and  aiding  in  their  evacuation.  Upon  his  return  to 
America,  he  brought  with  him  half  a  dozen  Russian  children 
to  whom  he  is  giving  a  home  and  training — a  beautiful  evidence 
of  his  friendship  to  the  country  and  his  distress  at  the  plight 
of  its  children. 


372  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

The  story  of  naval  aid  in  north  Russia,  while  not  conspicu- 
ous, was  a  blessing  in  chaotic  days  and  afforded  protection  and 
assistance  in  varied  ways.  The  Galveston  and  Chester  arrived 
in  Archangel  in  April,  1919,  with  Brigadier  General  W.  P. 
Richardson  and  a  detachment  of  the  167th  Railway  Transporta- 
tion troops  to  assist  in  the  withdrawal  of  American  forces.  The 
Des  Moines,  the  Yankton,  the  Sacramento  and  a  number  of 
eagle  boats  and  sub-chasers  came  later,  and  in  May  the  Des 
Moines  managed  to  get  through  the  ice  at  the  cost  of  a  few  hun- 
dred feet  of  copper  sheathing.  They  did  excellent  service  as 
despatch  boats,  and  brought  provisions  and  comforts  and 
doctors. 

All  American  troops  had  been  withdrawn  from  advanced 
positions,  and  all  the  troops,  except  a  very  small  detachment, 
were  withdrawn  from  Northern  Russia  in  June.  Then  the  with- 
drawal of  naval  ships  began,  the  last  one,  the  Des  Moines,  leav- 
ing in  August,  taking  out  the  last  of  the  Americans.  Prior 
thereto,  after  our  Ambassador,  Hon.  David  R.  Francis,  had, 
even  in  illness,  exhausted  every  effort  to  serve  Russia  and  the 
world's  peace,  the  Olympia  gave  him  passage  to  England  on  his 
way  home.  This  was  only  one  of  the  many  services  of  Dewey's 
flagship  in  the  war.  Dewey  and  the  Olympia  were  the  link  be- 
tween the  Spanish-American  and  the  World  War.  Under 
Dewey 's  leadership  the  plans  for  war  with  Germany  were  made 
before  we  entered  the  war.  His  old  flagship  was  the  ship  of 
service  during  the  war,  of  diplomacy  in  Europe  after  the  war, 
particularly  in  the  Adriatic,  and  was  often  the  bearer  of  food  to 
starving  peoples. 

The  duty  of  almoner  by  America  after  the  armistice  endeared 
our  country  to  all  Europeans,  particularly  those  in  distress. 
The  Navy  not  only  transported  and  distributed  supplies  but 
also  took  over  the  repair  and  operation  of  the  telegraph  and 
telephone,  the  operation  of  wireless,  and  made  possible  com- 
munication by  trained  radio  men  and  other  naval  personnel. 
"I  do  not  see  how  we  could  have  carried  on  the  work  without 
the  wonderful  help  of  the  Navy,"  said  Mr.  Herbert  Hoover,  who 
was  telling  me  in  Paris  in  March,  1919,  of  the  splendid  service 
of  navy  men  in  the  countries  devastated  by  war. 

In  December,  1920,  Russian  refugees  began  arriving  at  Cat- 


AFTER  THE  ARMISTICE  373 

taro  in  the  lower  Adriatic.  There  was  no  one  to  give  them  imme 
diate  help  but  the  Americans.  Admiral  Andrews  sent  the 
Olympic/,  and  wired  to  Paris  for  doctors,  money  and  nurses,  and 
hurried  them  to  the  place  by  fast  destroyers.  They  fed  and 
organized  the  first  8,000.  There  was  no  food  but  ours.  There 
were  some  soldiers,  but  most  of  the  refugees  were  old  men  and 
women  and  children.  Many  died  coming  from  Constantinople 
Fortunately  the  American  Red  Cross  was  near,  and  it  is  Bafe 
to  say  that  but  for  the  American  Navy  and  the  American  Red 
Cross,  there  would  have  been  thousands  of  deaths  from  typhus 
alone  and  that  disease  would  have  spread  all  over  the  Balkans 
and  Central  Europe. 

In  November,  1918,  Assistant  Secretary  Franklin  I).  Ra 
velt  went  to  Europe  to  expedite  settlements  with  Allied  govern- 
ments and  speed  up  the  return  of  American  ships  and  men. 
During  the  war  we  had  agreements  with  them  not  reduced  to 
writing,  and  these  called  for  adjustment.  Mr.  Roosevelt  was 
accompanied  by  Assistant  Attorney  General  Thomas  J.  Spellacy 
and  Commander  J.  M.  Hancock,  of  the  Supply  Corps.  All  nego- 
tiations were  satisfactorily  completed,  demobilization  hastened, 
and  excess  material  sold  or  salvaged.  The  most  important  of 
these  transactions  was  perfecting  the  sale  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment of  the  high  power  radio  station  built  in  France  by  our 
Navy  and  named  for  Lafayette. 

In  October,  1918,  Admiral  Benson,  making  his  second  official 
visit  to  Europe  during  the  war,  sailed  for  France  to  attend 
sessions  of  the  Allied  Naval  Conference  and  to  take  part  in  the 
arrangements  leading  up  to  the  armistice  and  the  fixing  of  naval 
terms  in  that  instrument.  He  remained  until  the  following  sum 
mer  as  the  naval  adviser  to  the  American  Peace  Mission.  With 
a  competent  staff,  he  was  enabled  to  give  information  and  ad- 
vice to  the  President  and  the  Peace  Mission.  Upon  his  arrival, 
Benson  took  his  place  as  the  American  naval  representative  on 
the  Allied  Naval  Council.  Admiral  Sims,  who  had  served  on 
the  Council  in  the  absence  of  Benson,  having  completed  his 
duties  at  London,  returned  to  the  United  States  in  the  spring  of 
1919.  He  was  succeeded  by  Rear  Admiral  Harry  S.  Knapp,  who 
was  later  promoted  to  Vice  Admiral.  Upon  his  retirement,  Ad 
miral  H.  McL.  P.  Huse  succeeded  to  the  assignment,  and  in  1920 


374  OUR  NAVY  AT  WAR 

Vice  Admiral  Niblack  became  the  commander  of  American 
forces  in  European  waters. 

In  Paris  in  1919  I  held  informal  conferences  with  Admirals 
Benson,  Knapp,  Niblack,  Griffin,  Taylor,  Earle  and  Long,  and 
with  representatives  of  Allied  nations  touching  problems  affect- 
ing the  future  naval  programs  of  the  nations.  At  that  time  the 
world  believed  that  with  the  adoption  of  the  peace  treaty,  naval 
and  military  policies  would  be  radically  changed.  It  was  con- 
fidently expected  that  the  countries  would  unite  to  reduce  the 
burdens  of  armament  which  the  war  had  shown  menaced  world 
peace. 

Admiral  A.  S.  Halstead,  who  had  succeeded  Admiral  Wilson 
at  Brest,  supervised  the  naval  duty  of  returning  the  soldiers, 
continuing  on  duty  until  embarkation  had  been  completed.  Other 
officers  in  all  parts  of  Europe  remained  in  connection  with  the 
shipping  and  the  other  tasks  which  the  Navy  was  called  upon 
to  perform. 

The  last  gigantic  task  had  to  do  with  the  greatest  American 
contribution  to  the  war — the  sweeping  up  of  the  mines  planted 
in  the  North  Sea  as  the  effective  barrier  against  the  egress  of 
submarines.  This  was  a  hazardous  undertaking,  involving  the 
loss  of  men  and  ships,  but  fewer  lives  were  lost  than  any  had 
dared  to  hope.  By  November,  1919,  the  89  ships  assigned  to 
that  drab  and  dangerous  duty,  with  their  officers  and  men,  were 
in  home  waters. 

Thus  the  task  of  the  Navy  in  the  World  War  came  to  an  end. 
The  officers  and  men  serving  overseas  had  forged  friendships 
with  their  comrades  of  the  mist  which  will  always  gladden  their 
lives.  As  they  raised  the ' '  homeward  bound ' '  pennant,  they  were 
cheered  by  the  consciousness  of  a  great  task  well  ended  and  by 
the  thanks  of  grateful  peoples  for  all  they  had  done. 

Coming  in  sight  of  the  Statue  of  Liberty,  its  steady  rays 
lighting  their  course,  they  found  awaiting  them  the  welcome 
reserved  only  for  those  who  love  liberty  more  than  life. 


